Our work aimed to study the relationships between different dimensions of school climate, moral disengagement, empathy, and bullying behaviors (perpetration and victimization). The study sample consisted of 629 students (304 boys and 325 girls) aged 12–14 years (M= 12.55,SD= 0.67). Results showed how different dimensions of school climate predicted moral disengagement, empathy, and victimization, and these, in turn, predicted bullying perpetration. The results show the need to generate favorable educational environments to reduce the levels of moral disengagement and victimization and (...) to increase empathy in students as a strategy to prevent negative consequences related to bullying. (shrink)

Interest in ethical aspects associated to product acquisition and consumption is a growing trend among consumers. In this context, the concept of “product with ethical attributes” has arisen to refer to products with explicit social and environmental characteristics. However, one of the factors that most hinders the purchasing of these products is certainly price. Given the difficulty of reducing price, the question that arises is the extent to which other product attributes can attenuate the negative impact of price on perceived (...) value. We assume that the special benefits associated to this type of products are, at a different level, attenuators of the relationship between price and perceived value. Focusing on Fair Trade organic coffee, hypotheses are tested regarding survey data from 407 customers. They were interviewed in an actual purchasing scenario. The models are tested using conventional Structural Equation Models and the Latent Moderated Structural Equation method. The results obtained shed some light on a highly generalised belief that the marketing of these products can only be improved by reducing their price. However, although a price reduction could be desirable, albeit complicated in this product category, its effects could be reduced by acting on other variables such as the ethical aspects, quality and healthiness of this product category. (shrink)

Physical education is often selected for applying multilingual initiatives through the use of the content and language integrated learning (CLIL) approach. However, it is still unclear whether the introduction of such approach might entail losing Physical Education’s essence and distorting its basic purposes. The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of CLIL on the Physical Education lessons. Given the purpose of this study, a mixed methodological approach based on a sequential exploratory design divided in two different phases (...) is used. We begin with an initial qualitative data collection (phase I) consisting in the analysis of interviews with 12 participants (8 teachers and 4 students). Based on its analysis, two foci are identified: social relationships and physical activity. Then, informed by the results obtained, a quantitative approach is used (phase II), differentiating these two sets of data to deepen on them. On one part, a sociometric questionnaire was applied to analyse the social relationships among CLIL students. On the other part, a quasi-experimental design (n = 49) was implemented using accelerometry to measure the MVPA of the PE sessions. Regarding physical activity, the results show that levels of MVPA are higher in the experimental group (CLIL) than in the control group showing light to the divergent viewpoints of interviewees. However, focusing on social relationships, the sociometric questionnaire results show that there were no statistical significative changes, although some signs of a slight effect on students’ relationships arise depending on their gender. Therefore, more research would be necessary to deepen on how CLIL affects in this regard. (shrink)

Jose Marti contributed greatly to Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain with words as well as revolutionary action. Although he died before the formation of an independent republic, he has since been hailed as a heroic martyr inspiring Cuban republican traditions.

La Colección de Tapices de la Corona de España puede considerarse una de las mayores del mundo, gracias al patrocinio de los Monarcas que enriquecieron el patrimonio de la Corona con sucesivas adquisiciones y a la custodia ejercida por el Real Oficio de la Tapicería. Medidas excepcionales que permitieron la pervivencia de una colección tan rica en calidad y en cantidad, paradigma de las colecciones europeas, fueron las disposiciones testamentarias de los Monarcas de la Casa de Austria cuya progresiva evolución, (...) desde Carlos V a Carlos II, vinculó las tapicerías al servicio de los príncipes herederos y las imprimió un carácter de bien afecto representativo de la autoridad de la Corona. (shrink)

This paper presents the design, simulation, and experimental verification of the fractional-order multiscroll Lü chaotic system. We base them on op-amp-based approximations of fractional-order integrators and saturated series of nonlinear functions. The integrators are first-order active realizations tuned to reduce the inaccuracy of the frequency response. By an exponential curve fitting, we got a convenient design equation for realizing fractional-order integrators of orders from 0.1 to 0.95. The results include simulations in SPICE of the mathematical description and the electronic implementation (...) and experimental measurements that confirm them. Monte Carlo and sensitivity tests revealed a robust realization. Contrary to its passive counterparts, the suggested realizations significantly reduce design and implementation efforts by favoring resistors and capacitors with commercial values and reducing hardware requirements. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses as a way to identify the structure of experiences, thoughts and their relations. To reach this purpose I draw some lessons from the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the structure of experience, from Cussins’s conception of mediational contents, and from Evans’s account of singular senses. I notice firstly that McDowell’s answer to Dreyfus consists in developing a practical and demonstrative notion of the (...) products of our conceptual capacities. A conception that entails that human experience is not entirely characterised in terms of an abstract specification of truth-conditions. McDowell and Cussins endorse Evans’s conception of singular senses. A specification that takes into account the dynamic and situated abilities involved in making reference. Whereas the first argues in favour of a conceptual conception of experience, the second one argues in favour of a nonconceptual conception. I introduce the notions of mediational fields and dynamic situated senses to argue that both converge in conceiving the contents of experience as mediational and not reducible to an abstract specification of truth-conditions. My proposal is to define a bidimensional space orthogonal to the conceptual/ nonconceptual, experience/thought, know-how/know-that dichotomies. Cognitive contents are ways to disclose the world both as mediational fields and as referential structures. The degree in which those elements are presented determine different varieties of cognition. I use the previous notions to develop the sketch of an account of singular, objective and contextual ways of cognition, and to argue that it is better to begin an enquiry about cognition with notions that do not presuppose a distinction between practical and intellectual capacities. (shrink)

Thought and Social Engagement in the Mexican-American Philosophy of John H. Haddox : A Collection of Critical Appreciations.

Reseña del libro: Cortés, F.. Del arte de la paz: reflexiones filosóficas sobre justicia transicional. Siglo del Hombre.

Discusses the nature of choice in terms of discovering God's will, tells how to face the fear of choosing, and looks at the role of compromise.

In 1836, at 19 years of age, Colombian philosopher José Eusebio Caro wrote a sociological and anthropological treatise titled Mecánica social that illustrates in context the reception of French philosophy in 19th-century Colombian philosophical thought. The purpose of this paper is to present critically Caro’s theory of the will and to bring to light the philosophical sources from which he draw, especially physiology and its role as theoretical basis for both ideology and a new “scientific” anthropology that could, in turn, (...) provide support for a science of morals and legislation, a major goal of French radical liberal thought. (shrink)

Many writers interested in Kelsen's concept of validity state that it is primarily related to such issues as the identity of a legal system, the membership of particular norms in a legal system, its internal consistency, and so on. The result is that for many, Kelsen's concept of validity bears no affinity to the idea of validity prevailing in traditional legal philosophy. This chapter argues that this reading of Kelsen's concept of validity is mistaken. Proponents of this reading have been (...) led to disregard important aspects of Kelsen's theory, formulating unwarranted and tortuous interpretations of it in order to show how it deals with issues that are erroneously supposed to be primarily connected to its concept of validity. It is shown that Kelsen's theory, like traditional philosophical accounts of law, equates the validity of law with its binding force and its existence, and that it conceives of the ascription of validity as a normative judgement. (shrink)

La economía ortodoxa oculta la cualidad esencial del dinero en tanto institución social de orden intelectual. En su lugar, lo presenta como una mercancía con el fin de ajustar de este modo su teoría del dinero al contexto teórico general del mercado como una esfera independiente del campo social que se autorregula virtuosamente por sí mismo, de manera natural, sin ninguna intervención externa. Sostengo que este sesgo naturalista tiene, no obstante, unos fundamentos que van más allá de una mera posición (...) teórica dentro de los debates de la ciencia económica. Su trasfondo último está implícito en la propia ontología moderna de raíces nominalistas y calvinistas, que subyace al pensamiento liberal, y que juzga que las pretensiones de la razón humana acerca de un conocimiento cualitativo —fundado pues en la potencia noética de la imaginación— sobre el bien del hombre y la sociedad son intrínsecamente ilegítimas. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es analizar las variedades de Capitalismo que emergieron en Latinoamérica y la Europa Central del Este desde 1980 como ejemplos de transferencia institucional. En el artículo considero la posibilidad de que el capitalismo, al igual que la democracia, es un complejo paquete institucional antes que una institución elemental. Algunos de sus componentes viajan más rápido que otros a través de formas híbridas, constituyendo, por tanto, nuevas perspectivas con potencial suficiente para ser institucionalizadas.

Over the last decade, attention has crawled from out of the shadows into the philosophical limelight with several important books and widely read articles. Carolyn Dicey Jennings has been a key player in the attention revolution, actively publishing in the area and promoting awareness. This book was much anticipated by insiders and does not disappoint. It is in no way redundant with respect to other recent monographs, covering both a different range of material and developing novel positions throughout. The book (...) might have been called The Attending Self, since Jennings defines attention as mental prioritization controlled by the self. This invocation of the self is among her central innovations, and may prove to be the main source of controversy. I will highlight points of contention here, but want to emphasize at the outset that the book is essential reading for anyone interested in attention. Jennings also contributes to a range of other debates, which will help a broader audience appreciate the importance this topic.After a brief introduction, Jennings provides “a philosophical landscape” of attention (chap. 2), tracing the concept through history. This is an invaluable achievement that will be welcomed by both newcomers and veterans. Jennings exhibits enormous breadth, covering areas that contemporary philosophers of mind tend to neglect: medieval philosophy, Buddhist thought, and phenomenology, to name a few. We also get perspectives on attention from core figures in the Western canon, such as Descartes, Locke, and Kant, as well as thinkers who gave the topic a more political inflection: Mary Wollstonecraft and W. E. B. DuBois. Jennings surveys contemporary literature as well, locating recent work in these older lineages. Some authors get more treatment later in the book (e.g., William James and Wayne Wu). Overall, Jennings provides the best overview of this history I have seen. She proves that attention is not a new topic, but one with deep roots and one that can inform current debates; Jennings draws on these roots throughout. I would love to see a companion piece surveying scientific theories, including “gain control” and “biased competition,” which get little airtime in the book. Some recent philosophical theories are under-explored as well, including Chris Mole’s concept of cognitive unison (Jennings discusses other aspects of his view), Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian’s exploration of attention’s diversity (we get a touch of this), and my own proposal that attention is a gateway to working memory (not mentioned here). That said, no extant survey is more complete.Chapter 3 begins with the empirical claim that attention is regulated by slow brainwaves, and then takes up two issues. The first is mental causation. Endorsing moderate emergentism, Jennings argues that slow brain waves are causally efficacious even though they are not reducible to lower-level processes. (The metaphysics and neuroscience are presented accessibly, aided by three appendixes.) Second, Jennings argues that these slow brain waves indicate that attention is controlled by the self. As someone who was never moved by the mental causation problem—I don’t think overdetermination threatens efficacy—I would have welcomed more development of this second issue. For one thing, in linking attention to subjective control, Jennings eschews the idea that there can be purely “bottom-up” attention driven by stimulus features alone. This goes against the orthodoxy in attention science, and makes it hard for her to accommodate phenomena such as “pop-out,” or the commonsense idea that attention can be “captured” by a sudden flash or loud sound. For another thing, I wanted to hear more on why Jennings relates slow brain waves to the self. Does this include the slow waves that occur during deep sleep? Is there even such a thing as the self? Is there one self or many? How do slow brain waves reflect our interests, projects, values, self-conceptions, autobiographical narratives, or social identities? Does the social self invoked by Wollstonecraft and DuBois gain a foothold here? The whole chapter campaigns against metaphysical reductionism, but arrives at a perspective on the self that will strike some readers as highly reductive.In the fourth chapter, Jennings sheds further light on her conjecture that attention involves the self by advancing the thesis that attention endows sensory information with meaning. On the face of it, this may sound implausible. Object recognition, reading, and many other meaning-involving processes can take place outside of attention and outside of consciousness. But Jennings has a richer notion of “meaning” in mind. She develops the idea of “subject unity,” which is imposition of structure on perception that reflects the interests of the perceiving subject. This, she claims, is what brings perception into the space of reasons. Along the way, she has interesting observations about binding, feature integration, and demonstrative reference. The material is highly original, and Jennings’s postulation of interest-based perceptual organization is compelling. At the same time, one might wonder whether interests are really relegated to the ambit of attentional control. Consider the cocktail party effect, wherein one’s own name captures attention. This implies a preattentive filter that reflects our interests. Emotionally charged words, facial expressions, and dangerous objects also work this way, and social biases can operate preattentively as well. If these reflect our interests, then meaning may arise outside attention.Jennings’s fifth chapter explores the relationship between attention and consciousness. Some authors have argued that attention is necessary and sufficient for consciousness. Jennings focuses primarily on the necessity claim. She does not systematically review the empirical literature here, but she addresses some of the key findings, and effectively rebuts studies that allege to find consciousness outside attention. She does not rest her case there, however. Instead, she identifies a new class of examples that purport to establish the possibility of consciousness without attention. Her central example she calls “conscious entrainment,” which is what we experience when engaged in habitual or skilled activities. Other possible examples touched on in the chapter include hypervigilance in individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), passive movie watching, dreaming, and “attentional neglect.” These states all involve intense focus, Jennings admits, but not attention. To some readers this may sound contradictory. Isn’t focus a kind of attention? Don’t these states of absorption involve stimulus selection and enhancement of relevant features, suppression of distractors, and other hallmarks of attention? Jennings says none of this is tantamount to attention. Recall that she thinks attention is controlled by the self. In these cases, we are invited to imagine that the self takes a passive role: control is either ceded to the world (movie watching) or to previously mastered routines (skills and habits). Thus, Jennings’s claim that there is no attention in these cases hangs on her contentious thesis that attention requires a controlling self. One might also push back by arguing that, in some of Jennings’s allegedly selfless examples, the self remains involved. Skilled activities and hypervigilance, for example, can reflect personal interests.Skills and hypervigilance get more airtime in chapter 6. There, Jennings turns to questions of responsibility—a neglected topic in attention research. The chapter begins with a manslaughter trial in which the teenage plaintiff was given a light sentence because the judge evidently believed that the teen’s ADHD compromised his ability to control his actions. The example may be a bit triggering for people who have a personal relationship with this diagnosis, but, putting that aside, Jennings uses it to introduce the important concept of attention-based control. With reduced control, Jennings argues, comes reduced responsibility. I am inclined to see ADHD as involving dysregulation of attention (difficulty disengaging and dividing attention, for example) rather than diminished attention, but that can still be characterized as an issue with control of attention; therefore ADHD still illustrates Jennings’s point that there is a link between responsibility and control of attention. This, it turns out, is only half of her story. Having argued for this link, one might expect Jennings to follow Wayne Wu, who contends that attention is necessary for action, and hence for responsibility. She does not. Instead, she says argues that responsibility can also arise in cases of “strategic automaticity.” This brings us back to skills. When skills are deployed, action is governed by learned pairings between stimuli and responses. The choice to exercise a skill requires attention, so attention is needed for being a responsible agent, but once a skill kicks in, attention is no longer required, and one can be held responsible for actions performed skillfully—thus attention is not required for responsibility tout court. Jennings addresses an opposing view (defended by Wu, Ellen Fridland, and Barbara Montero), according to which skills involve “automatic attention” rather than no attention. Jennings worries that this move will collapse the distinction between attention and other kinds of selection and filtering that occur throughout the nervous system, including the retina. She says that the attentional interpretation of skilled action is at odds with the lack of top-down reweighing of sensory inputs, regulated by lateral frontal cortex. These objections to automatic attention warrant response. My own view is that attention involves broadcasting to working memory, so retinal filtering is ruled out. Jennings’s insistence on top-down reweighing will not move those who believe attention can be purely bottom-up. For all that, I side with Jennings in wanting to allow for responsibility without attentional control. I think we can be responsible for implicit biases, for example. I also think attentional control is insufficient for responsibility, as when we act under duress.Jennings offers fresh perspective on the nature of attention, and its role in meaningful perception, consciousness, action, and responsibility. Each chapter can be read separately, but they hang together well, and each reflects her thesis that attention is essentially linked to the self. Though I am skeptical of that strong claim, we would do well to follow Jennings in regarding attention as interest-laden interface between mind and world. I look forward to a sequel in which attention is related to richer conceptions of identity, and where the political consequences of this link are actively explored. Meanwhile, one can hardly fault Jennings for covering too little. She tackles a remarkable range of topics, from metaphysics to ethics. Her arguments throughout demand response, repay careful study, and propel the field forward. (shrink)