An account is offered of Dooyeweerd’s non-reductionist ontology. It also includes the role of religious belief in theory making, although it omits his case for why such a role is unavoidable. The ontology is a theory of the nature of (created) reality which presupposes and is regulated by belief in the God of Judeo-Christian theism. Because it takes everything in creation to be directly dependent on God, it offers an account of the natures of both natural things and artifacts which (...) avoids regarding anything in the cosmos as what all else in the cosmos depends on. (shrink)

The recent development of RNA replicating protocells and capsules that enclose complex biosynthetic cascade reactions are encouraging signs that we are gradually getting better at mastering the complexity of biological systems. The road to truly cellular compartments is still very long, but concrete progress is being made. Compartmentalization is a crucial natural methodology to enable control over biological processes occurring within the living cell. In fact, compartmentalization has been considered by some theories to be instrumental in the creation of life. (...) With the advancement of chemical biology, artificial compartments that can mimic the cell as a whole, or that can be regarded as cell organelles, have recently received much attention. The membrane between the inner and outer environment of the compartment has to meet specific requirements, such as semi‐permeability, to allow communication and molecular transport over the border. The membrane can either be built from natural constituents or from synthetic polymers, introducing robustness to the capsule. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Down the Medical Rabbit HoleAnonymous ThreeEditors’ Note: This woman’s child was treated for an astrocytoma at 8–years–old. The surgery included tumor resection and placement of a ventricular peritoneal shunt, which manages the flow, drainage and pressure of cerebral spinal fluid (CSF ) throughout the brain and spinal column.Am I aliveWhat’s this pain I feelAching insideMaking me kneelDown to the groundSubmissiveLike I’ve been sentTo Hell–AnonymousI am making a time capsule (...) of words. If I don’t write these words now, how will I remember? It is for her. She will need these words to know who she is.They took her at the lowest point, when she was barfing and admitting she needed to be in the emergency room (ER). And they stripped her of the ability to use her words to defend herself.“There’s really no reason for you to be here. The x–ray of your shunt tubing looks fine. The CT of your head looks fine. You should think about going home.” I start to speak, but she is speaking so I wait to hear what she will say.“I was worried since my side hurts so bad that maybe it was my appendix and I didn’t want it to burst and then have the infection go up my shunt, I know someone that that happened to, and then my head was exploding and I threw–up.”“That’s when we have to come in to the ER “ I say. “We’ve done this before. We wait until the last possible moment before coming. You’ve seen us here for almost 12 hours now, but we waited more than 24 hours before coming and she was just like this the whole time.”“One of the only things we can see that might be wrong is that we think she might be constipated.”“I try to stay on top of it, ”My 20-year-old says. “I’ve been taking more pain killers lately because my head is always killing me and I push myself to make it to class. But I take stuff to make it easier for me so I don’t get constipated. Last Wednesday during class my head was exploding and I had to vomit. I don’t think my shunt is broken. But...”I interrupt, which is my job, because they are not hearing her, still she gives me hated looks, “She spends two days in bed laying basically flat so she can spend one day or even a few hours vertical the next day. This has been progressing for a while. Last May she had surgery for a CSF leak in her spine. But the headaches are different this time.”“We really think you should consider going home, the tests we’ve done look good.”This is the part that always happens, the part where I say you go into the twilight zone or down Alice’s rabbit hole. In May I had to demand that she have the right to sit up, pain free in the hospital for two hours before leaving. And that is how they admitted her, Mother wants her to sit upright.Here we are again 15 days before Christmas back in the ER—they, meaning the white coats, disbelieving us.She broke then, like a piece of a falling statue, an arm or a leg or part of a shoulder busting off. “I can’t go on like this, my head is exploding and I push myself so hard just to walk across campus [End Page 18] and when I’m sitting in class I know I shouldn’t be there, it’s just so hard. I had a surgery in April last year to replace my shunt and I never really bounced back, and then they found the cyst in my back and the leak and after that surgery I just couldn’t get any energy and my head still hurt.”They don’t know that she never tells anyone any of this.“I know you don’t see anything on her scans,” I say. They always look fine... (shrink)

Mary Midgley's Science and Poetry tackles so many topics of importance that one wants it to be very good. Yet Midgley, a moral philosopher, makes one idea the measure of all things, so that the book is just good enough. Her topic is not really “science and poetry” but the failure of neurobiological reductionism to understand the human mind. That poets understand the mind better than scientists is the subtext of this collection of essays, but the poetic theories Midgley quotes (...) are too general to make much headway against science's prejudices about the arts' naive handling of the serious matters of consciousness, the operation of the brain, and connections between mind and body. Midgley needs to dig deeper into poetry and to provide better analyses of works like Wordsworth's “Tintern Abbey” and Shelley's A Defence of Poetry. She also needs to update her poetic references to include contemporaries such as A. R. Ammons, Patti Ann Rodgers, and Alison Deming, who make the science‐based topics that preoccupy Midgley the overt focus of their work. The valuable first section of the book presents capsule histories of science and its march toward dualism, from the Greeks to the Enlightenment, interspersed with poets' contrary views. Midgley succinctly traces the evolution of the theories of the mind/body split that such a campaign produced. She drops the “science and poetry” focus in the second section for her major concern—showing that contemporary scientists themselves, in pursuing scientific understanding, employ choice, intention, and cognition, the very factors denied by strict scientific materialist explanations of how the mind works. This is the neatest feature of the book—its witty turning of scientific discourse about the purely mechanistic operations of the mind back on the scientists themselves, who violate their own theories in stating them. Her favorite scientists to tweak in this way are the sociobiologist E. O. Wilson and the geneticist Richard Dawkins. When she needs to, Midgley lets a philosopher of language like John Searle handle others, such as Daniel Dennett and his claim that cultural ideas are simply genetically produced “memes.” Midgley's summary, however, does not do justice to the complexity of the debate about the nature of language as a window to the operation of the mind. Midgley's strength is in testing fundamental theoretical assumptions by applying common‐sense reasoning to them. For example, Descartes's mind/body dualism fails on the face of it because he uses socially constructed language, a product of mind, as he asserts the complete independence and autonomy of individual minds. Midgley's deft use of simple but revealing thought‐problems also helps make her case, and she is particularly good at alerting us to ordinary words that need clarification, such as “cause.” She's like a poet when she sensitizes us to the power of simple words in shaping scientific discourse. In the miscellaneous last section of the book Midgley provides examples of the contemporary dangers of the reductivist way of thinking, but the first two parts could have used livelier, more pointed dramatizations of the consequences of splitting the world into subjects and objects. Universal human rights and the right of all creatures to live in cooperation are what Midgley believes science ultimately sacrifices in its vision of competitive, reductive materialism. Scientists and social scientists such as Freud and Marx who use that “vision” have led us down disastrous paths. That science should learn to see the world as a cooperating, interacting, and living whole is her wish—and the subject of many of her other books. Science and Poetry would be more effective if condensed into a single, focused essay that concentrated on convincing Midgley's presumed audience—scientists who may have found themselves at the dead end of materialism as their own disciplines discover their limits and branch out into territory more familiar to poets. The book should interest students of literature who want an introduction to the many topics it treats, but they will find little to convince them that poets do indeed have important ideas about the human mind. (shrink)

Miroir, miroir de mes désirsAu seuil de la réversibilité, la libido ardente des imagesEn parcourant les perspectives de Lacan, Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze, je me propose de montrer comment l’image – une image dont le rôle, depuis Platon, a été réduit par la métaphysique occidentale à celui de simple copie – rend possible une pensée nouvelle non dualiste, une pensée ouverte par le désir, c’est-à-dire par ce qui dépasse tout dualisme simpliste et qui trouve dans l’image sa voie privilégiée.L’image du miroir (...) – considérée par le platonisme comme le simulacre par excellence, comme l’emblème de la copie déformante et trompeuse d’un modèle originaire harmonieux – donne à voir bien plus qu’elle ne nous montre : comme Lacan le remarquait dans son célèbre essai de 1949, devant le miroir, nous nous découvrons, comme les enfants, sujets du monde, mais aussi, inévitablement, sujets au monde. Le «je» – dont nous sommes in-formés par l’image du miroir – s’abîme, par cette même image, dans les l’inquiétante étrangété de l’autre, et par suite dans les gorges insondables de son désir. Si l’image du miroir nous permet d’embrasser la totalité de notre corps et d’apprécier en un regard notre statut de sujet, ce regard nous est toutefois restitué – aveugle et insistant – sous la forme d’un objet partiel qui nous interpelle comme sujets désubjectivés, comme sujets castrés, ou encore comme simples « taches » dans lapeinture du monde. L’image fixée par l’enfant dans le miroir fonde, paradoxalement, l’idée traditionnelle du sujet comme pôle dynamique de la relation je-monde. Comme le remarque Slavoj Žižek, en commentant Lacan, la capacité dynamique du sujet se fonde en somme sur une fixation excessive de l’image du sujet lui-même, fixation qui trouve son origine absente dans le regard entendu comme objet a, c’est-à-dire comme point aveugle de la conscience, lieu d’acquisition et de perte qui, par la castration du sujet, ouvre la plaie libidineuse et pulsionnelle de l’inconscient et renverse par là le désir de l’homme en désir de l’autre, comme le rappelle une célèbre formule de Lacan.Longtemps considérées comme porteuses d’illusions, comme l’illusion en tant que telle, les images nous montrent en fait la vérité de cette illusion : le monde est déformation et réversibilité, et nous-mêmes, prétendus sujets faisant face à son tableau inerte, n’en sommes que des taches. Au cours des mêmes années durant lesquelles Lacan élabore une théorie du regard, Merleau-Ponty, son interlocuteur direct – qui se réfère lui aussi au comportement de l’enfant devant le miroir – réfléchit sur la question du « en-être », c’est-à-dire de la réversibilité de la chair, ce tissu de différences qui nous constitue – les animaux et les choses – comme autant de plis d’un horizon commun. Pour Merleau-Ponty comme pour Lacan, dans une telle perspective, le sujet ne se défi nit pas positivement, mais comme écart par rapport à lui-même, comme coupure dans la peau de la conscience, comme plaie ouverte sur l’inconscient et sur le désir qui en jaillit abondamment. Ainsi, voir dans le miroir que, comme disait le poète, « je est un autre », implique que l’image soit libérée de son statut dévalorisant de « seconde chose » hérité du platonisme. Cela inaugure, en fait, une pensée sans dualisme. Gilles Deleuze travaillera lui aussi dans ce sens, lorsqu’il théorisera un renversement du platonisme à partir des images, dans son essai de 1966 Renverser le platonisme.Historiquement, le commencement de la philosophie a coïncidé avec la recherche d’une origine, d’une archè. Mais un monde où les relations nées du désir tracent des itinéraires imprévisibles, où le je et l’autre ne se distinguent plus, où sujet et objet ne connaissent plus de frontière, où la copie cesse de présupposer le modèle, un monde ainsi fait, a-t-il encore une origine accessible? Confronté à cette question essentielle, Merleau-Ponty théorisera – une fois encore à partir de la vision –, au lieu d’une origine en soi préétablie, un originaire en perpétuelle explosion. De son côté, Deleuze élaborera quelque chose d’analogue, à partir de la réflexion sur le cinéma qui l’occupera dans les années 1980 : il « encapsulera » les extases temporelles dans une image-miroir, une concrétion cristalline à plusieurs facettes où le monde se différencie sans cesse, dans un éternel retour.Mirror, Mirror of my DesiresOn the Threshold of Reversibility, the libidic Passion of ImagesIn a journey through the perspectives of Lacan, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, I shall show how images – the images that from Plato on have been relegated by Western metaphysics to the role of mere copies – allow us to trace the direction of a new and non-dualistic thought, a direction opened up by desire, that is to say, by something exceeding any simplistic dualism and fi nding precisely in images its privileged channel.The specular image – conceived by Platonism as the simulacrum par excellence, as the emblem of the deforming, deceiving copy of a harmonious preliminarymodel – makes us see more than it actually shows: as Lacan remarked in a renowned essay published in 1949, since childhood, in front of the mirror, we discover ourselves as subjects of the world, but also – and inevitably – as subjected to the world. The ego – of which we are in-formed by the specular image – is turned, through that very image, into the obscure, uncanny chasm of the other, and, consequently, in the unfathomable vortex of the other’s desire. Indeed, if in the mirror we can embrace the whole of our body and catch with a single gaze its status of subject, by the mirror that very gaze is however returned – blind and insistent – as a partial object summoning us as desubjectivized subjects, as castrated subjects, namely, as mere “stains” in the picture of the world. Quite paradoxically, the image fixed by the child in the mirror founds the traditional idea of the subject conceived as the dinamic pole of the relation between the ego and the world. In short, as Slavoj Žižek remarks commenting on Lacan, the dinamic capability of the subject is grounded on an excessive fixation of the image of the subject itself, fixation which finds its absent origin in the gaze meant as object a, namely, meant as that blind point of consciousness, that point of acquisition and loss which, by castrating the subject, opens the acies of the libidically throbbing wound of the unconscious and turns, to borrow a renowed Lacanian expression, man’s desire into the other’s desire.For long considered to herald illusions, images show us the truth of illusion itself: the world is deformation and reversibility and we – presumed subjects in front of its inert picture – are, on the contrary, its “stains.” In the same years in which Lacan was elaborating a theory of gaze, Merleau-Ponty, who was then a direct interlocutor of his, was articulating – by referring, as Lacan did, to the child’s behaviour in front of the mirror – a series of important reflections over the problem of the en-être, that is to say, over the problem of the reversibility of flesh, i. e., that differential fabric constituting us – animals and things – as variegated gatherings of a common horizon. For Merleau-Ponty, as well as for Lacan, according to such a perspective, the subject, far from being defined in a positive way, is defined by a gap in relation with its own self, that is to say, by a cut in the skin of consciousness, by a wound opening to the unconscious and to the desire spurting abundantly from the subconscious.To see in the mirror that, as the poet said, “I am an Other,” is to free images from the status of “second things” with which Platonism had dismissed them; it is, in other words, to inaugurate a non-dualistic thought. For his part, Deleuze will also engage in the same direction by theorizing a reversing of Platonism from the very standpoint of images in his 1966 essay Renverser le platonisme.The beginning of philosophy has historically matched with the search for an origin, namely, an arké. But in a world in which the relations inaugurated by desire trace unpredictable itineraries, in a world in which the ego and the other can no longer be distinguished, in a world in which the subject and the object know no more boundary lines, in a world in which model and copy cease to exist as the presupposition of one another, in such a world, I said, is it still possible to find an origin? By measuring himself with such a crucial question, Merleau-Ponty will theorize – once again from the standpoint of vision – an “originating in perennial explosion” instead of a narrow, pregiven origin. For his part, Deleuze will elaborate something similar in his reflection on cinema, which will keep him busy in the first half of the eighties, by capsulating the temporal dimensions in a mirror-image, i. e., a crystalline concretion in whose facets the world perennially becomes in an eternal differential return. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the (...) very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence. (shrink)

Reductio arguments are notoriously inconclusive, a fact which no doubt contributes to their great fecundity. For once a contradiction has been proved, it is open to interpretation which premise should be given up. Indeed, it is often a matter of great creativity to identify what can be consistently given up. A case in point is a traditional paradox of the infinite provided by Galileo Galilei in his Two New Sciences, which has since come to be known as Galileo’s Paradox. It (...) concerns the set of all numbers, N: since to every number there is a corresponding square, there are as many squares as numbers. But since there are non-squares between the squares, “all numbers, comprising the squares and the non-squares, are greater than the squares alone”, i.e. there must be fewer numbers in the set of all squares S than in N. Thus N is both equal to and greater than S. This is a contradiction, so one of the premises must be given up: the question is, which one? (shrink)

A critical survey of the fundamental philosophical issues in the logic and formal ontology of space, with special emphasis on the interplay between mereology (the theory of parthood relations), topology (broadly understood as a theory of qualitative spatial relations such as continuity and contiguity), and the theory of spatial location proper.

It is common in contemporary metaphysics to distinguish two levels of ontology: the ontology of ordinary objects and the ontology of fundamental reality. This papers argues that natural language reflects not only the ontology of ordinary objects, but also a language-driven ontology, which is involved in the mass-count distinction and part-structure-sensitive semantic selection, as well as perhaps the light ontology of pleonastic entities. The paper recasts my older theory of situated part structures without situations, making use of a primitive notion (...) of unity. (shrink)

In 1969, Kisho Kurokawa stated that the ‘capsule is cyborg architecture’. The capsule is the ultimate form of the prefabricated building. As such it has emancipated itself from the land to become the immediate extension of the moving self, similar to cars or the Japanese kago. In Japanese Metabolism, an architecture movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the capsule is a small, repeatable building unit rooted in historical elements, such as the teahouse. The capsule is also a tool – a (...) machine for living – that is modular and part of a system offering simplicity and complexity. The capsule signifies individuality within a diverse society, including standardization, functionality, technology and smallness in scale. This article re-examines the potential of the capsule in contemporary bioarchitecture, in living systems and in evolving environments. Through Philip Galanter’s theory of ‘complexism’, the article connects the capsule to modular(ity), embodiment, protective vulnerability, voyeurism, unpredictability, complexity, immateriality and ephemerality. I propose that the capsule instantiates a cyborg bioarchitecture. (shrink)

ONE KIND OF PHILOSOPHICAL PUZZLEMENT arises when we have an apparent conflict of intuitions. If we are philosophers, we then try to show that the apparent conflict of intuitions is only an apparent conflict and not a real one. If we fail, we may have to say that what we took to be an apparent conflict of intuitions was in fact a conflict of apparent intuitions, and then we must decide which of the conflicting apparent intuitions is only an apparent (...) intuition. But if we succeed, then both of the intuitions will be preserved. Since there was an apparent conflict, we will have to conclude that the formulation of at least one of the intuitions was defective. And though the formulation may be imbedded in our ordinary language, we will have to say that, strictly and philosophically, a different formulation is to be preferred. But to make it clear that we are not rejecting the intuition we are reformulating, we must show systematically how to interpret the ordinary formulation into the philosophical one. The extent to which we can show this will be one mark of our success in dealing with the philosophical puzzle. Another will be the extent to which our proposed solution contributes to the solution of still other philosophical puzzles. (shrink)

Ward examines Scotus's arguments for his distinctive version of hylomorphism, the view that at least some material objects are composites of matter and form. It considers Scotus's reasons for adopting hylomorphism, and his accounts of how matter and form compose a substance, how extended parts, such as the organs of an organism, compose a substance, and how other sorts of things, such as the four chemical elements and all the things in the world, fail to compose a substance. It highlights (...) the extent to which Scotus draws on his metaphysics of essential order to explain why some things can compose substance and why others cannot. Throughout the book, contemporary versions of hylomorphism are discussed in ways that both illumine Scotus's own views and suggest ways to advance contemporary debates. (shrink)

This volume is the first systematic and thorough attempt to investigate the relation and the possible applications of mereology to contemporary science. It gathers contributions from leading scholars in the field and covers a wide range of scientific theories and practices such as physics, mathematics, chemistry, biology, computer science and engineering. Throughout the volume, a variety of foundational issues are investigated both from the formal and the empirical point of view. The first section looks at the topic as it applies (...) to physics. The section addresses questions of persistence and composition within quantum and relativistic physics and concludes by scrutinizing the possibility to capture continuity of motion as described by our best physical theories within gunky space times. The second part tackles mathematics and shows how to provide a foundation for point-free geometry of space switching to fuzzy-logic. The relation between mereological sums and set-theoretic suprema is investigated and issues about different mereological perspectives such as classical and natural Mereology are thoroughly discussed. The third section in the volume looks at natural science. Several questions from biology, medicine and chemistry are investigated. From the perspective of biology, there is an attempt to provide axioms for inferring statements about part hood between two biological entities from statements about their spatial relation. From the perspective of chemistry, it is argued that classical mereological frameworks are not adequate to capture the practices of chemistry in that they consider neither temporal nor modal parameters. The final part introduces computer science and engineering. A new formal mereological framework in which an indeterminate relation of part hood is taken as a primitive notion is constructed and then applied to a wide variety of disciplines from robotics to knowledge engineering. A formal framework for discrete mereotopology and its applications is developed and finally, the importance of mereology for the relatively new science of domain engineering is also discussed. (shrink)

While a surprising number of people, both religious and non-religious, have had deep and significant mystical experiences, scholars have reached little agreement about their cause and character. Many analyze mystical experiences as if they are formed by the same linguistic processes that shape ordinary experiences. This paper shows that this is based on a misunderstanding, for these experiences result from letting go of language. The paper concludes that we need to think about mystical experiences - and what they have to (...) teach about consciousness and reality - in a new light. (shrink)

Though capturing powerful analytical principles, this excellent article misses ways in which psychology and neuroscience bear on reciprocity and decision-making. I suggest more explicit consideration of scale. We may go further beyond gene-culture dualism by articulating how varieties of living systems, while ultimately drawing from both genetic and cultural streams, evolve sufficiently as unitary targets of selection to mediate higher-level complex systems. (Published Online April 27 2007).

I want to consider some features of the position put forward by Julian Barbour in The End of Time that seem to me of particular philosophical interest. At the level of generality at which I'll be concerned with it, the view is relatively easy to describe. It can be arrived at by thinking of time as decomposing in some natural way linearly ordered atomic parts, ‘moments’, and combining an observation about the internal structure of moments with an epistemological doctrine about (...) our access to the past. The epistemological doctrine, which I'll call ‘Presentism’, following Butterfield, is the view that our access to the past is mediated by records, or local representations, of it. The observation is that the state of the world at any moment has the structure of what Barbour calls a ‘time capsule’, which is to say that it constitutes a partial record of its past, it is pregnant with interrelated mutually consistent representations of its own history. (shrink)

The first feature film made about the design and deployment of the atomic bomb, The Beginning or the End (1947), begins with fake newsreel footage depicting the burial in a time capsule of a copy of the film and a projector to show it on. The scene, with its funereal overtones yet grim optimism that, even in the face of catastrophic destruction, the germ of civilization will endure, recalls the ceremonies surrounding the interment of the Westinghouse time capsule at the (...) New York World’s Fair in 1939. Time capsules, this article argues, stand in a complex relation to war and temporality, seeking to at once anticipate and work through the challenge posed to futurity by the threat of global conflict. As a container, the capsule attempts to deliver and control the reception of a legible inventory of the present, yet the principle of selection and the impossibility of predicting how information might be received in the deep future – if it is received at all – threatens this aim. The dilemma faced by time capsule curators is, we argue with reference to William Burroughs’ and Brion Gysin’s so-called cut-up method of writing, one of control. By reading the time capsule through the cut-up, anticipated catastrophe can be seen to be functioning proleptically in the present and already active as a challenge to the capsule as proof against disaster. (shrink)

Kant often compares reason to an organized body, which suggests that reason should be understood as a whole from which all possible uses of the faculties of reason are derived. However, Kant does not elaborate his conception of the whole of reason. Nor does the secondary literature. This paper suggests that the wholeness of reason is the apodictic modality of reason, i.e., the necessary standard that determines what can systematically belong to reason, and thus works as the systematic condition for (...) all possible uses of the faculties of reason. This necessary standard is the discipline of pure reason. Kant compare souvent la raison à un corps organisé, ce qui suggère que la raison devrait être comprise comme un tout à partir duquel dérivent systématiquement toutes les fonctions possibles des facultés de la raison. Ni Kant, ni la littérature secondaire n’élabore cependant sa conception de la raison comme un tout. Autrement dit, ils n’élaborent pas la notion d’unité de la raison. Je soutiens que l’unité de la raison devrait être comprise comme la modalité apodictique de la raison, c’est-à-dire le critère nécessaire qui détermine ce qui peut appartenir systématiquement à la raison. Ce critère nécessaire est la discipline de la raison pure. (shrink)

The centrality of the whole/part relation in mathematics is demonstrated through the presentation and analysis of examples from algebra, geometry, functional analysis,logic, topology and category theory.

In this work, the author formulates a critique of widely accepted mereological assumptions, presents a new conception of wholes as ‘Unities’, and demonstrates the advantages of this new conception in treating a variety of metaphysical puzzles (such as that of Tibbles the cat). More generally he suggests that conceiving wholes as Unities offers us a new way of understanding the world in non-reductive terms.

New technology, industry and commerce have spawned the global interdependency of all people, making us our brothers' keepers by necessity, asserts author Anna Lemkow in this exciting demonstration of the reality of Wholeness as a universal principle. She offers integrative approaches to religion, philosophy, science and world affairs that can help shape a bright future.

Five types of psychic duality are distinguished: bipolarity, bimodality, contrariety, dualism, and the coincidentia op–positorurn. Bipolarity is the basic division of the psyche into egoic and nonegoic (physico–dynamic) poles. Bimodality is the division of egoic functioning into active and receptive modes. Contrariety is the division of the nonegoic sphere into opposing sympathetic and parasympathetic systems. Dualism is the organization imposed upon the bipolar structure by primal repression. And the coincidentia opositorum is the condition of psychic integration that would emerge were (...) dualism to be transcended and the bipolar structure (together with the bimodal and contrarietal structures) unified into a higher whole. (shrink)

Whole Set of Contents of Current Issue (for cross-reference reading and hard-copy preservation of the whole issue).

Given the central place organisms occupy in Kant’s account of living nature, it might seem unlikely that his claims about biological wholes could be relevant to current debates over the problem of biological individuality. These debates acknowledge the multiple realizability of biological individuality in vastly different forms, including parts of organisms and complex groups of organisms at various levels of the biological hierarchy, sparking much controversy in attempts to characterize a biological individual. I argue that, far from being irrelevant (...) to this controversy, Kant’s account provides a key insight for addressing the multiple realizability problem. I show how the reciprocal causality between a self-organizing whole and its parts, which Kant thinks characterizes a natural end, is not limited to organisms but is exhibited by numerous types of beings in living nature. Self-organizing wholes of various kinds, and at various biological levels, may count as biological individuals, depending on the degree to which their functionally integrated parts are represented by reflective judgement as a natural end. (shrink)

For decades, physicians, philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and the public considered brain death a settled issue. However, a series of recent cases in which individuals were declared brain dead yet physiologically maintained for prolonged periods of time has challenged the status quo. This signals a need for deeper reflection and reexamination of the underlying philosophical, scientific, and clinical issues at stake in defining death. In this paper, I consider four levels of philosophical inquiry regarding death: the ontological basis, actual states of (...) affairs, epistemological standards, and clinical criteria for brain death. I outline several candidates for the states of affairs that may constitute death, arguing that we should strive for a single, unified ontological definition of death as a loss of integrated functioning as a unified organism, while acknowledging that two states of affairs may satisfy this concept. I argue that the clinical criteria for determining whole-brain death should be bolstered to meet the epistemic demand of sufficient certainty in defining death by adding indicators of cerebro-somatic dis-integration to the traditional triad of loss of consciousness, loss of brainstem function, and absence of confounding explanations. (shrink)

In his book, The Principles of Mathematics , the young Bertrand Russell abandoned the common-sense notion that the whole must be greater than its part, and argued that wholes and their parts can be similar, e.g. where both are infinite series, the one being a sub-series of the other. He also rejected the popular view that the idea of an infinite number is self-contradictory, and that an infinite set or collection is an impossibility. In this paper, I intend to (...) re-examine Russell's wisdom in doing both these things, and see if it might not have made more sense, and caused his enterprise fewer problems, if he had simply stuck to our commonplace ideas. To this end, I shall also be considering his treatment of certain paradoxes that he claims can only be resolved by the abandonment of the above notions, as well as certain others which his theories appear to have generated. (shrink)

The approach adopted by Early Modern authors to the notions of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ (what is called, in contemporary metaphysics, “mereology”, from the Ancient Greek word μερος: ‘part’) constitutes a central feature of their respective systems. The issue of what constituted a whole became all the more crucial as the new, revolutionary approaches to matter and extension – which mark the unavoidably fuzzy beginning of what we define as “modernity” – demanded a novel (and in some cases, radical) approach to (...) the questions of what constitutes a whole and how parts are arranged and bound together. It is important to mention that diverse attitudes towards mereology characterised Early Modern philosophers orthogonally to their belonging to different camps, such as the traditional categories of ‘Rationalists’ and ‘Empiricists’. Some of these philosophers considered wholes to be ontologically and/or logically prior to their parts (an approach that we may call “organicist” or “holist”, applying an anachronistic but nonetheless appropriate label). Others considered wholes to be derivative, resulting from the union of their parts (an approach that could be named “mereological mechanism”). Therefore, a word about terminology is in order: in what follows, I will apply the label “holist/organicist” to refer to a philosopher who would favour the priority of wholes over parts. Vice versa, I shall label as a “mereological mechanist” any philosopher favouring the priority of parts over the wholes formed by those parts, regardless of such parts being exclusively material, or including spiritual/mental parts as well as material ones. (shrink)

To what extend can genuinely mereological considerations apply to talk of wholes and parts in discussions of the relationship between individual persons and the social groups, etc. to which they belong?

Girls Laughters Solar Eclipse Output Solar Eclipse The programmatic ontology of our contemporary technical-information age is marked by a complicity with algorithmic architectures : new models of information processing evolving with the entropically-hiden complexities and open-ended contingencies of material evolution. Algorithms are abstractly-coordinated entities of “soft thought” sui generis. In fusing generative concreteness with abstract modelling – i. e. matter with information – - Galerie sonore – Nouvel article.

Girls Laughters Solar Eclipse Output Solar Eclipse The programmatic ontology of our contemporary technical-information age is marked by a complicity with algorithmic architectures : new models of information processing evolving with the entropically-hiden complexities and open-ended contingencies of material evolution. Algorithms are abstractly-coordinated entities of “soft thought” sui generis. In fusing generative concreteness with abstract modelling – i. e. matter with information – - Galerie sonore – Nouvel article.

Section 1. Prologue -- section 2. The whole being -- section 3. Engaging with wholeness -- section 4. Wholeness in Kashmiri Shaivism -- section 5. The Buddhist perspective -- section 6. Wholeness in the modern world -- section 7. The workings of wholeness in our world -- section 8. Epilogue.

Wholeness and Holiness guides us through a three-step journey to psychological soundness, spiritual wholeness, and saintly holiness. To attain this goal, a person must work at all three.

This chapter examines five emulation methods, drawing a distinction between structure replication and reconstruction (SR) methods, and reverse brain engineering (RBE) methods. It argues that we need reasons to claim a particular procedure does or does not maintain identity, independently of whether the procedure is destructive or nondestructive. The chapter proposes that whole brain emulation (WBE) research be aimed primarily at cybernetics and possibility of replacing a biological brain in steps that involve very small parts with no psychologically relevant structure. (...) It also argues that methods reliant on structure replication and reconstruction will not preserve personal identity, based on a neo‐Lockean definition of personal identity according to which the self is a relatively autonomous self‐perpetuating substance whose psychological continuity through time is ensured primarily by immanent causation. All SR methods involve too much transeunt causation. (shrink)