Thomas Szasz wrote over thirty books and several hundred articles, replete with mordant criticism of psychiatry. His works made him arguably one of the world's most recognized psychiatrists, albeit one of the most controversial. This book critically examines the legacy of a man who challenged the very concept of mental illness.

A compact edition of Mr. Beck's excellent translation of the second Critique, slightly revised, together with a helpful short introduction and a bibliography.--V. C. C.

An original and independent treatment of epistemology's central question--that concerning the relation between the mind and its objects. The author's answer is that of naive realism: the mind is a spectator of its objects, and the objects themselves are real and independent of it and its activity. The classical objections to such a view are examined forthrightly and yet with care; error, e.g., appears as a function of the unclarity with which some objects are apprehended rather than as evidence that (...) all objects are fictions. Professor Earle is quite willing to spell out the somewhat startling ontological consequences of his view; since whatever is an object of consciousness is real and independent, illusions differ from, say, material objects, not as non-being differs from being, but as one kind of being differs from another. The result is a contribution to metaphysics as well as to epistemology, and its conclusions in both areas are fresh and important. Part of Chapter I first appeared in this Review, VIII, 211-24.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Hanson has set forth in a fascinating way the story of the discovery of the positron. He takes up in some detail the question concerning the symmetry of explaining and predicting, argues that certain features of microphysical theory cannot be accommodated to mechanical-type models, and defends his interpretation of the "Copenhagen" view of quantum theory. He shows how an adequate understanding of these matters makes possible a grasp of the significance of the concept of the positron, and in so doing, (...) illustrates the complex relationships in which physical theory stands to observation and experiment. Consequently, Hanson's book is another of the recent works in which an author refuses to construe the scientific enterprise as a sophisticated search for facts, where so-called theoretical entities serve as mere devices to make calculation easier. The book includes four appendices of a rather technical nature and 41 pages of notes on the text.--C. V. (shrink)

A reprint, intended for student use. Despite the repudiation by some of the contributors of their articles after editing, the work as a whole has some value, and some of the pieces are distinguished.--V. C. C.

The thesis of this brief but suggestive essay in interpretation is that Kant's critical works express a unified "Weltanschauung" whose determining principles are ethical rather than epistemological. The argument is subtle and complex, and is supported by references more to the spirit than to the letter of the Kantian writings; its consequent difficulty, however, is more than outweighed by its breadth and illuminatory power. In his concern with the relations between morals and religion for Kant, and in his emphasis upon (...) the voluntaristic and subjective element in the Critical philosophy, Kroner draws a Kant who often looks like Kierkegaard. The result is challenging and, if nothing else, provides a useful contrast to the predominant "piecemeal" interpretations of the epistemologically oriented Marburg school.--V. C. C. (shrink)

Unlike many books of its kind, this collection of essays is more than a mere aggregate of papers loosely ordered around a set of common themes. In fact, for a work sensitive to the values inherent in the analytical tradition, it is surprisingly systematic, and strikes a happy balance between the products of the system-builders and the deliverances of those who are content to give us merely isolated insights. It embodies a sound knowledge of the history of philosophy, a sensitivity (...) to the contributions of the British philosophers since Bradley, and a desire to take science seriously without succumbing to the reductionism which so often characterized the contributions of the positivists. Throughout the papers the influence of Carnap, Kant and Wittgenstein is especially evident; and perhaps most characteristic are the repeated attempts to tread carefully, with their help, the sometimes narrow lines dividing realist and phenomenalist, realist and idealist, and realist and nominalist. Sellars is at pains to incorporate in his system the partial truths which always characterize conflicting philosophical alternatives. This book is well worth careful, critical study by philosophers of all persuasions.--C. V. (shrink)

Jowett's Protagoras has been revised extensively for this new edition, and helpful section titles have been provided. The editor's fifty-page introduction could stand alone; it is a solid and scholarly examination, with footnotes, cross-references, and logical analyses, of the great Socrates-Protagoras quarrel.--V. C. C.

The only English translation of the whole of the Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, in an attractive paperbound reprint. Sibree's translation, needs revision, as does the German text on which it is based, but this is a useful edition nevertheless, and it is better to have it than none at all. Friedrich's brief new introduction is a model.--V. C. C.

An account, systematically presented, of Plato's views on the subjects covered in the author's earlier books-ethics, aesthetics and philosophy of education--with only passing mention of Platonic logic, epistemology and metaphysics. The Platonic views are set against the views of Plato's Greek predecessors, and a final chapter discusses "Plato and Modern Philosophy." Mr. Lodge writes engagingly, but somewhat informally too; his book is intended more as an essay in appreciation than as a work of philosophical interpretation.--V. C. C.

A collection of six essays, including three previously unpublished papers entitled, "Methods of Philosophy," "The Nature of Value," and "The Metaphysical Concept of Space." The target in each case is the whole of technical philosophy; the thesis to be defended is the claim that its separate divisions represent no more than "linguistically contrived intellectual illusions." Along the way, it is argued that the traditional retreat from speculative metaphysics to philosophical analysis is to no avail, for it is claimed that since (...) all philosophy is of a piece, all its parts and methods stand or fall together. We are offered, therefore, the following dual thesis which is both surprising and unique: Philosophy is an ordered whole in structure and method, but the products of philosophical reflection embody nothing more than snares, delusions, and unproductive disputation.—C. V. (shrink)