In 1950, Quine inaugurated a strange new way of talking about philosophy. The hallmark of this approach is a propensity to take ordinary colloquial sentences that all of us utter routinely when we are not thinking about philosophy, or (more often) other sentences that very directly and obviously logically entail such sentences, and treat those sentences (i) as having a clear content, calling for little or no elucidation, and (ii) as proper objects of philosophical controversy. Questions like ‘are there numbers?’ (...) and ‘are there tables?’ were now placed on a par with questions like ‘are there immaterial souls?’ and ‘are there sense-data?’. Of course philosophers have always had a propensity to say things that sound odd to vulgar ears. What was new with Quine was a systematic policty of privileging these kinds of formulations over more distinctively philosophical idioms. Jargon which had been central to the practice of metaphysics—’logical construction’, ’nothing over and above’, ‘reduce’, ‘ground’, ‘in virtue of’, ‘fundamental’, ‘consist in’...—were shifted to a much more peripheral role. The tradition inaugurated by Quine raises some hard interpretative questions for anyone who, like me and Dave, thinks that there is a range of different propositions that people brought up as English-speakers might be tempted to try to get across by uttering one of these sentences. On the one hand, Dave and I agree that the propositions that any ordinary, unphilosophical use of a sentence like ‘there are some free tables at the back of the café’ would be intended to get across are (in many cases) extremely obvious. The idea that when ontologists assert ‘there are no tables’, or treat this claim as calling for serious debate, they are intending to call into question propositions as obvious as that seems implausibly uncharitable. On the other hand, it is also a hallmark of the Quinean tradition that it claims to be using words in their ordinary sense, at least to the extent that (unlike its founder) it is willing to traffic in talk of meanings at all.. (shrink)

Region R Question: How many objects — entities, things — are contained in R? Ignore the empty space. Our question might better be put, 'How many material objects does R contain?' Let's stipulate that A, B and C are metaphysical atoms: absolutely simple entities with no parts whatsoever besides themselves. So you don't have to worry about counting a particle's top half and bottom half as different objects. Perhaps they are 'point-particles', with no length, width or breadth. Perhaps they are (...) extended in space without possessing spatial parts (if that is possible). Never mind. We stipulate that A, B and C are perfectly simple. We also stipulate that they are connected as follows. A and B are stuck together in such a way that when a force is applied to one of them, they move together 'as a unit'. Moreover, the two of them together exhibit behavior that neither would exhibit on its own — Perhaps they emit a certain sound, or glow in the dark — whereas C is.. (shrink)

I graduated from medical school in 1957. I first went into hospital practice for 3½; years, and then went to Africa for 5 years before returning to Holland to resume practicing as a Family Physician. I have also participated in the postgraduate training and education for family doctors in Amsterdam, Currently, there are approximately 2,300 patients in my practice, about average for a Dutch physi- cian. Ten percent of those patients are over the age of 65.

Numerous informal logi- cians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put. Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens construction formels et théoriciens de l’argument- ation limitent leur non de théories à ce qu’ils appellent des arguments « authentiques ». (...) Mais y-a- t’il une distinction claire entre des arguments« authentiques » et « inau- thentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre descriptions possibles de cette préten- due distinction et je soutiens qu’- aucune ne répond aux besoins théori- ques auxquels elles sont censées ré- pondre. (shrink)

Kenneth Burke is, at long last, beginning to get the attention he de- serves. Among anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and rhetori- cians his "dramatism" is increasingly recognized as something that must at least appear in one's index, whether one has troubled to understand him or not. Even literary critics are beginning to see him as not just one more "new critic" but as someone who tried to lead a revolt against "narrow formalism" long before the currently fashionable explosion into the "extrinsic" (...) had been dreamed of. I have recently heard him called a structuralist-before-his-time-and what could be higher praise than that! But in almost everything said about his literary criticism, there is an air of condescension that is puzzling. The tone seems usually to echo that of Rene Wellek , who, as Burke himself laments , "almost overwhelms me with praise," referring to "men of great gifts, nimble powers of combination and association, and fertile imagination," but then deplores Burke's irresponsibility, repudiates his critical judgments, condemns his general method without bothering to look closely at it, and in general makes him look like some sort of idiot savant-a buffoon with a high IQ.Wayne C. Booth received the Phi Beta Kappa Christian Gauss Award in 1962 for his book The Rhetoric of Fiction. His most recent works, A Rhetoric of Irony and Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, appeared this year. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Irony and Pity Once Again: Thais Revisited" , "M.H. Abrams: Historian as Critic, Critic as Pluralist" , "THE LIMITS OF PLURALISM: 'Preserving the Exemplar': Or, How Not to Dig our Own Graves" , "CRITICAL RESPONSE: Notes and Exchanges" , "Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation" ,"Ten Literal 'Theses" , with Wright Morris: "The Writing of Organic Fiction: A Conversation" , and with Robert E. Streeter and W.J.T. Mitchell: "EDITORS' NOTE: Sheldon Sacks 1930-1979". (shrink)

This book examines the reactions of the friends and family of those who elect to die due to terminal illness. These surviving spouses, partners, relatives, and friends, in addition to coping with the death of a loved one, must also deal with the loved one's decision to die, thus severing the relationship. C. G. Prado examines how reactions to elective death are influenced by cultural influences and beliefs, particularly those related to life, death, and the possibility of an afterlife. Understanding (...) the role of these cultural influences on the grieving processes of survivors is a crucial step in allowing them to accept both intellectually and emotionally the finality of elective death and to deal with the decision of their loved one. (shrink)

Graffiti, as a form of artistic and social expression, has long been entangled in debates concerning its legitimacy, ethics, and cultural significance. Initially serving as a medium for creative expression and social communication, graffiti has evolved from an act of defiance to a widely recognized form of urban artistry. However, this transformation raises deeper philosophical and theological questions about the nature of artistic legitimacy, the moral implications of public space utilization, and the tension between transgression and sacred expression. Is graffiti (...) an act of rebellion against authority, or does it serve as a reflection of deeper existential and spiritual inquiries? Rooted in historical traditions of visual storytelling, from prehistoric cave paintings to religious iconography, graffiti occupies a unique space between vandalism and sacred art. Its presence in urban landscapes often symbolizes dissent and marginalized voices, yet it also engages with the broader philosophical discourse on freedom, moral agency, and the sanctity of public expression. The increasing acceptance of graffiti as a legitimate art form further complicates the boundary between crime and creative expression, raising ethical concerns about ownership, space, and cultural identity. This study explores graffiti’s evolution through a lens of religious and philosophical reflection, analyzing its role in shaping public consciousness, its intersection with ethical discourse on transgression and creativity, and its potential as a medium for spiritual and social transformation. By tracing graffiti’s historical roots, examining the debates surrounding its moral and aesthetic value, and considering its future trajectory in the democratization of public space, this paper argues that graffiti should not be viewed solely through the dichotomy of legality and illegality. Instead, it should be examined as an evolving cultural and philosophical phenomenon that challenges conventional notions of art, morality, and the human search for meaning in public expression. Future research should further explore graffiti as a contemporary manifestation of sacred and profane spaces, its parallels with religious artistic traditions, and its role in redefining ethical and spiritual engagement with the urban environment. (shrink)

La réception tardive de l'oeuvre de Ernst Troeltsch en France nous a privés d'une analyse du christianisme originale et féconde. Elle nuance et enrichit ce que nous savons, au travers de la réflexion wébérienne notamment, des relations de la religion chrétienne à la modernité. Contre les interprétations usuelles qui datent l'émergence de cette dernière de la Renaissance et de la Réforme, Troeltsch insiste sur la centralité des Lumières comme marquant la fin de la civilisation ecclésiastique ; c'es l'évanouissement de la (...) référence structurante à l'ordre divin qui inau­gure selon lui l'entrée dans le monde moderne. Sur la base de ce constat, il s'agit pour Troeltsch de trouver une définition du christianisme qui soit en adéquation avec les conditions de l'existence moderne. Dans son ouvrage datant de 1912, « Les doctrines sociales des Églises et groupes chrétiens », il examine les types « Église », « secte » et « mystique » pré­sents depuis les origines évangéliques, circonscrivant trois modes socio­logiques et éthiques qu'il confronte à la modernité. Aucun n'est seul adéquat. Pour durer, le christianisme devra, selon Troeltsch, renoncer à la réalisation d'un programme éthique d'essence religieuse au sein du monde et accepter le cantonnement de la foi dans l'intimité des cons­ciences, tout en s'articulant à des réalités socio-culturelles à l'échelle de tous dont les formes et les transformations internes sont toujours à repenser.The delayed reception of the work of Ernst Troeltsch in France deprived us of an analysis of an original and fertile Christianity. It nuances and enriches what we know, especially through a Weberian reflection, about the relations of the Christian religion and modernity. Against the customary interpretations that date the emergence of the latter from the Renaissance and the Reformation, Troeltsch insists on the centrality of the Enlightenment as marking the end of an ecclesiastical civilization. It is the disappearance of the structuring reference to the divine order that inaugurated, according to him, the entrance to the modern world. On the basis of this observation, Troeltsch is interested in finding a definition of Christianity that would be in harmony with the conditions of modern existence. In his work dating from 1912, "The social doctrines of the Churches and Christian groups ", he examines the categories "Church", "sect", and "mystic" that were present evangelical times, circumscribing three sociological and ethical modes, which he confronts with modernity. No single one is adequate. In order to endure, Christian­ity should, according to Troeltsch, renounce the attempt to set up an ethical program of a religious essence in the heart of the world and accept the establishment of a faith in the intimacy of consciences, all the while adapting its« to socia-cultural realities applicable to everyone, of which the forms and internal transformations are always to be re-thought. (shrink)

Stiff Person Syndrome is a rare autoimmune disorder associated with antibodies against glutamic acid decarboxylase, the key enzyme in γ -aminobutyric acid synthesis. In order to investigate the role of cerebral benzodiazepinereceptor binding in SPS, we performed [ 11 C]flumazenil positron emission tomography in a female patient with SPS compared to nine healthy controls. FMZ is a radioligand to the postsynaptic central benzodiazepine receptor which is co-localized with the GABA-A receptor. In the SPS patient, we found a global reduction of (...) cortical FMZ binding. In addition, distinct local clusters of reduced radiotracer binding were observed. These data provide first in vivo evidence for a reduced postsynaptic GABA-A receptor availability which may reflect the loss of GABAergic neuronal inhibition in SPS. (shrink)

Despite appearances, Agamben’s engagement with Foucault in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life is not an extension of Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics but rather a disciplining of Foucault for failing to take Nazism seriously. This moralizing rebuke is the result of methodological divergences between the two thinkers that, I argue, have fundamental political consequences. Re-reading Foucault’s most explicitly political work of the mid-1970s, I show that Foucault’s commitment to genealogy is aligned with his commitment to “insurrection”—not simply archival or (...) historical, but practical and political insurrection—even as his non-moralizing understanding of critique makes space for the resistances he hopes to proliferate. By contrast, Agamben’s resurrection of sovereignty turns on a moralizing Holocaust exceptionalism that anoints both sovereignty and the state with inevitably totalitarian powers. Thus, while both Agamben and Foucault take positions “against” totalitarianism, their very different understandings of this term and method of investigating it unwittingly render Agamben complicit with the totalitarianism he otherwise seeks to reject. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s Revolution argues that Nietzsche is a revolutionary who aims to liberate modernity by overthrowing Christianity. Although Nietzsche’s terrified inability to follow through on this revolutionary project causes him to retreat into a retrograde essentialism of race and gender that betrays his own revolutionary promise, Nietzsche’s complicity in this failure bequeaths this revolution to us, his future readers, who can take it up in the form of poststructuralist queer theory and politics. This is a revolutionary future Nietzsche could neither have (...) foreseen nor endorsed, but is the necessary consequence of his quest to overthrow Christianity’s cult of meaning. (shrink)

John Henry Newman wrote the “Theses de Fide” in Rome as a seminary student in 1846/1847, and the text represents a key point in the development of his thought. Newman wrote the “Theses” in an attempt to grapple with scholastic categories on faith, a question that had occupied him in the Anglican Church for years. Although the “Theses” were not published in Newman’s life, he returned to these reflections often over the course of his Roman Catholic career. This edition and (...) partial translation of the “Theses de Fide” is to aid general readers in understanding this moment in Newman’s life, and to assist specialists in approaching the manuscript record of the “Theses” themselves. (shrink)

In “Two Concepts of Liberty” Berlin notes the protean nature of the word “freedom” and then systematically proceeds to narrow its range of meanings. In the process, Berlin eliminates much of what most people, in everyday communication, regard as freedom, believing that this is in the best interest of intellectual clarity. As he puts it: [N]othing is gained by a confusion of terms. To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my freedom: (...) I may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be guilt‐stricken, and rightly so, if I were not, in some circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedom, however great the moral need or the compensation for it. Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience. (Emphasis added). Berlin's other, perhaps overarching, aim is to show how inattention to the specificity of the meanings of concepts might have potentially dangerous political repercussions. He implicitly argues that the intellectuals who promoted the idea of positive freedom as opposed to that of negative freedom contributed to the emergence of totalitarianism and fascism in Europe. (shrink)

According to Fichte, neither antithesis nor synthesis is possible without an absolute thesis, or what he called a thetic judgment. The only examples Fichte offers are ‘I am I’ and ‘self is free’. These judgments are absolute judgments, whereby the subject is neither equated with nor opposed to anything, but simply posited absolutely or as identical to itself. Thetic judgments presuppose no ground of conjunction or distinction, yet formally they seem to assert the identity of the subject and the predicate. (...) If this is so, there must be a third thing by reference to which the two are related. Or, in Fichte’s words, thetic judgements presuppose the requirement for a ground. In the proposition ‘I am I’ the ground of the relation is not present but must be sought as a task. The whole activity of the self is to find this basis. For example, in the proposition ‘self is free’ there is no ground of conjunction or distinction for relating these two concepts, but there is the requirement that the concepts be related. What the Wissenschaftslehre discloses is that these concepts can only be combined in the Idea of a self whose consciousness is determined by nothing outside itself. (shrink)

We consider Berezin's algebraic considerations regarding the quantization of phase space polynomials. After making a connection with Prugovečki's stochastic quantization approach, we give a particular construction of Berezin's L-Kernel in terms of Prugovečki's ξ-functions.

Let L be one of the intuitionistic modal logics considered in [4]. As in the classical modal case (see [7]), we define two different forms of the Beth property for L, which are denoted by B 1 and B 2 ; in this paper we study the relation among B 1 ,B 2 and the interpolation properties C 1 and C 2 , introduced in [4]. It turns out that C 1 implies B 1 , but contrary to the boolean (...) case, is not equivalent to B 1 . It is shown that B 2 and C 2 are independent, and moreover it comes out that, in contrast to classical case, there exists an extension of the intuitionistic modal logic of S 4 -type, that has not the property B 2 . Finally we give two algebraic properties, that characterize respectively B 1 and B 2. (shrink)

In the context of the agroecological transition, the ability of alternative ways of farming to develop themselves in the long run without being co-opted by mainstream input intensive agriculture is essential. Biodynamic farming (BF), which began a century ago in 1924, was one of the first alternatives to modern agriculture, associated with specific agricultural practices, worldview and human-nature relationships. Over the last 100 years, BF has developed worldwide in a context of growing industrialization, without becoming industrialized itself, and it is (...) still considered today as a radically alternative way of farming. To better understand the resistance of BF, this paper provides an overview of its history, with particular emphasis on its complex relationships with the broader organic agriculture (OA) movement. Three overlapping historical stages are distinguished: (1) _Agronomic consolidation stage_: from Rudolf Steiner’s agricultural courses to the first “Agricultural Experimental Circle”, the creation of the Demeter label and the emergence of OA (first half of 20th century); (2) _Institutionalization stage;_ Initially, BF was coevolving closely with the growing OA movement, but then the differentiation between both progressively increased. Meanwhile the first collaborations with academic research institutes were initiated; (3) _Expansion stage_: With growing commercialization opportunities for biodynamic products, the 21st century corresponds to a stage of economic development for BF and a new wave of geographic expansion in every continent. In the final section of the paper, the implications for sustainability transformations are discussed. Particularly, it is argued that the ability of BF to combine strategies of agronomic consolidation, institutionalization and expansion over time could be the key to its resilience. The complementarities between BF and other alternative ways of farming might play an important role in future evolutions. (shrink)