Ueshiba Morihei (1883-1969), créateur de l’aikidō, fonde son « budō » (voie martiale) avec Deguchi Onisaburō (1871-1948), dirigeant de l’Ōmoto-kyō, l’une des « nouvelles religions » japonaises. Ils conçoivent le budō comme « la voie de création et d’ordonnancement de l’univers » en opposition aux « budō corporels » influencés par le modèle occidental du sport. Selon eux, l’Occident, « matérialiste », a profondément modifié les pratiques japonaises de telle sorte que le vécu du corps comme shintai, comme réceptacle des (...) kami (esprits ou divinités) lors des transes de possession est en voie de se perdre, et avec lui tout un monde. Le corps de possession rend communiquant les mondes : avec sa perte, il n’y a plus de transgressions possibles des frontières ontologiques ; l’homme ne peut plus s’unir à sa racine et retrouver sa totalité ; les animaux, les plantes et les pierres ne parlent plus et le dieu originel unique devient inaccessible, caché dans « l’imperceptible de l’imperceptible ». (shrink)

Chapter 1 FROM ORDER TO DISORDER 5 mins. John enters and goes into his office. He says something very quickly about having made a bad mistake. He had sent the review of a paper. . . . The rest of the sentence is inaudible. 5 mins.

This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly (...) directed against interpretivism, the book provides a critical analysis of major alternative accounts of mental state possession as well as the interpretivist ideas originating from Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett. The viability of the approach is demonstrated by showing how one can treat mental causation as well as the faculties closely connected with consciousness -- perception and the awareness of one’s own mental states -- in the interpretivist framework. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

This article revisits the concept of the dividual, taking as a starting point Deleuze’s diagnosis about the relevance that dividual practices have gained with the advent of biotechnology and digital culture. Although we agree with this diagnosis, we highlight the intersections between the dividual and the individual both in Modernity and in the present time. The contemporary dividual is in tension with the modern individual, but not as a substitution, division or duplication of the individual. Rather, we state a complex (...) dividual-individual composition, focusing on biotechnologies, digital culture and financial capitalism. Following a Foucauldian approach, we understand this composition as a result of technologies of power and the result of certain modes of subjectivation. In dialogue with Simondon’s theory of individuation, we suggest that the dividual takes part in a new mode of subjectivation which can be named a ‘dividuation’ in the context of technologically mediated experiences. (shrink)

The present essay analyzes the understanding of epistemological behaviorism as a holism without metaphysical presuppositions, from Richard Rorty (1931-2007). In order to do so, we will start from the idea of ​​Wilfrid Sellars’ “Myth of the Given”, as a philosophical impulse that Rorty appropriates to develop his notion that epistemological behaviorism would be, at best, a holism to create justification contexts. Initially, we will propose a discussion on the question of psychological nominalism, presented in Margutti's text, Skepticism, pragmatism and Sellars' (...) critique of the “Myth of the Given”, observing how this assumption constitutes a Rortyan critique to reach the emphasis of the proposal. Next, we will emphasize the understanding that the neopragmatist philosopher has of what it is for him, the notion of epistemological behaviorism, without metaphysical connotations, one in which he starts from the vision of sensitive and epistemic data to explain our action with the world, until one that emphasizes the idea that it would be better perceived as a holism, that is, a language game that says what the best game can be played, through a practice of social justification. Our work relies on the theoretical contribution of Rorty (1979), Margutti (2000), among others. Our study indicates that in order to detach himself from metaphysical explanations and (re)describe epistemological behaviorism, Rorty points out a way out through linguistic apparatuses that provide an environment in social practices that allow going beyond sensitive impressions or cognitive data, clarifying how the proposal can be fuzzy if it aligns with justification rather than explanation. (shrink)

O trabalho tem o objetivo de evidenciar a ética da experimentação animal em John Dewey, observando se é possível propor uma deliberação moral antiespecista. Assim, analisaremos o modo deweyano de aliar uma ética voltada ao progresso humano, mesmo que dela resultem condutas que desencadeiem na exploração de animais não humanos, verificando paulatinamente se é possível propor uma deliberação moral de maneira criativa por meio da experiência humana e que beneficie os animais não humanos. No primeiro momento, será exposto o conceito (...) de especismo, tal como sua derivação, o especismo antropocêntrico, o qual será esmiuçado, para mostrar como os animais humanos incorrem em certas argumentações que viabilizem a exploração de animais não humanos, principalmente na discussão do pragmatismo deweyano. Segundo, iremos aprofundar a questão do especismo por meio de uma atitude pragmática, que, além de evidenciar o entrave moral a partir do pragmatismo clássico de Dewey, mostrará argumentações favoráveis a deliberações morais que propiciem o bem-estar dos animais não humanos, de acordo com o pragmatismo contemporâneo, já que esse debate sobre o bem-estar animal no contexto da moral pragmatista é recente. Nosso trabalho conta com o aporte teórico de Dewey (2020), Fesmire (2004) e Singer (2010), entre outros. A pesquisa indica que, ao manifestar uma possibilidade expansiva da experiência, através da natureza humana, criada por uma rede de relações sociais mútuas que está em constante movimento, e que precisa se adequar a novos entendimentos éticos, é possível alinhar tanto as emoções quanto a simpatia humana para permitir novas experiências sociais criativas que despertem deliberações morais que favorecem diversos seres sencientes. (shrink)

Recently, Linda Zagzebski has proposed an “exemplarist virtue theory.” Her idea is to define moral terms such as “right act”, “duty”, “good end”, “good motive”, “virtue” etc. by referring directly to exemplars we admire upon reflection such as Confucius, Jesus Christ, St. Francis, St. Elisabeth etc. In this article, I will first present the main theses of Zagzebski’s theory and relate them to the program of virtue ethics. Secondly, I will confront her theory with what I call “the Kant Complaint” (...) according to which one could give no “worse advice to morality than by trying to get it from examples”, and thirdly, I will argue that Zagzebski has the resources to counter several versions of this complaint. (shrink)

This commentary advocates an alternative to null-hypothesis testing that was originally represented by Rozeboom over three decades ago yet is not considered by Chow (1996). The central distinguishing feature of this approach is that it allows the scientist to conclude that the data are much better fit by those hypotheses whose values fall inside the interval than by those outside.

Vient ensuite une approche du style des philosophes dans son rapport à la construction même d'un système argumentatif autant qu'à divers modes d'expression : langage et littérarité donc, afin de sonder les voies de la création chez ...

It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

Theological thinking is hard. It takes various forms depending on its object of reflection, and needs to be doctrinally informed, contextually appropriate and methodologically consistent. Theological thinking about evolutionary creation meets all said conditions and restrictions on some sort of a larger-than-usual scale. I, thus, introduce a thinking tool – intuition pump, as Daniel Dennett calls it – that can help us theologically contemplate evolutionary creation. This approach aims to put together and to combine evolution and creation within the context (...) of the structure and form of Dennett’s proposed methodology and thought experiments using at one instance Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This intuition pump has its implications and effects in other theological domains (Trinity, Christology and Sacramentology) but its natural context lies within theology of creation. I will start by presenting Dennett’s heterophenomenological method for scientific research of consciousness, stretching our theological imagination by using it. This thinking tool enables us to see this world as God’s heterophenomenological world. At the same time, it enables us to recognize and confirm intrinsic properties or essences in nature and it warrant thinking about historicity of Adam and Eve. (shrink)

A reflexão parte da tarefa que Benjamin atribui aos que estão vivos: originar um verdadeiro “estado de exceção”. Compreende-se que essa é a tarefa primeira de uma Educação Histórica ética e estética. O artigo está organizado em três partes que compreendem os três elementos indissociáveis que constituem os primeiros movimentos no sentido de superar o “estado de Exceção” da violência sem memória. Na primeira parte, discutimos, a partir de Adorno, o “estado de exceção” da violência sem memória e reafirmamos o (...) dever de memória que se opõe a barbárie. Na segunda parte, comentamos, seguindo Levinas, a ética da responsabilidade. Na terceira, analisamos a estética do Eros contraeducativo de Gur-Ze’ev. Conclui-se que a postura de um pensar histórico ético e estético perpassa a recusa de esquecer e o desenvolvimento de uma atitude crítica para consigo mesmo, para com o Outro, e finalmente para com a realidade. (shrink)

El robo que san Agustín declara haber cometido a sus dieciséis años en sus Confesiones ha sido objeto de interpretaciones de diversa índole. Aquí, mediante el tratamiento de algunas de ellas y de los textos fuente en los que se apoyan, se propone una nueva lectura que toma como fundamento una óptica aún no delineada en los estudios agustinianos. A través de la aplicación de la perspectiva hermenéutica propuesta hace algunas décadas por el historiador francés René Girard, se advierte que (...) el relato del robo de las peras constituye un episodio afín al mensaje revelado por las Escrituras en torno a la naturaleza del deseo humano. Se elabora una exégesis que, tomando en consideración interpretaciones precedentes, se distancia a su vez de algunos de sus fundamentos, con el fin de profundizar su alcance y demostrar que el episodio en cuestión, en conformidad con el mensaje cristiano, revela el carácter conflictivo de la naturaleza mimética del deseo. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is an overview of the theory of knowledge in recent years in religious discussion, and discussion with some of the more traditional, which outlines the future direction of further development. This paper describes the religion that advocates for the challenge, and the reply made ​​by Kaplan Dingge, in addition to other early works, his recent book "confirms Christian faith" have gradually shed light on this issue. The problem is that Kaplan Dingge for the formation of (...) the will of the religious factor, have not made ​​proper discussion. At the same time to Newman's view of faith, complementary to, roughly sketched out. Concludes virtue epistemology, in order to illustrate the value of the knowledge of several intuitive. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of recent discussions in religious epistemology, to compare it with some traditional accounts, and to sketch a direction of further development. The article presents the evidentialist's challenge to religious belief and Alvin Plantinga's replay to it as he developed it in his earlier writings but also in his recent book Warranted Christian Belief. The question arises whether Plantinga does justice to the voluntary element in the formation of religious belief. As a complementary accout, John Henry Newman's view of Faith is sketched. Finally a version of virtue epistemology is presented as a general epistemology which tries to account for several intuitions concerning epistemic value. (shrink)

Autoren Johannes Brachtendorf, Professor für Philosophie am Institut für philosophische Grundfragen der Theologie an der Katholisch-Theologischen Fakultät ...

Is it possible to have a materialist definition of the subject which nonetheless separates the latter from any given type of object? In this article I start from the criticism – which both Alain Badiou and Gilles Deleuze provide – of the identification of the subject with a given type of substance, provided with specific modes of correlation with other objects. Namely, I try to show how for both authors the identification of the subject with a res – be it (...) the res cogitans, the human animal, or even the conditions of the possibility of experience of the latter –, pins down the subject to a specific place and function, and in this way ultimately provides a representation of the subject as a specimen of a given category of objects. More precisely, the identification of the subject with a specific class of objects is exposed by Deleuze as the very structure that tends to reduce the transformative capacity of the latter into the limits of a finite form; in a similar way, Badiou exposes this identification as one of the fundamental features of reactionary ideology. The article also shows how it is in this sense that one needs to read Deleuze’s refusal of the subsumption of the subjective process under the sole name ‘subject’, especially when the latter is identified with the cognitive structures of the human animal. Aiming nonetheless at maintaining a materialist definition of the subject, both authors stress the idea that the subject is an always singular process in which a new figure is created via a process of disidentification from a specific class of objects. This article then follows in particular three formal characteristics that Deleuze and Badiou find for the subjective process: first, that a subject appears as (or under condition of) a fracture or an inconsistency in the mode of organization of a class of objects; second, that a subject tends to turn such an evanescent fracture into a new body; and finally that a subject exposes such moments of disidentification and of production of novelty as being infinitely repeatable and universally valid. Starting from this, the article concludes by identifying a set of internal limits and contradictions in Badiou’s and Deleuze’s positions (namely a re-naturalization and re-anthropologization of the category of the subject) and by highlighting a series of developments in contemporary philosophy that allow the further elaboration of further the idea of the subject as an always singular (and yet universally repetable) practice of disidentification from a specific class of objects. (shrink)

El problema de la adopción, desarrollado por Kripke (2021) y elaborado por Padró (2015, 2021), ha generado considerable debate en la filosofía del lenguaje y de la lógica debido a sus consecuencias para las teorías de la racionalidad y la naturaleza de los principios lógicos. Se ha propuesto que existe una íntima relación entre este problema y el tipo de argumento de inconsistencia metarreferencial dirigido contra la defensa monista de una lógica no clásica. Esto ha llevado a pensar que la (...) postura de Kripke contra la adopción de una lógica implica una crítica al monismo lógico no clásico. El presente trabajo evalúa las dificultades de interpretar de este modo el problema de la adopción, en la forma en que ha sido presentado por Barrio, Fiore y Pailos (2021). Se busca argumentar que esta interpretación ignora elementos clave tanto del argumento como de la conclusión de Kripke. Se avanza una lectura alternativa al problema, y se argumenta que reviste ventajas interpretativas y filosóficas. Se espera con esto aportar a la comprensión del complejo problema kripkeano, así como a su relación con las discusiones contemporáneas en torno al monismo lógico. (shrink)