In the past quarter century C. B. MacPherson's reading of Locke has enjoyed a wide appeal. We are all by now familiar with Locke as the ardent proponent of possessive individualism, with its accompanying acquisitive tendencies and egoism. To be sure, MacPherson's interpretation has not gone unopposed. Of late it has been challenged in all its fundamentals by the scholarly and ingenious work of James Tully. Far from seeing Locke as providing the theoretical underpinnings for unbridled capitalism, Tully puts forward (...) the view that Locke was sympathetic to the possibility of radical redistributive measures. That is, that he was not in principle opposed to rights to welfare. (shrink)

Under the democratic auspices of our time, rights have tended to be distributed generously and widely—if not in deed, at least in word. The tendency has been to widen their legitimate applicability from humans to all sentient beings, to all living beings, and, as some would have it, to the environment as a whole. Fortunately, this penchant for cataloging virtually every human relation, ambition, and aspiration in terms of rights and duties has not gone unopposed. On the one hand, there (...) are those who, though essentially committed to rights and their place within political discourse, are nonetheless distressed by a seemingly endless and senseless proliferation. They are concerned that in becoming widely palatable, rights have become common fare, thin in substance and all too frequently misunderstood and misapplied. Theirs is a mission of separating the genuine article from the many pretenders. (shrink)

What has happened to the project of ‘symmetrical anthropology’ in the last twenty years? What difference does it make to consider a multiplicity of cultures over the background of a unified nature, or a multiplicity of natures in addition to a multiplicity of cultures? In which way does it open up another type of scientific anthropology, no longer based on comparison but on ‘diplomacy’? Can modernity, as an interpretation of the former West, be recalled? Translated by Stephen Muecke.

Revolutionary developments in economics are rare. The conservative bias of the field and its enshrined knowledge make it difficult to introduce new ideas not in line with received theory. Happiness research, however, has the potential to change economics substantially in the future. Its findings, which are gradually being taken into account in standard economics, can be considered revolutionary in three respects: the measurement of experienced utility using psychologists' tools for measuring subjective well-being; new insights into how human beings value goods (...) and services and social conditions that include consideration of such non-material values as autonomy and social relations; and policy consequences of these new insights that suggest different ways for government to affect individual well-being. In Happiness, emphasizing empirical evidence rather than theoretical conjectures, Bruno Frey substantiates these three revolutionary claims for happiness research. After tracing the major developments of happiness research in economics and demonstrating that we have gained important new insights into how income, unemployment, inflation, and income demonstration affect well-being, Frey examines such wide-ranging topics as democracy and federalism, self-employment and volunteer work, marriage, terrorism, and watching television from the new perspective of happiness research. Turning to policy implications, Frey describes how government can provide the conditions for people to achieve well-being, arguing that a crucial role is played by adequate political institutions and decentralized decision making. Happiness demonstrates the achievements of the economic happiness revolution and points the way to future research.Bruno S. Frey is Professor of Economics at the University of Zurich, Visiting Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, and Research Director of CREMA. He is co-editor of Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of (...) language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. (shrink)

Serious actualism is the prima facie plausible thesis that things couldn’t have been related while being nothing. The thesis plays an important role in a number of arguments in metaphysics, e.g., in Plantinga’s argument for the claim that propositions do not ontologically depend on the things that they are about and in Williamson’s argument for the claim that he, Williamson, is necessarily something. Salmon has put forward that which is, arguably, the most pressing challenge to serious actualists. Salmon’s objection is (...) based on a scenario intended to elicit the judgment that merely possible entities may nonetheless be actually referred to, and so may actually have properties. It is shown that predicativism, the thesis that names are true of their bearers, provides the resources for replying to Salmon’s objection. In addition, an argument for serious actualism based on Stephanou, 219–250 2007) is offered. Finally, it is shown that once serious actualism is conjoined with some minimal assumptions, it implies property necessitism, the thesis that necessarily all properties are necessarily something, as well as a strong comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic according to which for every condition there necessarily is the property of being a thing satisfying that condition. (shrink)

On the face of it, there is no connection between the social theory developed by Ulrich Beck under the name of `second modernization' and the post-ethnomethodological argument developed by Bruno Latour and his colleagues under the name of actor-network theory. Yet they are both concerned with empirical evidence of a major shift in modernity. Hence the idea of elaborating an empirical test to probe the extent to which `second modernization' is a real phenomenon, or rather, as is suggested here, (...) a shift in our interpretation of what modernity has always been about. (shrink)

In a series of papers, 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in. In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points (...) in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

The basis of a humane approach to others is the authentic comprehension of another subject. As humans, we can achieve this understanding well, and the reason lies in how we experience the world around us and other subjects in it. The development of robots capable of socially interacting and helping humans is progressing, even though they are still far from reaching an autonomous comprehension of others' intentions, emotions, and feelings. In this sense, the humane approach may be addressed in robotics (...) through the concept of experience. In a reciprocal exchange of perspectives, the core elements and the structure of human experience are investigated, together with how the idea of experience has been implemented in robots. The embodied Self and the relationship with other subjects form the pivot of any human experience and are suggested to be the basis for the emergence of a more profound idea of experience in robots. Conversely, the possibility to develop a robot with a primitive sense of Self raises questions about the nature of human experience and the impact such technologies have on it. (shrink)

When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in The Movement-Image, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This article introduces the concept of the impulse-image (...) in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes Zola and the Crack-up, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s, associated with the criticism of the 1970s. However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism, shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation. (shrink)

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...) In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

This paper proposes and partially defends a novel philosophy of arithmetic—finitary upper logicism. According to it, the natural numbers are finite cardinalities—conceived of as properties of properties—and arithmetic is nothing but higher-order modal logic. Finitary upper logicism is furthermore essentially committed to the logicality of finitary plenitude, the principle according to which every finite cardinality could have been instantiated. Among other things, it is proved in the paper that second-order Peano arithmetic is interpretable, on the basis of the finite cardinalities’ (...) conception of the natural numbers, in a weak modal type theory consisting of the modal logic $\mathsf {K}$, negative free quantified logic, a contingentist-friendly comprehension principle, and finitary plenitude. By replacing finitary plenitude for the axiom of infinity this result constitutes a significant improvement on Russell and Whitehead’s interpretation of second-order Peano arithmetic, itself based on the finite cardinalities’ conception of the natural numbers. (shrink)

In this paper we propose and defend the _Synonymy account_, a novel account of metaphysical equivalence which draws on the idea (Rayo in _The Construction of Logical Space_, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) that part of what it is to formulate a theory is to lay down a theoretical hypothesis concerning logical space. Roughly, two theories are synonymous—and so, in our view, equivalent—just in case (i) they take the same propositions to stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they (...) are committed to the truth of the same propositions. Furthermore, we put our proposal to work by showing that it affords a better and more nuanced understanding of the debate between Quineans and noneists. Finally we show how the _Synonymy account_ fares better than some of its competitors, specifically, McSweeney’s (Philosophical Perspectives 30(1):270–293, 2016) epistemic account and Miller’s (Philosophical Quarterly 67(269):772–793, 2017) hyperintensional account. (shrink)

The ArgumentA large part of our critical acumen depends on a clear distinction between what is real and what is constructed, what is out there in the nature of things and what is in there in the representation we make of them. Something has been lost however for the sake of this clarity and a heavy price has been paid for this dichotomy between ontological questions on the one hand and the epistemological questions on the other: it has become impossible (...) to understand the simplest features of action. What the critical gesture smashes into pieces is precisely the very possibility of hearing as synonyms the two sentences, “I have fabricated it well, thus it is autonomous.” The paper tries to find a way to avoid the critical gesture and link again together facts and fetishes, producing this rather strange hybrid: factishes. (shrink)

Quanto segue intende proporsi come il resoconto di una conversazione che Andrea Oliani, Bruno Cortesi e Pietro Vigiani, tutti studenti presso l’Almo Collegio Borromeo di Pavia, hanno intrattenuto con Emanuele Severino, volta ad enucleare, muovendo da spunti talvolta anche polemici, alcune delle concettualità fondanti quel corpus di dottrine che cade sotto il nome di severinismo. Severino è stato squisito nell’accoglierci e ospitarci nella sua dimora di Brescia, lucido e assolutamente puntuale nel controbattere alle nostre provocazioni. La discussione ha poi (...) trovato naturale seguito in una conferenza di carattere più divulgativo tenuta dal filosofo presso il Collegio Borromeo, dal titolo Sulla Tecnica. Severino consegue la laurea in Filosofia nel 1950 come alunno del Collegio Borromeo, discutendo una tesi intitolata Heidegger e la metafisica sotto la supervisione di Gustavo Bontadini. Solo un anno più tardi ottiene la libera docenza in filosofia teoretica. Nel 1964 pubblica lo scritto Ritornare a Parmenide, che, insieme a La Struttura Originaria rappresenta la miccia che innescherà negli anni successivi quello che molti hanno definito lo “scandalo” del severinismo. Questi scritti, come altri, posseggono una portata teorica tanto dirompente che già nel 1969, a seguito di un lungo e accurato esame condotto da Cornelio Fabro, la Chiesa cattolica proclamerà l’insanabile pposizione tra il pensiero di Severino e il Cristianesimo. Comprendere tale pensiero è cosa ardua, se prima non ci sia volti alla grecità delle origini: essa è, per Severino, il luogo ove in maniera inaudita (nel senso letterale di “mai udita prima”) viene pensato l’Incontrovertibile, il “Sempre Salvo”, ciò la cui egazione è auto-negazione, e che pertanto non può in alcun modo essere contraddetto; In altri termini: la Verità. Essa è anche stata in grado per la prima volta di concepire in maniera radicale L’Essere e il suo corrispettivo: il Niente inteso come radicale assenza di qualsiasi positività. L’aver inteso la Verità come Saphés (“Ciò che brilla di luce propria” da cui Philo-Sophìa) da un lato, e l’aver posto L’Essere e il Niente dall’altro, sono gli atti che per Severino fondano quell’immenso edificio culturale che ancora oggi domina il pianeta tutto: L’Occidente. È possibile, dunque, individuare una pars construens e una pars destruens negli scritti di Emanuele Severino: da una parte sembra che, facendo uso di un apparato logico e ontologico raffinatissimo, egli cerchi di porre in questione le categorie di pensiero occidentali risolvendo il Problema dell’Occidente alla radice, cioè eliminandolo (accenneremo a quale sia questo problema e a cosa significhi eliminarlo); in questa che è una vera e propria opera di demolizione, il Nostro (pars construens) intende mostrare come tutto quanto si mostra nell’orizzonte esperienziale sia “da sempre salvo” perché eterno. Ciò sfocia, in scritti quali Pensieri sul Cristianesimo, Technè, Il Giogo, Il Nulla e la Poesia, in una “ricostruzione” volta a mostrare come le categorie introdotte dal pensiero greco si riverberino in ogni forma della razionalità occidentale, dall’arte, alla filosofia, al diritto, alla politica, determinandone in maniera necessaria gli sviluppi. Precisiamo, per correttezza, che lo stesso non è stato rivisto da Severino. (shrink)

Without fudging or flinching, he answers these hard questions and more. In this slim volume, he gives the most convincing explanation of the mystery of evil that's available today.

Unfortunately, there is a mistake in line 10 of Section 1.2. The correct reference should read: As Kripke pointed out, we can produce one simply by baptizing the string ‘Jack is short’: Jack.

A mechanistic study of consciousness need not be confined to human complexity. Other animals also display key behaviors and responses that have long been intimately tied to the measure of consciousness in humans. Among them are some very well-defined and measurable endpoints: selective attention, sleep and general anesthesia. That these three variables associated with changes in consciousness might exist even in a fruit-fly does not necessarily imply that a fly is “conscious”, but it does suggest that some of the problems (...) central to the field of consciousness studies could be investigated in a model organism such as Drosophila melanogaster. Demonstrating suppression of unattended stimuli, which is central to attention studies in humans, is now possible in Drosophila by measuring neural correlates of visual selection. By combining such studies with an eventual understanding of suppression in other arousal states in the fly, such as sleep and general anesthesia, we might be unraveling mechanisms relevant to consciousness as well. BioEssays 27:321–330, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Die Philosophische Fakultat der Berliner Universitat stellte im Jahr 1828 eine Preisaufgabe, an deren Losung alle Studenten der Universitat teilnehmen konnten. Einem Vorschlag Hegels folgend ging es um eine Auseinandersetzung mit den "Prinzipien des Schonen" bei Kant. Nach anonymer Bewertung der eingegangenen Arbeiten wurde die von Bruno Bauer mit dem Preis geehrt. Wahrend die im Laufe der Jahre gestellten Aufgaben und erteilten Gutachten fast vollstandig erhalten sind, ist das Vorhandensein der von Bauer handschriftlich in lateinischer Sprache verfaten Arbeit eine (...) wissenschaftliche Raritat. Diese Schrift, deren Original sich im Archiv der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin befindet, wird hier erstmals publiziert. Eingeleitet durch eine philosophiegeschichtliche Betrachtung der Quelle (D. Moggach) und eine historische Einordnung der Preisschrift (W. Schultze) gestattet die synchrone Gegenuberstellung von lateinischem und deutschem Text dem Leser ein kritisches Studium der Quelle. Dieser Band soll den Auftakt fur weitere Publikationen wissenschaftlich und wissenschaftshistorisch interessanter Quellen des Archivs der Humboldt-Universitat bilden. (shrink)

In 1971, priest, theologian, and philosopher Ivan Illich wrote Deschooling Society, a plea to liberate education from schooling and to separate schooling from the state. On occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of its publication, Ivan Illich Fifty Years Later looks at the theological roots of Illich's thought and the intellectual and ideological strands that contributed to his ideas. Guided by the central question of how Illich reached the point of writing Deschooling Society, the book sheds light on how Illich produced (...) a critique of schooling that can be defined by its eclecticism. Bruno-Jofré and Igelmo Zaldívar explore how this controversial book was framed by Illich's early neo-scholastic and anti-modern foundation, his discovery of St. Thomas through Jacques Maritain, and the existential turning points that influenced his public life and intellectual direction in moving from a critique of the Church as institution to a critique of schooling. Drawing from the interpretative theories of Quentin Skinner, Reinhart Koselleck, and William H. Sewell and from concepts such as educationalization, transnationality, and configuration, among other heuristic tools, the authors provide an original and cross-disciplinary analysis of Deschooling Society and its place in Illich's journey. (shrink)