Revolutionary developments in economics are rare. The conservative bias of the field and its enshrined knowledge make it difficult to introduce new ideas not in line with received theory. Happiness research, however, has the potential to change economics substantially in the future. Its findings, which are gradually being taken into account in standard economics, can be considered revolutionary in three respects: the measurement of experienced utility using psychologists' tools for measuring subjective well-being; new insights into how human beings value goods (...) and services and social conditions that include consideration of such non-material values as autonomy and social relations; and policy consequences of these new insights that suggest different ways for government to affect individual well-being. In Happiness, emphasizing empirical evidence rather than theoretical conjectures, Bruno Frey substantiates these three revolutionary claims for happiness research. After tracing the major developments of happiness research in economics and demonstrating that we have gained important new insights into how income, unemployment, inflation, and income demonstration affect well-being, Frey examines such wide-ranging topics as democracy and federalism, self-employment and volunteer work, marriage, terrorism, and watching television from the new perspective of happiness research. Turning to policy implications, Frey describes how government can provide the conditions for people to achieve well-being, arguing that a crucial role is played by adequate political institutions and decentralized decision making. Happiness demonstrates the achievements of the economic happiness revolution and points the way to future research.Bruno S. Frey is Professor of Economics at the University of Zurich, Visiting Professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, and Research Director of CREMA. He is co-editor of Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field. (shrink)

I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.

This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of (...) language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. (shrink)

Technology is always limited to the realm of means, while morality is supposed to deal with ends. In this theoretical article about comparing those two regimes of enunciation, it is argued that technology is on the contrary characterized by the `ends of means' that is the impossibility of being limited to tools; technical artefacts are never tools if what is meant by this is a transmission of function in a mastered way. Once this modification of the meaning of technology is (...) accepted, then it is possible to relate technology, in a totally different way, to morality which is not about values, but about the exploration of ends. (shrink)

Are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them. These results settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for (...) any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle. The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity. (shrink)

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...) principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist. (shrink)

On the face of it, there is no connection between the social theory developed by Ulrich Beck under the name of `second modernization' and the post-ethnomethodological argument developed by Bruno Latour and his colleagues under the name of actor-network theory. Yet they are both concerned with empirical evidence of a major shift in modernity. Hence the idea of elaborating an empirical test to probe the extent to which `second modernization' is a real phenomenon, or rather, as is suggested here, (...) a shift in our interpretation of what modernity has always been about. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

This paper offers two competing accounts of normative requirements, each of which purports to explain why some—but not all—requirements are normative in the sense of being related to normative reasons in some robust way. According to the reasons-sensitive view, normative requirements are those and only those which are sensitive to normative reasons. On this account, normative requirements are second-order statements about what there is conclusive reason to do, in the broad sense of the term. According to the reasons-providing view—which I (...) attribute to John Broome—normative requirements are those and only those which constitute or provide normative reasons. I argue that the reasons-providing view is susceptible to two serious objections. First, the view generates an explanatory gap. Secondly, the view is implausible. I argue that these two objections give us reason to prefer the reasons-sensitive view of normative requirements over the reasons-providing view. (shrink)

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...) new hierarchical account that solves the problem. (shrink)

When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in The Movement-Image, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This article introduces the concept of the impulse-image (...) in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes Zola and the Crack-up, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s, associated with the criticism of the 1970s. However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism, shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation. (shrink)

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...) In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

Just War Theory is becoming increasingly important to nations when they contemplate and participate in war. This book recognizes the timeliness of the topic and so seeks, in concrete historical terms, to deal with the issue of constraining war on the basis of moral principles.

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

This article argues that using Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority to reject philosophical anarchism can be affected by political anarchism. Whereas philosophical anarchism only denies the authority of the state, political anarchism claims that anarchism is a better alternative to the state. Raz’s theory holds that an institution has authority if it enables people to better conform with reason. I argue that there are cases where anarchism is an existing alternative to the state and better fulfils this condition. Consequently, (...) in these cases, anarchist groups and societies and not the state have legitimate authority. When anarchism is not an existing alternative to the state, the state will, under Raz’s theory, have some legitimate authority, but that authority will be limited because anarchism remains a better possible alternative to the state. To support the political anarchist claim I discuss the anarchist collectives during the Spanish civil war, which I argue are an example of anarchism as an existing alternative to the state that better fulfils Raz’s service conception and also provide suggestive evidence that anarchism is in general a better possible alternative. I also discuss the relationship between political anarchism and authority and I argue that despite some tension they are not irreconcilable. I conclude that the interesting anarchist challenge for political theorists is political not philosophical. (shrink)

The development of science studies has an important message for political theory. This message has not yet been fully articulated. It seems that the science studies field is often considered as the extension of politics to science. In reality, case studies show that it is a redefinition of politics that we are witnessing in the laboratories. To the political representatives should be added the scientific representatives. Thanks to a book by Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, it is possible to reconstruct (...) the origin of this divide between the two sets of representatives. A definition of modernism is offered. Then the article explains how to interpret the shift to "nonmodernism, " that is, a historical period when the two branches of politics get together again. (shrink)

Bruno Latour is best known for his work in the cultural study of science. In this pamphlet he turns his attention to another worthy pursuit: the project of peace. As one might expect, Latour gives us a radically different picture of this project than Kant or the philosophes, asserting that the West has been in a constant state of war both with other cultures and its own—although unwittingly so. Read through the lens of his trademark take on "the modern," (...) his arguments are original, thoughtful, and, as usual, provocative. (shrink)

This article sets out to show that Wittgenstein and Freud have exerted a considerable - though narrow - influence on Bourdieu’s sociology. But their influence also pervades the theoretical development of two other currents that have emerged in French sociology in the last few years, and that were developed by L. Boltanski and L. Thévenot on the one hand, and B. Lahire on the other. Although they do not make it explicit, the advocates of these two currents have nevertheless been (...) influenced by Wittgenstein and Freud. Thus Boltanski has drawn on Wittgenstein to develop a sociology which gives primacy to the social actor’s interpretation of his or her situation through lay theorizing. Lahire’s work clearly pays a debt to Freud with his psychological sociology. It would therefore be interesting, in the first instance, to tease out how Wittgenstein and Freud, respectively, have influenced these two systems to demonstrate that they can indeed be used to generate new sociological currents, other than Bourdieu’s own. This would then allow us to explore how they could be used to fill any gaps in Bourdieu’s work, thus giving the latter renewed relevance and staunching its stagnating tendencies. Ultimately, this analysis aims to show how Wittgenstein’s and Freud’s theoretical influences can lead the way towards a theoretical synthesis between Bourdieu’s critical sociology, Boltanski’s social actor theory and Lahire’s psychological sociology. Currently, these three currents operate independently of each other, without any kind of dialogue. And yet, far from being incompatible, these sociologies offer opportunities for exploring how they might complement and mutually enrich each other. (shrink)

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

This review assesses the strengths and weaknesses of Peter Thomas’s long-awaited study ofThe Prison Notebooks, based on his extensive research and philological reconstruction of the critical edition. I distinguish three senses in which the ‘moment’ in the book’s title can be understood: as the historical moment around 1932 in which Gramsci proposed the outline of his distinct brand of the philosophy of praxis; as the moment or momentum that still lies in wait for a future research programme in Marxist philosophy; (...) and as a methodological principle for understanding the dialectic as a theory in which entities such as state and civil society, but also coercion and consent, far from allowing the kind of Eurocommunist or post-Marxist instrumentalisations in which they are seen as part of a chain of binaries, are actually moments of a unified larger structure that in Gramsci’s work comes to be associated with the idea of the integral state. This impressive reconstruction of Gramsci’s notebooks, however, also reveals some major lacunae, above all, in terms of the lack of attention given to Gramscian developments in the non-European world, in places such as India or Latin America. This omission is all the more surprising given the longstanding tradition, particularly in Latin America, of viewing Gramsci as a theorist of the integral state more so than of hegemony. (shrink)

Pretendo investigar de qué manera la metafísica de Whitehead puede arrojar alguna luz sobre un problema difícil de la historia social de las ciencias, la historicidad de las cosas, que hasta ahora no ha tenido solución satisfactoria. Como buen filósofo empírico, partiré de un ejemplo, el del descubrimiento-invención-construcción por Pasteur del fermento del ácido láctico en 1857. En este artículo examinaré dos cosas: ¿cómo podemos replantearnos una gran cuestión de filosofía de la historia a partir de Whitehead? ¿Cómo se comporta (...) su filosofía cuando hay que afrontar los detalles concretos de una situación experimental? (shrink)

The ArgumentA large part of our critical acumen depends on a clear distinction between what is real and what is constructed, what is out there in the nature of things and what is in there in the representation we make of them. Something has been lost however for the sake of this clarity and a heavy price has been paid for this dichotomy between ontological questions on the one hand and the epistemological questions on the other: it has become impossible (...) to understand the simplest features of action. What the critical gesture smashes into pieces is precisely the very possibility of hearing as synonyms the two sentences, “I have fabricated it well, thus it is autonomous.” The paper tries to find a way to avoid the critical gesture and link again together facts and fetishes, producing this rather strange hybrid: factishes. (shrink)

Recent years have witnessed an increasing interest in ecological issues among thinkers concerned with cosmopolitics. Here I wish to offer a slightly different perspective on the politics of ecological issues by adding two lines of reasoning to the topic: one of them from my original field, science and technology studies, and the other from what I have called the anthropology of the moderns.

Quanto segue intende proporsi come il resoconto di una conversazione che Andrea Oliani, Bruno Cortesi e Pietro Vigiani, tutti studenti presso l’Almo Collegio Borromeo di Pavia, hanno intrattenuto con Emanuele Severino, volta ad enucleare, muovendo da spunti talvolta anche polemici, alcune delle concettualità fondanti quel corpus di dottrine che cade sotto il nome di severinismo. Severino è stato squisito nell’accoglierci e ospitarci nella sua dimora di Brescia, lucido e assolutamente puntuale nel controbattere alle nostre provocazioni. La discussione ha poi (...) trovato naturale seguito in una conferenza di carattere più divulgativo tenuta dal filosofo presso il Collegio Borromeo, dal titolo Sulla Tecnica. Severino consegue la laurea in Filosofia nel 1950 come alunno del Collegio Borromeo, discutendo una tesi intitolata Heidegger e la metafisica sotto la supervisione di Gustavo Bontadini. Solo un anno più tardi ottiene la libera docenza in filosofia teoretica. Nel 1964 pubblica lo scritto Ritornare a Parmenide, che, insieme a La Struttura Originaria rappresenta la miccia che innescherà negli anni successivi quello che molti hanno definito lo “scandalo” del severinismo. Questi scritti, come altri, posseggono una portata teorica tanto dirompente che già nel 1969, a seguito di un lungo e accurato esame condotto da Cornelio Fabro, la Chiesa cattolica proclamerà l’insanabile pposizione tra il pensiero di Severino e il Cristianesimo. Comprendere tale pensiero è cosa ardua, se prima non ci sia volti alla grecità delle origini: essa è, per Severino, il luogo ove in maniera inaudita (nel senso letterale di “mai udita prima”) viene pensato l’Incontrovertibile, il “Sempre Salvo”, ciò la cui egazione è auto-negazione, e che pertanto non può in alcun modo essere contraddetto; In altri termini: la Verità. Essa è anche stata in grado per la prima volta di concepire in maniera radicale L’Essere e il suo corrispettivo: il Niente inteso come radicale assenza di qualsiasi positività. L’aver inteso la Verità come Saphés (“Ciò che brilla di luce propria” da cui Philo-Sophìa) da un lato, e l’aver posto L’Essere e il Niente dall’altro, sono gli atti che per Severino fondano quell’immenso edificio culturale che ancora oggi domina il pianeta tutto: L’Occidente. È possibile, dunque, individuare una pars construens e una pars destruens negli scritti di Emanuele Severino: da una parte sembra che, facendo uso di un apparato logico e ontologico raffinatissimo, egli cerchi di porre in questione le categorie di pensiero occidentali risolvendo il Problema dell’Occidente alla radice, cioè eliminandolo (accenneremo a quale sia questo problema e a cosa significhi eliminarlo); in questa che è una vera e propria opera di demolizione, il Nostro (pars construens) intende mostrare come tutto quanto si mostra nell’orizzonte esperienziale sia “da sempre salvo” perché eterno. Ciò sfocia, in scritti quali Pensieri sul Cristianesimo, Technè, Il Giogo, Il Nulla e la Poesia, in una “ricostruzione” volta a mostrare come le categorie introdotte dal pensiero greco si riverberino in ogni forma della razionalità occidentale, dall’arte, alla filosofia, al diritto, alla politica, determinandone in maniera necessaria gli sviluppi. Precisiamo, per correttezza, che lo stesso non è stato rivisto da Severino. (shrink)