Machine stability and energy efficiency have become major issues in the manufacturing industry, primarily during the COVID-19 pandemic where fluctuations in supply and demand were common. As a result, Predictive Maintenance (PdM) has become more desirable, since predicting failures ahead of time allows to avoid downtime and improves stability and energy efficiency in machines. One type of machine failure stands out due to its impact, machine overstrain, which can occur when machines are used beyond their tolerable limit. From the current (...) literature, there are little to no relevant works that focus on machine overstrain failure detection or prediction. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to implement and compare four Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for PdM applied to machine overstrain failures: Artificial Neural Network (ANN), Gradient Boosting, Random Forest and Support Vector Machine (SVM). Moreover, it proposes a training methodology for imbalanced data and the automatic optimization of hyperparameters, which aims to improve performance in the ML models. To evaluate the performance of the ML models, a synthetic dataset that simulates industrial machine data is used. The obtained results show the robustness of the proposed methodology, with the ANN and SVM models achieving a perfect recall score, with 98.95% and 98.85% in accuracy, respectively. (shrink)

I argue that dialetheists have a problem with the concept of logical consequence. The upshot of this problem is that dialetheists must appeal to a hierarchy of concepts of logical consequence. Since this hierarchy is akin to those invoked by more orthodox resolutions of the semantic paradoxes, its emergence would appear to seriously undermine the dialetheic treatments of these paradoxes. And since these are central to the case for dialetheism, this would represent a significant blow to the position itself.

The growing body of literature on the idea of the Anthropocene has opened up serious questions that go to the heart of the social and human sciences. There has been as yet no satisfactory theoretical framework for the analysis of the Anthropocene debate in the social and human sciences. The notion of the Anthropocene is not only a condition in which humans have become geologic agents, thus signalling a temporal shift in Earth history: it can be seen as a new (...) object of knowledge and an order of governance. A promising direction for theorizing in the social and human science is to approach the notion of the Anthropocene as exemplified in new knowledge practices that have implications for governance. It invokes new conceptions of time, agency, knowledge and governance. The Anthropocene has become a way in which the human world is re-imagined culturally and politically in terms of its relation with the Earth. It entails a cultural model, that is an interpretative category by which contemporary societies make sense of the world as embedded in the Earth, and articulate a new kind of historical self-understanding, by which an alternative order of governance is projected. This points in the direction of cosmopolitics – and thus of a ‘Cosmopolocene’ – rather than a geologization of the social or in the post-humanist philosophy, the end of the human condition as one marked by agency. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should solve paradoxes for propositions (such as the Russell–Myhill paradox) in essentially the same way that we solve Russellian paradoxes for sets. That is, the standard, iterative approach to sets is extended to include properties, and then the resulting hierarchy of sets and properties is used to construct propositions. Propositions on this account are structured in the sense of mirroring the sentences that express them, and they would seem to serve the needs of philosophers of (...) language and metaphysicians who rely on such propositions. The resulting account has limitations, comparable to those faced by the iterative approach to sets, but it is argued to be in important ways preferable to others that have been proposed. (shrink)

Are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them. These results settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for (...) any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle. The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity. (shrink)

Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions? That is, propositions that say of themselves that they have a certain property, such as that of being false. There can seem reason to doubt that there are. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why it matters. For suppose that there are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such as the Liar show that many plausible principles about sentences must be given up, no such fate will befall (...) principles about propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions would dash such hopes. Further, the existence of such propositions would also seem to challenge the widespread claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. The aim of this paper is thus to settle the question–at least given an assumption. In particular, I argue that if propositions are structured, then self-referential propositions exist. (shrink)

Metaphysically possible worlds have many uses. Epistemically possible worlds promise to be similarly useful, especially in connection with propositions and propositional attitudes. However, I argue that there is a serious threat to the natural accounts of epistemically possible worlds, from a version of Russell’s paradox. I contrast this threat with David Kaplan’s problem for metaphysical possible world semantics: Kaplan’s problem can be straightforwardly rebutted, the problems I raise cannot. I argue that although there may be coherent accounts of epistemically possible (...) worlds with fruitful applications, any such an account must fundamentally compromise the basic idea behind epistemic possibility. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the pluralist (...) are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

The notion of a proposition is central to philosophy. But it is subject to paradoxes. A natural response is a hierarchical account and, ever since Russell proposed his theory of types in 1908, this has been the strategy of choice. But in this paper I raise a problem for such accounts. While this does not seem to have been recognized before, it would seem to render existing such accounts inadequate. The main purpose of the paper, however, is to provide a (...) new hierarchical account that solves the problem. (shrink)

This study aimed to synthesize literature data on male judo combat time in international competitions between 2010 and 2019. The search was carried out from May 8th to June 11th, 2021, in electronic databases using the following keywords: AND. After the selection process, 8 articles were included in the systematic review and 7 in the meta-analysis. These studies analyzed 2,562 international male judo combats over the years 2010 to 2019. We observed that the average male judo combat time changed after (...) each rule change. There was a significant difference between combats that ended up to the regular time and those that needed overtime. There were differences between 60kg and +100kg categories and the others in 2011-2012. However, no significant difference was found between the combat time by weight division after the 2017 rule changes, although there are still differences in relation to the end of the combats. There were significant changes in the male judo combat time with each rule change, and the data from the included studies point to a trend of homogeneity in the combat time spent between the weight divisions over the years, and an increase in the occurrence of Golden Score. More studies need to be carried out to identify the new temporal behaviors of athletes. (shrink)

When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in The Movement-Image, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This article introduces the concept of the impulse-image (...) in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes Zola and the Crack-up, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s, associated with the criticism of the 1970s. However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism, shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation. (shrink)

A necessarily true sentence is 'brute' if it does not rigidly refer to anything and if it cannot be reduced to a logical truth. The question of whether there are brute necessities is an extremely natural one. Cian Dorr has recently argued for far-reaching metaphysical claims on the basis of the principle that there are no brute necessities: he initially argued that there are no non-symmetric relations, and later that there are no abstract objects at all. I argue that there (...) are nominalistically acceptable brute necessities, and that Dorr's arguments thus fail. My argument is an application of Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. (shrink)

The term “race,” and the concept it refers to, namely genetically different human populations in the world, is one of the most intellectually and emotionally charged in society, and in science as well. This article focuses on how human beings recognize individual faces of their own versus another “racial group,” and the term “face race” is used in the context of visual recognition, as traditionally done in the scientific literature. The article reviews the well-known phenomenon that people have greater difficulty (...) distinguishing and recognizing individual faces from a different human population, or “race,” than their own. Experience-based holistic accounts encompass and extend most other proposals, such as a more densely clustered organization of other-race faces in an internal face-space centered on a “norm,” and it leads to a number of interesting predictions about the processing of same race and other-race faces. (shrink)

This article synthesizes the results of several interviews with argumentation scholars from across the American continents to address three questions regarding the connections in argumentation studies between North and South/Central America: “What motivated the study of argumentation in the Americas?” “What commonalities, if any, exist in argumentation studies across the Americas?” and “What should the future of argumentation studies in the Americas look like?” Using these interviews in combination with existing textual sources, the article also provides motivated suggestions for directions (...) for the future of the community in the field. (shrink)

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...) In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers. (shrink)

The present essay analyzes the understanding of epistemological behaviorism as a holism without metaphysical presuppositions, from Richard Rorty (1931-2007). In order to do so, we will start from the idea of ​​Wilfrid Sellars’ “Myth of the Given”, as a philosophical impulse that Rorty appropriates to develop his notion that epistemological behaviorism would be, at best, a holism to create justification contexts. Initially, we will propose a discussion on the question of psychological nominalism, presented in Margutti's text, Skepticism, pragmatism and Sellars' (...) critique of the “Myth of the Given”, observing how this assumption constitutes a Rortyan critique to reach the emphasis of the proposal. Next, we will emphasize the understanding that the neopragmatist philosopher has of what it is for him, the notion of epistemological behaviorism, without metaphysical connotations, one in which he starts from the vision of sensitive and epistemic data to explain our action with the world, until one that emphasizes the idea that it would be better perceived as a holism, that is, a language game that says what the best game can be played, through a practice of social justification. Our work relies on the theoretical contribution of Rorty (1979), Margutti (2000), among others. Our study indicates that in order to detach himself from metaphysical explanations and (re)describe epistemological behaviorism, Rorty points out a way out through linguistic apparatuses that provide an environment in social practices that allow going beyond sensitive impressions or cognitive data, clarifying how the proposal can be fuzzy if it aligns with justification rather than explanation. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to argue that all—or almost all—logical rules have exceptions. In particular, it is argued that this is a moral that we should draw from the semantic paradoxes. The idea that we should respond to the paradoxes by revising logic in some way is familiar. But previous proposals advocate the replacement of classical logic with some alternative logic. That is, some alternative system of rules, where it is taken for granted that these hold without exception. (...) The present proposal is quite different. According to this, there is no such alternative logic. Rather, classical logic retains the status of the ‘one true logic’, but this status must be reconceived so as to be compatible with (almost) all of its rules admitting of exceptions. This would seem to have significant repercussions for a range of widely held views about logic: e.g. that it is a priori, or that it is necessary. Indeed, if the arguments of the paper succeed, then such views must be given up. (shrink)

Trata-se, neste artigo, de investigar as noções de filosofia, pedagogia e espírito à luz dos debates decoloniais. Neste sentido, a partir de um diálogo que procuro estabelecer com Enrique Dussel, Catherine Walsh e M. Jacqui Alexander, desenvolvo três hipóteses. Em primeiro lugar, apresento certa noção de pedagogia como constitutiva da própria filosofia (portanto, a ideia de pedagogia para além de mero instrumento, meio ou termo acessório à filosofia). Em segundo lugar, argumento que essa dita pedagógica-filosófica precisará ser entendida como a (...) epistemologia indispensável para a abordagem, conhecimento e tratamento da realidade, no seguinte sentido: mediante o aprender e o ensinar alternadamente (como práxis, atitude e método filosófico por excelência), tornar possível que a realidade apareça. E esse é mais um dos pontos em relação aos quais os três autores estão de acordo, assim como em relação ao terceiro e mais importante movimento da presente investigação. Pois será, então, do reconhecimento do fracasso da ontologia universalista (moderna e colonial), mais precisamente, do encontro com uma realidade indeterminada e aberta, que se poderá a fundo compreender o sentido da atitude pedagógica (da epistemologia pedagógica) que descerra toda a realidade possível. Tal realidade_ _sempre Outra_ _– que não se pode localizar em qualquer lugar ou tempo, na mesma medida em que se faz presente em todos os lugares e momentos – é o que se poderá caracterizar como espírito. E é o que fará do espírito, por conseguinte, agência de resistência e perturbação a todo esforço epistemológico/filosófico, tanto quanto (e por isso mesmo) da atitude pedagógica-filosófica instância de revelação de um mundo prenhe de sentidos possíveis. (shrink)

O trabalho tem o objetivo de evidenciar a ética da experimentação animal em John Dewey, observando se é possível propor uma deliberação moral antiespecista. Assim, analisaremos o modo deweyano de aliar uma ética voltada ao progresso humano, mesmo que dela resultem condutas que desencadeiem na exploração de animais não humanos, verificando paulatinamente se é possível propor uma deliberação moral de maneira criativa por meio da experiência humana e que beneficie os animais não humanos. No primeiro momento, será exposto o conceito (...) de especismo, tal como sua derivação, o especismo antropocêntrico, o qual será esmiuçado, para mostrar como os animais humanos incorrem em certas argumentações que viabilizem a exploração de animais não humanos, principalmente na discussão do pragmatismo deweyano. Segundo, iremos aprofundar a questão do especismo por meio de uma atitude pragmática, que, além de evidenciar o entrave moral a partir do pragmatismo clássico de Dewey, mostrará argumentações favoráveis a deliberações morais que propiciem o bem-estar dos animais não humanos, de acordo com o pragmatismo contemporâneo, já que esse debate sobre o bem-estar animal no contexto da moral pragmatista é recente. Nosso trabalho conta com o aporte teórico de Dewey (2020), Fesmire (2004) e Singer (2010), entre outros. A pesquisa indica que, ao manifestar uma possibilidade expansiva da experiência, através da natureza humana, criada por uma rede de relações sociais mútuas que está em constante movimento, e que precisa se adequar a novos entendimentos éticos, é possível alinhar tanto as emoções quanto a simpatia humana para permitir novas experiências sociais criativas que despertem deliberações morais que favorecem diversos seres sencientes. (shrink)

A pesquisa pretende fazer uma narrativa, à luz da teoria de Jacques-Alain Miller, sobre o sujeito em dialética com as formas jurídicas do trabalho. Considerando a dinâmica social transpassada pela mercantilização, buscou-se uma elucidação sobre a formação e relação do sujeito com a linguagem e o ’Outro’, não concebida no entendimento do sujeito de direito tradicional. Como resultado, notou-se que a desconsideração da subjetivação do trabalhador é uma lacuna no mundo jurídico, que viabiliza sua reiterada sujeição e descaracteriza a proteção (...) ao seu trabalho. (shrink)

Esse artigo é um resumo de uma tese de doutorado iniciada em 2017 que tem como objetivo analisar onze filmes do gênero documentário que abordam a liderança política de Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ao longo de sua trajetória no cenário nacional. Discuto, entendendo os documentários como fontes narrativas, o tipo de liderança política de Lula nos momentos específicos de suas produções, analisando esteticamente como ele foi representado pelos diversos diretores. Como objetivo específico, busco identificar traços do fenômeno político discutido (...) academicamente intitulado como “Lulismo” presentes nos filmes selecionados. Além da revisão bibliográfica necessária para confecção desse trabalho, utilizei a análise fílmica proposta por Vera Chaia e a Hermenêutica de Profundidade, utilizada por John Thompson em “Ideologia e Cultura Moderna”. (shrink)

rails to total abstraction, to conjure a perfect social system, between fulfilment of individual and colective will.

Long Range and short range, guns and violence, everyday life in cities and streets, between social and group identity and faith and religious belief, the vision to the "things of the world that cannot be seen" (Heróis do Mar).

a romantic solution to the dilemma beteew obscenity and ascetism.

Youthness and Aging, Time elapsed and relapsed memory, between lollenyness and secrecy about our desires, in front of openess and the back of the Ego.

A logic path between moral principles of social organization of religious rules and the economiy of belief in industrial societies. I argue that some lifes may be like currency, a Good and a Bad Side, due to the dilema betwee profit and spiritual reasons.

Violence is somehow equivalent to Be Right? How can I be fair and non-violent? It depends on the receptor, in terms of social comunication.

to be, being and belonging, some point of departure categories to arrive to the conclusion that happyness is connecte to a feeling of possession, the Havinng. I revisit some ideaas of my PhD Text.

A superficial look to some Nietzsche's itens from an anthropological point of view.

Etnofiction essay, between anthropology and philosophy.

In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as (...) Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Logics of Formal Underterminedness. Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction. (shrink)

Plausibly, mathematical claims are true, but the fundamental furniture of the world does not include mathematical objects. This can be made sense of by providing mathematical claims with paraphrases, which make clear how the truth of such claims does not require the fundamental existence of mathematical objects. This paper explores the consequences of this type of position for explanatory structure. There is an apparently straightforward relationship between this sort of structure, and the logical sort: i.e. logically complex claims are explained (...) by logically simpler ones. For example, disjunctions are explained by their (true) disjuncts, while generalizations are explained by their (true) instances. This would seem as plausible in the case of mathematics as elsewhere. Also, it would seem to be something that the anti-realist approaches at issue would want to preserve. It will be argued, however, that these approaches cannot do this: they lead not merely to violations of the familiar principles relating logical and explanatory structure, but even to reversals of these. That is, there are cases where generalizations explain their instances, or disjunctions their disjuncts. (shrink)

Saturation, intoxication to the medias of realization and porsuit of happyness.

Investigamos o problema da continuidade entre (1) cognições básicas e (2) complexas, especificamente em relação à linguagem. Nossa hipótese é a de que visões contemporâneas da linguagem não inviabilizam necessariamente a abordagem bottom-up ― abordagens tipicamente enativistas. Primeiro apresentamos a posição de Daniel Hutto e Erik Myin (2013, 2017), representantes do Radically Enactive Cognition (REC), a qual assume o desafio da continuidade e identifica na linguagem o critério para uma distinção de tipo entre (1) e (2). Em seguida, estabelecemos a (...) posição Wittgensteiniana defendida por Moyal-Sharrock (2019), na qual a linguagem seria apenas mais uma habilidade de possível desenvolvimento para (1) e (2). Haveria, portanto, somente uma distinção de grau , não de tipo. Por mais que a avaliação de Moyal-Sharrock seja interessante no sentido de que parece evitar um ceticismo de continuidade (identificado por ela no REC), também encontramos problemas em sua visão. (shrink)

following Spinoza an, somewhat, Locke, trough a luminous path of a unique philosophical adventure.

you can conspire. So do I. Reality, social or natural, supernatural, can conspire against you or in favour, it depends on the quality of your seeds...

The social and personal utility of mental and physical suffering, exploration of the ideia that pain can be tolerated if we belive and so on euthanasia is not mandatory to several cases.

This paper presents an account of the moral boundaries of organizations. We define an organization’s moral boundary to encompass all of the actions for which it could be held morally responsible. Our theory requires us to view organizations as subjects that act in the world, rather than as objects that are used as tools; that is, it requires us to focus on corporate moral agency. We present a process model for determining whether a given action lies within an organization’s moral (...) boundary, and we discuss how an organization’s moral boundary can be created, destroyed, or modified as a result of deliberate choices by human and organizational actors. Our article contributes to the literature by conceptualizing the distinction between organizations as subjects and organizations as objects, and so clarifying the distinction between legal and moral boundaries; by recentering the discussion of boundaries on organizational actions rather than on contingent institutional features; and by adding nuance to the assignment of moral responsibility in complex organizational networks and in situations where one corporate moral agent depends upon another for its existence. (shrink)

the struggle for status is more primitive of what we thing or tought about, it's very linked with the struggle for survavil, terretory, reproduction, pleasure....in a world more and more violent in some way and stupidly peacefful on other way and territories...

Can psychiatry be read from an anthropological point of view? What is normal? What is pathological? Social order and pathos in question on this essay.