Offers a compelling vision of how to achieve and conduct a liberal but democratic society through the ideal of Neutrality--between people and ideas of the good--and using the tool of Neutral dialogue.

Evidence and theory ranging from traditional philosophy to contemporary cognitive research support the hypothesis that consciousness has a two-part structure: a focused region of articulated experience surrounded by a field of relatively unarticulated, vague experience.William James developed an especially useful phenomenological analysis of this "fringe" of consciousness, but its relation to, and potential value for, the study of cognition has not been explored. I propose strengthening James′ work on the fringe with a functional analysis: fringe experiences work to radically condense (...) context information in consciousness; are vague because a more explicit representation of context information would overwhelm consciousness′ limited articulation capacity; help mediate retrieval functions in consciousness; and contain a subset of monitoring and control experiences that cannot be elaborated in focal attention and are "ineffable." In general, the phenomenology of the fringe is a consequence of its cognitive functions, constrained by consciousness′ limited articulation capacity. Crucial to monitoring and control is the feeling of "rightness." Rightness functions as a summary index of cognitive integration, representing, in the fringe, the degree of positive fit between a given conscious content and its parallel, unconsciously encoded context. Rightness appears analogous to the connectionist metric of global network integration, known variously as goodness-of-fit, harmony, or minimum energy. (shrink)

Editors provide a substantive introduction to the history and theories of perfectionism and neutrality, expertly contextualizing the essays and making the collection accessible.

A comprehensive introductory study of the key concepts and problems in traditional and contemporary metaphysics. Aune presents and defends a point of view that is naturalistic, nominalistic and pragmatic-an approach that has the overall advantage of providing a coherent, structured view of the topics he discusses.

We highlight exclusionary practices in management research, and demonstrate through example how a more inclusive management literature can address the unique contexts of persons with disabilities, a group that is disadvantaged in society, globally. Drawing from social psychology, disability, self-employment, entrepreneurship, and vocational rehabilitation literatures, we develop and test a holistic model that demonstrates how persons with disabilities might attain meaningful work and improved self-image via self-employment, thus accessing some of the economic and social-psychological benefits often unavailable to them due (...) to organizational-employment barriers. Our longitudinal study provides evidence of the self-image value of ‘doing’ in self-employment, highlighting the potential to reduce stigma and improve generalized self-efficacy and self-esteem. Implications for self-image theory, entrepreneurship training and development, and public policy related to persons with disabilities are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, according to a particular physicalist conception of information, information is both alethically neutral or non-alethic, and is intrinsically semantic. The conception of information presented is physicalist and reductionist, and is contrary to most current pluralist and non-reductionist philosophical opinion about the nature of information. The ontology assumed for this conception of information is based upon physicalist non-eliminative ontic structural realism. However, the argument of primary interest is that information so construed is intrinsically semantic on (...) a reductionist and non-alethic basis where semantic content is constituted by indication along causal pathways. Similar arguments have been presented by philosophers with respect to representation. I suggest the conception of information that I present is correct by the lights of the best applied mathematical and scientific theories of information. If so, there is no need for any separate theory of semantic information. Thus I present a theory of intrinsically semantic information which also constitutes an informational theory of truth where truth reduces to information. In the last section I discuss weakly and strongly semantic information, and reject them in favour of alethically neutral intrinsically semantic information. (shrink)

Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. I argue that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses (...) leads people to fallaciously infer that it is no longer true to say that the relevant person knows. I believe that that is a better explanation of the so-called intuition that the person does not know than the contextualists who claim that raising these skeptical hypotheses changes the standards that determine when it is true to say S knows that P. At the end I raise the possibility that contextualists might defend their view on pragmatic rather than skeptical grounds by arguing that the standards of evidence rise when more is at stake in a practical sense. (shrink)

The growth of U.K. business ethics education has been charted at the course or 'micro' level by Mahoney and Cummins using postal questionnaires. These surveys, normally restricted to elite providers, have not revealed the relative importance of business ethics in the business school curriculum. In the 2000-2001 subject review of business and management programmes conducted by the U.K. Quality Assurance Agency for higher education, 164 business and management programmes were required to summarise their aims and objectives. Examination of this data (...) using QSR-N6 software shows that only 14 made explicit reference to ethics. Church Colleges of Higher Education were disproportionately represented, indicating the importance of institutional context to curriculum development. An analysis of espoused aims in relation to business ethics suggests that cognition in business ethics is largely conceived as part of a broad contextual comprehension of the business environment rather than an understanding of theoretical constructs. The expression of aims in business ethics is more frequently characterised by affective or attitudinal verbs/nouns with a close link to the promotion of value positions, such as multiculturalism and environmentalism. It is concluded that business ethics occupies a more marginal position within the curriculum than previous studies have suggested. (shrink)

Performing reason: Mendelssohn on Judaism and enlightenment -- Jacobi and Mendelssohn: the tragedy of a messianic friendship -- In the year of the Lord 1800: Rosenzweig and the Spinoza quarrel -- Reinhold and Kant: the quest for a new religion of reason -- Beautiful life: Mendelssohn, Hegel, and Rosenzweig -- Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and political theology: beyond sovereign violence -- Beyond 1800: an immigrant Rosenzweig.

Celebrated as a courtesan and poet, and as a woman of great intelligence and wit, Tullia d'Aragona entered the debate about the morality of love that engaged the best and most famous male intellects of sixteenth-century Italy. First published in Venice in 1547, but never before published in English, _Dialogue on the Infinity of Love_ casts a woman rather than a man as the main disputant on the ethics of love. Sexually liberated and financially independent, Tullia d'Aragona dared to argue (...) that the only moral form of love between woman and man is one that recognizes both the sensual and the spiritual needs of humankind. Declaring sexual drives to be fundamentally irrepressible and blameless, she challenged the Platonic and religious orthodoxy of her time, which condemned all forms of sensual experience, denied the rationality of women, and relegated femininity to the realm of physicality and sin. Human beings, she argued, consist of body and soul, sense and intellect, and honorable love must be based on this real nature. By exposing the intrinsic misogyny of prevailing theories of love, Aragona vindicates all women, proposing a morality of love that restores them to intellectual and sexual parity with men. Through Aragona's sharp reasoning, her sense of irony and humor, and her renowned linguistic skill, a rare picture unfolds of an intelligent and thoughtful woman fighting sixteenth-century stereotypes of women and sexuality. (shrink)

Many of our inherited civic institutions are dead or dying. We need an ambitious reform program to revive democratic life. This essay advances a four-pronged “citizenship agenda”: a campaign finance initiative granting each voter fifty “patriot dollars” to fund candidates and political parties of his or her choice; a proposal for a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, held before each national election, enabling citizens to deliberate on the merits of rival candidates; a system of federally financed electronic news-vouchers to permit (...) professional journalism to survive the destruction of its traditional business model; and a new form of citizenship inheritance, which provides $80,000 to all Americans as they start off life as adults. Working with collaborators, I have developed each of these initiatives at book length. This essay suggests how the “citizenship agenda” yields a whole that is larger than the sum of its parts. (shrink)

In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is clearly the simplest, because it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard assertoric principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical (...) inference. I am not daunted by these objections. My aim here is to offer some observations that will make the merits of my account easier to appreciate. (shrink)

At the end of Frank Ramsey’s “General Propositions and Causality” ([1929b] 1990), he offers an enigmatic footnote that briefly describes his philosophy of science as a “forecasting theory”. What he means by this and by a “forecast” is unclear. However, elsewhere in his unpublished notes, he uses the term sporadically. An examination of those notes reveals the skeleton of a behavioral theory of mind. Ramsey held that all actions are at root driven by the sum total of a person’s dispositions (...) or habits. These habits operate in an unconscious process that produces psychological expectations about the realization of desires. When those expectations are frustrated, the violation is registered consciously to the individual as a proposition, and the offending habit is identified. Humans can then regulate and change those habits by the conscious application of logic through deliberation. The applicable logic is Ramsey’s decision theory, which aims to make beliefs probabilistically coherent by adopting the laws and chances that signify the habits people might use for guiding behavior. The outcome of this deliberation is to refashion psychological expectations as mathematical expectations on laws and chances. These mathematical expectations are forecasts, and a forecasting theory of science takes scientific theories to provide forecasts. (shrink)

The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and (...) digital computation are not essentially different, and so arguments such as Searle''s hold or not as well for one as for the other. (3) Whether or not a biological system (such as the brain) is computational is a scientific matter of fact. (4) A substantive scientific question for cognitive science is whether cognition is better modeled by discrete representations or by continuous representations. (5) Cognitive science and AI need a theoretical construct that is the continuous analog of a calculus. The discussion of these propositions will illuminate several terminology traps, in which it''s all too easy to become ensnared. (shrink)

Recently Terrance McConnell has attempted to show that not only does psychological egoism lend no support to ethical egoism but is even incompatible with it. 1 McConneU's attempt has been vitiated by Paul Simpson's critique of the version of psychological egoism that McConnell offered) In this discussion I will consider McConnell's and Simpson's arguments and then offer a version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's objections. After showing that one version of ethical egoism is incompatible with that version of psychological (...) egoism, I will consider other versions of ethical egoism in an attempt to find the best version of that moral doctrine. It will turn out that even the best version of ethical egoism is incompatible with the version of psychological egoism that avoids Simpson's criticisms. However, another version of psychological egoism will be offered that is compatible with all versions of ethical egoism and that is also not open to Simpson's objections. An argument will be offered, and then criticized, that seems to lend support to ethical egoism and that rests, in part, on this other version of psychological egoism. (shrink)

The bottom of the pyramid (BOP) concept suggests that business has a vital role to play in meeting the unmet needs of the 4 billion poorest people on the planet. Serious advances in research on bottom of the pyramid business will require effective evaluation of the social impacts these businesses are having on the people they are supposed to benefit. Evaluation will allow us to identify conditions in which specific business interventions can address unmet needs fairly and effectively. Theory-driven evaluation (...) offers an approach to assessing the successes and limitations of BOP businesses by exploring why a venture does or does not achieve its social objectives. The experience of AIG Uganda in the microinsurance business illustrates the insights possible from applying theory-driven evaluation. (shrink)

We say that a ring admits elimination of quantifiers, if in the language of rings, {0, 1, +, ·}, the complete theory of R admits elimination of quantifiers. Theorem 1. Let D be a division ring. Then D admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if D is an algebraically closed or finite field. A ring is prime if it satisfies the sentence: ∀ x ∀ y ∃ z (x = 0 ∨ y = 0 ∨ xzy ≠ 0). Theorem (...) 2. If R is a prime ring with an infinite center and R admits elimination of quantifiers, then R is an algebraically closed field. Let A be the class of finite fields. Let B be the class of 2 × 2 matrix rings over a field with a prime number of elements. Let C be the class of rings of the form $GF(p^n) \bigoplus GF(p^k)$ such that either n = k or g.c.d. (n, k) = 1. Let D be the set of ordered pairs (f, Q) where Q is a finite set of primes and f: Q → A ∪ B ∪ C such that the characteristic of the ring f(q) is q. Finally, let E be the class of rings of the form $\bigoplus_{q \in Q}f(q)$ for some (f, Q) in D. Theorem 3. Let R be a finite ring without nonzero trivial ideals. Then R admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if R belongs to E. Theorem 4. Let R be a ring with the descending chain condition of left ideals and without nonzero trivial ideals. Then R admits elimination of quantifiers if and only if R is an algebraically closed field or R belongs to E. In contrast to Theorems 2 and 4, we have Theorem 5. If R is an atomless p-ring, then R is finite, commutative, has no nonzero trivial ideals and admits elimination of quantifiers, but is not prime and does not have the descending chain condition. We also generalize Theorems 1, 2 and 4 to alternative rings. (shrink)

Because the biblical interpreter in dealing with texts must deal with language, and because language is a social product, methods must be found which can deal with that social dimension of the biblical texts.