This book is a co-publication and appears in conjunction with an exhibition organized and presented by the Mead Art Museum at Amherst College, on the occasion of the centennial celebration nationwide of Singer's birth in 2004.

As a group, LGBTQ+ people experience food insecurity at a disproportionately high rate, yet food security scholars and practitioners are only beginning to uncover patterns in how food insecurity varies by subgroups of this diverse community. In this paper, we use data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey—which added measures of gender identity and sexuality for the first time in 2021—to analyze New Englanders’ food insufficiency rates by gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity. We find that (1) in the (...) past seven days, 13.0 percent of LGB + (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and other non-heterosexual) New Englanders experience food insufficiency—which is nearly twice the rate of heterosexual people—and 19.8 percent of transgender+ (transgender, genderqueer, gender non-binary, and other non-cisgender people) New Englanders experience food insufficiency—which is two to three times the rate of cisgender men and women. (2) Whereas cisgender New Englanders experience food insufficiency at a _lower_ rate than their counterparts in the rest of the nation (about two percentage points lower for both cisgender men and women), transgender+ New Englanders experience no such New England advantage compared to transgender+ people in the country as a whole. (3) LGBTQ+ New Englanders of color experience devastatingly high rates of food insufficiency, with, for example, one in three Black transgender+ New Englanders not having enough food to eat in the past seven days. These findings suggest that addressing food insecurity in New England demands approaching the problem with an intersectional queer lens, with attention to the ways in which racism, cissexism, and heterosexism are creating a systemic, ongoing food crisis for LGBTQ+ New Englanders, especially those who are transgender+ and/or people of color. (shrink)

Infrastructure can make or break a farm’s economic viability. Farmers’ ownership and ability to invest in infrastructure is often arranged through the family farm model, where farmers are typically married to their business partners. In this paper, we analyze the implications of organizing infrastructure access through the family farm model. Through interviews with 66 farmers and key informants in New England, U.S., we identify a treadmill of infrastructure accumulation for farmers with family capital and a treadmill of high labor and (...) low profitability for farmers without the family capital to acquire needed infrastructure. Infrastructure accumulation in the family farm model builds farms that are difficult to adapt to new systems and markets, challenging to retire from without selling to developers, and hard for beginning farmers to afford. The economic tendencies of organizing infrastructure through the family farm model can make it difficult for farmers of all social backgrounds to access farmland and infrastructure. Moreover, continued inequities in family wealth and wages, credit access, and social capital means that the family farm model systematically disadvantages farmers of color, LGBTQ + farmers, limited resource, and women farmers. We argue that infrastructure accumulation through the family farm model is a process that intensifies inequities in farm viability, exacerbates the challenges of transitioning farms to new farmers and ways of farming, and fuels land injustice. (shrink)

The way farm viability is defined and conceptualized has become increasingly incongruent with the way that small-scale farmers make a living, as their livelihood strategies have evolved and changed in response to broad structural changes over the past several decades. Farm viability is typically defined as meeting the income needs of the farm family as well as supporting the farm’s operating costs. However, our study shows that New England farmers define farm viability as their ability to stay in business and (...) to keep the land in agriculture. In this paper, we bring together the agricultural economics and rural sociological research literature on farm viability and persistence as well as food justice scholarship to advance the development of a more relevant and integrated approach to evaluating the viability of small and mid-sized farms. We present farmers’ own conceptions of farm viability, drawn from 37 interviews with the operators of small farms in New England. While most of the farmers we interviewed conceptualize farm viability as their ability to stay in business, many of them shared broader views of farm viability that integrated the social and environmental sustainability of their enterprises in the face of financial pressures and increased weather extremes from climate change. These were described as their ability to continue farming year after year and keep their land in agriculture, and their ability to maintain their own health and wellbeing as integral to a viable farm enterprise. Farmers emphasized their (in)ability to continue farming from a social sustainability standpoint as directly impacting the viability of their farms. We argue for a shift away from narrow measures of farm viability that are solely based on farm owners’ household income to a broader, multidimensional approach to defining and measuring farm viability that could enable analyses that are relevant to critical sustainability concerns for US agriculture. (shrink)

Demoscene is a computer subculture that proliferated throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This article examines one aspect of the Demoscene culture, the production of the ‘Demo’, a computer animation generated and performed in real-time visualization through digital code. I analyse the Demo as a technological and aesthetic form, speculating on its possibilities for theorizing a unique mode of digital image experience.

Physicists and historians of science have always held that Isaac Newton should receive credit for the first proof that inverse-square orbits must be conics. This conviction derives from a brief argument, regarded as essentially correct, given by Newton in the Principia. Recently, however, it has been contended that this outline or sketch contains irreparable logical flaws. Here, the logical structure of this outline of Newton's, as well as the details that this outline omits, are carefully examined. We find that whilst (...) his argument does indeed contain a flaw, it is a minor omission rather than a serious logical error. Having rectified this omission, we show how Newton's outline expands into a convincing proof that inverse-square orbits must be conics. (shrink)

In this study, we test the security of a crucial plank in the Principia’s mathematical foundation, namely Newton’s path leading to his solution of the famous Inverse Kepler Problem: a body attracted toward an immovable center by a centripetal force inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the center must move on a conic having a focus in that center. This path begins with his definitions of centripetal and motive force, moves through the second law of motion, then (...) traverses Propositions I, II, and VI, before coming to an end with Propositions XI, XII, XIII and this trio’s first corollary. To test the security of this path, we answer the following questions. How far is Newton’s path from being truly rigorous? What would it take to clarify his ambiguous definitions and laws, supply missing details, and close logical gaps? In short, what would it take to make Newton’s route to the Inverse Kepler Problem completely convincing? The answer is very surprising: it takes far less than one might have expected, given that Newton carved this path in 1687.Keywords: Isaac Newton; Principia; Centripetal force; Second law of motion; Conic orbits; Inverse Kepler Problem. (shrink)

Intentional collective action -- Collective moral responsibility -- Collective guilt -- Individual responsibility for (and in) collective wrongs -- Collective obligation, individual obligation, and individual moral responsibility -- Individual moral responsibility in wrongful social practice.

Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse. This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, in this setting, any updating (...) rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape. (shrink)

Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of evidence—your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected‐accuracy‐based justification for planning to conditionalize on this evidence. This planning‐oriented justification extends to some cases where (...) you do not have transparent evidence, in the sense that your beliefs are not perfectly discriminating with respect to any non‐trivial facts. In other cases, accuracy considerations do not tell you to plan to conditionalize on any information at all, but rather to plan to follow a different updating rule. Even in the absence of evidence, accuracy considerations can guide your doxastic plan. (shrink)

People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic---but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the *Countable Sure Thing Principle*, as well as an infinitary generalization of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Independence axiom, which we call *Countable (...) Independence*. In violating these principles, they display foibles like those of people who deviate from standard expected utility theory in more mundane cases: they choose dominated strategies, pay to avoid information, and reject expert advice. We precisely characterize the preference relations that satisfy Countable Independence in several equivalent ways: a structural constraint on preferences, a representation theorem, and the principle we began with, that every prospect has a value that some outcome could have. (shrink)

This special issue of IJFAB starts from the premise that fitness is a feminist issue, and, more specifically, it is an issue that ought to be of concern to feminists interested in bioethics. While a neglected concept in feminist bio-ethics, fitness is of key importance to women’s health and well-being. Not only that, it is also an area of women’s lives that invites unwelcome policing and advice from friends, family members, medical practitioners, and even strangers. People have a difficult time (...) prying apart the idea of fitness from that of weight loss. Most women who embark on a fitness routine have weight loss among their primary goals.Since late 2011, we and a host of guest authors have been exploring the... (shrink)

Laurie Paul has recently argued that transformative experiences pose a problem for decision theory. According to Paul, agents facing transformative experiences do not possess the states required for decision theory to formulate its prescriptions. Agents facing transformative experiences are impoverished relative to their decision problems, and decision theory doesn’t know what to do with impoverished agents. Richard Pettigrew takes Paul’s challenge seriously. He grants that decision theory cannot handle decision problems involving transformative experiences. To deal with the problems posed by (...) transformative experiences, Pettigrew proposes two alterations to decision theory. The first alteration is meant to handle the problem posed by epistemically transformative experiences, and the second alteration is meant to handle the problem posed by personally transformative experiences. I argue that Pettigrew’s proposed alterations are untenable. Pettigrew’s novel decision theory faces both formal and philosophical problems. It is doubtful that Pettigrew can formulate the sort of decision theory he wants, and further doubtful that he should want such a decision theory in the first place. Moreover, the issues with Pettigrew’s proposed alterations help reveal issues with Paul’s initial challenge to decision theory. I suggest that transformative experiences should not be taken to pose a problem for decision theory, but should instead be taken to pose a topic for ethics. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

Suppose that, for reasons of animal welfare, it would be better if everyone stopped eating chicken. Does it follow that you should stop eating chicken? Proponents of the “inefficacy objection” argue that, due to the scale and complexity of markets, the expected effects of your chicken purchases are negligible. So the expected effects of eating chicken do not make it wrong. -/- We argue that this objection does not succeed, in two steps. First, empirical data about chicken production tells us (...) that the expected effects of consuming *many* chickens are not negligible. Second, this implies that the expected effect of consuming one chicken is ordinarily not negligible. *Parity* between your purchase and other counterfactual purchases and *uncertainty* about others’ consumption behavior each tend to pull the expected effect of a single purchase toward the average large scale effect. While some purchases do have negligible expected effects, many do not. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

What can nurse scientists learn from Rorty in the development of a philosophical foundation? Indeed, Rorty in his 1989 text entitled Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity tantalizes the reader with debates of reason 'against' philosophizing. Forget truth seeking; move on to what matters. Rorty would rather the 'high brow' thinking go to those that do the work in order to make the effort useful. Nursing as an applied science, has something real that is worth looking at, and that nurse researchers need (...) to think about. And as a profession built upon relationships, we should be thinking of the exchanges we have with those around us, of the contrasts in vocabularies used and of the contingencies involved, letting this launch us into our imaginings and areas of enquiry. The business of nurse researchers is to study what nurses do – how we care; Rorty would have us care. But, not to dismiss the reflective thinker as Rorty advocates for the self-doubting ironist to continue to seek the final vocabulary, the ideal of what 'this' means, accepting this as the best to be offered at the time. As a science struggling to find foundation, we need only to look at what we do and value – as antifoundational as Rorty portrays himself, Rorty 'ironically' may have revealed a foundation for nursing science that is consistent with its path. (shrink)

In response to Smith, I argue that probabilities cannot be rationally neglected. I show that Smith’s proposal for ignoring low-probability outcomes must, on pain of violating dominance reasoning, license taking arbitrarily high risk for arbitrarily little reward.

This paper is an attempt to identify a functional division of labour in art studies. To that end I have adopted the strategically minimalist approach advocated by Philip McShane in Method in Theology: Revisions and Implementations (2007).

Written for the general reader and the student of moral philosophy, this book provides a clear and unified treatment of Kant's theory of morals. Bruce Aune takes into account all of Kant's principal writings on morality and presents them in a contemporary idiom. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important (...) books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

(2001). Domestic violence and hate crimes: Acknowledging two levels of responsibility. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 31-43. doi: 10.1080/0731129X.2001.9992106.

In this book, Bruce Waller attacks two prevalent philosophical beliefs. First, he argues that moral responsibility must be rejected; there is no room for such a notion within our naturalist framework. Second, he denies the common assumption that moral responsibility is inseparably linked with individual freedom. Rejection of moral responsibility does not entail the demise of individual freedom; instead, individual freedom is enhanced by the rejection of moral responsibility. According to this theory of "no-fault naturalism," no one deserves either (...) blame or reward.In the course of arguing against moral responsibility, Waller critiques major compatibilist arguments-by Dennett, Frankfurt, Strawson, Bennett, Wolf, Hampshire, Glover, Rachels, Sher, and others. In addition, the implications of denying moral responsibility-for individual freedom, for moral judgments and moral behavior, and for social justice-are examined; the supposed dire consequences of the denial of moral responsibility are challenged; and the benefits of denying moral responsibility are described. Author note: Bruce N. Waller, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio, is the author of Critical Thinking: Consider the Verdict. (shrink)

The second edition of The Great Psychotherapy Debate has been updated and revised to include a history of healing practices, medicine, and psychotherapy, an expanded theoretical presentation of the contextual model, an examination of therapist effects, and a thorough review of the research on common factors such as the alliance, expectations, and empathy.

The epistemology of disagreement standardly divides conciliationist views from steadfast views. But both sorts of views are subject to counterexample—indeed, both sorts of views are subject to the same counterexample. After presenting this counterexample, I explore how the epistemology of disagreement should be reconceptualized in light of it.

RésuméJ'examine ici la plausibilité du perfectionnisme, compris comme une théorie morale dotée d'une structure conséquentialiste maximisante et du principe d'action suivant: maximise la valeur perfectionniste. Je soutiens que: 1) la structure en question ne répond pas aux préoccupations principales qui ont été responsables de l'intérêt récent pour ce type de théorie; 2) le principe d'action n'a que l'apparence de la précision; 3) nous ne pouvons promouvoir la valeur perfectionniste, vue comme une exigence morale, qu'en l'intégrant à un cadre moral pluraliste; (...) et 4) si nous l'intégrons à un cadre moral pluraliste, alors le principe requérant sa promotion ne peut pas être un principe de maximisation. (shrink)

Few, if any, present‐day undergraduate degree courses in Theology include in their syllabus a study of the Epistle to the Hebrews or other New Testament writings other than the Gospels and the Pauline epistles. The result is in effect that we create a canon within a canon.This paper, originally read at a postgraduate seminar, gives reasons why Hebrews in particular should not be neglected.Hebrews provides evidence of the diversity of early Christian tradition, for example, with its teaching that it is (...) impossible to be re‐admitted to the community of faith, having once abandoned it, and with its unique use of Israel’s day of Atonement rites in its presentation of Christ. Moreover, the very genre of Hebrews merits particular interest.Hebrews also evidences a Christian community which has yet to break with Judaism. Its thoroughly Jewish background illustrates for students of the New Testament the necessity of knowing the Jewish Scriptures as well as the writings of the New Testament. Moreover, a study of the Epistle could make a constructive contribution to present‐day Jewish–Christian dialogue, even if in the past it has been enlisted on the side of a thinly‐disguised anti‐Semitism.Finally, Hebrews brings the student face to face with the metaphorical character of much of the language of the New Testament – a form of language which is not to be taken less seriously than other kinds of language; and in this case, Hebrews’ Day of Atonement metaphors issue in new insights – in an innovative theology of access to God.For this and other reasons, the study of Hebrews has an important contribution to make to theology degree syllabuses. (shrink)

On March, 24, 2020, 818 cases of COVID-19 had been reported in New South Wales, Australia, and new cases were increasing at an exponential rate. In anticipation of resource constraints arising in clinical settings as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a working party of ten ethicists was convened at the University of Sydney to draft an ethics framework to support resource allocation decisions. The framework guides decision-makers using a question-and-answer format, in language that avoids philosophical and medical technicality. The (...) working party met five times over the following week and then submitted a draft Framework for consideration by two groups of intensivists and one group of academic ethicists. It was also presented to a panel on a national current affairs programme. The Framework was then revised on the basis of feedback from these sources and made publicly available online on April 3, ten days after the initial meeting. The framework is published here in full to stimulate ongoing discussion about rapid development of user-friendly clinical ethics resources in ongoing and future pandemics. (shrink)

In A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation, Colleen Murphy devotes a full chapter to arguing that international criminal trials make significant contributions to political reconciliation within post-conflict and transitional societies. While she is right to claim that these trials serve an important function, I take issue with her with respect to what that important function is. Whereas Murphy focuses on the contributions international criminal prosecutions might make to political reconciliation within the borders of transitional societies, I claim instead that their (...) primary function is to restore order at the international level and to dispense justice. The aims of justice are not always consistent with the aims of reconciliation. Moreover, several features of international criminal trials should give us pause with respect even to how well, in fact, they manage to serve the ends of international justice. (shrink)