In both law and ethics, precedent shapes the deliberation of novel issues. Despite the interconnection between new and old decisions, few research ethics boards have an explicit mechanism for archiving issue-based research ethics decisions to inform future decisions. With the intent of promoting expediency, consistency, and accountability in REB decision-making, Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre implemented a “decision bank”: a formal mechanism for systematically capturing institutional REB decisions. We describe the development of the decision bank, its implementation, and the lessons we (...) have learned from both. The decision bank, which is categorized by general issue themes such as consent, study design, and privacy, is still in the early implementation phase, but it provides a much-needed method to address the paucity of formal mechanisms and literature in a biomedical field otherwise inundated with evidence-based information. (shrink)

The distinction between cause and effect has been viewed as crucial to scientific thinking. David Hume dedicates many pages of his “Enquiry” to the argument of causality, and it appears to be of central vitality to our understanding of the world, despite the fact that he can find nothing to the notion. In Hume's prose, one senses both disappointment and heroic resignation. Some philosophers view causality—sometimes even universal causality—as a needed assumption or basic “presupposition” of science. It is sometimes argued (...) that universal causation, or at least its probability, is required for the induction's justification. (shrink)

Probabilistic connections are simple to reproduce counterfactually or hypothetically, since this involves simply adding the required statements to our evidential corpus without worrying about erasing some statements. In the serious uniform causal connections' case, the problem is complicated by the fact that some erasures will almost always have to be made, and that leads to the problems of intention and vagueness. On the other hand, uniform causal connections, considered both counterfactually and hypothetically, are exactly the connections needed to be taken (...) into account in life. Finally, however, some dispositions can be no more than hard facts. (shrink)

It has been manifested over the past few centuries that science provides superbly powerful tools and methods for modifying the natural world. Many people would agree that it has also offered explanation and understanding. But it is still unclear that these tools and methodology can propel us to solve all of the cognitive dilemmas that exist. It has been assumed, for example, that scientific knowledge and religious knowledge are so different that they cannot even clash with one another. But the (...) recent arguments about creation and evolution show that perhaps they can come into conflict after all. (shrink)

There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...) lower probabilities, etc. Updating probabilities introduces new considerations, and it is shown that the representation of belief as a set of probabilities conflicts in this regard with the updating procedures advocated by Shafer. The attempt to make subjectivistic probability plausible as a doctrine of rational belief by making it more flowery -- i.e., by adding new dimensions -- does not succeed. But, if one is going to represent beliefs by sets of distributions, those sets of distributions might as well be based in statistical knowledge, as they are in epistemological or evidential probability. (shrink)

To the Editor: It was with great interest that our Canadian Palliative Sedation Therapy Guideline working group read Jeffrey Berger's recent article ("Rethinking Guidelines for the Use of Palliative Sedation," May-June 2010). Given our own group's efforts to develop national guidelines, we have rethought the issue of palliative sedation therapy several times over the past year.The use of clear and concise definitions is fundamental to the development of any consensus guidelines on this topic. In the article, the term "palliative sedation (...) to unconsciousness," or PSU, implies the concerning assumption that sedation will knowingly be to unconsciousness in the palliative case under consideration. This conflicts with .. (shrink)

In the previous chapter, it was considered in very broad terms what can happen when the ties are cut between observability and certainty. More needs to be proved, however, before the framework developed can be applied to the types of real theories of interest: quantum mechanics, relativity, and other such highbrow creations. Particularly, close observation at the nature of those statements is needed in the corpus of practical certainties that comprise the analytical observational content of the corpus that we get (...) from the sorts of theories accepted. Consideration of choices among distinct theories is needed, if such there be, having the same analytical observational content. (shrink)

Efforts to get scientific knowledge reap valuable knowledge about the world. It is often rewarding simply to know more, but a greater benefit of knowing more is that, knowing the future, one can make sound decisions. There is an easy and unified decision theory that, if only it applied to everything, would solve all the decision problems humans face. It is known as “Bayesian” decision theory because it requires a set of probabilities determined over the world states.

There are two main classes of interpretations of probability. The first are those that rely on a measure of frequency. The other is those that take a logical or subjective view of a unique event, independent of past or future events. The interpretation of probability which is used in the book is then defined as evidential probability, a function based on a set of known statements based on frequency or measure. The properties of probability are then enumerated and explained. Probabilities (...) can also be based on statistical inference. Statistical inferences are statistical properties with high probability based on statistical evidence. (shrink)

This chapter chronicles the complex relationship between philosophy and science throughout history. It illustrates how they have mutually influenced each other in modern times. Philosophy and science are thought to be polar opposites, but they are not as different as they seem to be. Philosophy is considered part of the humanities and not the sciences. However, it can be argued that schools of science branched off from the domain of philosophy. Scientific studies start as or are inspired by philosophical ideas. (...) Mathematics, the very paradigm of a logical and rational discipline that much of science embodies, is a lot like philosophy in that it involves ideas that have no empirical basis and uses logic. (shrink)

This collection represents the best recent work on the subject and includes essays by Clark Glymour, James H. Fetzer, and Wesley C. Salmon.

The earliest Analects yet discovered, this work provides us with a new perspective on the central canonical text that has defined Chinese culture--and clearly illuminates the spirit and values of Confucius.

Crawshay-Williams defines the scope of his book as the study of statements "put forward with a sort of claim to general acceptance by the company [to which they are addressed]". Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca would certainly agree that only such statements are capable of giving rise to controversy. But this point, and one other that I shall mention shortly, are nearly the only ones on which the two books agree. And there is profound disagreement about how even this point is to (...) be interpreted. Crawshay-Williams is interested only in the extent to which the claim to acceptance can be satisfied. The phrase I have just quoted is his definition of statements that are testable. His book is largely a discussion of the tests that can be used to determine the correctness of such statements. The implication is, of course, that any genuine controversy can, in principle, be adjudicated by applying such tests to the statements over which it arises. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, on the other hand, are primarily interested in ways of expressing the claim to general acceptance. Their book is mainly a study of the means by which a statement, or a series of them, can be put forward so as to claim general acceptance by the company to which it is addressed. For them, controversy consists in claims and counter-claims. It can thus be decisively settled only when a claim is sufficiently overpowering to silence all counter-claims. But such a result can be accomplished only by force or hypnosis, and these settle controversy not by adjudicating it but by abolishing it. Controversy cannot therefore be adjudicated at all, except in relatively trivial cases. (shrink)

In order for an “ideal” to make relevance, it is not mandatory, certainly, to be able to reach it. It is enough that it is possible to approach it, and even only to a certain extent. To be able to approach the ideal arbitrarily closely is not needed, even “theoretically.” To make sense of the “improvement” we can get in approaching an ideal, the measure of how close the ideal needs to be must be determined. In the thermometer's case, the (...) measure was determined by the bias in the error distribution at different points on the scale. An essentially internal measure was given, a measure related closely to the pertinent kind of measurement. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the philosophy and logic behind the mathematical ideas of first-order logic, metalanguages, arithmetic, and geometry. It familiarizes the reader to these mathematical ideas, which will be used in succeeding chapters. The chapter also contrasts that mathematical or logical theories can utilize these mathematical ideas, while scientific theories will find them inapplicable. First-order logic involves conclusions based on premises which are given to be true with no room for imprecision or vagueness, both of which are crucial to the (...) productive use of scientific language. Metalanguage is contrasted with object language, in which scientific laws are expressed. Both arithmetic and geometry are used with idealized, abstract objects and have a limited physical application. (shrink)

In general, quantities should be interpreted in the same way as random quantities or random variables are interpreted in statistics: namely, as functions from a domain to a special set of objects. The fact that they reflect to some level the structure of a set of mathematical objects makes the range of these functions extraordinary. Measurement, meanwhile, is not a process of “assigning numbers to objects,” but rather of formulating the values of quantity functions given to objects. More briefly, it (...) is giving magnitudes to objects. (shrink)

One problem that has been plaguing for the long term is the problem of choosing the levels of rational corpora. Since what goes into a corpus is what has a probability higher than the index of that corpus, that index has a bearing on what is in a corpus. We have two levels to deal with, since the focus is both with the evidential corpus and with the practical corpus. What principles can be used to select these levels? A practical (...) way to approach this question is through the analysis of full belief or acceptance. Partial belief is distinguished in terms of a propensity to make, or fail to make, bets. (shrink)

Knowledge is distinguished between knowledge about the relations of ideas, like mathematical truths and logic, and knowledge of matters of fact or empirical knowledge of the world, which is derived from “sense experience.” Observational sentences are based on sense experience and can sometimes be judged to be true or false. Thus, the possibility of errors in observational judgment must be allowed. We can acknowledge the existence of observational error in general, and even be unable to specify any particular observation statement (...) that is certain, and yet be able to accept most observation statements on the basis of the corresponding reports and to reject others. (shrink)

An answer to the fact that it is very complex to find convincing grounds for considering in universal deterministic uniformity has been to suggest that causality is indeed universal: all events are caused—but many, if not all, causal laws are statistical or probabilistic in character. Thus, a law of causality does not spell out what will be the effect of a given cause in a particular case; it just provides a probability of a given effect when the cause is determined. (...) This seems suitable not only in the rarified air of quantum mechanics, but particularly in the swampy territory of human activity: in epidemiology, psychology, economics, and the like. One way of interpreting statistical relationships as causal is through the law of large numbers. (shrink)

For this reason also the question is asked, whether happiness is to be acquired by learning or by habituation or some other sort of training, or comes in virtue of some divine providence or again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness should be god-given, and most surely god-given of all human things inasmuch as it is the best. But this question would perhaps be more appropriate to another inquiry; (...) happiness seems, however, even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of virtue and some process of learning or training, to be among the most god-like things; for that which is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best thing in the world, and something godlike... (shrink)

Readers of the Analects of Confucius tend to approach the text asking what Confucius believed; what were the views that comprise the 'ism' appended to his name in English? A Reader's Companion to the Confucian Analects suggests a different approach: he basically taught his students not doctrines, but ways for each of them to find meaning and purpose in their lives, and how best to serve their society. Because his students were not alike, his instruction could not be uniform; hence (...) the large number of incompatible readings that have been given to what he said. By providing brief essays, finding lists, background and comparative materials, and historical context, this Companion is not intended as another interpretation of the ancient text, but rather as an aid for contemporary students to develop their own interpretive reading of it, in the hope of thereby aiding them in the search for meaning, purpose, and service in their own lives - as seventy-three generations of Chinese have done. (shrink)

Coping with uncertainty is a necessary part of ordinary life and is crucial to an understanding of how the mind works. For example, it is a vital element in developing artificial intelligence that will not be undermined by its own rigidities. There have been many approaches to the problem of uncertain inference, ranging from probability to inductive logic to nonmonotonic logic. Thisbook seeks to provide a clear exposition of these approaches within a unified framework. The principal market for the book (...) will be students and professionals in philosophy, computer science, and AI. Among the special features of the book are a chapter on evidential probability, which has not received a basic exposition before; chapters on nonmonotonic reasoning and theory replacement, matters rarely addressed in standard philosophical texts; and chapters on Mill's methods and statistical inference that cover material sorely lacking in the usual treatments of AI and computer science. (shrink)