Over the years, egalitarian philosophers have made some challenging claims about the nature of egalitarianism. They have argued that egalitarian reasoning should make us reject the Pareto principle; that the Rawlsian leximin principle is not an egalitarian idea; that the Pigou–Dalton principle needs modification; that the intersection approach faces deep problems; that the numbers should not count within an egalitarian framework, and that egalitarianism should make us reject the property of transitivity in normative reasoning. In this paper, taking the recent (...) philosophical debate on equality versus priority as the starting point, I review these claims from the point of view of an economist. (shrink)

Where there is a fixed population (i.e., who exists does not depend on what choice an agent makes), the deontic version of anonymous Paretian egalitarianism holds that an option is just if and only if (1) it is anonymously Pareto optimal (i.e., no feasible alternative has a permutation that is Pareto superior), and (2) it is no less equal than any other anonymously Pareto optimal option. We shall develop and discuss a version of this approach for the variable population case (...) (i.e., where who exists does depend on what choice an agent makes). More specifically, we shall develop and discuss it in the context of a person-affecting framework—in which an option is just if and only if it wrongs no one according to certain plausible conditions on wronging. (shrink)

The most influential egalitarian perspective is undoubtedly Rawls's (1971, 1993), which assigns absolute priority to the least advantaged in society (the difference principle). However, many have claimed that even though an egalitarian perspective should imply some priority to the worst off, the Rawlsian perspective is too demanding. One response to this criticism is to argue in favour of an egalitarian perspective that never assigns absolute priority to the worse off, but which still includes limited priority to those members of society (...) in distributive conflicts. A different response to the demandingness criticism is to agree that the worse off should not always be given absolute priority, but to argue that there are some cases where they should be. In this paper, we elaborate on this view, and look at the possibility of deviating from the leximin approach within this category of egalitarian principles. (shrink)

Utopian rationalism names the belief that science has made utopia a practical possibility. Its characteristics include determinism, collectivism, distrust of individual initiative and belief in the superiority of collective planning in securing human happiness. The first section traces the utopian and dystopian tradition into modern science fiction. The ideas collected here are systematized in the next section, which on all points dismisses the tenets and claims of utopian rationalism as false, and in a final section, which discusses utopian thinking and (...) its dangers in general. Utopian thinking is traced to three traits of human nature, namely, the quests for happiness, perfection, and submergence. (shrink)

I will demonstrate how religious change repeatedly confronts the sociology of religion with new problems of interpretation and explanation. In the first part (I), I will take a closer look at these problems at a macro sociological level. In doing so, I will provide a brief historical outline and link this to the respective problems of interpretation and explanation. This historical development allows us to discuss the various explanatory models. In the second part (II), I will take a different perspective (...) and switch to the micro sociological level. I will show how responding to the question of meaning is still possible in secular societies, where the answers handed down by religious traditions are no longer accepted as a matter of course. In this part, I will take up the problems of explanation previously outlined and trace in particular the transformation of church-based religion into subjective forms of religiosity. My paper focuses on the following questions: How are social developments and religious change interwoven? How do theories in the sociology of religion explain religious change? What does social modernization and functional differentiation mean for the individual? What effects does modernity have on religion and in particular on the religiosity of individuals? (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for psychic conflict within Seneca's moral psychology. Some scholars have taken Seneca's explicit claim in De Ira that the soul is unitary to preclude any kind of simultaneous psychic conflict, while other interpreters have suggested that Seneca views all cases of anger as instances of akrasia. I argue that Seneca's account of anger provides the resources for accommodating some types of simultaneous psychic conflict; however, he denies the possibility of psychic conflict between two action-generating impulses, (...) thus rejecting the phenomena of genuine akrasia and enkrateia. Although superficially counterintuitive, Seneca's cognitivist account of anger, according to which anger is complex and requires assent to the propositions that ‘I have been wronged’ and ‘I ought to seek revenge’, renders his denial of akrasia and enkrateia more plausible. (shrink)

Summary A. Vagueness is not definable in terms of behaviour (Section 4).

George Berkeley opens the Principles (Part I) with "a Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" including such ideas "as are perceiv'd by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind." Scholars have rejected this passage as being "philosophically impossible," not seriously meant, just a reference to John Locke's ideas of reflection, or not at all about "ideas." It is true, in a few unpublished manuscripts Berkeley used the term "ideas" for image-pictures of particular things (the Old Paradigm). But, (...) I argue, in the Theory of Vision he develops a New Paradigm; and if we follow Berkeley's advice to read his book "in the order [he] published them," then his "Survey of the Objects of Human Knowledge" makes perfect sense in the light of this New Paradigm. (shrink)

School-based Physical Education is important, especially to students with disabilities whose participation in physical activities out of school is limited. The development over time of participation-related constructs in relation to students’ perceived functioning and achievement is explored. Students in mainstream inclusive secondary school self-rated their PE-specific self-efficacy, general school self-efficacy, aptitude to participate in PE, and perceived physical and socio-cognitive functional skills at two timepoints, year 7 and year 9. Results were compared between three groups of students with: disabilities, high (...) grades, or low grades in PE. Over time, perceived physical skills of students with disabilities became strongly associated with self-efficacy and aptitude to participate. Perceived socio-cognitive skills in the study sample improved and had a positive effect on PE-specific self-efficacy. Efforts should be made to limit the accelerated negative impact of perceived restricted functioning of students with disabilities. Grading criteria need to be developed to comply with standards adapted to fit abilities of students with disabilities. Meaningful learning experiences appear to be created when participation is promoted and capacity beliefs are boosted. Allocating resources to support the development of students’ socio-cognitive skills seem to have potential for overall positive school outcome. (shrink)

This essay contributes to the discussions about the end, or rather reform, of the Counseling Movement. One central problem concerns the question of whether, apart from the positive impact psychology has had on pastoral counseling, this influence may not also have led to an obfuscation of theological profile. This question is addressed in view of the language used in pastoral counseling. First, various implications of the use of psychological terms are exposed insofar as these influence pastors’ professional identity as well (...) as the pastoral communication. In a second step, a parishioner-oriented communication model is proposed, which renders different language games complementary to each other. (shrink)

Religiöse Bildung findet in einem krisenhaften Umfeld statt, das religionspädagogisch etablierte Konzepte fundamental herausfordert. Unter Rückgriff auf fachgeschichtliche Ressourcen und aktuelle Debatten in den Bezugsdisziplinen der Religionspädagogik werden die Probleme, Potenziale und Perspektiven einer kritisch-emanzipatorischen Religionspädagogik diskutiert. Besonders die religionspädagogische Reformdekade um 1968 gerät so in den Blick, weil in dieser der soziopolitische Kontext religiöser Bildung besonders intensiv reflektiert wurde.

Körner's notion of vagueness, its relation to ostension and the alledged gulf between logic and experience are examined. Ostension is seen not to cause vagueness ~ there are precise concepts of mathematics which can be ostensively introduced. A distinction is drawn between classical logic not applying to the vague world and not applying to the vague language. The claims about logic and the vague world are unverifiable claims about existence. Körner's attempt to elimmate the seeming incompatibility between vague language and (...) logic leads to a Protagorean relativism which is rejected. It is denied that the incompatibility between vagueness and classical logic causes a gulf between two sublanguages; instead, ordinary language is held to contain both and so to be inconsistent. (shrink)

Did George Berkeley, as I argued long ago in Belfrage (1986), defend a theory of "emotive meaning" in his Manuscript Introduction (an early version of the introduction to the Principles)? This question has raised a broad spectrum of different issues, which I think it is important to keep apart, such as rhetorical, psychological, semantic, ethical, metaphysical, and theological aspects. In the present paper, I hope to clear the ground of ambiguities, which have led to serious misunderstandings on this interesting point (...) in Berkeley's unpublished philosophy. I open with a summary account of the historical context. (shrink)

Fairness preferences fundamentally affect individual behavior and play an important role in shaping social and political institutions. However, people differ both with respect to what they view as fair and with respect to how much weight they attach to fairness considerations. In this article, we study the role of family background in explaining these heterogeneities in fairness preferences. In particular, we examine how socioeconomic background relates to fairness views and to how people make trade-offs between fairness and self-interest. To study (...) this, we conducted an economic experiment with a representative sample of 14- to 15-year-old and matched the experimental data to administrative data on parental income and education. The participants made two distributive choices in the experiment. The first choice was to distribute money between themselves and another participant in a situation where there was no difference in merit. The second choice was to distribute money between two other participants with unequal merits. Our main finding is that there is a systematic difference in fairness view between children from low-socioceconomic status families and the rest of the participants; more than 50 percent of the participants from low-SES families are egalitarians, whereas only about 20 percent in the rest of the sample hold this fairness view. In contrast, we find no significant difference in the weight attached to fairness between children from different socioeconomic groups. (shrink)

Friendship (philia) plays a prominent role in Aristotle’s ethical thought. It is only within the context of his discussions of philia that Aristotle explicitly mentions acting for the sake of another’s good: friends, he claims, wish and do good things for one another for the sake of the friend. However, it is not clear whether Aristotle limits disinterested wishing well to the complete friendships of virtuous agents. I argue that he does not; friends of all varieties, to the extent that (...) they are friends at all, wish and act well for the friend’s sake. I also consider whether Aristotle’s remarks on self-love and friendship might provide reason for thinking that love for others is and ought to be an extension of self-love. I reject the idea that love for a friend is justified by self-love: the virtuous agent does not care about the good of her friends only insofar as she sees those friends as her other selves. (shrink)

This article explores the extent to which Christian traditions, especially the monastic way of life, possess a transformative potential toward a socio-ecological society. Christian ideas are not unbroken utopias, but they possess an eschatological proviso based on God's otherness. Neither is monastic life a prefiguration of the Kingdom of God, nor do Christians or the Church prefigure a heavenly society, but Christian action and religious communities can be regarded as forms of _refigurative practice_, which can fail again and again without (...) losing hope. This article describes the relationship between niche and transformation, between monastic cell and utopia, as such a refigurative practice. (shrink)

Apollo's failure to give oracles in P. Oxy. 3723 has its closest parallel in Tibullus' elegy 2, 3, where the god is described as completely helpless and bereft of all his divine attributes as a result of his servitium amoris. The seeming parallel in Ovid's narration of the story of Apollo and Daphne in the first book of the Metamorphoses exhibits a more complicated concept: Apollo presents himself in command of all divine powers, but mourns the failure of these powers (...) to archieve the love of Daphne. He does not humiliate himself as in Tib. 2, 3, but the comic element in his appearance consists in the self-reflected discrepancy between his divine self-confidence and his erotic failure. The haughtiness of Ovid's Apollo is in line with the broader context of met. 1, especially his defeat of Pytho and his quarrel with Cupido. Ovid regularly contrasts in the early books of the Metamorphoses ‘epic’ and ‘elegiac’ structural sections. In book one he programmatically contrasts his modified concept of divine love not absorbing completely the god's personality with the exhausting and uncompromising divine servitium amoris in Tib. 2, 3. (shrink)