This chapter challenges the assumption of attention functioning as a means of preventing consciousness from getting overloaded, and also challenges the assumption of any relationships between management of scarce resources and the original biological function of attention. It emphasizes that attention is directly derived from mechanisms governing the control of basic movements. The author establishes the theoretical stage through discussions on the implications of the brain’s preference to stimulus events and action plans in a feature-based manner and processing information through (...) different mechanisms. The chapter also discusses many empirical findings supporting the conception of action planning and action control having the potential to determine perception and attention. (shrink)

This paper seeks to introduce cultural techniques to an Anglophone readership. Specifically geared towards an Anglophone readership, the paper relates the re-emergence of cultural techniques (a concept first employed in the 19th century in an agricultural context) to the changing intellectual constellation of postwar Germany. More specifically, it traces how the concept evolved from – and reacted against – so-called German media theory, a decidedly anti-hermeneutic and anti-humanist current of thought frequently associated with the work of Friedrich Kittler. Post-hermeneutic rather (...) than anti-hermeneutic in its outlook, the reconceptualization of cultural techniques aims at presenting them as chains of operations that link humans, things, media and even animals. To investigate cultural techniques is to shift the analytic gaze from ontological distinctions to the ontic operations that gave rise to the former in the first place. As Siegert points out, this shift recalls certain concurrent developments within the North American posthumanities; the paper therefore also includes a discussion of the similarities and differences between German and North American posthumanism. (shrink)

Responsive ethics stands out against every sort of communicative ethics merely orientated towards common aims, general norms, and utility calculation. It is based on a clear contrast between being responsible for what one has done and responding to the Other′s appeal and claim. The logic of response includes aspects like temporal delay, inevitability, gifts and freedom arising from elsewhere. Both – being responsible for and responding to – meet through the Third Party which intervenes in terms of habits and rules, (...) yet without being able to cover the extra-ordinary demands of the Other. Responsive ethics defends the unsocial within sociality. (shrink)

Twenty Years After Communism is concerned with the explosion of a politics of memory triggered by the fall of state socialism in Eastern Europe, and it takes a comparative look at the ways that communism and its demise have been commemorated by major political actors across the region.

The article delineates the program of a praxeology of truth that allows for studying the dynamics and variability of truth in the sense of situated doing truth. It proposes a heuristic differentiation between »truth scenes« and »truth figures« that helps to analyze the emergence of theories of truth as well as that of specific truth cultures.

An ethical epoché is required to leave the terrain of a self-evident morality and question its origin. In particular, four fundamental motifs of the ethical dimension are identified: pathos, to be thematised as an alternative to the persistent activist unilateralism; response, which always involves body and soul; diastasis with its stumbles and subtractions; and finally coaffection, in which the social dimension of experience is announced. Ethical behaviour feeds on the magma of pathos, which in turn would be blind and directionless (...) without any ethos. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Marxistische Gesellschaftsdialektik oder "Systemtheorie der Gesellschaft"?" verfügbar.

To speak of Merleau‐Ponty means to speak of phenomenology in France. If French phenomenology found its own idiom in the 1930s, one which dominated French thinking until the 1960s and even left its mark on the structuralist break with phenomenology, that is very largely due to the patient philosophical work of Merleau‐Ponty. A philosophy which, as Merleau‐Ponty himself points out, dwells in a world to which there are several modes of access, not all of them open to the philosopher, will (...) find its place “where the transition from one's own self into the world and to the other occurs; at the place where the roads cross.”. (shrink)

The following considerations do not take their point of departure in legal logic, legal pragmatics, or in the critique of law but rather in the genesis of law, its emergence, and its place in actual experience. In particular, I would like to look at law as a special form of order and ordering power. Reference to “the law” can only be provisional, as it concerns a variable term that also changes in its linguistic designations.I will concentrate on the pre-juridical and (...) supra-juridical aspects of legal practice itself. Accordingly, although the law will not hereinafter be the object of an inquiry from an external point of view, I assume that legal thinking, as all thinking that takes place in determinate orders, has its own peculiar outside.Here I follow Foucault’s injunction concerning a penser du dehors. Close scrutiny of the internal/external difference opens up critical perspectives that spring from “the very core of law.” In general, the following pages take their cue from the responsively oriented and ‘pathically’ grounded phenomenology I have developed hitherto. (shrink)

Experience is investigated according to those breaking points where the unexpected surfaces and the surprise of the extraordinary and the alien breaks through. What happens is always in the postponement between pathos and response; this represents the fundamental agreement of a responsive phenomenology: it is never a quiet succession, but always something arriving too early or too late. Threshold experiences such as hesitation, delay, waiting, pausing, stumbling are investigated in this framework.

Living corporeity is the intermediate element between nature and culture, which must be thought of as a reciprocal interconnection, since as corporeal beings we always move on a threshold. In the reflection of the bodily self, a doubling between the living body as a functioning subject and as a material object is revealed; after all, even one's own body sometimes takes on the features of a foreign body, as is the case in the experience of illness. In the technical instrument, (...) the body is prolonged and this highlights the connection between the technique of the thing and the technique of the self; however, despite the gradual autonomisation of the technical element from the living corporeity, there remains what escapes calculation and looms large in the subtraction of the alien. (shrink)

The idea that the city is a place of sin and immorality is as old as urban civilization. But what does anti-urban thought mean in societies which are highly urbanized under the conditions of modern industrialism? Furthermore, is anti-urbanism in the interwar period a German völkisch phenomenon––one further stride on Germany's special path? And what does rural revival and the “back-to-the-land” cult mean in Great Britain, the first industrial nation? This article seeks to provide an answer to these questions by (...) exploring anti-urbanist writing between the End of the First World War and 1933 in Germany, and 1939 in Britain. By examining two key themes it aims to show that the clear-cut distinction between German anti-urban radicalisation and the West's coming to terms with urbanisation cannot be maintained. Firstly, attention will be drawn to the ambiguity of perceptions of the city in the writings of “Conservative Revolutionary” authors in the Weimar Republic. In a second step, the British “back-to-the-land” movement, whose advocates developed comprehensive anti-urban third-way theories in the interwar period and were themselves part of a broader popular anti-industrial movement and a rural cult throughout the 1930s, will be examined. (shrink)

Dass "Wahrnehmung" sich historisch verändert, ist in den gegenwärtigen Debatten ebenso präsent wie die Einsicht, dass "Geschichte" selbst hochgradig wahrnehmungsabhängig ist. Die Autoren dieses Bandes erörtern die wechselseitigen Beziehungen von Wahrnehmung und Geschichte nicht allein theoretisch, sondern vorrangig materialbezogen - mit Blick auf konkrete Fallbeispiele. Das Spektrum der Beiträge reicht von der Erörterung der historischen Vermittlungsfunktion technischer Medien und verschiedener Künste bis zur Frage, welcher Logik Wahrnehmung und Vergessen der jüngsten und eigenen Geschichte unterliegen. Michel Foucault und Marshall McLuhan werden (...) als Vordenker einer solchen Aisthesis materialis, zu der hier "Markierungen" geliefert werden, begriffen. Beide kommen mit einem programmatischen Text auch selbst zu Wort. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Leibliches Verhalten, sei es Gehen, Wahrnehmen, Sprechen, Hantieren, Essen oder raumzeitliche Orientierung, entspringt diesseits von Natur und Kultur einer Lebenswelt, in der alles mehr oder weniger natürlich vorgeprägt wie künstlich geformt ist. Es vollzieht sich in zwischenleiblichem Verkehr mit Anderen. Es verkörpert sich in einer Zwischensphäre von Werkzeugen, Apparaturen, Medien und Symbolen. Es zehrt von einer natürlichen Vorgeschichte. In seiner Doppelrolle als Leibkörper bildet der Leib eine „Umschlagstelle” zwischen Natur und Kultur, zwischen Eigenem und Fremdem. So fungiert die Natur (...) innerhalb der Lebenswelt, bevor sie sich in Form alltäglicher Störungen, methodisch und technisch herbeigeführter Eingriffe oder pathologischer Spaltungen absondert. Unser Leib ist nicht aus einem Guss. Reine Natur und reine Kultur sind Konstrukte der Moderne, die aus einer naturalistischen oder kulturalistischen Leibvergessenheit resultieren. (shrink)

Starting from the experience of the Other, phenomenology takes otherness as something which withdraws from my own experience and exceeds the limits of our common orders. Radical otherness is something extraordinary, arising in my own body, situated between us and striking us before we look for it. Psychiatry confronts us with a peculiar sort of pathological otherness which in ethnopsychiatry is doubled to an otherness of a higher degree. We encounter the anomalies of other orders as if we were dipping (...) into the Other’s shadow. This brings up many questions. How is the pathic related to the pathological, the normal to the abnormal? How can psychiatry take account of the intercultural Other without sacrificing its otherness to universal points of view? How is the unconsciousness of our own culture connected with that of other cultures? To what extent does intercultural otherness affect our intracultural otherness? Is there an alternative to the extremes of fundamentalism and globalism, which tend either to repress otherness or to level it? (shrink)