Philosophers such as Eric Katz and Robert Elliot have argued against ecological restoration on the grounds that restored landscapes are no longer natural. Katz calls them “artifacts,” but the sharp distinction between nature and artifact doesn’t hold up. Why should the products of one particular natural species be seen as somehow escaping nature? Katz’s account identifies an artifact too tightly with the intentions of its creator: artifacts always have more to them than what their creators intended, and furthermore the intention (...) behind some artifacts might explicitly be to allow things to happen unpredictably. Indeed, to build any artifact is to employ forces that go beyond the builder: in this sense all artifacts are natural. Recognizing the naturalness of artifacts can help encourage the key environmental virtues of self-knowledge and humility. (shrink)

While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules in decision making, especially tie-breaking rules and (...) coordination rules. It is argued that within RC no satisfying account of such rule-following behav- ior can be given. In particular it is impossible to determine suitable pref- erence orderings such that coordinating may be understood as maximizing relative to these orderings. Still, once there is coordination, following a coordination rule may be perfectly consistent with the basic assumptions of RC. So there might be a more complex theory of action that incorpo- rates RC as well as a satisfying theory of rule-guided behavior. (shrink)

Unlike the supergame model assumes agents in exchange situations will normally not be perfectly informed on past behaviour of their partners. Also, they will be able to choose their partners to a certain extend. A formal model is presented that attempts to take account of these facts. It is supposed that for any actor the probability of finding a partner for a lucrative exchange depends on his past behaviour. A model of reputation formation is presented as a formal description of (...) this interdependency. Based on this model it is shown that under certain conditions only co-operative conduct will pay in the long run. Thus it is confirmed that - given the mechanism of trust - rational agents may act trustworthy. (shrink)

Metaphysical investigation often proceeds by way of linguistic meaning. This tradition relies on an assumption about meanings, namely that they can be given in terms of referential relations and truth. Chomsky and others have illustrated the difficulty with this externalist hypothesis regarding natural language meanings, which implies that natural languages are ill‐suited for the purposes of metaphysical investigation. In reply to this discordance between the features of natural languages and the goals of metaphysical investigation, metaphysicians propose that we look to (...) the invented languages used to express our best scientific theories as metaphysical guides, in the hope that these languages are better behaved. I argue that this retreat is beset with similar troubles for the metaphysician. In particular, I argue that central terms in the field of biology, namely ‘gene’ and ‘species’, exhibit a kind of lexical flexibility that renders them, much like their natural language counterparts, ill‐suited for the metaphysician's aims. (shrink)

While Gödel’s first theorem remains valid under substitution of various provability predicates, Gödel’s second theorem does not. This is one reason to label G1 as “extensional” but to call G2 “intensional.” Although this asymmetry between G1 and G2 is known for long, no satisfying account of G2’s intensionality has been put forward. After briefly reviewing the discussion so far, the paper presents a new analysis based on two observations. First, the underestimated role of provable closure under modus. Provable closure under (...) modus ponens—usually listed as the second derivability condition—or similar requirements, do not get much attention since their proof isn’t perceived as much of challenge. Closer inspection shows, however, that the requirement of provable closure under modus ponens interacts differently with different formalized proof predicates and has thus a direct bearing on the discussion of G2’s intensionality. Second, in order to establish the co-extensionality of various proof predicates and hence the extensionality of G1, the role informal consistency assumption play goes largely unnoticed and unanalyzed. Closer inspection shows, however, that if such informal consistency assumptions are being made precise, the former distinction between G1 and G2 becomes blurry and G2’s intensionality can be made go away. Both observation then support the thesis that the traditional extensional/intensional distinction is not as robust as the received view believed it to be. (shrink)

A basic conviction in moral non-cognitivism is: only hypothetical norms may be justified. Hartmut Kliemt argues for a moderate variant: there are only hypothetical justifications of norms whether the norms are hypothetical or categorical in kind. In this paper the con- cept of ‘hypothetical justification’ is analyzed. It is argued that hypothetical justifications are not of the kind that we should look for in normative ethics.

The legal logic discovered the heuristic function of the deduction decades ago. This knowledge has not spread in the dogmatic disciplines. One reason might be a lack of communication between legal theory and jurisprudence. This paper tries to locate the gap and bridge it. Some examples might prove the underestimated use of legal logic in the concrete application of law and thereby show its practical relevance.

The extent to which trust prevails can be measured by the subjective probability with which an agent expects another one to act in desired ways. An agent´s trust in other agents forms in repeated social interactions which typically have the structure of an elementary game of trust. The process of trust formation in such interactions may be described by a reputation function. It is argued that in view of real world processes of trust formation any adequate reputation function must satisfy (...) certain conditions. A simple model conforming to these conditions is presented. Analysing this example it is shown that there is a co-operative Nash equilibrium in a trust supergame which is in line with the basic conditions of trust formation. However, it is also proved that no process of trust formation can be reasonably similar to real world mechanisms and at the same time lead to subgame perfect equilibria in a trust supergame. (shrink)

Building on work by Popper, Schweber, Nozick, Sober, and others in a still-growing literature, I explore here the conceptual kinship between Adam Smith''s ''invisible hand'' and Darwinian natural selection. I review the historical ties, and examine Ullman -Margalit''s ''constraints'' on invisible-hand accounts, which I later re-apply to natural selection, bringing home the close relationship. These theories share a ''parent'' principle, itself neither biological no politico-economic, that collective order and well-being can emerge parsimoniously from the dispersed action of individuals. The invisible (...) hand operates on ''memes'' the way natural selection operates on genes. Like Darwin''s concept, it brings together traditional opposites, ''nature'' and ''selection,'' forming a saltation-mitigating transition between biological instinct and full-blown conscious design. Herschel''s criterion of confirmation, which Darwin long strove to satisfy, is itself an invisible hand-like meme – a ''Midas effect'' revealing and rewarding the fittest theories, Darwin''s and Smith''s emphatically among them. (shrink)

A short biography of Johannes von Kries, followed by a bibliography of his works, containing more than 70 previously unknown works.

The title of this special topic in RMM is borrowed from a 1978 paper of Hillel Steiner in which he argues against Robert Nozick's invisible hand conception of the emergence of the state. Steiner believes that central institutions of social order such as money and government need some form of conscious endorsement by individuals to emerge and to persist over time. -/- Tony de Jasay's critique (in Philosophy 85, 2010) of Bob Sugden's plea for a Humean version of contractarianism (see (...) RMM, Vol 0) motivated us, to take this old – but still central – theme of the debate on the origin of social order as one starting point in a new attempt to evaluate the idea of a social contract). -/- Within the 35 years since the publication of Hillel Steiner's paper different advances have been made in economics and philosophy that may well shed some new light on some of the fundamental issues in the debate about a contractarian conception of social order. These make us confident that a new attempt to explore the contractarian idea is well worthwhile. -/- Those who first motivated this project, Hillel Steiner, Anthony de Jasay, and Robert Sugden, as well as a number of other renowned scholars confirmed to contribute. The special topic will actually start with a previously unpublished paper by Hillel Steiner, originally written in 1986, in which he extends and elaborates on his argument about money from the 1978 paper, and with an original article by Anthony de Jasay, in which he further clarifies his worries. A response by Robert Sugden will follow. Further contributions will discuss the matter by reference to the roots of the debate in seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy or to recent advancements in economics, the behavioral sciences or in social philosophy. Some of the contributions confirmed are already in a very elaborated stage and ready to be published soon. They are announced here right from the start and – for the time being – marked as 'to appear'. -/- As always, the special topic is an open ended project and further contributions will be considered; please send your submission to [email protected] (see 'How to Submit' for details). Also, readers are invited to submit shorter comments for the discussion section, which may be published after an abridged refereeing process. (shrink)

Within the rational choice approach trust is usually analysed as a problem of choice under uncertainty. In a standard social situation in which trust plays a role a trustor A has to choose between trusting or mistrusting a trustee B. If he chooses to trust, B can either honour the trust given which will be of some advantage to both or exploit it no matter what the consequences for A are. A can in general protect himself against being exploited by (...) choosing not to trust. But then he forgoes the possible advantages of trustful co-operation. A´s problem typically is that he is not sufficiently informed about B´s incentives or motivation. He may, for instance, not know whether B possesses some favourable character traits or not. The paper uses the well known game of trust with imperfect information to illustrate the core of the problem. From a rational choice point of view the possibility of a trustful decision is determined by the beliefs of A concerning B´s preferences. Thus the crucial parameter in the model is a probability measure p that measures A´s subjective expectations that a rational B will co-operate. According to the standard rational choice account trust is either a consequence or simply the expression of the expectations of a trustee represented by p. I refer to this account of trust as the theory of trust as rational expectancy. I shall criticise this solely cognitive view of trust for neglecting some central aspects of trusting relationships. My argument draws on the distinction between trust and reliance. It will be based on some simple observations, in particular: 1. The perception of the choice problem by the trustor as well as his perception of the trustee and the trustee´s characteristics may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 2. The trustor´s evaluation of the possible outcomes may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 3. The motivation of the trustee will often depend on whether he is trusted or not. If my argument is sound, then - to some considerable extend - it is impossible to analyse trust problems solely in terms of options, preferences and believes. There simply are no preferences and believes of the interacting individuals which are prior to and independent of trust. Trust then must be understood as a cause or basis of a trustor´s expectations, and not as their consequence. I shall finish my considerations by pointing to some general implications for an account of trust as social capital. (shrink)

Matthias Vogel challenges the belief, dominant in contemporary philosophy, that reason is determined solely by our discursive, linguistic abilities as communicative beings. In his view, the medium of language is not the only force of reason. Music, art, and other nonlinguistic forms of communication and understanding are also significant. Introducing an expansive theory of mind that accounts for highly sophisticated, penetrative media, Vogel advances a novel conception of rationality while freeing philosophy from its exclusive attachment to linguistics. (...) class='Hi'>Vogel's media of reason treats all kinds of understanding and thought, propositional and nonpropositional, as important to the processes and production of knowledge and thinking. By developing an account of rationality grounded in a new conception of media, he raises the profile of the prelinguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of rationality and advances the Enlightenment project, buffering it against the postmodern critique that the movement fails to appreciate aesthetic experience. Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media--books, movies, newspapers, the Internet, and television--while offering an original and exciting contribution to media theory. (shrink)

Derek Allen, Richard Boyd, and Alan Gilbert have suggested that Marx’s normative political views should be reconstructed as a sophisticated version of moral consequentialism. This paper investigates whether Marx’s ostensible anti-moralism differs in any interesting way from Mill’s sophisticated utilitarianism plus some Marxist social science. I present an account of the social meaning and implications of moral language and argument, based on Marx’s description of morality as a social practice based on distinctive motives, emotions and sanctions, to explain why Marx (...) would reject moral consequentialism. This account will explain how Marx can consistently reject morality yet retain a normative basis for his social criticism. (shrink)