In this paper, we reconsider the context of Barbara Carper'salternative ways of knowing,a prominent discourse in modern nursing theory in North America. We explore this relative to the concepts ofrealism, non‐realismandnominalism, and investigate the philosophical divisions behind the original typology, particularly in relationship to modern scientific enquiry. We examine forms of knowledge relative to realist and nominalist positions and make an argument ad absurdum against relativistic interpretations of knowledge using the example of Borge's Chinese Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge. We propose (...) a contentious postpositivist practical classification for nursing knowledge that demonstrates and supports the idea that knowledge has both individual and subjective components. This classification supports the practical application of nursing knowledge within the paradigm of realist postpositivist science. (shrink)

This text presents a few preliminary results of research currently being conducted at the Université de Sherbrooke’s Research Institute on Educational Practices. The study seeks to understand how situations presented in teacher education can support the functioning and success of trainee teachers’ professional learning. The article’s aim is to identify the points of convergence between situations of professional activity, situations of professional learning, and training situations. The text will attempt to analyze the role that can be played by certain training (...) structures that seek to support a professionalization process that we define in terms of a general aim: the construction of professional knowledge. The originality of this research lies in that it draws on the work of Gaston Bachelard to develop a theoretical frame enabling a reading and interpretation of the results. Ce texte présente quelques résultats préliminaires d’une recherche menée présentement à l’Institut de recherche sur les pratiques éducatives de l’Université de Sherbrooke. Cette recherche vise à comprendre comment les situations présentes dans la formation à l’enseignement peuvent soutenir le fonctionnement et la réussite de l’apprentissage professionnel des enseignants en formation. Nous cherchons à identifier les points de rencontre entre les situations d’activité professionnelle, les situations d’apprentissage professionnel et les situations de formation. Nous tenterons d’analyser le rôle que peuvent jouer certains dispositifs visant à soutenir un processus de professionnalisation que nous définissons au regard d’une finalité : la construction de savoirs professionnels. L’originalité de cette recherche est la convocation des travaux de Gaston Bachelard pour élaborer le cadre théorique permettant la lecture et l’interprétation des résultats. (shrink)

[opening paragraph]: As some of us in the brain and cognitive sciences struggled in relative obscurity over the last two decades to gain some sound empirical understanding of conscious experience, a succession of celebrated philosophers and scientists told us that our work was doomed to failure. They expended extraordinary ingenuity trying to prove their case, at least as much as those of us toiling in the trenches devoted to the job of gaining a little bit of clarity. Fortunately, `impossibility proofs' (...) of this kind tend to have a short half-life. They succeed each other year after year; in the same way that impossibility proofs were flourished triumphantly by critics to demonstrate, once and forever, that we could never understand planetary motion, biological evolution, quantum mechanics -- or whatever next topic science, in its Brobdignagian march, was threatening to clarify. Arthur C. Clarke once proposed a law stating that for every major advance in knowledge one can find at least one celebrated scientist who was able to `prove', shortly before it was achieved, that it could not be done. In the case of conscious experience the quest to prove impossibility is especially passionate, as if a reasonable scientific approach to human experience were the enemy of all that is good and decent. (shrink)

One of the more striking developments in contemporary philosophic discussions about morality has been the rise of anti-theory — the rejection of moral theories as ‘unnecessary, undesirable, and/or impossible’. Among those associated with this view have been Bernard Williams, John McDowell, Edmund Pincoffs and James Wallace.

The contributions of Professor Bernard Dickens to health law and bioethics span the era in which these fields have emerged as distinct domains of teaching, scholarship and professional and public conversation. Neither field exists in a vacuum. The concerns of bioethics, like the content of health law, are a product of social forces. The bureaucratization of medical care, the possibilities and uncertainties created by developments in medical technology, not to mention glaring health inequalities, have been destabilizing forces in medicine. (...) Writing in 1974, American sociologist Renée Fox noted that medicine had reached “a stage of development characterized by diffuse ethical and existential self-consciousness.” This new medical introspection was evidenced by intense engagement with issues of biomedical regulation, and with the growth of professional codes and processes for resolving value-laden issues within clinical settings.While sometimes described as a process or site for discussion and “engagement,” bioethics evolved rapidly into a domain of governance, with direct implications for clinical practice. (shrink)

In chapter four of Truth and Truthfulness Bernard Williams presents an account of assertion that relies heavily on the ‘psychological’ notions of belief and intention. In chapter five his definition of lying similarly relies on such notions. For Williams, insofar as there are norms governing assertion as such or norms broken by lying as such, these norms relate to saying what you think to be true, as distinct from saying what is true. I argue that this ‘psychologized’ account of (...) assertion (and lying) is for various reasons mistaken. A consequence of Williams’s approach is that ‘Shall I tell the truth here?’ is presented as a much more open question for an agent than it possibly can be. Only by adverting to the language-game presupposed by that question’s having any sense at all can we arrive at a fair picture of when and how the answer ‘No’ might be reasonable. (shrink)

Il ne va pas de soi que l’alchimie, science du perfectionnement des métaux, se soit intéressée à la prolongation de la vie. C’est en fait à la faveur des ambiguïtés lexicales et conceptuelles liées aux termes désignant les substances chimiques que s’est effectué dans l’alchimie arabe un rapprochement entre la perfection des métaux et la guérison des êtres vivants. La doctrine de la quintessence de Rupescissa, puis les théories de Paracelse achèveront cette évolution qui donne à l’alchimie sa double dimension, (...) chimique et médicale, rationnelle et mythique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Liberation and SpiritualityRoger HaightThese reflections on liberation and spirituality respond to a precise question. There is no better way to begin than in stating it clearly. People committed to action in behalf of liberation need a spirituality. What spirituality does Christianity offer them? The issue is not why Christian spirituality needs to be attentive to the demands of the poor and other victims of discrimination. The reasons why Christian (...) spirituality must be liberationist have been made convincingly over the past forty-five years. It should be taken for granted that Christians are to be concerned with liberation. A slightly different issue is at stake in the question of what spirituality, present in Christianity, is summoned forth when people who are dedicated to the project of liberation turn to Christianity and ask about its spiritual resources. This question comes from a different audience, one made up of those who are not sure that Christianity or religion generally has anything to offer to the commitment to human liberation. In addressing that question the goal is to respond with some clear convictions about what Christianity has to offer and how it may affect the lives of liberationists.Because this has to be done in a short space, the response will appear more like an outline than an argument. But both those familiar with Christianity and those less so will be able to understand the basic elements of the spirituality that is proffered. The presentation moves forward in three parts. The first explores the language of liberation and spirituality. The second and substantive part brings forward four classic witnesses to Christian spirituality and allows each to highlight a particular element of an integral Christian spirituality. And the third emphasizes the dimensions of ultimacy and finality.liberation and spiritualityThe words “liberation” and “spirituality” are familiar to everyone, but they do not bear the same meaning in everyone’s usage. The discussion, then, has to begin with a brief definition of the meaning of these terms as they are used here. These definitions [End Page 135] do not have to be developed at length. What follows simply stipulates aspects of these terms that are crucial for the logic of the position presented here.The term “liberation” is used very broadly because human repression takes many forms. In these reflections “liberation” refers to the process of attaining or assisting others to attain freedom from various obstacles to human flourishing. There can be no doubt that since the nineteenth century social oppression has provided a focal point for understanding liberation. Humanity in the West has gradually become more and more conscious of social and historical conditioning of individual human beings. We have learned that societies are human constructions; that they favor some and neglect, marginalize, and positively subjugate others; that no society has to be the way it is; that it can be changed; that some people encourage and others resist change; and that human beings can have a less or more conscious role in the process. We have the potential to be agents of social liberation. But other forms of liberation need not be excluded from the concept. It does not make any sense to neglect some forms of repressed human freedom in favor of others, even though some forms of human deprivation are more serious than others.One problem with such an open view of liberation is that it seems to give every liberationist concern an equal voice. It may even open a door to competitive interests. It is one thing to say that every human diminishment requires attention, but in a limited economy of human energy, time, and resources we cannot, either as individuals or societies, attend to all problems with equal vigor at the same time. We need some criteria for measuring importance. To this question a scale of values offered by Bernard Lonergan has some relevance. He begins to rank from below in an ascending scale the needs and values that lie open to human commitment.1 The denial of any basic human requirement like food and shelter calls out for liberation. But a scale of values measures relative importance of various human needs and opportunities for freedom’s development... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000) 296-298 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha Le Sutra D'amida Prêché Par Le Buddha. By Jérôme Ducor. Schweizer Asiatische Studien: Monographien; Vol. 29. Bern: Peter Lang, 1998. 216 pp. Paper. $35.95 (in U.S.A.; available from the New York office of the publisher) It is immediately clear that this edition of the Smaller Sukhavativyuha Sutra must be regarded as (...) the standard work on it in a European language. Ducor is both a scholar (at the University of Lausanne and at the Museum of Ethnography in Geneva) and a practitioner (an ordained minister of the Honganji branch of Jodo Shinshu) [End Page 296] and he combines his skills to produce a well-rounded and balanced treatment that demonstrates, by comparison, the limitations of the standard Buddhological approach to Sutra studies.The methodology of sutra translation is, I believe, a Buddhist-Christian problem, since, ostensibly Buddhist, it often proceeds along crypto-Christian lines. Why do we translate sutras at all? Or, rather, why are the sutras as a rule translated nude, as it were, quivering in the scholar's spotlight, bereft of their seemly covering of s´astras? Sutras are, by themselves, largely unintelligible. They are nuggets of Dharma, to be, on the one hand, digested by the teachers so that they might (to paraphrase St. Bernard of Clairvaux) proffer the milk of nourishing discourses to their disciples and, on the other hand, chanted in mystifying, often artificial, languages, for their meritorious and pacifying effect. When chanted, it is the sound that matters, not the meaning. It is said that a pigeon was reborn as a monk because Asaga compassionately chanted out loud the texts that he was studying. We are to suppose that the fortunate pigeon was not well versed in Sanskrit, yet it benefited remarkably from the chanting. Ducor is aware of this traditional use of the sutras and includes a discussion on "The Amida Sutra in Liturgical Practice" (pp. 131-137). He cites Gyoyo, writing in fifteenth-century Japan, to the effect that the incomprehensible Sino-Japanese "preserves multiple meanings: the masses, on hearing them, mysteriously, according to their capacities, achieve enlightenment," whereas the Japanese translation "bears only a single sense" and therefore "for normal chanting it is best to chant in the Sino-Japanese pronunciation" (p. 134).But Eurocentric, especially Anglophone, Buddhologists have insisted on translating only the sutras and ignoring their attendant s´astras. Often enough the translations are done from an archaic or even an invented version which is never used in practice but is preferred simply because it is in Sanskrit. The scholar then searches, in the presumed "more original" text, for precisely that single meaning against which Gyoyo warns us. Something seems familiar. Can it be Martin Luther whom we espy lurking behind our Monier Williams? Are we still in thrall to Max Muller, who, even after having naturalized as British, was evangelisch to the core and fought in the Academy under the banner of sola scriptura, believing, with Luther, that a sacred text, because it is revealed, is most truly interpreted by reference to itself, and that its meaning would only be obscured by a human, and therefore fallible, commentary? Perhaps: for the bionic Belgian Buddhologists, we note, were more Catholic in their approach, and translated the summa of the great Buddhist scholastics.The point is that a sutra can only be said to have been properly presented for our study when it is displayed in its native context, that is, with full reference to the commentarial tradition. Ducor does this. He opens with a translation from the rufubon (the textus receptus or "vulgate" as he calls it) version of the Chinese, attributed to Kumarajiva, and follows it with notes on Kumarajiva, on the principal doctrines of the sutra, and on the place of the sutra in the trilogy (sambukyo) tradition in Japan. Then he repeats the translation, interspersing it with references to the commentaries in China, Korea, and Japan. This is followed by detailed textual notes... (shrink)

Today there is a tendency to do ethics on the basis of what I should like to call the “self-other model.” On this view, an action has no moral worth unless it benefits others–and not even then, unless it is motivated by altruism rather than selfishness. This radical rift between self-interest and virtue traces back at least to Philo of Alexandria, according to whom, “lovers of self, when they have stripped and prepared for conflict with those who value virtue, keep (...) up the boxing and wrestling until they have either forced their opponents to give in, or have completely destroyed them.” More recently, the distinction between those who value themselves and those who “value virtue” has been drawn sharply by Bernard Williams: “[I]n moral theory … it is not the Kantian leap from the particular and the affective to the rational and universal that makes all the difference; it is rather the Humean step–that is to say, the first Humean step–from the self to someone else.”. (shrink)

This collection consists of fourteen essays, a long introduction, and a useful bibliography. All of the essays have appeared previously--either in philosophy journals or as book chapters--over the last thirty years. They include such well-known philosophical essays as Thomas Hill's "Servility and Self-Respect," Bernard Boxill's "Self-Respect and Protest," and Rawls's early treatment of self-respect, here titled, "Self-Respect, Excellences, and Shame." In addition, there are a number of essays that come from the "virtues approach" to ethics, such as Gabriele Taylor's (...) "Shame, Integrity, and Self-Respect." Oddly enough, although they are mentioned in almost every article in this collection, none of the classic treatments of self-respect--such as those of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant--are included in the book, nor are there any extended commentaries on these classical treatments. Moreover, there are no articles from any discipline outside philosophy, although it would seem that this might be one topic in which psychological investigations would be especially helpful. These problems are alleviated to some degree by Dillon's long introduction, which attempts a sketch of the relevant conceptual terrain and relates the selections to the history of thought on this subject. (shrink)

Scholars who mention the turn to Aristotelian virtue ethics in the Mid-Twentieth Century tend to cite G. E. M. Anscombe’s famous ‘complaint’, and sometimes Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue. It is less usual to write of Roger Scruton. Placed in the context of Bernard Williams and John Casey’s works – at the intersection of moral philosophy and the philosophy of the emotions – Scruton’s theory of the imagination is shown to concern the rationality of moral attitudes. In short, it (...) concerns virtue ethics. Of broader interest, following Scruton’s arguments, his aesthetics may be conceived as concerning stores of moral knowledge; this is by virtue of the sensuous conditioning of the thought-content of moral judgement. The centrality of imitation to Aristotelian ethics, in other words, finds its concomitant in the object of imitation as the artwork. It is my view that Scruton’s work, Art and Imagination (his PhD thesis of 1973), is an attempt to provide a framework for the judgement involved in virtue ethics, concerning both intentionality and object. (shrink)

The main aim of this article is to reconstruct and comment on Bernard Suits’ argument concerning the paradoxicality of the perfectly played game and explain how the argument might contribute to the game vs. performance distinction. The argument was mentioned by Suits in ‘Tricky Triad: Games, Play and Sport’ in the course of argumentation for the distinction between games and performances but it has not been presented in any of Suits’ works published during his lifetime. However, Suits’ fonds deposited (...) in the Special Collections and Archive of the University of Waterloo contains two texts that were nevertheless meant for publication: ‘A Perfectly Played Game’ (recently published as Appendix III to Suits’ Return of the Grasshopper) and unpublished ‘The Search for a Perfectly Fair Game’. The latter is a modified version of the former; there is an overlapping core in both texts, but there are also some essential differences between them. To provide a formula capable of embracing Suits’ ideas from both texts and remove the tension between the ideas of a perfectly played and perfectly fair game, I introduce the concept of a perfect game. (shrink)

Argues that the only way to understand the Confucian vision of the consummate moral life is to take the tradition on its own terms.

This collection - assembled by the author in 1995 - includes all his articles then published that he thought worthy of preserving. Contents. 1. Hutcheson, Hume and the Ontology of Morals. (1985) - A critique of David Norton's 1982 book David Hume - Common Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician. 2. Hume, Spencer and the Standard of Morals. (1983) 3. Egoism and Rigorism: Spencer's Resolution of a Moral Paradox. (1995) - not previously published. 4. On distinguishing between Love and Lust. (1977) 5. (...) Love and Lust revisited: Intentionality, Homosexuality and Moral Education. (1988) - A critique of aspects of Roger Scruton's 1986 book Sexual Desire. 6. In Defence of Gay Lessons. (1988) 7. Homosexuality and Education: a reply to Jim Ferguson. (1990) 8. The Two Minds of Roger Scruton. (1991) 9. Public Schools, Private Privilege and Common Sense. (1985) - A defence of independent education. 10. Was Hume's Natural History of Religion inspired by Mandeville's Fable of the Bees Part II? (1995). The clear textual parallels here noted were not noticed by Tom Beauchamp in his 2007 text of NHR for the Clarendon Edition of Hume's works. (shrink)

Nobel laureate Erwin Schrödinger's What is Life?, one of the great science classics of the twentieth century appears here together with Mind and Matter.

Introduction -- The mathematical roots of the concept of analogy -- Aristotle : the uses of analogy -- Aristotle : analogy and language -- Thomas Aquinas -- Immanuel Kant -- Karl Barth -- Final reflections.

Technics and Time 2: Disorientation continues Stiegler's interrogation of prosthetic and ortho-thetic memory in light of the crisis that arises when speed and delay are irreconcilable, the crisis of "human being" itself.

Following his celebrated book The Aesthetics of Music, Scruton explores the fundamental elements that constitute a great piece of music.

This collection of essays examines the philosophical and cultural aspects of technology. The issues range widely - from quantum technology to problems of technology and culture in a developing country and contributors approach the issues from a variety of perspectives. The volume includes case-studies, and also more theoretical pieces which consider the fundamental question of whether technology should be perceived as a force for liberation or enslavement. The volume aims to stimulate debate about the relation between technology and philosophy and (...) society in general, and to open a field of enquiry that has been relatively neglected. Written in an accessible style, the contributions are intended equally for philosophers exploring the novel problems arising in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but also for technologists interested in the philosophical implications of their work. (shrink)