The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this dilemma, namely Williams’ requirement of the constancy of character of the immortal, is defensible. We next argue against a recent attempt that accepts the dilemma, but rejects the conclusion Williams draws from it. From these we conclude that blocking the second (...) horn of the dilemma is the best way to respond to Williams. Our objection contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature of human existence, namely curiosity, and that his negative evaluation of an eternal life is therefore unconvincing. (shrink)

A survey of democratic institutions and republics reveals the aristocratic origins of democracy.

Today’s question concerning technology involves asking about both the post-pandemic world and the post-data-economy world, in a situation where resentments and scapegoats are easily generated. We c...

Current thinking and research on consciousness and the brain.

Bertrand Russell presented three systems of propositional logic, one first in Principles of Mathematics, University Press, Cambridge, 1903 then in “The Theory of Implication”, Routledge, New York, London, pp. 14–61, 1906) and culminating with Principia Mathematica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1910. They are each based on different primitive connectives and axioms. This paper follows “Peirce’s Law” through those systems with the aim of understanding some of the notorious peculiarities of the 1910 system and so revealing some of the early history (...) of classical propositional logic. “Peirce’s Law” is a valid formula of elementary propositional logic: [ ⊃ p] ⊃ p This sentence is not even a theorem in the 1910 system although it is one of the axioms in 1903 and is proved as a theorem in 1906. Although it is not proved in 1910, the two lemmas from the proof in 1906 occur as theorems, and Peirce’s Law could have been derived from them in a two step proof. The history of Peirce’s Law in Russell’s systems helps to reconstruct some of the history of axiomatic systems of classical propositional logic. (shrink)

"Aujourd'hui, toute doctrine qui se refuse à envisager les conséquences du progrès, soit qu'elle proclame ce genre de problèmes secondaires (idéologie de droite), soit qu'elle le divinise (idéal de gauche), est contre-révolutionnaire". Visionnaires, Charbonneau et Ellul rejetèrent dos à dos les voies libérales, soviétique et fascistes. Dès les années 1930, ils ouvrirent une critique du "Progrès" et du déferlement de la technique et de la puissance au détriment de la liberté. La solution : une révolution contre le nouvel absolutisme du (...) triptyque Science-Etat-Industrie ; une insurrection des consciences ; un projet de civilisation ancré dans un nouveau rapport à la nature. Ce recueil rassemble quatre textes sources de l'écologie politique, inédits pour trois d'entre eux. Contemporains de la Grande Dépression, d'Auschwitz et d'Hiroshima, ces textes incisifs offrent une clé de lecture très actuelle, humaniste et libertaire, de nos sociétés contemporaines, productivistes, consuméristes et techniciennes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Pandemics and plagues function rhetorically, by doing violence to the structures of discourse, sociality, hospitality, and mutual engagement that characterize ethical human interaction. They infect us, as rhetorical subjects, and reorient our capacity for engagement. The coronavirus's “novelty” renders it uncertain as to how long it will last or who will be infected next; the near-uniform response to it has been a forced distance of ourselves from others and a displacement from our itineraries and our locations. Through COVID-19 we (...) are learning that pandemic does violence to our sense of place, to how we think of respite, and has highlighted our sense of vulnerability in the midst of others. (shrink)

After more than a decade teaching ancient Greek history and philosophy at University College, Oxford, British philosopher and political theorist Bernard Bosanquet resigned from his post to spend more time writing. He was particularly interested in contemporary social theory, and was involved with the Charity Organisation Society and the London Ethical Society. Much of his work focused on the place of logic in philosophy, especially its role in metaphysical thought - the area where he is considered to have made (...) his most important intellectual contributions. In 1888 he published this two-volume study of logic, addressing a variety of questions relating to logic, and drawing from the work of Hegel in his examination. In Volume 2, Bosanquet focuses on inference, arguing that it has a similar essence to judgment but is fundamentally different in that it is used to 'mediate' reality. (shrink)

tome 1. Les origines -- tome 2. Les nouvelles recherches.

"Anthropologie philosophique est une mémoire de l'historicité de l'individu. Le je vis précédant le je pense y expose la "gradation des valeurs bourgeoises et la marche de la pensée moderne". Une philosophie de la vie puise dans sa propre histoire pour montrer que ce qui importe est chaque fois "la question que l'homme se pose à lui-même, et non la façon d'y répondre", et cette histoire lui est nécessaire pour inventer des "formes nouvelles d'existence". L'érudition n'y cherche pas des doctrines, (...) mais une aventure. C'est pourquoi ce qui est dit ici de Platon, de Montaigne, reste toujours nouveau : non une philosophie, mais "l'exercice de la philosophie".Henri Meschonnic. (shrink)

This work makes three valuable contributions to the study of human slips and errors.

This paper explores a remarkable convergence of ideas and evidence, previously presented in separate places by its authors. That convergence has now become so persuasive that we believe we are working within substantially the same broad framework. Taylor's mathematical papers on neuronal systems involved in consciousness dovetail well with work by Newman and Baars on the thalamocortical system, suggesting a brain mechanism much like the global workspace architecture developed by Baars (see references below). This architecture is relational, in the sense (...) that it continuously mediates the interaction of input with memory. While our approaches overlap in a number of ways, each of us tends to focus on different areas of detail. What is most striking, and we believe significant, is the extent of consensus, which we believe to be consistent with other contemporary approaches by Weiskrantz, Gray, Crick and Koch, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Newell and colleagues, Posner, Baddeley, and a number of others. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience is moving toward a shared understanding of consciousness in the brain. (shrink)