All of the current leading theories of location are parsimonious: they have at most one locative primitive, and the definitions of all of the other locative relations appeal to nothing beyond that primitive, mereological properties and relations, and basic logic. I argue that if we believe there can be extended, mereologically simple regions, we can construct cases that are incompatible with every possible parsimonious theory of location. In these cases, an object is contained within a simple region that is larger (...) than the object; that is, there is some region, r, and some object, x, are such that every subregion of r fails to be completely free of x, yet x fails to fill r. I argue that we ought to respond to this incompatibility by rejecting the analytic possibility of extended, simple regions. (shrink)

Logics of part/whole relations frequently take parthood or proper parthood as primitive, defining the remaining mereological properties and relations in terms of them. I argue from considerations involving Weak Supplementation for the conclusion that we should take fusion as our mereological primitive. I point out that the intuitions supporting Weak Supplementation also support a stronger principle, Weak Supplementation of Pluralities, and that the principle can only do the work demanded by our intuitions when formulated in terms of a notion of (...) fusion that cannot be defined merely in terms of mereological properties and relations, logic, and a membership relation. So, insofar as we think any definition of fusion must be so restricted, we have motivation to take fusion as primitive; further, we have greater insight into the motivation for our supplementation principle and which version of that principle we ought to endorse. (shrink)

Trinitarians claim there are three Divine persons each of which is God, and yet there is only one God. It seems they want three to equal one. It just so happens, some metaphysicians claim exactly that. They accept Composition as Identity: each fusion is identical to the plurality of its parts. I evaluate Composition as Identity's application to the doctrine of the Trinity, and argue that it fails to give the Trinitairan any options he or she didn't already have. Further, (...) while Composition as Identity does give us a new way to assert polytheism, its help requires us to endorse a claim that undercuts any Trinitarian motivation for the view. (shrink)

We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses that (...) involve reading these sentences as generics, similar to "The polar bear has four paws". The first response takes these sentences to be about kinds, and the second takes the relevant noun-phrases to act as predicates. We reject these accounts, but offer a third alternative which is informed by both, and which enables us to deny the existence of repeatable artworks while endorsing the truth of sentences seemingly about them. (shrink)

Recently, we have been presented with an argument against the intrinsicality of shape that appeals to a plausible Humean principle. According to the argument, if shape is intrinsic and the location relation is fundamental, then we cannot explain the necessary correlation between an object’s shape and the shape of its location. And, it is claimed, the Humean principle tells us that an unexplained necessary correlation like this one is unacceptable. In this paper I respond to this argument by rejecting the (...) favoured interpretation of the Humean principle. I claim that sometimes there are truths about what it means to stand in a given relation, even when that relation has no analysis.. These truths sometimes entail that the relata of the relation have certain features. And it is not problematic for truths about what it means to stand in a relation to be unexplained. I argue that it is plausible to take is located at to be such a relation; an object’s having exactly the same shape as the region it is located at is part of what it means to be located at that region. I conclude with an amended formulation of the Humean claim that still captures the spirit of the principle without threatening the intrinsicality of shape. (shrink)

It is common to think that it’s possible for entities to spatially coincide in multiple ways: with overcrowding, and without overcrowding. Typically, we can distinguish between these by claiming that uncrowded spatial overlap involves a sharing of parts, and crowded spatial overlap does not. However, if we think that mereologically unusual entities, such as extended simples or some kinds of gunk, can also spatially overlap in crowded and uncrowded ways, we lose the ability to distinguish between those varieties of spatial (...) overlap via appeal to shared parts. Thus, we should either reject the possibilities that generated this difficulty, or we must look for an alternative explanation of these varieties of spatial overlap. (shrink)

Multilocation and Minimal Mereology do not mix well. It has been pointed out that Three-Dimensionalism, which can be construed as multilocation-friendly, runs into trouble with Weak Supplementation. But in fact, regardless of one’s theory of persistence, if someone posits the possibility of any one of several kinds of multilocation, he or she will not be able to maintain the necessity of any of the three axioms of Minimal Mereology: the Transitivity of Proper Parthood, the Asymmetry of Proper Parthood, and Weak (...) Supplementation. In fact, positing even the mere conceivability of cases involving multilocation will require the denial of the analyticity of Minimal Mereology. In response to this, some have claimed that we ought to relativise parthood, either to one region or to two. Unfortunately, if we replace the axioms of Minimal Mereology with region-relativised counterparts, we will not be able to capture the intuitions that supported the original axioms. The only adequate solution, I maintain, is to restrict multilocation to a domain outside the scope of the rules we intuitively take to govern the parthood relation. For those who take Minimal Mereology to be necessary and universal, that will mean relinquishing the possibility of multilocation. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful arguments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding disbelief in God’s existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational disbelief in God. In showing options for response to these arguments, I (...) will describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect. (shrink)

A team of leading philosophers presents original work on theories of parthood and location. Topics covered include how we ought to axiomatise our mereology; whether we can reduce mereological relations to identity or to locative relations; whether Mereological Essentialism is true; and what mereology and propositions can tell us about one another.

Some Trinitarians, such as Thomas Aquinas, wish to claim that God is mereologically simple; that is, God has no parts distinct from Himself. In this paper, I present Simple Trinitarianism, a view that takes God to be simple but, diverging from Aquinas, does not identify the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit with anything in our ontology. Nonetheless, Simple Trinitarians would like Trinitarian sentences to be true; thus, they must give a non-standard semantics for those sentences. I will focus on one (...) possible semantics a Simple Trinitarian may give: taking Trinitarian claims to be translatable into feature-placing sentences, which posit property instantiation without requiring commitment to any objects that instantiate those properties. (shrink)

I examine the implications of positing stuff as a way to avoid colocation in the case of the statue and the bronze that constitutes it. When characterising stuff, it’s intuitive to say we often individuate stuff kinds by appealing to things and their relations. I argue that if this intuition is correct, there are important restrictions on how we can characterise stuff in order to avoid colocated portions of stuff.

(1996). Local politics and international relations: The case of the relations between Württemberg and Japan. The European Legacy: Vol. 1, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the study of European Ideas, pp. 778-781.

«Desde el punto de vista del discurso moderno e ilustrado sobre el sujeto, para este todo es posible; sin embargo, el discurso contemporáneo sobre el sujeto devuelve la tesis de que todo lo posible es ya pasado. [...] De un modo intuitivo pensamos que ser niño es, en cierta medida, tener un campo de posibilidad abierto e indefinido ---todo es posible--- pero que ese campo de posibilidades no ha sido decidido ni elegido, ni siquiera creado por uno ---todo lo posible (...) es ya pasado---. Si queremos saber cómo salir de la perplejidad, tenemos que entrar en la infancia y quizá buscar en ella alguna salida». «La filosofía, que es el oficio vital de Úbeda, ha meditado sobre la muerte, o sea, sobre la madurez y sobre la decrepitud de la vida; pero apenas ha prestado atención frontal a la infancia, e incluso no ha sabido relacionar con ella, como sin duda tendría que haber hecho, su modo de entender la muerte. Este libro reflexiona largamente acerca de la desconfianza y la deslealtad con la que, sobre todo el pensamiento moderno, se ha comportado respecto de la infancia. Jorge Úbeda habla desde la experiencia que busca retomar los términos esenciales de lo real y desde el conocimiento de una cultura cuya profundidad no siempre ha estado a la altura de lo Simple. Es la suya una voz que no debemos ya desatender nunca». (Miguel García-Baró). (shrink)

In this article we examine the role of Entscheider (decision-makers) in the German asylum procedure, both legally and ethical. As the responsibility for deciding on asylum applications lies exclusively with them, their significance for the German asylum procedure can hardly be underestimated. However, over the last few decades the situation of Entscheider changed significantly: While the number and complexity of the cases they have to decide on has increased due to the growing immigration, the requirements for their education have been (...) lowered, owed to critical amendments to the relevant law. We analyze how the law currently defines the role of Entscheider, whether the legal framework is constitutional, and what modifications morality requires. Although the law defining their role seems to be constitutional, Entscheider’s education must be improved and they must be entrusted with the hearing of the applicants to meet what morality requires, we conclude. DOI: 10.17879/95189429199. (shrink)

The Nemesis of Power is the first book to look at the history of international relations theories. Many theorists have investigated the nature of power, studying it in its social, political, economic, intellectual and physical contexts in order to define it. Rather than present yet another definition, Harald Kleinschmidt shows how the theorists themselves have perceived and handled the concept of power and how conduct in international relations has been evaluated. Taking a broad look at international relations theories from (...) the Roman Empire to the modern transformation of the European world picture, Kleinschmidt bridges the gap between theory and history by subjecting theory to the logic and method of historical inquiry. Drawing on original sources, he reads international relations theories against their social and cultural contexts, placing an emphasis on the ways in which changes in theory are reflections of a wider pattern of changes in culture. (shrink)

The relation of being more fundamental than, as well as the Finean notion of partial grounding, are widely taken to be irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric. However, certain time-travel cases that have been used to raise worries about the irreflexivity, transitivity, and asymmetry of proper part of can also be used to argue that more fundamental than and partially grounds do not have these formal properties. I present this worry and discuss several responses to it, with the aim of showing that (...) the problem is harder to address when applied to fundamentality and partial grounding than it was when merely applied to proper parthood. (shrink)

According to Principles of Sufficient Reason, every truth (in some relevant group) has an explanation. One of the most popular defenses of Principles of Sufficient Reason has been the presupposition of reason defense, which takes endorsement of the defended PSR to play a crucial role in our theory selection. According to recent presentations of this defense, our method of theory selection often depends on the assumption that, if a given proposition is true, then it has an explanation, and this will (...) only be justified if we think this holds for all propositions in the relevant group. I argue that this argument fails even when restricted to contingent propositions, and even if we grant that there is no non-arbitrary way to divide true propositions that have explanations from those that lack them. Further, we can give an alternate explanation of what justifies our selecting theories on the basis of explanatory features: the crucial role is not played by an endorsement of a PSR, but rather by our belief that, prima facie, we should prefer theories that exemplify explanatory power to greater degrees than their rivals. This guides our theory selection in a manner similar to ontological parsimony and theoretical simplicity. Unlike a PSR, our belief about explanatory power gives us a prima facie guiding principle, which provides justification in the cases where we think we have it, and not in the cases where we think we don't. (shrink)

Achille Varzi has shown that it is harder to deny Extensionality than we may have thought: he's argued that if we define proper parthood as parthood with distinctness, cases we take to violate Extensionality don’t really involve sharing of all proper parts. Aaron Cotnoir has responded by showing that, if we instead define proper parthood as asymmetric parthood, we can take Extensionality to be violated in these cases. I will offer a new response to this argument. Even granting Varzi's definition (...) of proper parthood, there are versions of Extensionality very similar to the one Varzi and Cotnoir discuss. One of these is motivated by the same intuitions as Varzi's Extensionality, and is violated in cases traditionally taken to be anti-Extensional. Thus, even granting Varzi's definition of proper parthood, anti-Extensionalists can capture a sense in which their cases violate Extensionality, without this merely amounting to a violation of Uniqueness of Composition. (shrink)

Study of the changing nature of the perception of an action and the action itself, and how thought-processes altered radically in the Middle Ages"--Provided by publisher.

"Illustrations and narrative work together in this book to present medieval culture as one visual image. Drawing extensively from a wide range of primary source material, the breadth and originality of Kleinschmidt's study will have an important influence on scholarly perception of the middle ages, as a period of continual change and continually changing attitudes."--BOOK JACKET.

The At-At Account of motion is the extremely popular view that, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, I will present a case in which, intuitively, motion does not occur, though the At-At Account of motion entails that it does. I will then turn to the only tenable response that avoids revising the At-At Account: (...) denying the possibility of my case. I will argue that the response is both contentious and fails to defend the spirit of the At-At Account qua reduction of motion (rather than mere listing of necessary and sufficient conditions for motion’s occurring). (shrink)

Current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism may be objected to on grounds that they are too inflexible: the formulations do not seem to allow for enough variety in the views they are paired with. For instance, Kit Fine has noted that formulations of Four-Dimensionalism in terms of instantaneous parts may be too demanding for Four-Dimensionalists who believe nothing is instantaneous. And Trenton Merricks has argued that one can think something persists four-dimensionionally without taking it to have proper temporal parts, and claims that (...) our formulation of Four-Dimensionalism should be revised to allow for this. I will add my own worries to those of Fine and Merricks. I will note that current formulations of Four-Dimensionalism are not sufficiently neutral with respect to the structure of time, with respect to how liberally objects decompose into parts, and with respect to whether objects and the regions they fill match in mereological structure. I will show that we can formulate Four-Dimensionalism in a sufficiently neutral way, while still producing a view that can do the work we typically require of Four-Dimensionalism. (shrink)

Social and linguistic perceptions are linked. On one hand, talker identity affects speech perception. On the other hand, speech itself provides information about a talker's identity. Here, we propose that the same probabilistic knowledge might underlie both socially conditioned linguistic inferences and linguistically conditioned social inferences. Our computational–level approach—the ideal adapter—starts from the idea that listeners use probabilistic knowledge of covariation between social, linguistic, and acoustic cues in order to infer the most likely explanation of the speech signals they hear. (...) As a first step toward understanding social inferences in this framework, we use a simple ideal observer model to show that it would be possible to infer aspects of a talker's identity using cue distributions based on actual speech production data. This suggests the possibility of a single formal framework for social and linguistic inferences and the interactions between them. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie Ökonomisierung bzw. die Kommerzialisierung des Sports ist ein langfristiger Prozess, der sich bereits seit der Wende zum 20. Jahrhundert vollzog und unterschiedliche Sportarten in unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsphasen und Geschwindigkeiten erfasste. Sportartikelunternehmen wie adidas beschleunigten diese Entwicklung nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, indem sie anlässlich sportlicher Großereignisse wie Olympischen Spielen oder Fußball-Weltmeisterschaften intensive Kontakte und Netzwerke zu Spitzensportlern und Funktionären aufbauten. Dabei ging es zunächst um die individuelle Ausrüstung der Sportler mit Schuhen und Kleidung, seit den 1960er Jahren dann auch um Promotionverträge (...) bei denen – in West- wie in Osteuropa – Geldzahlungen eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle spielten. Eine solche Vermarktlichung – also die Gestaltung von Prozessen, die bislang über den Staat oder bürokratische Strukturen und nun zunehmend über den Markt geregelt wurden (Ahrens et al. 2015: 395f.) Ökonomisierung, Kommerzialisierung und Vermarktlichung sind verwandte Begriffe, die z.T. auch synonym benutzt werden. Siehe dazu jüngst Graf (2019)., was im Vergleich zu anderen gesellschaftlichen Subsystemen durchaus eine Art „Normalisierung“ darstellte, erreichte spätestens in den 1980er Jahren und mit der massenmedialen Verbreitung des Sports neue Dimensionen, die wiederum mit Hilfe von adidas unter Horst Dassler in Kooperation mit dem IOC und der FIFA vorangetrieben wurden und die Grundlagen einer Kommerzialisierungsspirale legten, deren Auswirkungen bis in die Gegenwart reichen. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 48 Heft: 1 Seiten: 155-206.

The Journal The English Historical Review and the Development of historical science in England. ‐ The organisational aspect of the history of historical writing and of historical scholarship has, for its largest part, been a neglected field of study, the history of history having essentially been the history of ideas. This study, by making use of the concept of professionalisation as developed by Felix Gilbert (1965) and Doris Goldstein (1982) for the description and explanation of the foundation and the early (...) history of the English Historical Review, is designed to reveal organsational features in the history of historical scholarschip in late 19th century Britain. Because of the lack of institutional affiliation of British historical studies in the Victorian age, the editorial board of the English Historical Review formed the base from which scholarly done historical research and teaching ‐ following the models provided in France and Germany ‐ could emerge. (shrink)

The early medieval exegesis of the Pentecost account in the Acts of the Apostles emphasised the divine origin of the light that some early medieval theologists, specifically Hrabanus Maurus, believed to have descended upon the Apostles and provided them with special powers. The following article links Hrabanus Maurus's exegetical work with early pictorial representations of Pentecost as well as medieval theories of action.

Sometimes people petition God for things through prayer. This is puzzling, because if God always does what is best, it is not clear how these prayers can make a difference to what God does. Difference-Making accounts of petitionary prayer attempt to explain how these prayers can nonetheless influence what God does. I argue that, insofar as one is motivated to endorse a Difference-Making Account because they want to respect widespread intuitions about this feature of petitionary prayer, they should also be (...) motivated to endorse an account of prayer that respects widespread intuitions about other central features of petitionary prayer. I describe three problematic cases and the intuitions we have about them, and show how these intuitions restrict any Difference-Making account of petitionary prayer. (shrink)