In this commentary, we assess the propositional approach to associative learning not only in terms of veridicality and falsifiability, but also in heuristic value. We remark that it has furthered our knowledge and understanding of human, as well as animal, associative learning. At the same time, we maintain that models developed from the association formation tradition continue to bear great heuristic value as well.

Common methods for analysing response time (RT) tasks, frequently used across different disciplines of psychology, suffer from a number of limitations such as the failure to directly measure the underlying latent processes of interest and the inability to take into account the uncertainty associated with each individual's point estimate of performance. Here, we discuss a Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model and apply it to RT data. This model allows researchers to decompose performance into meaningful psychological processes and to account optimally for (...) individual differences and commonalities, even with relatively sparse data. We highlight the advantages of the Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model decomposition by applying it to performance on Approach–Avoidance Tasks, widely used in the emotion and psychopathology literature. Model fits for two experimental data-sets demonstrate that the model performs well. The Bayesian hierarchical diffusion model overcomes important limitations of current analysis procedures and provides deeper insight in latent psychological processes of interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIndividual differences in fear generalisation have been proposed to play a role in the aetiology and/or maintenance of anxiety disorders, but few data are available to directly support that claim. The research that is available has focused mostly on generalisation of peripheral and central physiological fear responses. Far less is known about the generalisation of avoidance, the behavioural component of fear. In two experiments, we evaluated how neuroticism, a known vulnerability factor for anxiety, modulates an array of fear responses, including (...) avoidance tendencies, towards generalisation stimuli. Participants underwent differential fear conditioning, in which one conditioned stimulus was repeatedly paired with an aversive outcome, whereas another was not. Fear generalisation was observed across measures in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, with overall highest responding to the CS+, lowest to the CS− and intermediate responding to the GSs. Neuroticism had very little impact on fear generalisation, in line with the idea that fear generalisation is largely an adaptive process. (shrink)

Two key research issues in the field of causal learning are how people acquire causal knowledge when observing data that are presented sequentially, and the level of abstraction at which learning takes place. Does sequential causal learning solely involve the acquisition of specific cause-effect links, or do learners also acquire knowledge about abstract causal constraints? Recent empirical studies have revealed that experience with one set of causal cues can dramatically alter subsequent learning and performance with entirely different cues, suggesting that (...) learning involves abstract transfer, and such transfer effects involve sequential presentation of distinct sets of causal cues. It has been demonstrated that pre-training can modulate classic causal learning phenomena such as forward and backward blocking. To account for these effects, we propose a Bayesian theory of sequential causal learning. The theory assumes that humans are able to consider and use several alternative causal generative models, each instantiating a different causal integration rule. Model selection is used to decide which integration rule to use in a given learning environment in order to infer causal knowledge from sequential data. Detailed computer simulations demonstrate that humans rely on the abstract characteristics of outcome variables to select a causal integration rule, which in turn alters causal learning in a variety of blocking and overshadowing paradigms. When the nature of the outcome variable is ambiguous, humans select the model that yields the best fit with the recent environment, and then apply it to subsequent learning tasks. Based on sequential patterns of cue-outcome co-occurrence, the theory can account for a range of phenomena in sequential causal learning, including various blocking effects, primacy effects in some experimental conditions, and apparently abstract transfer of causal knowledge. (shrink)

Generalising what is learned about one stimulus to other but perceptually related stimuli is a basic behavioural phenomenon. We evaluated whether a rule learning mechanism may serve to explain such generalisation. To this end, we assessed whether inference rules communicated through verbal instructions affect generalisation. Expectancy ratings, but not valence ratings, proved sensitive to this manipulation. In addition to revealing a role for inference rules in generalisation, our study has clinical implications as well. More specifically, we argue that targeting inference (...) rules might prove to be an effective strategy to affect the excessive generalisation that is often observed in psychopathology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAffective states influence how individuals process information and behave. Some theories predict emotional congruency effects. Emotional congruency should theoretically obstruct the learning of reward associations and their ability to guide behaviour under negative mood. Two studies tested the effects of the induction of a negative affective state on appetitive Pavlovian learning, in which neutral stimuli were associated with chocolate or alcohol rewards. In both experiments, participants showed enhanced approach tendencies towards predictors of reward after a negative relative to a positive (...) performance feedback manipulation. This increase was related to a reduction in positive affect in Experiment 1 only. No effects of the manipulation on conditioned reward expectancies, craving, or consumption were observed. Overall, our findings support the idea of counter-regu... (shrink)

Thousands of youth suffering from acquired brain injury or other early-life neurological disease live, mature, and learn with only limited communication and interaction with their world. Such cognitively capable children are ideal candidates for brain-computer interfaces. While BCI systems are rapidly evolving, a fundamental gap exists between technological innovators and the patients and families who stand to benefit. Forays into translating BCI systems to children in recent years have revealed that kids can learn to operate simple BCI with proficiency akin (...) to adults. BCI could bring significant boons to the lives of many children with severe physical impairment, supporting their complex physical and social needs. However, children have been neglected in BCI research and a collaborative BCI research community is required to unite and push pediatric BCI development forward. To this end, the pediatric BCI Canada collaborative network was formed, under a unified goal to cooperatively drive forward pediatric BCI innovation and impact. This article reflects on the topics and discussions raised in the foundational BCI-CAN meeting held in Toronto, ON, Canada in November 2019 and suggests the next steps required to see BCI impact the lives of children with severe neurological disease and their families. (shrink)

Mitochondrial function and biogenesis depend on the transport of a large variety of proteins, ions, and metabolites across the two surrounding membranes. While several specific transporters are present in the inner membrane, transport processes across the outer membrane are less understood. Recent studies reveal that the number of outer membrane channels and their transport mechanisms are more diverse than originally thought. Four protein‐conducting channels promote transport of distinct sets of precursor proteins across and into the outer membrane. The voltage‐dependent anion (...) channel (VDAC) forms the major channel for small hydrophilic molecules. In addition, three channels with yet unknown substrate specificity exist in the outer membrane. In this review, we outline the emerging functional diversity, selectivity, and regulation of mitochondrial outer membrane channels. The presence of several channel‐forming proteins challenges the traditional view that the outer membrane forms an unspecific size‐exclusion filter for the flux of small hydrophilic molecules. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionGerhold K. BeckerThe concept of personhood has been a prime focus in contemporary bioethics. Three areas of ethical decision making in particular have been addressed through explorations into the conditions and criteria of personhood: the beginning and the end of human life and the morally relevant boundaries that separate human beings from nonhuman animals. Blending theology with science fiction, the scope of the latter area has been expanded further (...) to include entities ranging from gods, angels, and extraterrestrials all the way down to machines. Although the recognition of personhood traditionally has been based on metaphysical and ontological considerations about sets of (psychological and cognitive) person-making properties, the emphasis is now squarely placed on moral concerns. Simply put, from a moral perspective a person is someone morally considerable who is the subject of moral rights and merits moral protection. The implications of the conferral of person status for moral decision making in medicine, health care, and research are, however, less clear. Problems arise from the fact that the traditional concept of personhood is constituted by three rather different ideas. As David Wiggins has pointed out, the concept of personhood combines in a single focus the ideas of the person as object of science (biological, neurophysiological, and so forth), as subject of consciousness and experience, and as locus of value and moral attributes. It is therefore extremely difficult to neatly separate metaphysical personhood from moral personhood, and vice versa, and to draw morally relevant conclusions without continuously moving back and forth between the different constitutive factors. Thus, moral rights seem to presuppose moral agency, and moral agency is contingent on personal identity, which in turn presupposes some form of physical (including psychological) existence. It is obvious, that differences in the analysis of any one of these constituents of personhood will result in different conceptions of personhood with different implications for ethical decision making. Bioethical disputes about the moral status of human fetuses or of irreversibly comatose patients, as well as of the great apes [End Page 289] and other animals, are notoriously complex because they involve fundamental disagreements about personhood and the most promising strategies for their resolution. Although this has led some to question the usefulness of the concept of personhood for bioethics altogether, others seek remedy through the analysis of moral agency within the context of particular bioethical issues.The essays in this volume clearly reflect the current state of the bioethical debate on personhood and are representative of its major strands. They evolved from discussions at an international symposium on Bioethics and the Concept of Personhood at the Centre for Applied Ethics, Hong Kong Baptist University, May 1998, that explored the bioethical implications of the concept of personhood in a historical and cross-cultural perspective.In the opening essay, John Harris gives Locke’s concept of person a new twist by reading his list of criteria of personhood as preconditions of a being’s capability to value his or her own existence. The status of person is contingent upon the possession of the capacity to value one’s own existence; whoever is capable of such valuation is a person (as long such capacity actually exists) and makes moral claims on other persons. On this account, personhood is not co-extensive with human life or the human species, and even transcends other forms of organic life. Harris allows for the possibility that some machines in effect might qualify for person status. Although human life develops gradually and with it the capacity to value existence, Harris rejects both the potentiality argument and gradualism on the grounds that personhood is a “threshold” concept. Accordingly, proximity to the threshold is morally insignificant, and everything depends on actually crossing the threshold.Tom Beauchamp takes issue with what he sees as the dominant trend in contemporary bioethics to derive moral conclusions from metaphysical accounts of personhood. On his reading, metaphysical theories of personhood are abused in normative analysis by employing certain sets of psychological or cognitive properties to identify persons as bearers of moral rights. He argues that by themselves, without the incorporation of independent moral principles, such properties have no moral implications and cannot confer moral standing. Thus, a being may... (shrink)

An existential psychodynamic theory is presented based on Ernest Becker's claim that self‐esteem and cultural worldviews function to ameliorate the anxiety associated with the uniquely human awareness of vulnerability and mortality. Psychological equanimity is hypothesized to require (1) a shared set of beliefs about reality that imbues the universe with stability, meaning, and permanence; (2) standards by which individuals can judge themselves to be of value; and (3) promises of safety and the transcendence of death to those who meet the (...) standards of value. An empirical research program in support of this theory is then described, and the personal and interpersonal implications of these ideas are briefly considered. (shrink)

Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski offer experimental confirmation for Ernest Becker's claim that the fear of death is a powerful unconscious motive producing polarized worldviews and scapegoating. Their suggestion that their findings also prove Sigmund Freud's theory of repression, with worldviews as its irrational products, is questionable, although Becker's own statements about worldviews as “illusions” seem to invite such interpretation. Their basic theory does not depend on this, however, and abandoning it would enable them to take better advantage (...) of their finding that worldviews incorporating the values of rationality and tolerance tend to counteract polarization effects. (shrink)

The Belgian Auditor's Office is not competent to judge good management. Parliamentary initiatives have been taken to extend its competence towards an efficiency, effectiveness and economy control. Up till 1985 the Belgian budget was drawn up according toa classification system with insufficient regard for the application ofmanagement objectives to budgetary allocation. Based on notions originating from the P.P.B.S. system the budget is drawn up now by programmes assigned to organisation divisions. In the future the parliamentary budget procedure could be transformed (...) into a ratification of the General Budget of Expenses and a supervision of the execution of the departmental budgets. The General Budget will contain the programmes. A similar system offers the external controller a better management and control instrument.An efficiency control exists in various farms in Germany, Great-Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, France, Spain and Canada. The European Auditor's Office evaluates good financial management too. (shrink)

Unlike nonhuman primates, thousands of bird species have articulatory capabilities that equal or surpass those of humans, and they develop their vocalizations through vocal imitation in a way that is very similar to how human infants learn to speak. An understanding of how speech mechanisms have evolved is therefore unlikely to yield key insights into how the human brain is special.

Le rôle des mathématiques dans la formation des officiers de l’armée néerlandaise, a profondément changé pendant le premier xixe siècle avec la fondation de l’Académie militaire en 1828. Les mathématiques étaient au centre de la formation. L’Académie était un des lieux les plus importants de diffusion des connaissances mathématiques aux Pays-Bas pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle, mais elle a perdu ce rôle pendant les années 1860-1870. Dans cet article, je me propose d’examiner à la fois les programmes de (...) l’Académie et le rôle central des enseignants de mathématiques de l’Académie dans la Société Mathématique néerlandaise et dans l’Académie royale des Sciences. Par ailleurs, l’évolution des mathématiques, visible dans ces deux institutions dans les années 1850, n’a pas entraîné une adaptation des programmes au sein de l’Académie. Ainsi, à partir de 1870, l’Académie a presque complètement disparu de la vie mathématique des Pays-Bas. The role of mathematics in the education of Dutch army officers changed dramatically in the early 19th century. This shift became visible with the founding of the Dutch Royal Military Academy in 1828, which shows the role of mathematics in military education shifting toward a purely pedagogical function. This change in approach, which primarily occurred in 1860’s, affected the standing and perception of an academy once highly respected in the field of mathematics. In the present work, I examine both the curricula at the Academy and the crucial role of the Academy’s mathematics instructors in the Dutch Mathematical Society and the Royal Academy of Sciences. Importantly, these two institutions managed to successfully adapt to the changing character of mathematical sciences that occurred around 185 Mathematicians at the Royal Military Academy, however, appeared to cling to an outdated view of mathematics. Failing to update their approach ultimately caused the Academy to lose its once prominent place in the Dutch mathematical community. (shrink)

I generalize acyclic deterministic structural causal models to the nondeterministic case and argue that this offers an improved semantics for counterfactuals. The standard, deterministic, semantics developed by Halpern (and based on the initial proposal of Galles & Pearl) assumes that for each assignment of values to parent variables there is a unique assignment to their child variable, and it assumes that the actual world (an assignment of values to all variables of a model) specifies a unique counterfactual world for each (...) intervention. Both assumptions are unrealistic, and therefore I drop both of them in my proposal. I do so by allowing multi-valued functions in the structural equations. In addition, I adjust the semantics so that the solutions to the equations that obtained in the actual world are preserved in any counterfactual world. I provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the resulting logic and compare it to the standard one by Halpern and to more recent proposals that are closer to mine. Finally, I extend these models to the probabilistic case and show that they open up the way to identifying counterfactuals even in Causal Bayesian Networks. (shrink)

In this paper we present a new proposal for defining actual causation, i.e., the problem of deciding if one event caused another. We do so within the popular counterfactual tradition initiated by Lewis, which is characterised by attributing a fundamental role to counterfactual dependence. Unlike the currently prominent definitions, our approach proceeds from the ground up: we start from basic principles, and construct a definition of causation that satisfies them. We define the concepts of counterfactual dependence and production, and put (...) forward principles such that dependence is an unnecessary but sufficient condition for causation, whereas production is an insufficient but necessary condition. The resulting definition of causation is a suitable compromise between dependence and production. Every principle is introduced by means of a paradigmatic example of causation. We illustrate some of the benefits of our approach with two examples that have spelled trouble for other accounts. We make all of this formally precise using structural equations, which we extend with a timing over all events. (shrink)

"Eva Besnyö was not only an exceptionally gifted photographer but was also politically active during her lifetime: she acquired her photographic skills in the studio of József Pécsi in Budapest, became aware of the aesthetics of modern photography in the early 1930s in Berlin and became a respected master photographer in Amsterdam. Eva Besnyö's life and work were not only influenced by Modernism the arts but also by the dramatic political movements and events of 20th century Europe such as Fascism, (...) National Socialism, immigration and persecution. By the time the Hungarian-Jewish photographer arrived Berlin in 1930, she had made the two most momentous decisions of life: to make photography her profession and to leave Fascist Hungary forever. Modern art was a passion for her. She produced true masterpieces with her Rolleiflex during her expeditions around Berlin. When Besnyö immigrated to Amsterdam in 1932, she was one of the outstanding representatives of "New Photography" together with László Moholy-Nagy and Erwin Blumenfeld: her portraits, architectural views and landscapes have retained their intensity to this day. She worked as a photographer until the 1980s, and among her other roles as a chronicler of the "Dolle Mina" feminist movement. In the 1990s she won prestigious awards Germany and The Netherlands for her outstanding body of work."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Vox pops are a frequent and growing practice in the news. However, there seems to be a general tendency in journalistic practice to be quite critical about these interviews with the ordinary man on the street. Yet, hardly any research exists about journalists’ evaluation of vox pops or that has gone further than speculating about why they are used. This study tackles these research gaps using a survey involving 253 Belgian journalists. We conclude that vox pops are used mostly by (...) audiovisual journalists, and that journalists seem to use them mostly because vox pops increase audience involvement with a news item. Generally, the journalists are quite negative about vox pops, but journalists who perceive them as involving and good public opinion tools are more positive. Against our expectations, the experience of journalists does not influence the evaluation nor the use of vox pops. (shrink)

I generalize acyclic deterministic structural causal models to the nondeterministic case and argue that this offers an improved semantics for counterfactuals. The standard, deterministic, semantics developed by Halpern (and based on the initial proposal of Galles & Pearl) assumes that for each assignment of values to parent variables there is a unique assignment to their child variable, and it assumes that the actual world (an assignment of values to all variables of a model) specifies a unique counterfactual world for each (...) intervention. Both assumptions are unrealistic, and therefore I drop both of them in my proposal. I do so by allowing multi-valued functions in the structural equations. In addition, I adjust the semantics so that the solutions to the equations that obtained in the actual world are preserved in any counterfactual world. I provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the resulting logic and compare it to the standard one by Halpern and to more recent proposals that are closer to mine. Finally, I extend these models to the probabilistic case and show that they open up the way to identifying counterfactuals even in Causal Bayesian Networks. (shrink)

Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X = x causes Y = y iff X = x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y = y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due (...) to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl’s first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation. (shrink)

In (Beckers, 2025) I introduced nondeterministic causal models as a generalization of Pearl’s standard deterministic causal models. I here take advantage of the increased expressivity offered by these models to offer a novel definition of actual causation (that also applies to deterministic models). Instead of motivating the definition by way of (often subjective) intuitions about examples, I proceed by developing it based entirely on the unique function that it can fulfil in communicating and learning a causal model. First I (...) generalize the more basic notion of counterfactual dependence, second I show how this notion has a vital role to play in the logic of causal discovery, third I introduce the notion of a structural simplification of a causal model, and lastly I bring both notions together in my definition of actual causation. Although novel, the resulting definition arrives at verdicts that are almost identical to those of my previous definition (Beckers, 2021, 2022). (shrink)

The counterfactual tradition to defining actual causation has come a long way since Lewis started it off. However there are still important open problems that need to be solved. One of them is the (in)transitivity of causation. Endorsing transitivity was a major source of trouble for the approach taken by Lewis, which is why currently most approaches reject it. But transitivity has never lost its appeal, and there is a large literature devoted to understanding why this is so. Starting from (...) a survey of this work, we will develop a formal analysis of transitivity and the problems it poses for causation. This analysis provides us with a sufficient condition for causation to be transitive, a sufficient condition for dependence to be necessary for causation, and several characterisations of the transitivity of dependence. Finally, we show how this analysis leads naturally to several conditions a definition of causation should satisfy, and use those to suggest a new definition of causation. (shrink)

Necessary and sufficient conditions ofinvariance on four-vectors under the Poincaré group E(3, 1) and its subgroups are exploited. As an example the Euclidean group in three dimensions and its subgroups are explicitly considered. Their invariant “potentials” are systematically derived.

Beckers & Vennekens recently proposed a definition of actual causation that is based on certain plausible principles, thereby allowing the debate on causation to shift away from its heavy focus on examples towards a more systematic analysis. This paper contributes to that analysis in two ways. First, I show that their definition is in fact a formalization of Wright’s famous NESS definition of causation combined with a counterfactual difference-making condition. This means that their definition integrates two highly influential approaches (...) to causation that are claimed to stand in opposition to each other. Second, I modify their definition to offer a substantial improvement: I weaken their difference-making condition in such a way that it avoids their problematic analysis of cases of preemption. The resulting Counterfactual NESS definition of causation forms a natural compromise between counterfactual approaches and the NESS approach. (shrink)

The ethical concerns regarding the successful development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. The idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Others look at this problem from the opposite perspective, namely that of the AI itself. Here the idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that (...) it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is important enough to warrant serious consideration. This paper starts from the observation that both concerns rely on problematic philosophical assumptions. Rather than tackling these assumptions directly, it proceeds to present an argument that if one takes these assumptions seriously, then one has a moral obligation to advocate for a ban on the development of a conscious AI. (shrink)

The ethical concerns regarding the successful development of an Artificial Intelligence have received a lot of attention lately. The idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of an AI causing extreme human suffering is important enough to warrant serious consideration. Others look at this problem from the opposite perspective, namely that of the AI itself. Here the idea is that even if we have good reason to believe that (...) it is very unlikely, the mere possibility of humanity causing extreme suffering to an AI is important enough to warrant serious consideration. This paper starts from the observation that both concerns rely on problematic philosophical assumptions. Rather than tackling these assumptions directly, it proceeds to present an argument that if one takes these assumptions seriously, then one has a moral obligation to advocate for a ban on the development of a conscious AI. (shrink)

Scientific models describe natural phenomena at different levels of abstraction. Abstract descriptions can provide the basis for interventions on the system and explanation of observed phenomena at a level of granularity that is coarser than the most fundamental account of the system. Beckers and Halpern (2019), building on work of Rubenstein et al. (2017), developed an account of abstraction for causal models that is exact. Here we extend this account to the more realistic case where an abstract causal model (...) offers only an approximation of the underlying system. We show how the resulting account handles the discrepancy that can arise between low- and high-level causal models of the same system, and in the process provide an account of how one causal model approximates another, a topic of independent interest. Finally, we extend the account of approximate abstractions to probabilistic causal models, indicating how and where uncertainty can enter into an approximate abstraction. (shrink)

Although standard Machine Learning models are optimized for making predictions about observations, more and more they are used for making predictions about the results of actions. An important goal of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is to compensate for this mismatch by offering explanations about the predictions of an ML-model which ensure that they are reliably action-guiding. As action-guiding explanations are causal explanations, the literature on this topic is starting to embrace insights from the literature on causal models. Here I take (...) a step further down this path by formally defining the causal notions of sufficient explanations and counterfactual explanations. I show how these notions relate to (and improve upon) existing work, and motivate their adequacy by illustrating how different explanations are action-guiding under different circum- stances. Moreover, this work is the first to offer a formal definition of actual causation that is founded entirely in action-guiding explanations. Although the definitions are motivated by a focus on XAI, the analysis of causal explanation and actual causation applies in general. I also touch upon the significance of this work for fairness in AI by showing how actual causation can be used to improve the idea of path-specific counterfactual fairness. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to offer the first systematic exploration and definition of equivalent causal models in the context where both models are not made up of the same variables. The idea is that two models are equivalent when they agree on all "essential" causal information that can be expressed using their common variables. I do so by focussing on the two main features of causal models, namely their structural relations and their functional relations. In particular, I define (...) several relations of causal ancestry and several relations of causal sufficiency, and require that the most general of these relations are preserved across equivalent models. (shrink)

Andreas & Günther have recently proposed a difference-making definition of actual causation. In this paper I show that there exist conclusive counterexamples to their definition, by which I mean examples that are unacceptable to everyone, including AG. Concretely, I show that their definition allows c to cause e even when c is not a causal ancestor of e. I then proceed to identify their non-standard definition of causal models as the source of the problem, and argue that there is no (...) viable strategy open to AG to fixing it. I conclude that their definition of causation is damaged beyond repair. (shrink)

As autonomous systems rapidly become ubiquitous, there is a growing need for a legal and regulatory framework to address when and how such a system harms someone. There have been several attempts within the philosophy literature to define harm, but none of them has proven capable of dealing with with the many examples that have been presented, leading some to suggest that the notion of harm should be abandoned and "replaced by more well-behaved notions". As harm is generally something that (...) is caused, most of these definitions have involved causality at some level. Yet surprisingly, none of them makes use of causal models and the definitions of actual causality that they can express. In this paper we formally define a qualitative notion of harm that uses causal models and is based on a well-known definition of actual causality (Halpern, 2016). The key novelty of our definition is that it is based on contrastive causation and uses a default utility to which the utility of actual outcomes is compared. We show that our definition is able to handle the examples from the literature, and illustrate its importance for reasoning about situations involving autonomous systems. (shrink)

We consider a sequence of successively more restrictive definitions of abstraction for causal models, starting with a notion introduced by Rubenstein et al. (2017) called exact transformation that applies to probabilistic causal models, moving to a notion of uniform transformation that applies to deterministic causal models and does not allow differences to be hidden by the "right" choice of distribution, and then to abstraction, where the interventions of interest are determined by the map from low-level states to high-level states, and (...) strong abstraction, which takes more seriously all potential interventions in a model, not just the allowed interventions. We show that procedures for combining micro-variables into macro-variables are instances of our notion of strong abstraction, as are all the examples considered by Rubenstein et al. (shrink)

As more and more decisions that have a significant ethical dimension are being outsourced to AI systems, it is important to have a definition of moral responsibility that can be applied to AI systems. Moral responsibility for an outcome of an agent who performs some action is commonly taken to involve both a causal condition and an epistemic condition: the action should cause the outcome, and the agent should have been aware -- in some form or other -- of the (...) possible moral consequences of their action. This paper presents a formal definition of both conditions within the framework of causal models. I compare my approach to the existing approaches of Braham and van Hees (BvH) and of Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner (HK). I then generalize my definition into a degree of responsibility. (shrink)

The foundations of analysis offered by Cauchy and Riemann were not immediately welcomed by the mathematical community. Before 1870 the foundations of mathematics were considered more or less a national affair. In this paper, Dutch ideas of rigour in analysis between 1840 and 1870 will be discussed. These ideas show that Dutch mathematicians were aware of developments abroad but preferred the concept of infinitesimals as a foundation of mathematics.

Causal models have proven extremely useful in offering formal representations of causal relationships between a set of variables. Yet in many situations, there are non-causal relationships among variables. For example, we may want variables LDL, HDL, and TOT that represent the level of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, the level of lipoprotein high-density lipoprotein cholesterol, and total cholesterol level, with the relation LDL+HDL=TOT. This cannot be done in standard causal models, because we can intervene simultaneously on all three variables. The goal of (...) this paper is to extend standard causal models to allow for constraints on settings of variables. Although the extension is relatively straightforward, to make it useful we have to define a new intervention operation that disconnects a variable from a causal equation. We give examples showing the usefulness of this extension, and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for causal models with constraints. (shrink)

A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09632-6.