Socialism and Feminism in the 19th century.

Paul Appelbaum and colleagues propose four models of informed consent to research that deploys whole genome sequencing and may generate incidental findings. They base their analysis on empirical data that suggests that research participants want to be offered incidental findings and on a normative consensus that researchers incur a duty to offer them. Their models will contribute to the heated policy debate about return of incidental findings. But in my view, they do not ask the foundational question, In the context (...) of genome sequencing, how much work can consent be asked to do? (shrink)

This paper makes a plea for more reflexive attempts to develop and anchor the emerging concept of responsible research and innovation. RRI has recently emerged as a buzzword in science policy, becoming a focus of concerted experimentation in many academic circles. Its performative capacity means that it is able to mobilise resources and spaces despite no common understanding of what it is or should be ‘made of’. In order to support reflection and practice amongst those who are interested in and (...) using the concept, this paper unpacks understandings of RRI across a multi-disciplinary body of peer-reviewed literature. Our analysis focuses on three key dimensions of RRI that remain particularly opaque. A total of 48 publications were selected through a systematic literature search and their content was qualitatively analysed. Across the literature, RRI is portrayed as a concept that embeds numerous features of existing approaches to govern and assess emerging technologies. Our analysis suggests that its greatest potential may be in its ability to unify and provide political momentum to a wide range of long-articulated ethical and policy issues. At the same time, RRI’s dynamism and resulting complexity may represent its greatest challenge. Further clarification on what RRI has to offer in practice—beyond what has been offered to date—is still needed, as well as more explicit engagement with research and institutional cultures of responsibility. Such work may help to realise the high political expectations that are attached to nascent RRI. (shrink)

A consideration of efforts to explain religion naturalistically, including a range of recent cognitive-evolutionary approaches. The book also examines recent efforts to reconcile natural-scientific accounts of the world with traditional religious teachings.

The article is in two parts with the first part showing that the material in the New Zealand Business Roundtable documents is consistent with the contemporary, international, libertarian ideology. The second part draws parallels between this material and the characteristics shown by religious movements, including a claiming of autority from past prophets, a belief in an overarching Power, a missionary zeal to convert others, a canon of texts, a ‘theodicy’, a sense of bonding among believers, a ‘doctrine’ of humanity, and (...) the use of ritual language. The article concludes that the documents show a self-supporting belief system built on a fallacious theoretical premise. (shrink)

Bioethics education now takes place outside universities as well as within them. How should clinicians, ethics committee members, and policymakers be taught the ethics they need, and how may their progress best be evaluated?

In today’s digital societies, it has become very difficult for people to exercise meaningful control over what and how data is collected and used. McCoy and colleagues (2023) seek to address this p...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:20. HUME ON REASON1 One of the main concerns of Hume's Treatise of 2 Human Nature (T) is the investigation of the role that reason plays in belief and action. On the standard interpretation, Hume is taken to argue that neither our beliefs nor our actions are determined by reason; Books I and III are thus seen as sharing a common theme: the denigration of reason's role in human (...) affairs. Arguing for this view, Kemp Smith claims that "Hume's principle of the subordination of reason to the passions runs through his whole philosophy ", not merely through Books II and III. This interpretation of Hume's enterprise presupposes that the faculty of reason whose role in action is discussed in Book III is the same faculty which has been shown not to determine belief in Book I. In this paper I argue that a univocal reading of 'reason' and related terms like 'reasoning' throughout the Treatise has the consequence that there are major internal inconsistencies in Hume's philosophy, cannot account for some important sections of the work, and leads to misinterpretation of the nature of his overall argument. In its place I develop an interpretation which avoids these difficulties and emphasizes the radical nature of Hume's naturalism. The Argument of the Treatise Let me begin by reviewing the salient features of the main argument of the Treatise. In Book I, Hume is concerned to show that our most fundamental beliefs — e.g., about the continued and distinct existence of object, about what we are not presently observing, and in the existence of the self — are not acquired by reason, but instead by the imagination, influenced by custom and habit. In a typical passage, he argues: Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, 21. therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by reason... (T92)4 In Book III, and in Book II, Part III, Section III (Of the influencing motives of the will), Hume is concerned to show that reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition (T414), and the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion (T414-415). Hume uses this result in Book III, Part I, Section I, to show that the rules of morality...are not conclusions of our reason (T457). Proponents of the univocal reading of 'reason' would hold that the Treatise thus constitutes a continuous attack on reason, showing that it causes neither our most fundamental beliefs nor our actions and moral judgments. But if this reading were correct, Hume would fail to avail himself of an obvious and persuasive argument for the conclusion he reaches in Books II and III, and in the latter books he would contradict the results of Book I. Conflict between Book I and Books II and III If Hume did have the same faculty in mind throughout the Treatise, a strong argument to show that reason does not cause action would be available to him in Books II and III, utilizing the results he has established in Book I. The principal way in which reason would be thought to influence action is by informing us of facts about efficient means to achieve our ends and about the possible effects of actions — facts about causal relations. Since the conclusion of Book I is that judgments about causal relations do not result from reason, it follows that even if such beliefs did cause action, it would still not be the case that reason caused action. But Hume not only does not make such an argument in Books II and III, he denies one of its premises — the claim that beliefs about causal relations do not result from reason — which was the main conclusion of Book I. In the 22. later books he asserts repeatedly that reason can cause beliefs about causal relations. For example, in Book III, he says:...reason, in a strict and philosophical... (shrink)

Technology assessment (TA) as aninstitution was introduced nearly thirty yearsago as an instrument to render possible themaking of responsible decisions concerning newtechnological options. Another recentdevelopment however has been the introductionof participatory technology assessment (pTA),mainly connected to the growing insight thatthe evaluation of technological options withrespect to their risks and benefits, is not –only – a scientific question. This paper willfocus on the questions, to what degree theideas of technology assessment and thePrecautionary Principle are connected and how.Without naming it explicitly, the (...) PrecautionaryPrinciple is put to debate in the``TA-arrangement on the cultivation oftransgenic herbicide resistant crops,''organized by the Science Centre, Berlin. Fromthe perspective of ethical clarification, someunique features concerning theconceptualization of the discoursive procedureand reconstruction of the argumentation processin order to come to results have to beanalyzed. Finally the performance and resultsof the pTA-arrangement are reflected in thelight of the Precautionary Principle andconclusions are drawn. (shrink)

Landau also pushes the role of syntax and its mapping to semantics in learning what some would consider “easy words”—the simplest spatial prepositions in English, in and on. Taking as a starting point that the syntactic distribution of a word is a reflex of its meaning, Landau shows that careful study of how children and adults linguistically encode a range of containment and support configurations reveals a special status for “core” configurations in each domain. She proposes that children come to (...) learning spatial terms with the expectation that configurations reflecting core concepts of containment and support will be expressed with the maximally simple, unmarked, linguistic expression. (shrink)

Steven French proposes a vindication of “scientifically disinterested” metaphysics that leaves little room to its original ambitions. He claims that as a discipline that looks to find out truths about the world, it is untenable; and that rather, its vindication lies in its use as a “toolbox” of concepts for a philosophical discipline that does have a claim at getting us closer to truth—the philosophy of science, and more specifically of physics. I respond to both his main claims. The first (...) claim, I argue, neglects what I call “archaeological” metaphysics, which tries to impose some order on phenomena by “digging deeper” from the less to the more fundamental, or from the less to the more abstract questions. The second claim imposes a hierarchical relation between metaphysics and philosophy of science which should, I argue, be replaced with a more egalitarian picture of philosophy. (shrink)

Contemporary organizations often reciprocate to society for using resources and for affecting stakeholders by engaging in corporate social responsibility. It has been shown that CSR has a positive impact on employee attitudes. However, not all employees may react equally strongly to CSR practices. Based on socio-emotional selectivity theory, we contend that the effect of CSR on employee satisfaction will be more pronounced for older than for younger employees, because CSR practices address those emotional needs and goals that are prioritized when (...) people’s future time perspective decreases. In one multi-source field study and one experimental study, we demonstrate that CSR indeed has a stronger positive effect on employee satisfaction for older relative to younger employees. Accordingly, engaging in CSR can be an attractive tool for organizations that aim to keep their aging workforce satisfied with their job. (shrink)

Is it possible to find an ethical and generative way to speak about the ‘work’ of Indigenous art? Regardless of what prohibitions exist to protect sacred knowledge from the gaze of Western eyes, Indigenous work is circulating; it is being read, misread, interpreted, misinterpreted and otherwise known. How can a non-Indigenous person ‘speak’ about Indigenous art without reducing it to the diagram, collapsing it into Western modes of knowing, or intruding into the domain of restricted cultural information? Given the lessons (...) of the Indigenous cultural practices, I propose that the work of art is performative and not merely representational. Through attention to the operation of rhythm in Kathleen Petyarre’s paintings, I propose to reconfigure contemporary understandings of performativity. In this formulation I will argue that in the dynamic productivity of the performative act, the world intrudes into practice, and in a double movement, practice casts its effects back towards the world. In this way I suggest that just as life gets into images, so imaging also produces reality. This mutual reflection is the work of art. (shrink)

Aristóteles foi o primeiro filósofo que articulou uma taxonomia da ciência: os quatro livros que compõem os Analíticos oferecem uma teoria do conhecimento científico e os critérios que uma disciplina deve respeitar para receber a designação de ciência. Aristóteles, porém, foi também o fundador da ciência zoológica e o pai da anatomia comparada. Trata-se de uma questão já clássica, saber se o modo pelo qual Aristóteles desenvolve sua ciência dos animais na Historia Animalium e no De Partibus Animalium conforma-se aos (...) critérios científicos estabelecidos nos Analíticos Posteriores. Na primeira parte deste artigo, evidenciamos a relação entre as normas estipuladas nos Analíticos para a investigação científica e as pesquisas relatadas nos tratados naturais. Na segunda parte, examinamos a explicação fornecida pelo Estagirita acerca da função do cérebro, a qual leva o filósofo a incorrer num erro considerado escandaloso pelos pensadores que lhe sucederam. (shrink)

Aristóteles foi o primeiro pensador que articulou uma taxonomia do conheci-mento científico: os quatros livros dos Segundos Analíticos descrevem os critérios que uma disciplina qualquer deve respeitar e satisfazer para legitimamente receber a designação de ciência teorética. Mas Aristóteles é mesmo o criador das “ciências particulares”, ou seja, a biologia, a psicologia, a zoologia e, em geral, as ciências naturais. Trata-se de uma questão já clássica saber se o modo pelo qual Aristóteles desenvolve sua ciência dos animais con-forma-se aos padrões (...) normativos estipulados pela teoria da ciência nos Analíticos. Na men-talidade de muitos intérpretes ficou a convicção de que as obras biológicas de Aristóteles conformam-se a um padrão que utiliza apenas dados empíricos, ao passo que o conheci-mento nos Analíticos é estabelecido a partir de premissas primeiras e imediatas. Agora, nos Segundos Analíticos, encontramos exemplos provenientes da meteorologia, da botânica, da zoologia ao lado de exemplos matemáticos. Fica a pergunta: a metodologia axiomática de estilo matemático que o Estagirita propõe nos Analíticos é totalmente independente e ina-dequada para o estudo da biologia? Se for assim, Aristóteles não teria conseguido encaixar as ciências naturais nos padrões normativos expostos nos Segundos Analíticos. No presente estudo, pretendemos, pelo contrário, ressaltar o fato de que é razoável tomar os textos aristotélicos como orbitando em torno de uma mesma e grande pesquisa, a pesquisa cientí-fica, que inclui os Analíticos, assim como os tratados naturais.Aristotle was the first Greek thinker to articulate a taxonomy of scientific pursuits: the four books of the Analytics present a theory of scientific knowledge with a rigorous ac-count of what a body of propositions must be like in order to count as a theoretical science. But Aristotle was also the originator of “special sciences”. A longstanding problem about Aristotle’s philosophy of science is to understand if there is a conflict between the account of scientific explanation in the Posterior Analytics and the investigations reported in treatises such as the History of Animals, Parts of Animals, Generation of Animals 1. The Analytics restricts knowledge to what has been demonstrated from self-evident first principles. The sciences of nature seem to secure their results without such demonstrations: there are not axioms, nor theorems or proofs, nor definitions. Yet many of the examples in the Posterior Analytics are drawn from meteorology, botany and zoology, and are discussed side by side with mathe-matical examples. It is curious that a philosopher as systematic as Aristotle could formulate the first rigorous theory of scientific inquiry and demonstration, pepper the treatise in which he does so with biological examples, and not aim to structure his science of animals in ac-cordance with that theory. In this investigation I want to show that there is a relation betwe-en Aristotle’s official account of the definition in Posterior Analytics and the nature and the role assigned to definition in the Natural Treatises. (shrink)

In 2005, seven European countries signed the so-called Prüm Treaty to increase transnational collaboration in combating international crime, terrorism and illegal immigration. Three years later, the Treaty was adopted into EU law. EU member countries were now obliged to have systems in place to allow authorities of other member states access to nationally held data on DNA, fingerprints, and vehicles by August 2011. In this paper, we discuss the conditions of possibility for the Prüm network to emerge, and argue that (...) rather than a linear ascent towards technological and political convergence and harmonisation, the story of Prüm is heterogeneous and halting. This is reflected also in the early stages of implementing the Prüm Decision which has proven to be more challenging than it was hoped by the drivers of the Prüm process. In this sense, the Prüm network sits uncomfortably with success stories of forensic science . Instead of telling a story of heroic science, the story of Prüm articulates the European dream: one in which goods, services, and people live and travel freely and securely. (shrink)