Drawing from the Boulding''s (1956) framework for general systems theory, the need to employ richer paradigm in the study of organizations (Pondy and Mitroff, 1979) is reiterated. It is argued that a better understanding of organizational ethical behavior is contingent upon viewing organizations as symbol processing systems of shared language and meanings. Further, it is proposed that organizations, like individuals, develop into collectivities of shared cognitions and rationale, over a period of time. The study adapts Kohlberg''s (1983) model of moral (...) development to examine if organizations can be viewed as passing through different stages of moral development depending on the type of moral reasoning employed to explain their behaviors in the face of ethical crises. Several cases raising questions about the ethics of corporate behavior were researched. An instrument entitled Organization Response Analysis was constructed using statements made by various spokespersons representing five of these organizations. The instrument was administered to 246 graduate and undergraduate students of business (N = 246). Results indicated a great degree of concurrence among respondents of differing genders, levels of education and work experience in determining the stages of moral development of organizations. Limitations of the current study and implications for future research and practice are discussed. (shrink)

As I had rejected en bloc references to Bacchanalia as indications of date, it was a mere chance which led me, after the above had left my hands, to look up Cas. 980 ‘ nunc Bacchae nullae ludunt,’ quoted in Schanz, R. Lit.3, p. 78. As this affords an excellent opportunity of testing my conclusions, perhaps a word or two will not be out of place.

Simultaneous discovery in science has been a subject of close historical investigations, not only for assessing claims of priority, which occasionally generate controversy rather than consensus, but also for understanding the cultural and intellectual context of the time. Thomas S. Kuhn is a pioneer in the contextual study of simultaneous discovery, and his paper on the formulation of the first law of thermodynamics has already become a classic.

The principle of non-directiveness remains an important tenet in genetics. However, the concept has encountered growing criticism over the last two decades. There is an ongoing discussion about its appropriateness for specific situations in genetics, especially in light of recent significant advancements in genetic medicine. Despite the debate surrounding non-directiveness, there is a notable lack of up-to-date international research empirically investigating the issue from the perspective of those who actually do genetic counselling. Addressing this gap, our article delves into the (...) viewpoints and experiences of medical geneticists in Germany and Switzerland. Twenty qualitative interviews were analysed employing reflexive thematic analysis. Participants’ responses revealed substantial uncertainties and divergences in their understanding and application of the concept. It seems to cause distress since many geneticists stated that the principle was difficult to put into clinical practice and was no longer ethically justified given the increasing likelihood of therapeutic implications resulting from genomic testing outcomes. The insights provided by our qualitative empirical study accord with the ongoing theoretical debate regarding the definition, legitimacy, and feasibility of the principle. An adequately nuanced understanding and application of non-directiveness seems crucial to circumvent the risks inherent in the principle, while promoting patient autonomy and beneficence. (shrink)

This paper investigates a well-known case of simultaneous discovery in twentieth-century chemistry, the origins of the concept of hybridisation, in the light of Kuhn's insights. There has been no ambiguity as to who discovered this concept, when it was "rst in print, and how important it was. The full-#edged form of the concept was published in 1931 independently by two American scientists John C. Slater (1900}1976) and Linus Pauling (1901}1994), although both of them had made their ideas public earlier: Slater (...) at the American Physical Society meetings in 1930, and Pauling in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 1928. Slater and Pauling both argued for the necessity of using an s orbital as well as three p orbitals in the carbon atom in order to explain carbon's four valences and the tetrahedral structure of methane. The metaphor &hybridisation' for denoting this mix of s and p orbitals was "rst used by Robert S. Mulliken and J. H. Van Vleck before gaining currency with the scienti"c community around 1935.2 The concept of hybridisation was indeed indispensable for extending the quantum-mechanical interpretation of the chemical bond as an electron pairing from diatomic molecules to polyatomic ones. To be sure, the emergence of hybridisation attests to scientists' growing interest in exploring the borderland between physics and chemistry, a trend that led to the creation of physical chemistry in the late nineteenth century and of chemical physics and quantum chemistry in the 1920s and 30s. Slater and Pauling themselves experienced and on many occasions talked about the fruitfulness of interdisciplinary research; and historians have legitimately illuminated their works by examining them in this broad context.3 Yet the careful analysis of their research notes and published papers reveals that Slater and Pauling were working in quite disparate disciplinary traditions, with di!erent approaches, for di!erent audiences, and towards di!erent goals. The aim of this paper is to explore their di!erent routes to a common destination*hybridisation*and thereby to explicate tensions existing between physics and chemistry amidst the institutional and conceptual overlapping of the two disciplines. (shrink)

In his account of probable reasoning, Poincare used the concept, or at least the language, of conventions. In particular, he claimed that the prior probabilities essential for inverse probable reasoning are determined conventionally. This paper investigates, in the light of Poincare's well known claim about the conventionality of metric geometry, what this could mean, and how it is related to other views about the determination of prior probabilities. Particular attention is paid to the similarities and differences between Poincare's conventionalism as (...) it applies to probabilities and de Finetti's subjectivism. The aim of the paper is to suggest that in accounts of the development of ideas about probable reasoning, particularly those customarily described as Bayesian, Poincare's discussion deserves more attention than it has so far received. (shrink)

This paper addresses whether universal, general education programs are enough to satisfy basic criteria of human rights, or whether comprehensive family planning programs, in conjunction with universal education programs, might also be morally required. Even before the Reagan administration instituted the ‘global gag rule’ at the 1984 conference in Mexico City, prohibiting funding to nongovernmental organizations that included providing information about abortion as a possible method of family planning, the moral acceptability of family planning programs has been called into question. (...) This paper makes a moral argument for family planning by appealing to both data and to theory: data about the efficacy of universal and comprehensive family planning education programs at reducing fertility and infant mortality, and theory about what is required for the establishment of autonomy. It reasons that universal educational programs are insufficient for the promotion of autonomy, and therefore argues on substantive autonomy grounds for comprehensive family planning programs in addition to universal education programs. (shrink)

La idea de que los delirios son creencias es apoyada por la observación de que los delirios, al igual que las creencias, son usados en el razonamiento. Sin embargo, los delirios tienen otras características que son difíciles de explicar por medio de una teoría doxástica —por ejemplo, los delirios persisten a pesar de la evidencia en su contra y algunas veces entran en conflicto con las acciones del agente (de maneras en que las creencias parecerían no hacerlo), dando lugar a (...) lo que se conoce como el fenómeno de la doble cuenta—. Estas características han motivado teorías no doxásticas, que argumentan que los delirios son otro tipo de fenómeno mental (e.g., imaginaciones o actos de habla vacíos). Mientras que las teorías no-doxásticas pueden explicar dichas características de los delirios—como su persistencia a pesar de la evidencia en su contra y el fenómeno de la doble cuenta— estas teorías tienen dificultades para explicar las características de los delirios que los hacen similares a las creencias. Nos encontramos entonces en un punto muerto en el que ni los enfoques doxásticos ni los no doxásticos pueden explicar todas las características de los delirios. En este artículo, propongo avanzar en este debate mostrando que la propuesta doxástica puede, después de todo, dar cuenta tanto de las características de los delirios que los hacen similares a las creencias como de sus demás características. Basándome en literatura reciente en epistemología, argumento que las creencias (racionales) puede estar motivadas por factores no evidenciales (e.g. pragmáticos o emocionales) y que estos factores sirven para explicar las características aparentemente desconcertantes de los delirios. También propongo que categorizar las creencias a través de dos compartimentos funcionales, el implícito y el explícito, nos ayuda a entender la interacción dinámica entre creencias delirantes y no delirantes. (shrink)

Adopting a noncognitivist metaethics, Smart presents hedonistic-act utilitarianism as a position which appeals to benevolent and sympathetic men. He renounces any attempt to prove the position, but he does try to show that it is not open to the usual objections. There are some interesting comments on the concept of happiness and a brief attempt to show a way in which game theory can be used in a utilitarian position.--J. B. S.