Within the research field of computer-mediated communication, extensive attention has been paid to the differences between CMC and spoken conversation, particularly in terms of sequential structure. In this study, the aim is to analyse how participants maintain continuity and handle discontinuities in institutionally arranged, computer-mediated communication. The empirical material consists of chat log files from in-service training courses for professionals in the food production industry. In the chat sessions we analysed, participants initially had some problems in co-ordinating their postings, that (...) is, keeping track of the discussion’s threading.We also found, however, that methods for co-ordinating postings rather quickly were established among the participants. Two methods for making recognizable how postings were to be read were common in the material: 1) the use of personal names to address a specific participant, and 2) recycling part of the content of a previous posting or reformulating the content in the posting addressed in recognizable ways. We also found an emerging norm in their interaction: that of waiting for one’s turn. (shrink)

This article analyses the dynamics of the use of institutional categories in institutional encounters. The focus is on documenting how categories are invoked to index what is relevant to situated knowing in interactional sequences where there is a need to bridge the gap between action and expectation. This general problem has been studied in the context of interactions between job applicants and vocational guidance officers in a public employment agency. Institutional categories are inference-rich, and they work as flexible tools that (...) allow participants to recontextualize and negotiate the issues at stake. In this sense, categories serve as constitutive tools that can be crafted to fit into a broad range of circumstances. However, in order to produce a relevant account, participants’ ways of reasoning need to fit into the institutionally specific traditions of argumentation and the practical outcomes which need to be produced. In this sense, the focus on accounting practices is illuminating when attempting to understand the situated knowing that maintains institutional practices. (shrink)

BackgroundRich in different kind of potent cells, embryos are used in modern regenerative medicine and research. Neurobiologists today are pushing the boundaries for what can be done with embryos existing in the transitory margins of medicine. Therefore, there is a growing need to develop conceptual frameworks for interpreting the transformative cultural, biological and technical processes involving these aborted, donated and marginal embryos. This article is a contribution to this development of frameworks.MethodsThis article examines different emotional, cognitive and discursive strategies used (...) by neurobiologists in a foetal cell transplantation trial in Parkinson’s disease research, using cells harvested from aborted embryos. Two interviews were analysed in the light of former observations in the processing laboratories, using the anthropologist Mary Douglas’s concept of pollution behaviour and the linguist, philosopher, psychoanalyst and feminist Julia Kristeva’s concept of the abjective to explain and make sense of the findings.ResultsThe findings indicate that the labour performed by the researchers in the trial work involves transforming the foetal material practically, as well as culturally, from trash to treasure. The transformation process contains different phases, and in the interview material we observed that the foetal material or cells were considered objects, subjects or rejected as abject by the researchers handling them, depending on what phase of process or practice they referred to or had experience of. As demonstrated in the analysis, it is the human origin of the cell that makes it abjective and activates pollution discourse, when the researchers talk of their practice.ConclusionsThe marginal and ambiguous status of the embryo that emerges in the accounts turns the scientists handling foetal cells into liminal characters in modern medicine. Focusing on how practical as well as emotional and cultural strategies and rationalizations of the researchers emerge in interview accounts, this study adds insights on the rationale of practically procuring, transforming and utilizing the foetal material to the already existing studies focused on the donations. We also discuss why the use and refinement of a tissue, around which there is practical consensus but cultural ambiguity, deserves further investigation. (shrink)

Crick and Koch’s 1990 “neurobiological theory of consciousness” sparked the race for the physical correlates of subjective experience. 30 years later, cognitive sciences trend toward consideration of the brain’s electromagnetic field as the primary seat of consciousness, the “to be” of the individual. Recent advancements in laboratory tools have preceded an influx of studies reporting a synchronization between the neuronally generated EM fields of interacting individuals. An embodied and enactive neuroscientific approach has gained traction in the wake of these findings (...) wherein consciousness and cognition are theorized to be regulated and distributed beyond the individual. We approach this frontier to extend the implications of person-to-person synchrony to propose a process of combination whereby coupled individual agents merge into a hierarchical cognitive system to which they are subsidiary. Such is to say, the complex mammalian consciousness humans possess may not be the tip of the iceberg, but another step in a succeeding staircase. To this end, the axioms and conjectures of General Resonance Theory are utilized to describe this phenomenon of interpersonal resonant combination. Our proposal describes a coupled system of spatially distributed EM fields that are synchronized through recurrent, entraining behavioral interactions. The system, having achieved sufficient synchronization, enjoys an optimization of information flow that alters the conscious states of its merging agents and enhances group performance capabilities. In the race for the neurobiological correlates of subjective experience, we attempt the first steps in the journey toward defining the physical basis of “group consciousness.” The establishment of a concrete account of the combination of consciousness at a scale superseding individual human consciousness remains speculation, but our suggested approach provides a framework for empirical testing of these possibilities. (shrink)

The thesis examines a central and controversial question in the philosophy of mind and language: Is meaning normative? Are there rules we must follow for our words to have meaning? ;Philosophers are sharply divided over this question. One side, often associated with Wittgenstein and more recently Kripke, sees meaning as essentially normative. If a sign is to be meaningful, then surely, it is argued, there must be a distinction between the correct and incorrect use of that sign. The other side (...) eschews the appeal to rules. This line of thought goes back to Quine, and has been vigorously defended by Davidson, who argues that linguistic rules are no more essential to speaking a language than the rules of etiquette at a dinner table are to consuming food. ;The dissertation proposes that we approach the question by asking whether there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning. Various common versions of the notion of linguistic incorrectness are considered, including the one appealed to by Saul Kripke in his discussion of Wittgenstein, the suggestion that going against the communicative conventions is making a linguistic error, and Tyler Burge's idea that we err when we violate certain constitutive community norms. Neither of these suggestions, it is argued, supports the idea that rules are essential to meaning. ;But we should not conclude from this, as does Davidson, that we can reject the notion of linguistic incorrectness altogether. If a speaker is to be interpretable there must be certain constraints on her linguistic use, and a plausible construal of these constraints, it is argued, presupposes a notion of linguistic incorrectness. The conclusion is that there is a notion of linguistic incorrectness which is essential to meaning, although this notion is not to be understood along the ordinary lines. (shrink)

Dignity, usually considered an essential ethical value in healthcare, is a relatively complex, multifaceted concept. However, healthcare professionals often have only a vague idea of what it means to respect dignity when providing care, especially for persons with impaired autonomy. This article focuses on two concepts of dignity, human dignity and dignity of identity, and aims to analyse how these concepts can be applied in the care for persons with impaired autonomy and in furthering the practice of respect and protection (...) from harm. Three vignettes were designed to illustrate typical caring situations involving patients with mild to severely impaired autonomy, including patients with cognitive impairments. In situations like these, there is a risk of the patient’s dignity being disrespected and violated. The vignettes were then analysed with respect to the two concepts of dignity to find out whether this approach can illuminate what is at stake in these situations and to provide an understanding of which measures could safeguard the dignity of these patients. The analysis showed that there are profound ethical challenges in the daily care of persons with impaired autonomy. We suggest that these two concepts of human dignity could help guide healthcare professionals to develop practical skills in person-centred, ethically grounded care, where the patient’s wishes and needs are the starting point. (shrink)

This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the (...) second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective. (shrink)

My paper examines the popular idea, defended by Kripke, that meaning is an essentially normative notion. I consider four common versions of this idea and suggest that none of them can be supported, either because the alleged normativity has nothing to do with normativity or because it cannot plausibly be said that meaning is normative in the sense suggested. I argue that contrary to received opinion, we don’t need normativity to secure the possibility of meaning. I conclude by considering the (...) repercussions of rejecting semantic normativity on three central issues: justification, communication, and naturalism. (shrink)

Volume: v. 1 General Books publication date: 2009 Original publication date: 1824 Original Publisher: Printed at the Mirror Office Subjects: Philosophy / Ethics.

Through these books, scholars, interpreters, students, and non-academics alike can see the thoughts and beliefs of Americans who came before us.".

Cultural evolution, the propagation and transfer of ideas from generation to generation, as well as from one person to another and from one culture to another, is much faster than normal, genetic evolution. This could account for the speedy proliferation of humankind on this planet, at the expense of other life forms.

Background: In end of life care, ethical problems often come to the fore. Little research is performed on ways or strategies for handling those problems and even less on obstacles to and possibilities of using such strategies. A previous study illuminated stroke team members’ experiences of ethical problems and how the teams managed the situation when caring for patients faced with sudden and unexpected death from stroke. These findings have been further explored in this study. Objective: The aim of the (...) study was to illuminate obstacles and possibilities perceived by stroke team members in using strategies for handling ethical problems when caring for patients afflicted by sudden and unexpected death caused by stroke. Research design: A qualitative method with combined deductive and inductive content analysis was utilized. Participants and research context: Data were collected through individual interviews with 15 stroke team members working in stroke units of two associated county hospitals in western Sweden. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Regional Ethics Review Board, Gothenburg, Sweden. Permission was also obtained from the director of each stroke unit. Findings: All the studied strategies for handling of ethical problems were found to have both obstacles and possibilities. Uncertainty is shown as a major obstacle and unanimity as a possibility in the use of the strategies. The findings also illuminate the value of the concept “the patient’s best interests” as a starting point for the carers’ ethical reasoning. Conclusion: The concept “the patient’s best interests” used as a starting point for ethical reasoning among the carers is not explicitly defined yet, which might make this value difficult to use both as a universal concept and as an argument for decisions. Carers therefore need to strengthen their argumentation and reflect on and use ethically grounded arguments and defined ethical values like dignity in their clinical work and decisions. (shrink)

Hume’s mysterious words, “we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves” have been the focus of a variety of different interpretations, some more creative than others. But the solution to this interpretative problem is indeed very simple, too simple to occur to most readers. What Hume has in mind is actually nothing but the different ways association works with regard to, on the (...) one hand, imagination, and, on the other hand, passion. Hence, one may easily read the entire Treatise as containing just one idea of self, that is, the bundle of perceptions discussed in “On personal identity.” Contrary to what many scholars have recently suggested, this idea may very well be “the idea, or rather impression” of self at play in the mechanism of sympathy, as well as the object of pride and humility. This faithful but dull reading makes Hume coherent, probably more coherent than any two-ideas interpretation does. (shrink)

When people die suddenly and unexpectedly ethical issues often come to the fore. The aim of the study was to describe experiences of members of stroke teams in stroke units of ethical problems and how the teams manage the situation when caring for patients faced with sudden and unexpected death from stroke. Data were collected through four focus group interviews with 19 team members in stroke-unit teams, and analysed using interpretive content analysis. Three themes emerged from the analysis characterized by (...) information, decisions about care and support for the next-of-kin in the changing and uncertain situation, with mutual trust as the core. Mutual trust, both within the stroke team and with next-of-kin was seen by the stroke-team members as a way of handling ethical problems by administering care with the patient’s best interest at heart. (shrink)

Commentary and summarization of the selected works of Yaḥyá ibn Ḥabash Suhrawardī, 1152 or 1153-1191.

In order to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics in violent situations in institutional care for elderly people the aim of this study was to explore involved parties’ positions, and to illuminate forces and moves related to these positions. One involved care provider's narrative was analysed using narrative analysis and positioning theory. In the narrative the involved parties’ positions were fluid and often overlapping, and not exclusively as victim or perpetrator. Across the narrative the narrator altered the involved (...) parties’ positions by using available discourses. We understand that the altered positions were a salient way for the care provider to make sense of her experiences. By reading the care provider's narrative we further understand that she was much more than just a perpetrator, which was the origin for her narrative. This study led us to two assumptions important for implications in nursing practice. First, it is of significance how we position ourselves and others in narratives and conversations. Second, there is a difference between being categorised in advance and getting the opportunity to narrate one's own story. (shrink)

Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy (...) of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support. (shrink)

Background: Ethical problems are a universal phenomenon but rarely researched concerning patients dying from acute stroke. These patients often have a reduced consciousness from stroke onset and thereby lack ability to convey their needs and could be described as ‘incompetent’ decision makers regarding their own care. Objective: The aim of the study was to deepen the understanding of stroke team members’ reasoning about truth-telling in end-of-life care due to acute stroke. Research design: Qualitative study based on individual interviews utilizing combined (...) deductive and inductive content analysis. Participants and research context: A total of 15 stroke team members working in stroke units of two associated county hospitals in western Sweden participated. Ethical considerations: The study was approved by the Regional Ethics Review Board, Gothenburg, Sweden. Findings: The main findings were the team members’ dynamic movement between the categories ‘Truth above all’ and ‘Hide truth to protect’. Honesty was highly valued and considered as a reason for always telling the truth, with the argument of truth as common morality. However, the carers also argued for hiding the truth for different reasons such as not adding extra burden in the sorrow, awaiting a timely moment and not being a messenger of bad news. Withholding truth could both be seen as a way of protecting themselves from difficult conversations and to protect others. Discussion: The results indicate that there are various barriers for truthfulness. Interpreted from a virtue of ethics perspective, withholding of truth might also be seen as an expression of sound judgement to put the patient’s best interest first. Conclusion: The carers may need support in the form of supervision to be given space to reflect on their experience and thereby promote ethically justified care. Here, the multi-professional team can be of great value and contribute through inter-professional sharing of knowledge. (shrink)

The paper discusses the thesis of extended belief and its implications for the possibility of extending ordinary, personal level knowledge. A common worry is that knowledge will overextend, that there will be ‘cognitive bloat’. If the subject’s standing beliefs can be realized in devices such as notebooks and smart phones, what is there to prevent the conclusion that she knows everything stored on such devices? One response to this worry is to block the move from belief to knowledge, and argue (...) that these externally stored beliefs, although reliable, do not qualify as knowledge. I argue, instead, that the fundamental problem arises at the level of belief. We prevent bloating of knowledge by preventing the bloating of belief. To do so, I argue, we need to take seriously Clark and Chalmers’ suggestion that what is distinctive of belief is its role in folk psychological explanations. Paying attention to this role shows that the usual examples, such as Otto’s notebook information, do not qualify as beliefs. To qualify, the external information would have to be much more directly connected to, and deeply integrated into, the subject’s overall system of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

To gain legitimacy for climate change adaptation decisions, the distribution of responsibility for these decisions and their implementation needs to be grounded in theories of just distribution and what those a ected by decisions see as just. The purpose of this project is to contribute to sustainable spatial planning and the ability of local and regional public authorities to make well-informed and sustainable adaptation decisions, based on knowledge about both climate change impacts and the perceptions of residents and civil servants (...) on what constitutes a sustainable distribution of responsibility. Our aims are: (1) a better understanding of the practical implications of theories about just distribution of responsibility for the choice of local and regional climate adaptation measures; (2) knowledge about what residents and civil servants consider a sustainable distribution of responsibility for climate adaptation measures; and (3) a better understanding of conflicts concerning the distribution of responsibilities and systematic knowledge about the possibilities to manage them. In this interdisciplinary project, we study six municipalities and their residents, and two county administrative boards, all in Sweden, using mixed methods: value theory, document studies, interviews, focus groups, and surveys. (shrink)

Background: The midwifery profession in Sweden has a history since the early 1700s when government training for midwives began. Midwifery is historically well described, but the idea of caring within midwifery is not described. Aim: The aim was to describe the patterns of ideas of caring as they appeared in midwifery during the first half of the 20th century. Research design: This study has a hermeneutic approach and the method is history of ideas. Sources of material are taken from the (...) journal Jordemodern (Midwifery), textbooks for midwives, and midwifery regulations. The study has a caring science perspective according to Eriksson. Ethical considerations: This study is conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines for good scientific practice issued by The Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity. The special demands on approach to the analyzed text in history of ideas have been met. Findings: Three themes were identified: Serving as a way of life, Acting in a redemptive spirit, and Having independence with heavy responsibility. The various themes are not refined, but current ideas are woven into the weave that were characteristic of midwifery during the first half of the 20th century. Conclusion: History of ideas is a fruitful method for understanding and re-finding valuable cultural goods. We can once more stress the manner of being within the midwife’s profession where inner values, ethos, shape the manner of conduct in the care of women in childbirth. (shrink)

We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have (...) suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning. (shrink)

Ever since Putnam and Burge launched their respective attacks on individualist accounts of meaning the individualist has felt squeezed for space.1 Very little maneuvering room, it seems, is left for the philosopher who wants to deny that meaning and mental content depend on the speaker's social environment. One option, popular amongst individualists, is to grant that reference is socially determined but argue that there is nevertheless a notion of meaning or content that can be understood individualistically. That is, the individualist (...) can opt for a. (shrink)

How ethical praxis is shaped by different contexts and situations has not been widely studied. We performed a follow-up study on stroke team members’ experiences of ethical problems and how the teams managed the situation when caring for patients faced with sudden and unexpected death from stroke. A number of ways for handling ethical problems emerged, which we have now explored further. Data were collected through a three-part form used as base for individual interviews with 15 stroke team members and (...) analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. In the analysis, the approaches in the form were condensed into strategies, and the two different ways those strategies were preferred and used by the team members were shown. Hindrances perceived by the team members to impede them from working the preferred way were also revealed and grouped into eight categories. (shrink)

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini poses and answers this overall question: When and why, if at all, are socially constructed norms morally binding? Valentini develops an original account, the agency-respect view, that offers an answer to this general question by offering a moral criterion in terms of agency respect. I agree with the criterion proposed by the agency-respect view, given the account of socially constructed norms that it assumes. However, its account of socially constructed norms seems too (...) narrow to answer the general question. More specifically, I argue that the account of social norms is too narrow, even according to Valentini’s own standard, since it does not account for teleological social norms, which are about standards of excellence rather than standards of behavior. Taking teleological social norms into account calls the moral criterion proposed by the agency-respect view into question: it is plausible concerning the type of social norm assumed by the agency-respect view, but not for teleological social norms. Hence, the general question has not been fully answered. (shrink)

In the Treatise, Hume writes several seemingly incompatible things about the moral sentiments, thus there is no general agreement about where they fit within his taxonomy of the perceptions. Some passages speak in favor of the view that moral sentiments are indirect passions, a few in favor of the view that they are direct passions, and yet a couple of explicit statements strongly suggest otherwise. Due to these tensions in Hume’s text, we find at least five competing characterizations in the (...) literature: • Moral sentiments are calm emotions. • Moral sentiments are calm direct passions. • Moral sentiments are calm versions of the indirect passions of love or hatred. • Moral sentiments are unique species of calm indirect passions. • Moral sentiments are indirect secondary impressions. This paper assesses each of these interpretations. When their virtues are brought together, a new interpretation of the origin of moral sentiments starts to emerge. (shrink)

Abstract:Hume’s theory of pride has been dismissed due to the contingent relation between passion and object. But why did Hume state the theory as he did? Why did he give two accounts of pride, one holistic and one atomistic? This paper considers Hume’s reasons for giving two accounts, and how he unified them. The holistic account enables Hume to explain how moral distinctions are made, whereas the atomistic allows him to anchor morality in human nature. The accounts are unified by (...) the distinction of feeling pride and being proud: a steady passion of pride would not count as that if it did not contain feelings of pride identified by their introspective quality, and would not be a state of pride without the causal relation of ideas. (shrink)