Clinical bioethics is big business. There are now hundreds of people who bioethics in community and university hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation and home care settings, and some who play the role of clinical ethics consultant to transplant teams, managed care companies, and genetic testing firms. Still, there is as much speculation about what clinically active bioethicists actually do as there was ten years ago. Various commentators have pondered the need for training standards, credentials, exams, and malpractice insurance for ethicists engaged (...) in clinical consultation. Much of the discussion seems to accept an implicit presumption that all clinical ethics consultation practices look pretty much alike. But is this accurate? What do clinical ethicists do, how and where do they do it, and what kind of clinical ethics is useful in the hospital and in other settings? (shrink)

Two decades of critique have sensitized historians and philosophers of science to the inadequacies of conventional dichotomies between theory and practice, thereby prompting the search for new ways of writing about science that are less beholden than the old ways to the epistemological mores of theoretical physics, and more faithful to the actual practices not only of physics but of all the natural sciences. The need for alternative descriptions seems particularly urgent if one is to understand the place of theory (...) (and, in parallel, the role of modeling) in contemporary molecular biology, a science where, until now, no division between theory and experiment has obtained, and where distinctions between representing and intervening, and more generally, between basic and applied science, are daily becoming more blurred. Indeed, the very division between theory and experiment threatens to slight the extensive and sophisticated theoretical analyses (and even modeling) on which experimental work in contemporary molecular biology so often depends. My aim in this paper is to find a way of talking about theoretical practices in biology that is directly rooted in the mix of conceptual and material work that biologists do. As an example of such theoretical practices, I choose for the focus of my analysis the development of a model for gene regulation out of the experimental work of Eric Davidson and his colleagues at Cal Tech. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Allure of Monsters Explaining the Allure: First Look Stalking the Deeper Reasons Closing in for the Kill Removing Empathy The Prison of Rules Conclusion.

Tout au long de sa longue carrière, Henri Lecoq a eu une réputation contrastée dans la communauté scientifique. Son oeuvre est citée par Mendel et par Darwin; cependant certains de ses compatriotes, tels qu'Adolphe Brongniart lui ont dénié originalité et profondeur. Dans une certaine mesure, Lecoq a subi le destin de beaucoup de naturalistes provinciaux dont les efforts n'étaient pas vraiment reconnus par les maîtres de la discipline. Mais une explication plus spécifique se trouve peut-être dans l'habitude qu'avait Lecoq d'utiliser (...) dans le même texte différents styles considérés comme incompatibles. Son travail sur l'hybridation végétale est à cet égard significatif: des bribes de vulgarisation hautes en couleurs y côtoient des conseils pratiques pour les horticulteurs, et les descriptions pittoresques s'y mêlent aux réflexions théoriques. Au terme de cette étude, Lecoq apparaît comme un homme de science qui combine un sens aigu de l'observation avec les caractéristiques d'un auteur romantique. (shrink)

Throughout the history of molecular biology, the primary meaning of biological information has been taken from the image of a word-based linguistic code. I want to argue that the metaphor of such a code does not begin to capture either the variety or the richness of the processes by which nucleotide sequences inform biological processes. Current research demonstrates that nucleotide sequences inform not only development but also heredity and evolution, and they do so in all sorts of ways. Even though (...) they do not exhaust the varieties of biological information employed in these processes, I claim that the power of DNA sequences to inform these processes is richer and perhaps far greater than the conventional understanding of genetic information permits, indeed richer than what any of our images of simple linguistic codes or of senders and receivers permits. Rather than a tape in a Turing machine or a message or signal sent through the generations, DNA is first and foremost a physicochemical structure with a range of potential uses by the physicochemical arsenal of biological cells that is so large as to expose the poverty of our most familiar metaphors. Recognition of this fact leads us to conclude that DNA is both more and less than we thought—more because it carries both symbolic and non-symbolic information and less because accepting that fact undermines its radical distinction from other biological molecules. (shrink)

Over the last couple of decades, a call has begun to resound in a number of distinct fields of inquiry for a reattachment of form to matter, for an understanding of ‘information’ as inherently embodied, or, as Jean-Marie Lehn calls it, for a “science of informed matter.” We hear this call most clearly in chemistry, in cognitive science, in molecular computation, and in robotics—all fields looking to biological processes to ground a new epistemology. The departure from the values of a (...) more traditional epistemological culture can be seen most clearly in changing representations of biological development. Where for many years now, biological discourse has accepted a sharp distinction between information and matter, software and hardware, data and program, encoding and enactment, a new discourse has now begun to emerge in which these distinctions have little meaning. Perhaps ironically, much of this shift depends on drawing inspiration from just those biological processes which the discourse of disembodied information was intended to describe. (shrink)

The acronym Developmental systems theory (DST) has been introduced into the literature on development in at least three different contexts in recent years – twice for DST, and before that, for Dynamical Systems Theory – and in all cases, to designate a new perspective for understanding development. Subtle but significant differences in argument and aims distinguish these uses, and confound the difficulty of saying just what DST is. My aim in this paper is to disambiguate these different terms – both (...) to call attention to the difference of perspectives, and to carve out a conceptual space for the concrete issues at stake. (shrink)

This article portrays unification of physics as a central tenet of ErnstMach’s thought, and organizes some of the focal issues in philosophy of science around the process of unification of science. Mach finds a natural place in the history. Newton’s Principia marked the beginning of the era of mathematical physics, which developed triumphantly in the eighteenth century, until new phenomena were discovered in the nineteenth century whose explanations went over and above Newtonian physics. Also Positivism emerged in the nineteenth century. (...) This was the setting where Mach entered. The notion that a central function of physics is to give mathematical descriptions of perceptions is all over Mach’s work, but in Mach’s thought mathematics comes together with hypothetical laws of nature and an overall world-view, similarly as in Newtonian physics where mathematics comes together with the laws of motion. Mach’s criticism of Newtonian absolute time and space was in line with positivism, and his suggestions about an overall holistic worldview were to function as an intuitive background for the new physics. Thus, as a physicist and a philosopher of physics, Mach should be seen primarily as a unifier, and his famous anti-metaphysics should be seen as derivative from this unificationist project: he did not intend to banish the metaphysical core that he himself proposed, but only metaphysics that is not needed in unified science. (shrink)

Contemporary theoretical physics is divided into diversified theories of different phenomena. These are characteristically frameworks for giving mathematical descriptions of perceptions, in the absence of understandable explanations or a unified worldview. This is not an optimal state of affairs, for people by nature desire to understand; this sets a major obstacle for an optimal progress rate of physics, for understandable explanations are more prolific of new predictions and applications than non-understandable explanations. Disunification in physics can be remedied only by discovering (...) an understandable ontology and applying it as the basis of unifying explanations of phenomena that were earlier explained by different theories. Due to disunified physics and the nature of traditional analysis in philosophy, there is no consensus about central concepts such as time, possibility and truth. It is suggested that philosophical analysis would be more prolific of understandable and applicable concepts, were it complemented by a method of unification. (shrink)

This work introduces a causal explanation of the passage of time, and contrasts it with rival explanations. In the causal explanation, laws of physics are shown to entail that events are in causal succession, and the passage of time is defined as their causal succession. The causal explanation is coupled with phenomenology of the passage of time, and contrasted with the project of making sense of the idea that time does not pass.

In the classical ideal, a physical theory provides understandable dynamic explanations and yields novel predictions of phenomena. Relativistic Physics (RP), namely the special and general theories of relativity and relativistic cosmology, does not meet this ideal. This discrepancy has been addressed by transforming the classical ideal into a ‘relativistic methodology’, where it is accepted that nature is not fully understandable, predictions are prioritized over dynamic explanations, new phenomena may be accommodated in an orderly fashion with the aid of additional hypotheses, (...) and anomalous data may be disregarded. Relativistic methodology and the enduring confidence in RP stem from tradition, where physicists who have learned to conceptualize reality through RP see it as the only alternative. Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend have taught us that to fully understand a theory’s weaknesses, it must be juxtaposed with an alternate theory, and that its replacement requires a superior theory. Here, RP is confronted with Tuomo Suntola’s Dynamic Universe (DU). Suntola claims that DU matches or surpasses RP’s predictive accuracy for several central phenomena from the terrestrial to the largest cosmological scales, while adhering to the classical ideal and cohering with quantum mechanics. If this claim withstands scrutiny, DU deserves further attention from physicists, philosophers and funding institutions. (shrink)

Studies of primate cognition have conclusively shown that humans and apes share a range of basic cognitive abilities. As a corollary, these same studies have also focussed attention on what makes humans unique, and on when and how specifically human cognitive skills evolved. There is widespread agreement that a major distinguishing feature of the human mind is its capacity for causal reasoning. This paper argues that causal cognition originated with the use made of indirect natural signs by early hominins forced (...) to adapt to variable late Miocene and early Pliocene environments; that early hominins evolved an innate tendency to search for such signs and infer their causes; that causal inference required the existence of incipient working memory; and that causal relationships were stored through being integrated into spatial maps to create increasingly complex causal models of the world. (shrink)

This article explores the principles of interaction that shape grammatical practices of conversational speech cross-linguistically. Seven such principles are explored, and the grammatical practices they give rise to are illustrated. The role of these principles in shaping non-linguistic behavior is also touched on.

Two recent attempts to clarify misunderstandings about the nature of cultural evolution came to very different conclusions, based on very different understandings of what evolves and how. This paper begins by examining these two ‘clarifications’ in order to reveal their key differences, and goes on to rethink how culture evolves by focussing on the role of cognitive structure, or worldview.

We argue that human rights are best conceived as norms arising from a fiduciary relationship that exists between states and the citizens and noncitizens subject to their power. These norms draw on a Kantian conception of moral personhood, protecting agents from instrumentalization and domination. They do not, however, exist in the abstract as timeless natural rights. Instead, they are correlates of the state's fiduciary duty to provide equal security under the rule of law, a duty that flows from the state's (...) institutional assumption of irresistible sovereign powers. (shrink)

This work aims to make tense logic a more robust tool for ontologists, philosophers, knowledge engineers and programmers by outlining a fusion of tense logic and ontology of time. In order to make tense logic better understandable, the central formal primitives of standard tense logic are derived as theorems from an informal and intuitive ontology of time. In order to make formulation of temporal propositions easier, temporal operators that were introduced by Georg Henrik von Wright are developed, and mapped to (...) the ontology of time. (shrink)

The laboratory animal environment: room for concern.

Drawing on everyday telephone and video interactions, this book surveys how English speakers use grammar to formulate responses in ordinary conversation. The authors show that speakers build their responses in a variety of ways: the responses can be longer or shorter, repetitive or not, and can be uttered with different intonational 'melodies'. Focusing on four sequence types: responses to questions, responses to informings, responses to assessments, and responses to requests, they argue that an interactional approach holds the key to explaining (...) why some types of utterances in English conversation seem to have something 'missing' and others seem overly wordy. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Martin Hackl and I identified a variety of circumstances where scalar implicatures, questions, definite descriptions, and sentences with the focus particle only are absent or unacceptable (Fox and Hackl 2006, henceforth F&H). We argued that the relevant effect is one of maximization failure (MF): an application of a maximization operator to a set that cannot have the required maximal member. We derived MF from our hypothesis that the set of degrees relevant for the semantics of degree (...) constructions is always dense (the Universal Density of Measurement, UDM). The goal of this paper is to present an apparent shortcoming of F&H and to argue that it is overcome once certain consequences of the proposal are shown to follow from more general properties of MF. Specifically, the apparent problem comes from evidence that the core generalizations argued for in F&H extend to areas for which an account in terms of density is unavailable. Nevertheless, I will argue that the account could still be right. Certain dense sets contain "too many alternatives" for there to be a maximal member, thus leading to MF. But, there are other sets that lead to the same predicament. My goal will be to characterize a general signature of MF in the hope that it could be used to determine the identity of alternatives in areas where their identity is not clear on independent grounds. (shrink)

We present an argument for revising the theory of alternatives for Scalar Implicatures and for Association with Focus. We argue that in both cases the alternatives are determined in the same way, as a contextual restriction of the focus value of the sentence, which, in turn, is defined in structure-sensitive terms. We provide evidence that contextual restriction is subject to a constraint that prevents it from discriminating between alternatives when they stand in a particular logical relationship with the assertion or (...) the prejacent, a relationship that we refer to as symmetry. Due to this constraint on contextual restriction, discriminating between alternatives in cases of symmetry becomes the task of focus values. This conclusion is incompatible with standard type-theoretic definitions of focus values, motivating our structure-sensitive definition instead. (shrink)

These are the proceedings of Physics and Reality 2024, International Conference on Philosophy of Physics, held at University of Helsinki, Finland, 4-6 June 2024. -/- The conference was organised by the research project Appearance and Reality in Physics and Beyond that started in June 2023. The project is located in the Department of Philosophy, History and Art Studies, University of Helsinki. -/- The conference explored central themes in philosophy of physics, including interpretations of quantum theory, geometric vs. dynamic approaches to (...) relativistic phenomena, the project of unifying quantum theory and general relativity, and extending quantum theory to new domains. The conference provided a platform for representing well-informed novel ideas, which are needed as the theoretical foundations of physics are not ready. Moreover, it is to be noted that the greatest 20th century philosophers of science —Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend— reminded us that rival theories are needed to fully understand the weaknesses of a paradigmatic theory. -/- Altogether 18 articles are included in the proceedings. Their authors and titles, the members of the organizing and program committees, and the peer reviewers are listed below. -/- Helsinki, January 17, 2025 Avril Styrman, Paavo Pylkkänen and Saara Wuokko Editors -/- Cosmology and Relativistic Phenomena -/- Martín López-Corredoira. Alternative cosmologies Karen Crowther. On the Motivations for Seeking a Theory of Quantum Gravity Tuomo Suntola. The Dynamic Universe Avril Styrman. Evaluation of Theories and Methodologies: Relativistic Physics vs. the Dynamic Universe — With Remarks from Physics and Reality 2024 and Cosmology on Small Scales 2024 Conferences Tarja Kallio-Tamminen. Beyond wave-particle dualism: How Suntola's mass-wave concept unites physics and metaphysics Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila. A Neo-Aristotelian Approach to a Unified Theory of Physics Michal Křížek. Infrared measurements of the JWST suggest that our dynamic universe is spatially closed Álvaro Mozota Frauca. Quantum Cosmology and the Age of the Universe William Mark Stuckey and Michael Silberstein. Unifying Special Relativity and Quantum Mechanics via Adynamical Global Constraints Michal Křížek and Václav Vavryčuk. Twin paradox in accelerated systems and the Equivalence Principle Enrico Maresca. Noncommutative Geometry and Spacetime: A Historical Reconstruction -/- Quantum Perspectives, Scientific Metaphysics, and Free Will -/- Vikram Athalye. Unifying Perspectives: All-encompassing Reality vs. All-inclusive Physics Paavo Pylkkänen. Was David Bohm a Wave Function Realist? Cristi Stoica. Structural Realism and the underdetermination of the physical meaning Maria Luisa Chiofalo. Quantum Toolbox for Neurobiology Sensory Systems Hans Liljenström. Can physics and neuroscience allow for free will? Alessandra Pulga. A Framework for Free Will within a Quantum Universe Kiran Pala and S Shalu. A Quantum Paradigm in Conscious Experience and Cognitive Process -/- Organizing committee -/- Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki (chair) Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki (vice-chair) Saara Wuokko, University of Helsinki (conference manager) -/- Program committee -/- Chris Fuchs, University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA Albert Solé, University of Barcelona, ES Marilu Chiofalo, University of Pisa, IT Bert Kappen, Radboud University, NL Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki, FI (chair) Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki, FI Saara Wuokko, University of Helsinki, FI -/- Peer reviewers -/- Vikram Athalye, Cummins College Pune, IN Jerome Busemeyer, Indiana University, USA Marilu Chiofalo, University of Pisa, IT Karen Crowther, University of Oslo, NO Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, University of Helsinki, FI Marja-Liisa Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Aalto University, FI Tarja Kallio-Tamminen, Physics Foundations Society, FI Michal Křı́žek, Czech Academy of Sciences, CZ Petri Lievonen, Screen io, FI Martı́n López-Corredoira, Instituto de Astrofı́sica de Canarias, ES Olga Louchakova-Schwartz, University of California, US Prakash Mondal, Indian Institute of Technology Hyderabad, IN Ilkka Pättiniemi, Helsinki Circle, FI Paavo Pylkkänen, University of Helsinki, FI Heikki Sipilä, Physics Foundations Society, FI Avril Styrman, University of Helsinki, FI Tuomo Suntola, Physics Foundations Society, FI Václav Vavryčuk, Czech Academy of Sciences, CZ. (shrink)

Propositional temporalism is the view that there are temporary propositions: propositions that are true, but not always true. Factual futurism is the view that there are futurist facts: facts that obtain, but that will at some point not obtain. Most A-theoretic views in the philosophy of time are committed both to propositional temporalism and to factual futurism. Mark Richard, Jeffrey King and others have argued that temporary propositions are not fit to be the contents of propositional attitudes, or to be (...) the semantic values of natural language utterances. But these discussions have overlooked another role that the A-theorist’s posits struggle to play: the role of facts in explaining other facts. Focusing on the case of action explanation by reasons, this paper presents the challenge that explanation poses for factual futurism. It then brings that challenge to bear against propositional temporalism and the A-theory more generally. My argument saddles the factual futurist with surprising commitments concerning reasons, facts and explanation. The futurist might accept those commitments and pay the price. The alternative – which I prefer – is to reject factual futurism, and with it the A-theory. (shrink)

Serving as an analysis of some of the major connections between Charles S. Peirce and Mikhail Bakhtin, this paper demonstrates that each thinker’s reliance on a triadic model can be incorporated to explain the analogous relationship between the dialogical movement within the sign vehicle and without it. Inside the sign, the dialogical relationship between the immediate and dynamical objects transposes its form onto what becomes Bakhtin’s dialogical model of consciousness with its centripetal and centrifugalvalences. These are pulls within a consciousness (...) toward internal consistency and external dynamism. Taken together, Peirce’s semeiotic and Bakhtin’s theory of dialogical development offer a nuanced, post-traditional explanation of the shape of self, the dialoguebetween the semiotic form and human consciousness. (shrink)

The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit (...) a general susceptibility to two kinds of definition that all “sense-based concepts” share. Against Garrett, I argue that the definitions express an imperfection Hume finds only in our concept of causation. That imperfection is absent from other sense-based concepts, and prompts skeptical sentiments in Hume’s conclusion to the Treatise’s Book 1. I close by comparing my interpretation with those of Helen Beebee, Stephen Buckle, Galen Strawson and Paul Russell. (shrink)

This paper will be concerned with the conjunctive interpretation of a family of disjunctive constructions. The relevant conjunctive interpretation, sometimes referred to as a “free choice effect,” (FC) is attested when a disjunctive sentence is embedded under an existential modal operator. I will provide evidence that the relevant generalization extends (with some caveats) to all constructions in which a disjunctive sentence appears under the scope of an existential quantifier, as well as to seemingly unrelated constructions in which conjunction appears under (...) the scope of negation and a universal quantifier. (shrink)

The General Theory of Relativity (GR) and the Dynamic Universe (DU) are evaluated in how they explain frequencies of atomic clocks. DU and GR predict the frequencies with equal accuracy, but their explanations, the postulates they apply in the explanations and the word-views that come along with them are entirely different. The central argument is that if unified and under- standable physics is appreciated, then DU deserves to be taken as a viable alternative to GR. In GR different frequencies of (...) identical atomic clocks are explained by letting rates of the flow of time in their frames of reference vary as functions of the clocks’ states of motion and gravitation. The GR- based world-view is nonunderstandable because GR violates absolute simultaneity, and disunified because quantum mechanics is built on different postulates than GR. In DU different frequencies of identical atomic clocks are explained by letting their frequencies vary as functions of their states of motion and gravitation. As DU commits to absolute simultaneity and as the postulates of DU suffice as the ontological ground of quantum mechanics at least partially, DU provides an under- standable and unified scientific world-view. -/- Résumé: La théorie de la relativité générale (RG) et de l’univers dynamique (UD) sont évalués sur la fac ̧on dont ils expliquent les fréquences des horloges atomiques. La RG et l’UD prédisent les fréquences avec une précision égale, mais leurs explications, les postulats qu’ils appliquent aux explications et les visions du monde qui les accompagnent sont entie`rement différents. L’argument central est que si l’on reconnaˆıt la physique unifiée et compréhensible, alors l’UD mérite d’ être considéré comme une alternative viable à la RG. En RG, différentes fréquences d’horloges atomiques identiques sont expliquées en faisant varier les vitesses de l’écoulement du temps dans leurs cadres de référence en fonction des états de mouvement et de la gravitation des horloges. La vue du monde basée sur la RG est incompréhensible parce que la RG viole la simultanéité absolue, et est désunifiée parce que la mécanique quantique est construite sur des postulats différents de ceux de la RG. Dans l’UD, différentes fréquences d’horloges atomiques identiques sont expliquées en laissant leurs fréquences varier en fonction de leurs états de mouvement et de gravitation. Comme l’UD s’engage à la simultanéité absolue et que les postulats de l’UD suffisent, au moins en partie, comme fondements ontologiques de la mécanique quantique, l’UD fournit une vision du monde scientifique compréhensible et unifiée. (shrink)

Building on previous works which argued that scalar implicatures can be computed in embedded positions, this paper proposes a constraint on exhaustification which restricts the conditions under which an exhaustivity operator can be licensed. We show that this economy condition allows us to derive a number of generalizations, such as, in particular, the ‘Implicature Focus Generalization’: scalar implicatures can be embedded under a downward-entailing operator only if the scalar term bears pitch accent. Our economy condition also derives specific predictions regarding (...) the licensing of so-called Hurford disjunctions. (shrink)

Mixing fiction, history, psychoanalysis, and personal fantasy, Teresa, My Love turns a past world into a modern marvel, following Sylvia Leclercq, a French psychoanalyst, academic, and incurable insomniac, as she falls for the sixteenth-century Saint Teresa of Avila and becomes consumed with charting her life. Traveling to Spain, Leclercq, Julia Kristeva's probing alter ego, visits the sites and embodiments of the famous mystic and awakens to her own desire for faith, connection, and rebellion. One of Kristeva's most passionate and transporting (...) works, _Teresa, My Love_ interchanges biography, autobiography, analysis, dramatic dialogue, musical scores, and images of paintings and sculpture to engage the reader in Leclercq's--and Kristeva's--journey. Born in 1515, Teresa of Avila outwitted the Spanish Inquisition and was a key reformer of the Carmelite Order. Her experience of ecstasy, which she intimately described in her writings, released her from her body and led to a complete realization of her consciousness, a state Kristeva explores in relation to present-day political failures, religious fundamentalism, and cultural malaise. Incorporating notes from her own psychoanalytic practice, as well as literary and philosophical references, Kristeva builds a fascinating dual diagnosis of contemporary society and the individual psyche while sharing unprecedented insights into her own character. (shrink)

Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief (...) requirement is wrong, or lying isn’t interesting. I suggest an alternative necessary condition for lying on a degree-of-belief framework. (shrink)

Fox, Patricia The first time I heard the words 'Never waste a catastrophe!', they were spoken with an Australian accent during a hearing at the United Nations, in New York, May 2013. The topic was 'Sustainability and the Future of the Planet'. The speaker was describing how a recent catastrophic drought in Australia had provided an unexpected opportunity: it had enabled the disastrous state of the entire Murray-Darling River System to begin to be restored to health. He argued that such (...) had been the political stasis on this critical issue that only a mammoth disaster such as this was able to begin the processes necessary to unlock it. (shrink)