There can be no doubt about the object which Delphis was in the habit of leaving at Simaetha's house. The word λπη is capable of meaning a ladle or jug for wine , and the name is conventionally applied by archaeologists to a particular form of jug, but Delphis did not carry a jug about with him. What he took to the gymnasium or palaestra where he appears to have spent most of his time was the portable flask of oil, (...) carried indeed by others, but, together with sponge and scraper, the regular equipment of the athlete. ὌΟλπις, which appears to be a mere synonym, also has the same two meanings. At Sapph. fr. 51 it is a wine-jug, but at T. 18. 45, where the Spartan girls will make libation of oil at Helen's plane-tree, the silver λπις containing it is no doubt that from which they anoint themselves in their masculine way by the Eurotas. (shrink)

One of Mark Textor’s main aims in Brentano’s Mind is to refute Brentano’s claim that intentionality – the capacity our mental acts have for being of, about, or directed on something – is the mark of the mental. I defend the view that Brentano analysed intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence (and so wasn’t an intentionality primitivist as Textor suggests). And I argue that we can regard intentionality as being the mark of the mental, but only if we give a (...) non-relational analysis of the idea of intentional inexistence. Textor objects to an analysis of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence for failing to account for the relationship between the object our mental act is directed on, and the ‘immanent’ or ‘inexistent’ object which all mental acts contain. I claim that this problem doesn’t arise if the object our mental act is directed on just is the immanent/ inexistent object. I argue that Brentano (at least sometimes) seems to identify the two. I then offer my own view of intentionality according to which our mental acts are directed on immanent/ inexistent objects, and that ‘directedness’ should be understood non-relationally. (shrink)

James Gow's A Short History of Greek Mathematics provided the first full account of the subject available in English, and it today remains a clear and thorough guide to early arithmetic and geometry. Beginning with the origins of the numerical system and proceeding through the theorems of Pythagoras, Euclid, Archimedes and many others, the Short History offers in-depth analysis and useful translations of individual texts as well as a broad historical overview of the development of mathematics. Parts I and II (...) concern Greek arithmetic, including the origin of alphabetic numerals and the nomenclature for operations; Part III constitutes a complete history of Greek geometry, from its earliest precursors in Egypt and Babylon through to the innovations of the Ionic, Sophistic, and Academic schools and their followers. Particular attention is given to Pythagorus, Euclid, Archimedes, and Ptolemy, but a host of lesser-known thinkers receive deserved attention as well. (shrink)

All non-relational views of perceptual experience face Jackson's famous many-property problem. I argue that the original problem, and the existing responses to it, have focused too closely on the controversial terminology for which adverbialism is best known. We can also direct Jackson's many-property problem explicitly onto the adverbialist's metaphysics, generating a new challenge. The responses contemporary adverbialists and non-relationalists have made to the original objection are not successful against this challenge. We need a new non-relational account. I sketch an outline (...) of a new theory, and motivate the view by explaining how it can respond successfully to this additional challenge. -/- . (shrink)

My first aim in this paper is to show that the transparency claim cannot serve the purpose to which it is assigned; that is, the idea that perceptual experience is transparent is no help whatsoever in motivating an externalist account of phenomenal character. My second aim is to show that the internalist qualia theorist's response to the transparency idea has been unnecessarily concessive to the externalist. Surprisingly, internalists seem to allow that much of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience depends (...) essentially (and not just causally) upon externally located properties. They argue that we can also be aware of internal, non-intentional qualia. I present an alternative response the internalist can make to the transparency claim: phenomenal character is wholly internal, and seeming to be aware of externally located properties just is being aware of internally constituted experiential features. (shrink)

David Papineau develops a new argument against representationalism, centering on the idea that sensory experiences are essentially representational on this view. He defends his own “qualitative view” according to which sensory experiences are only contingently representational. I discuss his main argument against essentialist representationalism and then provide two challenges for his positive account. First, Papineau's theory faces a dilemma when it comes to explaining the contents of our perceptual beliefs in situations where the conscious character of sensory experience comes apart (...) from what it represents. Second, we may need to abandon the idea that sensory experiences are assessable for veridicality. (shrink)

The idea that we can perceive absences is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary philosophy of mind, and seeing empty space and hearing silence are alleged to be two paradigmatic examples. In this paper, I remain neutral over the question of whether empty space experiences and experiences of silence are genuinely perceptual phenomena, however, I argue that these experiences do not qualify as absence experiences. Consequently, our experiences of empty space and silence cannot be appealed to as proof of the perceptual (...) view of absence experience. (shrink)

Externalist representationalists claim that the phenomenal character of a visual perceptual experience is determined by the representational content of that experience. Their deployment of the idea that perceptual experience is transparent shows that they account for representational content with reference to the properties which are represented – the properties out there in the world. I explain why this commits the externalist representationalist to objectivism and realism about colour properties. Colour physicalism has proved to be the position of choice for externalist (...) representationalists. However, my aim in this paper is to demonstrate that the proponent of the view which combines externalist representationalism with colour physicalism is unable to account for the phenomenal character of colour hallucination. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception have a notoriously difficult time trying to account for hallucinatory experiences. One surprisingly quite popular move, and one that cross-cuts the representationalism/relationalism divide, is to say that hallucinations involve an awareness of uninstantiated properties. In this paper, I provide a new argument against this view. Not only are its proponents forced to classify many hallucinations as veridical, such experiences turn out to be necessarily veridical. In addition, I show that representationalists who endorse the uninstantiated property view must (...) reject the common fundamental kind claim and adopt disjunctivism, and naïve realists/relationalists must radically modify their disjunctivism: The distinction between ‘veridical’ and ‘hallucinatory’ will no longer track a metaphysical distinction between the relevant experiences. (shrink)

Game theory provides a descriptive or a normative account of an important class of decisions. Given the cognitive sciences' emphasis on explanation, unification with the behavioral sciences under a descriptive model would constitute a step backwards in their development. I argue for the interdependence of the cognitive and behavioral sciences and suggest that meaningful integration is already occurring through problem-based interdisciplinary research programs. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Li. 263 and 264 have been much vexed, and a string of conjectures will be found in Wecklein's appendix. All of them produce roughly the same meaning–‘it is useless to enquire into the future, which is bound to be disastrous.’.

The view that physical objects do not, in fact, possess colour properties is certainly the dominant position amongst scientists working on colour vision. It is also a reasonably popular view amongst philosophers. However, the recent philosophical debate about the metaphysical status of colour properties seems to have taken a more realist turn. In this article, I review the main philosophical views – eliminativism, physicalism, dispositionalism and primitivism – and describe the problems they face. I also examine how these views have (...) been classified and suggest that there may be less disparity between some of these positions than previously thought. (shrink)

On p. 118 I said that the injunction of Pythagoras παρà θνσíαν μxs22EF xs22EFννχíζον, quoted by Goettling with a false reference, might be illuminating in its context but that I suspected it of being a figment. My suspicions were unfounded. The reference, as Mr. A. B. Cook has kindly pointed out to me, is Iambl. Protrept. 364 K.; but Iamblichus's explanation—that ‘nails’ stands for one's remoter kinsfolk, οíον xs22EFνεψιáδαι xs22EF πατραδxs22EFλφων γαμβρονοτιδεîς xs22EF τοιοντοí τινες, with whom one should renew relations (...) on festal days—does not seem very helpful. (shrink)

China is moving from a centralized to a market economy to bring about efficiency in its economy and to form a business partnership with the West. With its reform adopting an open-door policy, there may be a need to assure its partners in the western world that appropriate steps would be taken to develop and foster a business culture with which the western countries and the Chinese businesses can work. The present study attempted to find whether there has been a (...) change in business ethical culture, accounting system and practice in the Chinese business between 1978 and the present, and the degree of similarity in the Chinese ethics and guidelines compared to Western ethics and guidelines. The result of the study has been analyzed from an institutional perspective to explore institutional change. The result showed that there is general growing support of Chinese management toward change in business ethical culture and practice. It was observed that there was not much similarity in the documents used for ethical guidance and control with those of the West. The findings of the paper are expected to be relevant to international investors and executives interested in investing or working in China. (shrink)

Line 24 on page 218 in the July number of this volume of Philosophy should read as follows: naturally out of matter itself lifeless or that consciousness and intelli-.

Processes governing the creation, perception and production of spoken words are sensitive to the patterns of speech sounds in the language user’s lexicon. Generative linguistic theory suggests that listeners infer constraints on possible sound patterning from the lexicon and apply these constraints to all aspects of word use. In contrast, emergentist accounts suggest that these phonotactic constraints are a product of interactive associative mapping with items in the lexicon. To determine the degree to which phonotactic constraints are lexically mediated, we (...) observed the effects of learning new words that violate English phonotactic constraints on phonotactic perceptual repair processes in nonword consonant-consonant-vowel stimuli. Subjects who learned such words were less likely to “repair” illegal onset clusters and report them as legal ones. Effective connectivity analyses of MRI-constrained reconstructions of simultaneously collected magnetoencephalography and EEG data showed that these behavioral shifts were accompanied by changes in the strength of influences of lexical areas on acoustic-phonetic areas. These results strengthen the interpretation of previous results suggesting that phonotactic constraints on perception are produced by top-down lexical influences on speech processing. (shrink)

The scholiasts supposed that it was Zeus, not Strife, who dwells γαíνσ Έν ŕίζησι, and Paley has punctuated the line accordingly. I do not in any case doubt that he is wrong, but if the Theogony is evidence, he can almost be proved so. In the Theogony the γης ŕίσα;ι are a kind of suburb of Tartarus, from which the author does not very clearly distinguish them. In his useful though somewhat desultory gazetteer of those districts he says that Styx (...) dwells there apart from the gods, and that Iris only comes down when there are oaths to be administered in Olympus. Clearly Zeus is not at home in such a place. Strife herself is not enumerated in the Theogony among the residents, but her family is. Whatever she may be elsewhere, both in the Works and Days and in the Theogony she is the daughter of Night; and in the Theogony not only Night but also her two sons Sleep and Death reside in the district. Strife may appropriately keep them company. (shrink)

The last epigrammatist named by Meleager as contributing to his Garland is Phanias, who, with Meleager's customary irrelevance, is said to be represented there by cornflowers . No inferences can be drawn from his place in the catalogue, which is neither chronological nor topographical in arrangement, and with one possible exception the epigrams give no hint of his home or date. In A.P. 6. 299.

Some years ago, when discussing Theocr. 22. 177 sqq. , I suggested that Theocritus had been a little careless in envisaging the circumstances which he is describing, and had written as though a duel normally resulted in the deaths of both combatants. That still seems to me the probable explanation of the difficulty with which I was dealing, and, as I then said, the oversight with which I charged Theocritus is venial enough, for in fact two deaths result from the (...) particular duel which he is about to describe. He is concerned with the drama, not with the setting, and if the setting proves to be of cardboard, the play is after all the thing. (shrink)

The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this, and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual (...) experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate, but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist’s claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology. (shrink)