Most of all, this book introduces readers to a genuine lover of wisdom, a philosopher who used ordinary English to address traditional problems of philosophy.

The research project described in this report represents one of the most extensive studies of character education ever undertaken, including over 10,000 students and 255 teachers in schools across England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Research techniques consisted of a mixture of surveys, moral dilemmas and semi-structured interviews. This report explores: - The current situation in character education, both in the UK and internationally - How developed British students are with respect to moral character and the extent to which they (...) are able to understand and apply moral virtues, especially those aged 14 and 15 - How teachers in the UK understand their role in terms of students’ moral and character development - What helps or hinders the development of children’s characters according to teachers in UK schools. (shrink)

The eagerly-awaited second volume of The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts will allow scholars and students access for the first time in English to major texts in ethics and political thought from one of the most fruitful periods of speculation and analysis in the history of western thought. Beginning with Albert the Great, who introduced the Latin west to the challenging moral philosophy and natural science of Aristotle, and concluding with the first substantial presentation in English of the revolutionary (...) ideas on property and political power of John Wyclif, the seventeen texts in this anthology offer late medieval treatments of fundamental issues in human conduct that are both conceptually subtle and of direct practical import. Special features of this volume include copious editorial introductions, an analytical index, and suggestions for further reading. This is an important resource for scholars and students of medieval philosophy, history, political science, theology and literature. (shrink)

Cannabis use in some individuals can meaningfully introduce de novo risk for the initiation of opioid use and development of opioid use disorder. These risks may be particularly high during adolescence when cannabis use may disrupt critical periods of neurodevelopment. Current research studying the combination of genetic and environmental factors involved in substance use disorders is poorly understood. More research is needed, particularly to identify which adolescents are most at risk and to develop effective interventions addressing contributing factors such as (...) trauma and psychiatric comorbidity. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that questions about the semantics of rigid designation are commonly and illicitly run together with distinct issues, such as questions about the metaphysics of essence and questions about the theoretical legitimacy of the possible-worlds framework. I discuss in depth two case studies of this phenomenon – the first concerns the relation between rigid designation and reference, the second concerns the application of the notion of rigidity to general terms. I end by drawing out some conclusions (...) about the relations between rigid designation, semantic frameworks, reference, and essence. (shrink)

Philosophical discussions of akrasia over the last fifteen years have focused on certain skeptical arguments which purport to question the possibility of a kind of akratic action which, following Pears, I call 'last ditch akrasia' (Pears [38]). An agent, succumbing to last ditch akrasia, freely, knowingly, and intentionally performs an action A against his better judgment that an incompatible action B is the better thing to do. (See Audi [1] for a detailed analysis.) Last ditch akrasia is not the only (...) kind that has been discussed. Some philosophers (Mele [32], Scaltas [48]) have been concerned with a more extreme form of akratic action, viz. one in which the agent not only judges that action B is best, but in addition intends (chooses, decides) to B. Some have even questioned whether freely acting against one's better judgment is sufficient for akratic action (Schiffer [49]: 201-3).1 Weaker types of akratic action have been discussed, though to a much lesser extent, since they are thought less problematic. Pears distinguishes last ditch akrasia from what he calls, "motivated irrational action" ([38]: 160). In cases of the latter, the akrates' rebellious desire infects his prior reasoning and thinking in such a way that his contemplated action seems to him warranted, and he acts accordingly. (For a taxonomy of cases of akratic action, see Rorty ([44])). Nor has the discussion of akrasia been restricted to akratic action. Philosophers have discussed whether akrasia can be exhibited in the formation of intentions, wants (See Audi [1]: 181-185), and beliefs (Mele [32]: ch. 8; Heil [19]). The primary focus in this paper is on last ditch akratic action. (shrink)

DUALISM AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD 257 IX. THE NATURE OF KNOWING AS A NATURAL EVENT . . 303 INDEX 323 PREFACE The principal purpose of this volume is not to present ...

(Accepted for an edition of Synthese that never saw light of day, and remained on my website. Written 2005.) Noting the status of the Law of Continuity as one of Leibniz’s most cherished axioms, Bertrand Russell charged that his philosophy nevertheless amounted to “a complete denial of the continuous”. Georg Cantor made a similar accusation of inconsistency about Leibniz’s philosophy of the actual infinite. But I argue that neither doctrine is inconsistent when the subtleties of Leibniz’s syncategorematic interpretation are properly (...) taken into account. Leibniz rejects the existence of infinite wholes: an infinite aggregate of actual things forms only a fictitious whole. Analogously, infinitesimals are only fictitious parts, this time of ideal wholes. That is, just as an actual infinity of terms can be understood syncategorematically as more terms than can be assigned a number, without there being any infinite numbers, so too the infinitely small can be given a syncategorematic interpretation by means of the Law of Continuity, without there existing any actual infinitesimals. By examining Leibniz’s justification of infinitesimals in his calculus, I argue that the syncategorematic interpretation is also applicable to series of changes, and thus exonerates Leibniz from Russell’s criticism: on this interpretation all naturally occurring transitions are continuous in that the difference between neighbouring states is smaller than any assignable. This means not that there exists a least difference, but that for any assignable finite difference, there exists a smaller one. Thus there is a true continuous transition, even though the states themselves and all assignable differences between them are actually discrete. (shrink)

Gottfried Leibniz is well known for his claim to have “rehabilitated” the substantial forms of scholastic philosophy, forging a reconciliation of the New Philosophy of Descartes, Mersenne and Gassendi with Aristotelian metaphysics (in his so-called Discourse on Metaphysics, 1686). Much less celebrated is the fact that fifty years earlier (in his Hypomnemata Physica, 1636) the Bratislavan physician and natural philosopher Daniel Sennert had already argued for the indispensability to atomism of (suitably re-interpreted) Aristotelian forms, in explicit opposition to the rejection (...) of substantial forms by his fellow atomist Sébastien Basson.1.. (shrink)

One of the most puzzling features of Leibniz’s deep metaphysics is the apparent contradiction between his claims that the law of continuity holds everywhere, so that in particular, change is continuous in every monad, and that “changes are not really continuous,” since successive states contradict one another. In this paper I try to show in what sense these claims can be understood as compatible. My analysis depends crucially on Leibniz’s idea that enduring states are “vague,” and abstract away from further (...) changes occurring within them at a higher resolution—consistently with his famous doctrine of "petites perceptions." As Leibniz explains further in a recently transcribed unpublished manuscript, these changes are dense within any actual duration, which is conceived as actually divided by them into states that are syncategorematically infinite in number and unassignably small. The correspondence between these unassignably small intervals between changes and the differentials of his calculus allows processes to be conceived as continuous, despite the discontinuity of the changes that occur in actuality. (shrink)

But even with respect to inductive arguments there are a number of different philosophical problems. One is to make explicit the fundamental or most general pattern or patterns of inductive argument. Once these patterns are known a second and third problem arise. The second is to justify man's use of and faith in inductive arguments. And the third is to formulate some general propositions about nature which could reasonably be accepted by users of inductive arguments and which when added to (...) the premises of these arguments make them explicitly deductive. (shrink)

Review of Georges Didi-Huberman (2022) Het Voortleven van de Vuurvliegjes. Vertaling: Ineke van der Burg. Amsterdam: Octavo Publicaties.

In his paper "Noneism or Allism" David Lewis argued that Richard Sylvan's rehabilitation of Meinong's theory of objects was not a noneist one but rather an allist, that is, that all objects whatsoever actually exist and thus Meinong and Sylvan are among the greatest "entity-multipliers". But this is exactly what Sylvan tried to show is not the case. I'll argue that Lewis' attack ultimately fails in re-instating an old serious misinterpretation of Meinongian metaphysics. In doing so he deflects attention away (...) from the substance of Sylvan's position and casts him as the defender of something unintelligible. (shrink)