Environmental aesthetics is an emerging discipline that explores the meaning and influence of environmental perception and experience on human life. Arguing for the idea that environment is not merely a setting for people but is fully integrated and continuous with us, The Aesthetics of Environment explores the aesthetic dimensions of the human-environmental continuum in both theoretical terms and concrete situations. From outer space to the museum, from architecture to landscape, from city to countryside to wilderness, this book discovers in the (...) aesthetic perception of environment the reciprocity that constitutes both person and place. (shrink)

Generalisation in evaluative conditioning occurs when the valence acquired by a conditional stimulus (CS), after repeated pairing with an unconditional stimulus (US), spreads to stimuli that are similar to the CS (generalisation stimuli, GS). CS evaluations can be updated via CS instructions that conflict with prior conditioning (negative conditioning + positive instruction). We examined whether CS instructions can update GS evaluations after conditioning. We used alien stimuli where one alien (CSp) from a fictional group was paired with pleasant US images (...) and another alien (CSu) from a different group was paired with unpleasant US images. The other members from the two groups were used as GSs. After conditioning, participants received negative CSp instructions and positive CSu instructions. In Experiment 1, explicit and implicit GS evaluations were measured before and after the instructions. In Experiment 2, we used a between-participants design where one group received positive/negative CS instructions while a control group received neutral instructions. In both experiments, the positive/negative CS instructions caused a reversal of explicit GS evaluations and an elimination of implicit GS evaluations. The findings suggest that generalised evaluations can change after CS instructions which may have implications for interventions aimed at reducing negative group attitudes. (shrink)

Aesthetic sensibility rests on perceptual experience and characterizes not only our experience of the arts but our experience of the world. _Sensibility and Sense_ offers a philosophically comprehensive account of humans' social and cultural embeddedness encountered, recognized, and fulfilled as an aesthetic mode of experience. Extending the range of aesthetic experience from the stone of the earth's surface to the celestial sphere, the book focuses on the aesthetic as a dimension of social experience. The guiding idea of pervasive interconnectedness, both (...) social and environmental, leads to an aesthetic critique of the urban environment, the environment of daily life, and of terrorism, and has profound implications for grounding social and political values. The aesthetic emerges as a powerful critical tool for appraising urban culture and political practice. (shrink)

During evaluative conditioning, a neutral conditional stimulus becomes pleasant or unpleasant after pairings with a positive/negative unconditional stimulus. Measures of US expectancy are...

I critically examine Nietzsche’s argument in The Will to Power that all the detailed events of the world are repeating infinite times (on account of the merely finite possible arrangements of forces that constitute the world and the inevitability with which any arrangement of force must bring about its successors). Nietzsche celebrated this recurrence because of the power of belief in it to bring about a revaluation of values focused wholly on the value of one’s endlessly repeating life. Belief in (...) recurrence would bring joy to those who had achieved excellence in this life and crush those who had not. I point out, however, that this significance of recurrence must be spoiled by the consideration that within each of the long cycles of recurrence there would have to be, as well, countless variations of this life. And I consider the issue of personal identity within such recurrences. Is it the same person or merely resembling but distinct persons in the recurrences or the variations? If it is the same person in precise recurrences, should the subjectively identical experience be thought of as really additional for that person? (shrink)

Principa Practica is a provocative work in which author Arnold Johanson maintains that philosophers since Socrates have been asking the wrong questions, like "What is good?" and "What is right?" The reason for this, according to the author, is that moral philosophers have based their work on a logical framework more suitable to science than to ethics and politics. Striking out in a new direction, the author bases his work on the concept of requirement which he finds not only (...) has a rich logical structure but, if properly formulated, can be used to guide humanity in its struggle to find meaning in life, on one hand, and to find peace, happiness, and order, on the other. The fact that the work has an emphasis on logic may suggest that only those with a technical bent can read this work, but this is not so: much of this work—over two-thirds—is designed to be read by those without a technical background in mathematics and logic. (shrink)

This article describes our efforts to screen and enrol clinical trial participants conscientiously in the COVID-19 pandemic setting. We present the standard screening and enrolment process prior to, and our process of adapting to, the pandemic. Our goal was to develop a way to screen and enrol people for clinical trials that was both equitable and effective. In addition, we outline the steps our research department took to ensure that ethical, clinical and logistical factors were considered when matching a patient (...) to a clinical trial. (shrink)

The idea that simplicity matters in science is as old as science itself, with the much cited example of Ockham's Razor, 'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem': entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A problem with Ockham's razor is that nearly everybody seems to accept it, but few are able to define its exact meaning and to make it operational in a non-arbitrary way. Using a multidisciplinary perspective including philosophers, mathematicians, econometricians and economists, this 2002 monograph examines simplicity (...) by asking six questions: what is meant by simplicity? How is simplicity measured? Is there an optimum trade-off between simplicity and goodness-of-fit? What is the relation between simplicity and empirical modelling? What is the relation between simplicity and prediction? What is the connection between simplicity and convenience? The book concludes with reflections on simplicity by Nobel Laureates in Economics. (shrink)

Habit and habitualisation play an important role in Husserl's phenomenology, yet one aspect of habituality has been somewhat overlooked, namely the dimension of authenticity/inauthenticity. While authenticity in Heidegger has received a lot of attention, inauthenticity in Husserl is less well researched, although, as I will show, it is of equal importance to his overall theorising. The central aim of this paper is to explore the authenticity/inauthenticity-distinction in the various domains of habitualisation and to establish its fundamental importance for Husserl. In (...) the first, introductory part of this paper I offer a few remarks on how to understand and categorise Husserl's transcendental take on habits; I also introduce the important distinction between authentic and inauthentic habits and authenticity and inauthenticity in general. In the second part I present the problem of mechanisation as a form of inauthentic habitualisation as it appears in Husserl's phenomenologies of ethics and, more importantly, science. The third part concludes the paper with a reflection on how phenomenology is programmatically aimed against any form of inauthenticity, and on how it might or might not achieve this goal. (shrink)

This conceptual article draws on structuration theory and social identity theory to isolate firm-internal institutionalization processes as antecedents and drivers of corporate political strategizing. Path dependencies in corporate routines and actors' knowledgeability about these path dependencies are singled out as primary factors structuring strategic decision making within the firm. The concepts of path dependency and knowledgeability, respectively, refer to the institutional and cognitive dimension of corporate political strategizing. These two dimensions come together in actors' identities. Identities on their turn shape (...) managers' recognition of policy issues and the interpretation of issue salience relative to corporate interests. Thus, the article argues that institutional features of competitive environments precipitate in processes of identity building and preference formation and are reproduced through organizational routines and practices within the firm. (shrink)

In evaluative conditioning, a neutral conditional stimulus (CS) acquires the valence of a pleasant or unpleasant unconditional stimulus (US) after the CS and US are paired (acquisition). Valence acquired by the CS can generalise to other stimuli from the same category. Presenting the CS alone can reduce evaluative conditioning (extinction), but evaluations can return after the US is presented alone (reinstatement). The current research investigated whether extinction and reinstatement generalise to other category members (generalisation stimuli, GS). In Experiment 1, evaluations (...) generalised in acquisition after conditioning with one category exemplar, but GS evaluations were unaffected by extinction and reinstatement. In Experiment 2, we aimed to enhance generalisation by presenting multiple category exemplars during conditioning. This strengthened the generalisation of evaluations in extinction but not reinstatement. In Experiment 3, conditioning with multiple exemplars caused explicit and implicit evaluations (measured using an affective priming task) to generalise in acquisition but not in extinction or reinstatement. The acquisition and extinction of US expectancy generalised in all experiments, but the reinstatement generalised in Experiment 3 only. Overall, we found partial evidence of evaluative generalisation during extinction (but not reinstatement) and demonstrated that the extinction and reinstatement of US expectancy generalises in evaluative conditioning. (shrink)

The essays in this volume exhibit many sides of the perceptual complex that is the aesthetic field and develop them in different ways. They reinvigorate our understanding of such arts as music and architecture; they range across the natural landscape to the urban one; they reassess the place of beauty in the modern environment and reassess the significance of the contributions to aesthetic theory of Kant and Dewey; and they broach the kinds of meanings and larger understanding that aesthetic engagement (...) with the human environment can offer. (shrink)

Confused terms appear to signify more than one entity. Carnap maintained that any putative name that is associated with more than one object in a relevant universe of discourse fails to be a genuine name. Although many philosophers have agreed with Carnap, they have not always agreed among themselves about the truth-values of atomic sentences containing such terms. Some hold that such atomic sentences are always false, and others claim they are always truth-valueless. Field maintained that confused terms can still (...) refer, albeit partially, and offered a supervaluational account of their semantic properties on which some atomic sentences with confused terms can be true. After outlining many of the most important theoretical considerations for and against various semantic theories for such terms, we report the results of a study designed to investigate which of these accounts best accords with the truth-value judgments of ordinary language users about sentences containing these terms. We found that naïve participants view confused names as capable of successfully referring to one or more objects. Thus, semantic theories that judge them to involve total reference failure do not comport well with patterns of ordinary usage. (shrink)

Arnold Kowalewski (1873-1945) war der letzte Vertreter der Königsberger Kant-Forschung, die mit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges abbrach. Von dem unabgeschlossenen Projekt einer Volksausgabe der Kantischen Schriften in 5 Bänden, mit dem er von der Stadt Königsberg 1941 beauftragt worden war, um einen Überblick über das Kantische Schaffen zu erleichtern, ist allein das Typoskript für Band 1 vollständig ausgearbeitet worden. Der wissenschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit war der erreichte Stand der Realisierung unbekannt. Typoskript, korrigierte Druckfahnen und weitere Dokumente zur Entstehung der Ausgabe (...) blieben bis in den Sommer 1998 Teil des unveröffentlichten Nachlasses. Die besondere Bedeutung des im Nachlaß von Arnold Kowalewski bewahrten Manuskripts mit Dokumenten und Quellentexten zu Kants Lehrtätigkeit liegt heute darin, daß der anerkannte Kant-Philologe und -Interpret für seine Edition noch auf Texte und Zeugnisse aus den Beständen der Königsberger Bibliotheken zugreifen konnte, die seit 1945 verschollen sind. Dies gilt vor allem für die ausgewählten Texte aus Kants Vorlesungen über Anthropologie, Geographie, Logik und Metaphysik, die - wenn auch in sekundärer Überlieferung - durch den vorliegenden Band erhalten sind. (shrink)

Negative conditional stimulus valence acquired during fear conditioning may enhance fear relapse and is difficult to remove as it extinguishes slowly and does not respond to the instruction that unconditional stimulus presentations will cease. We examined whether instructions targeting CS valence would be more effective. In Experiment 1, an image of one person was paired with an aversive US, while another was presented alone. After acquisition, participants were given positive information about the CS+ poser and negative information about the CS− (...) poser. Instructions reversed the pattern of differential CS valence present during acquisition and eliminated differential electrodermal responding. In Experiment 2, we compared positive and negative CS revaluation by providing positive/negative information about the CS+ and neutral information about CS−. After positive revaluation, differential valence was removed and differential electrodermal responding remained intact. After negative revaluation, differential valence was strengthened and differential electrodermal responding was eliminated. Unexpectedly, the instructions did not affect the reinstatement of differential electrodermal responding. (shrink)

A provocative new view of Marx stressing his humanist philosophy and challenging both Soviet distortion and Western ignorance of his basic thinking.

Carnap in the 1930s discovered that there were non-normal interpretations of classical logic - ones for which negation and conjunction are not truth-functional so that a statement and its negation could have the same truth value, and a disjunction of two false sentences could be true. Church ar-gued that this did not call for a revision of classical logic. More recent writers seem to disa-gree. We provide a definition of "non-normal interpretation" and argue that Church was right, and in fact, (...) the existence of non-normal interpretations tells us something important about the condi-tions of extensionality of the classical logical operators. (shrink)

This paper could be thought of as divided into two parts. In the first I show through a series of thought experiments that it is a mistake to think of one’s individual experience as necessarily belonging to only one particular place, time and organism. In repetitions across a universe large enough to host them, the particular experience that one finds oneself in, which can be individuated only by the detailed type that is the entirety of its momentary subjective content, would (...) exist equally in every occurrence of that type, much as a moment in the plot of a novel would exist equally in every copy of that novel. Each distinguishable subjective moment of experience is thus a ‘moment universal’. In the second part of the paper I draw from this the conclusion that there could not be any proper possessors of lines of experience - that there are no proper persons - no continuing subjects of consciousness and self-interest. About five years after writing this paper I came to see that the particular identity of an experience could not be confined by types of momentary subjective detail any more than it could be confined by particular places, times or organisms. All experience is equally here, now and mine and all conscious organisms are equally I. My argument for this crucial further development is presented in ‘One Self – The Logic of Experience’, Inquiry 33 (1991): pp. 39-68. (shrink)

Inspired from Buchholz' ordinal analysis of ID1 and Beckmann's analysis of the simple typed λ-calculus we classify the derivation lengths for Gödel's system T in the λ-formulation.

This paper studies the complexity of constant depth propositional proofs in the cedent and sequent calculus. We discuss the relationships between the size of tree-like proofs, the size of dag-like proofs, and the heights of proofs. The main result is to correct a proof construction in an earlier paper about transformations from proofs with polylogarithmic height and constantly many formulas per cedent.

This paper examines the critique of Voegelin in Kelsens "Secular Religion". While Kelsen sets out with the false premise that secular world view can in principle have no religious character, his critique of Voegelin remains largely unimpaired by this mistake. With convincing arguments Kelsen criticises (1) Voegelins interpretation of modernity as an age of gnosticism, (2) Voegelins reinterpretation of enlightened and secular philosopher as gnostics in disguise and (3) Voegelins rejection of modern politics and, to a lesser degree, modern science. (...) I have also uploaded the critical margin notes that some person (unfortunately I do not know any more who) had been so friendly to sent me. The paper was originally written in German, but an English translation is available as well. (shrink)

I explore how the notion of divine creation could be made understandable in a worldview dominated by empirical science. The crucial question concerns the empirical basis of belief in creation. Astronomical observations have changed our worldview in an exemplary manner. I show by an example from imaginative literature that human beings can perceive stars by means other than astronomical observation. This alternative mode may be described as “participatory perception,” in which a human experiences the world not by objectifying separation as (...) in science, but by personal involvement. I relate such perceptions to “embodied cognitive science,” a topical interdisciplinary field of research in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. Embodied cognitions initiate processes that can convey personal experiences of the stars. Such cognitions may involve religious apprehensions and give rise to sophisticated values. It is argued that the knowledge available through astrophysics and interpretation of the universe as divine creation represent two different ways of perceiving the same reality and should thus be seen as mutually complementary. (shrink)

Many philosophical positions wholly undermine themselves because to possess the truth that they claim for themselves they would have to be false. These are the theories that in one way or another reject the meaningfulness or attainability of objective truth.

Imagine two urns, each with a thousand beads - in one all the beads are blue while in the other only one of the thousand is blue. If one of these urns is pushed forward (based on the toss of a fair coin) and the single bead then randomly drawn from it is blue, we must infer that it is a thousand times more probable that the urn pushed forward is the purely blue one. The hypothesis that this was instead (...) the urn with only one blue bead would require that the occurrence of the evidence, the blue bead being drawn, was something improbable - and it is improbable that something improbable is what has occurred. Next consider an example of only one urn with no prior description. By the same reasoning as above, if all the first beads randomly drawn are blue, it is becoming more and more probable that the beads in the urn are generally blue. (Otherwise something improbable would be happening in another colour not appearing; and what’s improbable is improbable.) It is therefore probable also that the next bead drawn will be blue. This is induction. As Hume would have said, we could not know a priori, given this evidence, that the next bead will be blue. But, as he overlooked, we can know a priori, given this evidence, that it is probable that the next bead will be blue. In neither urn example has the belief regarding the beads been formed as a Humean habit of expectation after many observations of beads. (In the first case there is only one observation. The second could be modified to have all the beads drawn out at once.) Rather the belief is a product of a priori reasoning about probability. Next imagine that a coin has been tossed a thousand times and landed heads every time. There was a fair and a loaded coin. According to the same reasoning, it is overwhelmingly more probable that the coin used was the loaded one. For that the fair coin had so landed is most improbable. The hypothesis that there is no external world makes the orderliness in my current experience improbable - much like getting all heads with a fair coin. (Uncaused sensation would most probably be chaotic.) The most probable hypothesis is that of things like those we believe in causing this orderliness - as the coin’s being loaded would have caused all heads. The hypothesis that my experience has been made to take this pattern by a Cartesian malicious demon or by scientists controlling my brain in a vat can only falsely seem to make the character of the experience probable by sneaking in an inherently improbable ad hoc specification that this sort of pattern of experience was that which they were aiming at producing - like an ad hoc specification that the fair coin was one that by chance landed heads all thousand times. We may thus reject such hypotheses as improbable. So this is the problem of induction solved and scepticism answered through a priori reasoning. (shrink)