This volume is devoted to Brentano's influence on the Polish Analytic Philosophy better known under the name of: Lvov-Warsaw School.

Artykuł dotyczy „pamiętnika z Sołówek” Mieczysława Lenardowicza, opublikowanego dwukrotnie w 1930 roku. Wersja krótsza utworu, zatytułowana Pamiętnik z Sołówek, ukazała się nakładem Towarzystwa Wydawniczego „Rój”, zaś wersja obszerniejsza, Na wyspach tortur i śmierci. Pamiętnik z Sołówek, została wydana przez Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy. Utwór Lenardowicza jest prawdopodobnie pierwszym polskim dziełem literatury łagrowej, i szerzej, literatury obozowej. Uwagi dotyczące utworu: jego genezy, wersji, formy, zawartości i pragmatyki, poprzedza próba ustalenia tożsamości autora, o którym praktycznie niczego nie wiadomo.

The most striking feature of Meinong's theory of intentionality is his thesis that every mental act has its reference‐object “beyond being and non being”. This theory seems, at first, to be a clear example of the so called object‐theory of intentionality, as it introduces special “postulated” entities in the target‐position of the mental act. Closer examination, however, reveals in Meinong's works important elements of the mediator‐theory. Meinong speaks of auxiliary incomplete objects situated “between” the subject and the object of reference (...) and “mediating” the intentional access to the reference‐object. Moreover, even if the object of reference is of the simple nominal form, the mediating structure involves essentially propositional entities . In the paper we attempt to give a set‐theoretical interpretation of Meinong's theory in the frame of which we could eventually do without the incomplete mediating objects. Yet, some general epistemological considerations suggest the indispensability of such incomplete mediating structures. (shrink)

Das Buch ist eine analytische Darstellung der Hauptideen der Erkenntnistheorie Ingardens. Es basiert zum größten Teil auf dem bis vor kurzem noch unpublizierten bzw. ausschließlich in polnischer Sprache verfaßten Material und wendet sich vor allem an die Phänomenologen aber auch an die analytischen Philosophen, die sich für die Erkenntnistheorie und Ontologie der Intentionalität interessieren. Die Ingardensche Erkenntnistheorie, seine Theorie der Intentionalität und die Hauptzüge seiner Ontologie werden auf dem Hintergrund der Brentanoschen und Husserlschen Tradition präsentiert und mit den begrifflichen Werkzeugen (...) der zeitgenössischen analytischen Philosophie analysiert. Die Erkenntnistheorie Ingardens bildet das Ergebnis einer Synthese der Husserlschen phänomenologischen Methode mit der ontologischen Präzision, die für die Schriften Ingardens so charakteristisch ist. Sie besteht aus zwei Disziplinen: der reinen und der angewandten Erkenntnistheorie. Die reine Erkenntnistheorie ist eine absolutistische, Cartesianische Disziplin. Sie formuliert die Definition der Erkenntnis und beruht auf einem besonderen, selbstreferierenden Bewußtseinszustand, den Ingarden Intuition des Durchlebens nennt. Die angewandte Erkenntnistheorie untersucht dagegen die konkreten Fälle der Erkenntnis und ist eine empirische, hypothetische und fehlbare Wissenschaft. (shrink)

The book is an analytic exposition of Brentano's early theory of intentionality. In spite of the immense influence of this theory it is the first separate monograph on this topic. The book is based in great part on the unpublished manuscripts where one can find substantially better articulated formulations then those expressed in the already published `standard' works. Our analysis concentrates mainly on the ontological and epistemological problems of Brentano's immanent object. We highlight an interesting ambiguity of this concept and (...) try to outline the inner logic of its evolution. It turns out that Brentano's early philosophy of intentionality should be conceived not as a single, well defined theory but rather as a bundle of kindred but not always fully consistent and sometimes even competing ideas. Primary audience for the work are philosophers interested in Brentano's philosophy, theory of intentionality and its epistemology and ontology, phenomenologists and cognitive scientists. Das Buch bietet eine analytische Darstellung von Brentanos früher Theorie der Intentionalität. Trotz der großen historischen Bedeutung dieser Theorie bildet es die erste Monographie zu diesem Thema. Das Buch basiert zum größten Teil auf den unveröffentlichten Manuskripten, in denen man die Formulierungen findet, die viel besser artikuliert sind als jene, die in den publizierten Standard-Werken Brentanos zu finden sind. Unsere Analyse konzentriert sich in erster Linie auf die ontologischen und epistemischen Probleme des Brentanoschen immanenten Objekts. Wir besprechen eine interessante Mehrdeutigkeit dieses Begriffs und skizzieren die innere Logik seiner Entwicklung. Es stellt sich heraus, daß die frühe Philosophie der Intentionalität Brentanos nicht als eine einheitliche, eindeutig bestimmte Theorie, sondern eher als ein Bündel von verwandten, jedoch nicht immer völlig koherenten und manchmal sogar konkurrierenden Ideen interpretiert werden soll. Das Buch wendet sich in erster Linie an die Philosophen, die sich für die Philosophie Brentanos, für die österreichische Philosophie, für die Theorie der Intentionalität und ihre Epistemologie und Ontologie interessieren. Es wird ferner auch für die Phänomenologen und die Forscher im Bereich der cognitive science interessant sein. (shrink)

The thought of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) has a distinguished position within the conceptual space of ontology. He was the first philosopher who tried systematically to develop a quasi-ontological discipline which was intended to be much more general than the metaphysics in the traditional sense. Metaphysics investigates being qua being; and this constitutes only a small part of the domain of the theory of objects (Gegenstandstheorie) as Meinong conceived of it. For – so reads one of Meinong’s most frequently cited theses (...) – the objects considered purely qua objects are neutral concerning their being or non-being. In this book Meinong’s theory of objects is presented in its historical development and investigated within the context of his theory of intentionality. This connection is justified because the real motivation behind Meinong’s introduction of entities "beyond being and non being" lies in the philosophical puzzles of the theory of intentionality. (shrink)

In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism. He approaches the matter using the tools of formal semantics developed by Alfred Tarski and draws a rather surprising conclusion. According to Ajdukiewicz, the idealist position, claiming that the world around us is ontologically dependent on our cognitive activity can be shown to be implausible on purely logical grounds. It is worth taking a closer look at this (...) insightful argument, since Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, if sound, has a relevance reaching far beyond purely historical questions concerning the right interpretation and proper assessment of past idealist doctrines. These days various species of idealism are thriving under such labels as ‘anti realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. Ajdukiewicz’s venerable paper goes to the very core of many contemporary metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to examine the post-pandemic business cycle in Poland and in the United States in the light of the Austrian business cycle theory. The study shows that this theory satisfactorily explains the post-pandemic business cycle. Moreover, it seems that the Austrian business cycle theory explains some important facts better than competing theories of business cycle. The analysis also indicates that the post-pandemic business cycle differs significantly in many respects from previous business cycles – and that (...) these differences could be explained within the framework of the Austrian business cycle theory. (shrink)

Die oberflächengrammatische Form einer Beschreibung der inten-tio-nalen Beziehung suggeriert, daß wir es mit einer Relation zwischen dem Subjekt und dem Objekt zu tun haben. Angesichts der logischen Anomalien der intentionalen Kontexte postulieren jedoch viele Philosophen spezielle Entitäten, die den intentionalen Zugang zum eigentlichen Referenzobjekt vermitteln. Wir untersuchen drei Intentionalitätstheorien dieser Art: eine Meinongsche Theorie; eine Brentanosche Theorie; und eine Repräsentationstheorie sensu stricto. Alle Theorien akzeptie-ren die These, daß die vermittelnden Entitäten nur in der Weise repräsentieren können, indem sie eine Beschreibung (...) des Referenzobjektes involvieren. Die Unterschiede zwischen ihnen betreffen drei Fragen: ob zwischen den Eigenschaften, die die vermittelnden Entitäten haben, und den-jenigen, die den Referenzobjekten zukommen, das Verhältnis der Identität besteht; ob die Weise, in der die Eigenschaften „gehabt" werden, in beiden Fällen die gleiche ist; und ob die Weise, in der es die betreffenden Entitäten gibt, immer ontologisch verpflichtend ist. (shrink)

Although it is a welcome and timely idea, the behavioural constellation of deprivation needs to explain how the development of personal control, trust, and perception of future risk is mediated through relationships with parents. Further, prioritising the present over the future may not be the essence of this constellation; perhapsnotquite being, either in the presentorin the future, is a better depiction.

Viele Philosophen Glauben, daß die sogenannte „klassische” Definition des Wissens: -/- (W)Das Subjekt S weiß, daß p =Df. (i) S glaubt (ist überzeugt), daß p; (ii) S hat eine Begründung (eine epistemische Rechtferigung) für seine Überzeugung, daß p; und (iii) es ist der Fall, daß p. -/- durch das berühmte Gegenbeispiel Gettiers endgültig demoliert wurde: Gettier hat die folgende Situation konstruiert: -/- (G)(1) Das Subjekt S hat eine gute induktive Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. (2) S hat die Überzeugung (...) vom Inhalt p oder q. (3) S hat demgemäß die Begründung für seine Überzeugung, daß p oder q; und zwar kraft der Begründung, die es für die Überzeugung, daß p, hat. (4) Was q betrifft, so hat S gar keine epistemischen Gründe (weder für noch gegen q). (5) p erweist sich als falsch, q ist dagegen (dank eines Zufalls) wahr. -/- Wir argumentieren, daß die philosophische Bedeutung des Rätsels von Gettier in der Regel stark überschätzt wird. Das Subjekt S hat eine gute Begründung für die Überzeugung, daß p. Trotzdem ist der Inhalt seiner Überzeugung nicht einfach p, sondern stattdessen p oder q. Eine solche Über¬zeu¬gung wäre verständlich, wenn S für q noch eine unabhängige Begründung hätte. Kraft der Voraussetzung hat es jedoch keine solche Begründung. Das Gettiersche Subjekt hat in diesem Sinne gratis abgeschwächte Überzeugungen. Wir argumentieren, daß solche Überzeugungen nicht nur aus den psychologischen, sondern auch aus gewissen im weiten Sinne logischen Gründen ausgeschloßen werden soll, und versuchen die Regeln zu formulieren, die solche gratis abgeschwächten Überzeugungen ausschließen. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to examine the legacy of Menger’s theory of social institutions. We argue that Menger’s insights about the origin of social structures inspired later contributions in three main areas: theory of spontaneous order, theory of money, and theory of law.

In this paper, we present a battery of empirical findings on the relationship between cultural context and theory of mind that show great variance in the onset and character of mindreading in different cultures; discuss problems that those findings cause for the largely-nativistic outlook on mindreading dominating in the literature; and point to an alternative framework that appears to better accommodate the evident cross-cultural variance in mindreading. We first outline the theoretical frameworks that dominate in mindreading research, then present the (...) relevant empirical findings, and finally we come back to the theoretical approaches in a discussion of their explanatory potential in the face of the data presented. The theoretical frameworks discussed are the two-systems approach; performance-based approach also known as modularity-nativist approach; and the social-communicative theory also known as the systems, relational-systems, dynamic systems and developmental systems theory. The former two, which both fall within the wider modular-computational paradigm, run into a challenge with the cross-cultural data presented, and the latter - the systemic framework - seems to offer an explanatorily potent alternative. The empirical data cited in this paper comes from research on cross-cultural differences in folk psychology and theory-of-mind development; the influence of parenting practices on the development of theory of mind; the development and character of theory of mind in deaf populations; and neuroimaging research of cultural differences in mindreading. (shrink)

Ingarden’s official ontology of states of affairs is by no means reductionist. According to him there are states of affairs, but they are ontologically dependent onother entities. There are certain classical arguments for the introduction of states of affairs as extra entities over and above the nominal objects, that can be labelled “the problem of composition,” “the problem of relation” and “the problem of negation.” To the first two Ingarden proposes rather traditional solutions, while his treatment of negation proves to (...) be original and interesting. Ingarden doesn’t deny the existence of negative states of affairs altogether, but he (i) accepts only a restricted group of them and (ii) ascribes to them an extremely weak mode of being. Negative states of affairs are construed as supervenient entities, and their supervenience-basis involves two factors: on the one hand the appropriate positive states of affairs, and on the other hand certain mental acts of conscious subjects. They enjoy thus a curious “half-subjective” mode of being. (shrink)

Das Buch bietet die erste systematische esamtdarstellung der Ontologie Brentanos. Es zeigt, daß es in Brentanos ontologischem Denken drei Perioden gibt: die frühe "konzeptualistische" (1862-1874), die mittlere "deskriptiv-psychologische" (1874-1904) und die späte "reistische" (1904-1917). Diese drei Perioden werden in ihrer Kontinuität und komplizierten Dialektik unter Rückgriff auf unveröffentlichte Manuskripte Brentanos dargestellt. Dabei wird von dem logischen Handwerkszeug der zeitgenössischen analytischen Ontologie Gebrauch gemacht. Das Buch wendet sich nicht nur an Brentano-Forscher, sondern an alle an ontologischen Fragen Interessierten. Die Analysen zur (...) Ontologie der Intentionalität sind insbesondere für Phänomenologen und für Forscher im Bereich der cognitive science von Interesse. (shrink)

The paper examines narrative operations involved in the temporal configuration of experience within a general framework of the phenomenological treatment of temporality. Taking as its point of departure a most basic instantiation of temporal experience, namely that of a ticking clock, it argues that the narrative dynamics which give form and charge the interval between tick and tock with significant duration are directly derived from the time-constituting operations of the embodied mind and, as such, are independent of their linguistic articulations. (...) Thus, it critically invokes Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, more specifically his model of retention-primary impression-protention, first in the context of Francisco J. Varela’s account of the neurodynamics of lived time, and then with reference to David Carr’s argument for continuity between narrative and the world of our experiences and actions. Building on these critical trajectories, the paper outlines how proto-narrative elements of lived time form a basis for the properly narrative operation of emplotment and, in its final section, discusses some of the complex relations between lived time and narrative time by contrasting Carr’s account of narrative with Paul Ricoeur’s model of triple mimesis. (shrink)

The central and probably most controversial point concerning the psychologism — anti-psychologism debate is the problem of Frege’s alleged influence on the change in Husserl’s views. Contemporary thinkers investigating the early period of Husserl’s philosophy have attempted to show that the opinion that Frege’s doctrine had a traumatic influence on Husserl’s views is not justified. This paper, which tries to maintain a balance between strictly philosophical argumentation and narrowly understood historical argumentation, suggests an alternative solution. By appealing to Frege’s works (...) published before 1894, the locus of psychologism will be determined. Afterwards, I will present Husserl’s and Frege’s views on the elucidation procedure and the distinction between calculus and ‘lingua characteristica’. By discussing Husserl’s works from 1894-1897, I will show that his standpoint changed dramatically as he entered into the anti-psychological program, involving a new theory of concepts, judgment, and the so-called ‘pure Fregean flavour’ — a new account of logical content. (shrink)

Artykuł stanowi wprowadzenie do lektury „pamiętnika z Sołówek” Mieczysława Lenardowicza, opublikowanego dwukrotnie w 1930 roku jako Na wyspach tortur i śmierci. Pamiętnik z Sołówek (Wojskowy Instytut Naukowo-Wydawniczy) i Pamiętnik z Sołówek (Towarzystwo Wydawnicze „Rój”). Utwór ten jest prawdopodobnie pierwszym dziełem polskiej literatury łagrowej i, szerzej, obozowej. W artykule zarysowano kontekst historyczny i historycznoliteracki utworu Lenardowicza: genezę bolszewickich i sowieckich obozów koncentracyjnych, a w szczególności Sołowieckiego Obozu Specjalnego Przeznaczenia, oraz wskazano najważniejsze wczesne świadectwa dotyczące sowieckich obozów koncentracyjnych (głównie Sołowek), w tym (...) teksty opublikowane w Polsce i w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie do 1945 roku. Są wśród nich, obok utworu Lenardowicza, świadectwa obcojęzyczne (rosyjskie, ukraińskie, niemieckie) i ich przekłady, napisane po polsku wspomnienia Białorusina Franciszka Alachnowicza oraz teksty napisane po polsku przez Polaków: artykuły prasowe, reportaże, eseje – traktujące o Sołowkach w sposób mniej lub bardziej bezpośredni. (shrink)

At least since Hume we have a serious problem with explaining our moral valuations. Most of us – with notable exception of certain (in)famous esoteric thinkers like Nietzsche or De Sade – share a common intuition that our moral claims are in an important sense objective. We believe that they can be right or wrong; and we believe that if they happen to be right, then they are binding for each human being conducting a similar action in similar circumstances. Now (...) Hume drew our attention to the fact that our valuations do not follow from descriptions of the actions in question. There seems to be nothing in the “descriptive content” of the world around us that could make them true or false and in face of that it becomes very puzzling how they ever could be right, objective or committing. As we all know Hume’s solution proclaims emotions as the basis of our moral valuations. Calling something right or wrong should be in the first place understood as an expression of our emotional attitude toward it. This move explains a part of the initial puzzle, but it also leaves us with a certain unpleasant consequence. It seems that in the strict sense emotions could be neither rational nor true, and consequently we can hardly imagine any conclusive moral argument. De gustibus non disputandum est. Our feeling of objectivity vis a vis our moral valuations has to be classified as a kind of illusion and what follows is a kind of moral relativism or scepticism. Some philosophers are happy with this conclusion, but some others find it untenable. Brentano and his followers belonged to the second group. They generally accepted Hume’s claim that emotions constitute the basis of our moral valuations but developed interesting strategies to avoid his relativistic conclusions. (shrink)

The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property – a property taken as an individual aspect of (...) a particular object. A trope is thus the colour of this table or the shape of this sculpture. In the light of this conception tropes are, as it were, direct abstractions from concrete individuals. According to the second intuition a trope is still such an individual (and abstract) colour or such an individual (and abstract) shape, but now it is not only abstracted from the concrete individual of which it is a trope but also taken in abstraction from the very fact that it has been abstracted this way. We can imagine that the cognitive access to these tropes is obtained by a kind of a double abstraction. All this can sound puzzling at first blush, but in what follows I hope to make the matter a little clearer. Let us anticipate briefly. On the second view, tropes are construed not so much as abstractions from concrete individuals, but rather as primitive items of which the concrete individuals are composed. Tropes so construed are, as it were, metaphysically prior to concrete individuals. We will call tropes of this kind unstructured tropes, whereas tropes conceived as aspects of individual things will be called propositional tropes. This terminology is justified because tropes understood as aspects of things seem to involve something like propositional structure, a structure that tropes conceived as primitive “building blocks” of reality definitely lack. It is sometimes believed that these two concepts of trope are nearly equivalent, that the difference between them is for the most part verbal. Yet it will turn out that there is an important ontological difference here. Propositional tropes are non-trivially propositional and unstructured tropes are non-trivially deprived of such a structure (althought not necessarily deprived of any dependence-links with respect to other tropes). It will be argued that tropes are metaphysically interesting only on the second conception (i.e., as primitive, unstructured items), whereas only on the first conception (tropes as propositionally structured entities) can they function as semantically efficient truthmakers. The moral of the paper will be that our trust in tropes must be mitigated. A trope ontology could plausibly be viewed as a serious metaphysical alternative, but its semantical possibilities should not be exaggerated. (shrink)

Stosunki polsko-węgierskie pozostają czymś niezwykłym na skalę europejską. Choć w świadomości społeczeństw obu narodów dominuje pozytywne postrzeganie wzajemnych relacji, nie było to zjawisko stale występujące w historii. Najintensywniej zachodziło, gdy oba kraje opierały się dominacji pierwiastka germańskiego. Węgry jako pierwsze utraciły niepodległość, ulegając naciskom ze Wschodu. Również Polska podzieliła los Węgier, ulegając presji zarówno ze Wschodu, jak i Zachodu. Doświadczenia historyczne obu krajów pokazały konieczność współdziałania wobec zagrożeń płynących z obu kierunków. Warunki po 1886 roku nie sprzyjały realizacji tego założenia, (...) choć w XIX i XX wieku Polacy i Węgrzy snuli wizje geopolityczne określające skalę możliwych przemian w Europie Środkowej. Zmiana nastąpiła po zakończeniu II wojny światowej. Niezależnie od naturalnie występujących rozbieżności w postrzeganiu własnego otoczenia, w XXI wieku trudno wskazać polską koncepcję geopolityczną, która nie uwzględnia regionalnej roli Węgier, czy też węgierską, ignorującą Rzeczpospolitą Polską. (shrink)

The development of self-regulation in early childhood is related to development of emotional regulation and attention, in particular executive attention. As the ability to self-regulate is crucial in life, it is important to reveal early predictors of self-regulation. The aim of the paper is to present the results of longitudinal studies on the relationships between the functioning of attention, regulation of emotion and later self-regulatory abilities. 310 children were assessed at three time points. At 12 months of age emotional regulation (...) in situation of frustration and attention regulation were assessed. At 18 and 24 months behavioral-emotional regulation in the Snack Delay Task was measured. Additionally parents assessed executive attention using The Early Childhood Behavior Questionnaire when children were 26 months old. Structural equation modelling revealed two different paths to development of self-regulatory abilities at 18 months: emotional and emotionalattentional and only one emotional-attentional path at 24 months. The early ability to focus attention and later executive attention functioning revealed to be important predictors of self-regulatory abilities both at 18 and 24 months of age. (shrink)

SUMMARYThe aim of this paper is to make a case for the claim that Karl Löwith's thought is predominately preoccupied with one major philosophic–historical problem that may be broadly labelled existentialism. This notion is usually employed by Löwith in order to grasp the various phenomena and developments within the European history in the modern age. I claim that the meaning assigned by Löwith to the notion of existentialism is inseparable from its political consequences. In other words, I attempt to reconstruct (...) the notion of existentialism in Löwith's thought primarily as a political problem. By advancing this argument, I am inclined towards the view that Löwith’s œuvre deserves more careful reception from political theorists than it has yet received. (shrink)

The paper is focused on the relationship between thought and language. One of the current hypotheses claims that public language is responsible for our ability to display second order cognitive dynamics. In order to investigate the alleged role of language in our ability to think about thoughts philosophers and psychologists have concentrated on the attribution of thought to another people i.e. on "mind reading" abilities. Evaluating series of experimental results (for example: The false belief task ) some of them have (...) put forward a strong hypothesis that capacity to attribute a thought to another people deploys a symbolic representations made available by the language faculty. Making this claim they have attempted to support the general idea that language is regarded as a necessary precursor for second order cognitive dynamics, i.e. the acquisition of specific language constructions fosters our ability to think consciously of our thoughts. In the paper (in opposition to this strong hypothesis) the moderate view is developed. According to the moderate view language is not considered as a devise that re-program our cognitive abilities and creates a new kind of cognition (second order thinking) but is rater an external resource that may scaffold our higher order cognitive abilities. (shrink)

Intensionality (or opacity) is a core property of mental representations and sometimes understanding opacity is claimed to be a part of children's theory of mind (evidenced with the false belief task). Children, however, pass the false belief task and the intensionality tasks at different ages (typically 4 vs. 5;1-6;11 years). According to two dominant interpretations, the two tests either require different conceptual resources or vary only in their executive or linguistic load. In two experiments, involving 120 children aged 3-6 (Experiment (...) 1) and 75 children aged 4-6 (Experiment 2), we tested two variants of the executive load hypothesis: The differential linguistic complexity of the two tests, and the dual-name problem of the intensionality task. The former was addressed by standardizing and minimizing the linguistic demands of both tasks (contrasted with the typical narrative intensionality task), and the latter by introducing the dual-name problem into the false belief task as well, so that it was present in both tasks. We found that (1) two structurally different intensionality tasks shared more variance with each other than with the structurally similar false belief task, and that (2) introducing a dual label problem into the false belief task did not reduce the developmental gap. Our results speak against interpreting the difference between the time children pass the two tests entirely in terms of performative issues, and support the conceptual enrichment hypothesis. We discuss the theoretical relevance of these results, suggesting that they are best explained by fine-grained increments within the concept of belief, rather than a radical conceptual change. We conclude that understanding opacity of minds – which emerges between age 5 and 6 – is an important step towards a more advanced form of ToM. (shrink)

W niniejszym artykule ukazana została polemika polskiego filozofa Wojciecha Dzieduszyckiego z jednym z postępowych haseł głoszonych w XIX wieku. Hasło to sam Dzieduszycki określił jako „bezwyznaniowość”. Autor artykułu analizuje argumentację Dzieduszyckiego co do negatywnych skutków wyrugowania religii z życia publicznego, zarówno w przeszłości, jak i w czasach mu współczesnych, a także ukazuje pozytywną rolę religii w życiu jednostek, państw, narodów, a nawet całych cywilizacji. Bez religii bowiem, twierdził polski myśliciel, społeczności degradują się i obumierają. Ciekawa, a współcześnie bardzo ważna dyskusja (...) o roli religii w życiu społecznym, została w artykule zestawiona z propagowaną przez Dzieduszyckiego ideą „mesjanizmu polskiego”, jak również z obecnymi dziś w kulturze i polityce propozycjami radykalnej laicyzacji. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary volume of essays explores how the notion of time varies across disciplines by examining variance as a defining feature of temporalities in cultural, creative, and scholarly contexts. Featuring a President's Address by philosopher David Wood, it begins with critical reassessments of J.T. Fraser's hierarchical theory of time through the lens of Anthropocene studies, philosophy, ecological theory, and ecological literature; proceeds to variant narratives in fiction, video games, film, and graphic novels; and concludes by measuring time's variance with tools (...) as different as incense clocks and computers, and by marking variance in music, film, and performance art. (shrink)

Despite Karol Wojtyła later to become Pope John Paul II was firstly a moral and anthropological philosopher, his reflection also concerns in historiosophical and civilizational issues. This part of his intellectual activity is rather less known. But Wojtyła was an author of original conception of history and civilization. Among different ways of historiosophical and civilizational interpretations we can find him as a representative of moderate universalism. He joined the belief in existence of universal history as well as the common values (...) with a need of clear definition of human “ego” that could be realized thanks to concrete communities. He saw history in theological and philosophical aspects. Firstly, for him it was a universal history of salvation that is a participation of all nations and cultures as well as every real man. In a philosophical sense he emphasized the universal desire of getting to know the ultimate truth and gaining absolute good. His ethical model of universal civilization is based on the acceptation of cultural diversities. That is why it could be named as “ecumenical civilization”. Its main method is a dialogue that leads to truth and peace. We can find the source of Wojtyła’s universalism in a personalistic philosophy, which sees a proper subject of history and culture aswell as civilization in a person. (shrink)

Ukazano relacje Polaków dotyczące przyrody południowoafrykańskiej z perspektywy ponad 400 lat. Afryka Południowa, praktycznie do naszych czasów, jawiła się im zawsze jako kraj nie tylko bardzo odległy, ale też egzotyczny i interesujący. Determinowało to w poważnym stopniu charakter relacji. Podkreślały one przede wszystkim różnorodność i bogactwo przyrody południowoafrykańskiej. Przyrodę południowoafrykańską postrzegano również przez pryzmat wielkich możliwości łowieckich. Wielu Polaków odwiedzających Afrykę Południową wyrażało zdziwienie z obecności w tym kraju dwóch wykluczających się w zasadzie światów – nietkniętej przyrody i cywilizacji europejskiej. (...) Najczęściej opisywanym miejscem Afryki Południowej był Przylądek Dobrej Nadziei oraz okolice dzisiejszego Kapsztadu. Pierwszego dokładnego zapisu interior dokonał Antoni Rehman w latach siedemdziesiątych XIX wieku. Rzeczowo i ze znawstwem pisali o przyrodzie południowoafrykańskiej polscy uczeni, którzy uczestniczyli w XV Międzynarodowym Kongresie Geologicznym w Pretorii w 1929 roku: Walery Goetel, Jan Lewiński, Józef Morozewicz i Jerzy Loth. Dość liczne relacje odnośnie przyrody południowoafrykańskiej pojawiły się współcześnie w kontekście złożonej sytuacji społeczno- politycznej Afryki Południowej. (shrink)