Eudemian ethics -- Nicomachean ethics -- Magna moralia -- Virtues and vices.

Introduces Aristotle's writings on ethics, and discusses character, intelligence, pleasure, and friendship.

Aristotle's Ethics develops a complex theory of the qualities which make for a good human being and for several decades there has been intense discussion about whether Aristotle's theory of voluntariness, outlined in the Ethics, actually delineates what modern thinkers would recognize as a theory of moral responsibility. Javier Echeñique presents a novel account of Aristotle's discussion of voluntariness in the Ethics, arguing - against the interpretation by Arthur Adkins and that inspired by Peter Strawson - that (...) he developed an original and compelling theory of moral responsibility and that this theory has contributed in important ways to our understanding of coercion, ignorance and violence. His study will be valuable for a wide range of readers interested in Aristotle and in ancient ethics more broadly. (shrink)

In Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy Claudia Baracchi demonstrates the indissoluble links between practical and theoretical wisdom in Aristotle's thinking. Referring to a broad range of texts from the Aristotelian corpus, Baracchi shows how the theoretical is always informed by a set of practices, and specifically, how one's encounter with phenomena, the world, or nature in the broadest sense, is always a matter of ethos. Such a 'modern' intimation can, thus, be found at the heart of Greek thought. Baracchi's (...) book opens the way for a comprehensively reconfigured approach to classical Greek philosophy. (shrink)

What is the good life? Posing this question today would likely elicit very different answers. Some might say that the good life means doing good—improving one’s community and the lives of others. Others might respond that it means doing well—cultivating one’s own abilities in a meaningful way. But for Aristotle these two distinct ideas—doing good and doing well—were one and the same and could be realized in a single life. In Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics, Eugene Garver examines how we (...) can draw this conclusion from Aristotle's works, while also studying how this conception of the good life relates to contemporary ideas ofmorality. The key to Aristotle’s views on ethics, argues Garver, lies in the Metaphysics or, more specifically, in his thoughts on activities, actions, and capacities . For Aristotle, Garver shows, it is only possible to be truly active when acting for the common good, and it is only possible to be truly happy when active to the extent of one’s own powers. But does this mean we should aspire to Aristotle’s impossibly demanding vision of the good life? In a word, no. Garver stresses the enormous gap between life in Aristotle’s time and ours. As a result, this book will be a welcome rumination on not only Aristotle, but the relationship between the individual and society in everyday life. (shrink)

This is a study of Aristotle's moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.

Annotated bibliography of Aristotle's ethical writings, organized topically.

This is a study of Aristotle's moral philosophy as it is contained in the Nicomachean Ethics. Hardie examines the difficulties of the text; presents a map of inescapable philosophical questions; and brings out the ambiguities and critical disagreements on some central topics, inclduing happiness, the soul, the ethical mean, and the initiation of action.

This volume studies the teaching of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (the standard textbook for moral philosophy) in the universities of Renaissance Italy. Special attention is given to how university commentaries on the Ethics reflect developments in educational theory and practice and in humanist Aristotelianism. After surveying the fortune of the Ethics in the Latin West to 1650 and the work’s place in the universities, the discussion turns to Italian interpretations of the Ethics up to 1500 (Part (...) Two) and then from 1500 to 1650 (Part Three). The focus is on the universities of Florence-Pisa, Padua, Bologna, and Rome (including the Collegio Romano). Five substantial appendices document the institutional context of moral philosophy and the Latin interpretations of the Ethics during the Italian Renaissance. Largely based on archival and unpublished sources, this study provides striking evidence for the continuing vitality of university Aristotelianism and for its fruitful interaction with humanism on the eve of the early modern era. (shrink)

On the nature of Aristotle's Ethics, by R. A. Gauthier.--Reason, happiness, and goodness, by F. Siegler.--The nature of aims, by J. Dewey.--Thought and action in Aristotle, by G. E. M. Anscombe.--On forgetting the difference between right and wrong, by G. Ryle.--Aristotle and the punishment of psychopaths, by V. Haksar.--Suggested further readings (p. 121-123).

How are we to understand Aristotle's famous doctrine of the mean? "If ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds"... In fact, the relation of morality to physical health is more intimate than mere analogy. Emotions involve a bodily process (cp On the Soul 403al6ff): for example, 'Anger is productive of heat' (On the Parts ofAnimals 650b35), while 'Fear is, indeed, a kind (...) of chill' (Rhetoric 1389b32). The hot temper of youth and the cool temper of old age, to take two extremes, are corollaries of physical extremes, of literal heat and cold respectively (Rhetoric 1389a2ff). In general, moral as well as bodily excellences are supervenient upon physical states; specific to moral excellence is what it supervenes upon, viz bodily pleasures and plains (Physics 246b3-247a20, an early passage not relevantly superseded). Health and virtue are both grounded upon the physiological condition of a psycho-physical entity... Yet it is hard to view the physiology of virtue as more than a general precondition. It more satisfactorily identifies natural virtue than virtue proper. The blood of young men is heated by nature (as though by wine), so that they are hot-tempered and hopeful; this makes them less timorous and more confident, and so more courageous, than the old (Rhetoric 1389al8ff). But the properly brave man is one 'who faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time' (11 5b1b7ff). (shrink)

Presents the Nicomachean Ethics as a work of political philosophy, emphasizing the interplay between its practical political concerns and its underlying philosophic perspective and arguing that it is rhetorical in the precise Aristotelian meaning of the term.

This Element is an examination of the philosophical themes presented in Aristotle's Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. Topics include happiness, the voluntary and choice, the doctrine of the mean, particular virtues of character and temperamental means, virtues of thought, akrasia, pleasure, friendship, and luck. Special attention has been paid to Aristotle's treatment of virtues of character and thought and their relation to happiness, the reason why Aristotle is the quintessential virtue ethicist. The virtues of character have not received the attention (...) they deserve in most discussions of the relationship between the two treatises. (shrink)

In ethics and politics, Aristotle is a classic representative of eudaimonism. The summum bonum for human being is happiness (eudaimonía), which consists in the activity of the soul to realize its virtue (areté). Virtues carried out in rational activity are divided into ethical and dianoetic (sc. intellectual). The highest moral ideal, according to Aristotle, is to live a contemplative life (bíos theōrētikós; vita contemplativa), because happiness is a kind of contemplation. The blessed life consists of enjoying contemplation, i.e. in (...) the study of philosophy. Philosophy, the subject of which is the highest principles of existence, is the most speculative of the sciences. Therefore, a life devoted to philosophy is the most perfect. (shrink)

It is well known that Max Scheler framed his ethics in opposition to Kant’s “formalistic” ethical framework. However, it is a lesser-known fact that Scheler offered a critique of the ancient Greek moral vision. Although this critique was less developed than the one of Kant, the critique of the ancients was no less significant. First explicated in 1912 in Ressentiment, its central theme is reprised in nearly all of Scheler’s main texts even up until his death. Scheler’s contention is (...) with what he calls the “love of goodness,” which he also happens to think Aristotle’s ethics represents. This paper will primarily examine the love of goodness, first, as one side of the “categorial form” of "Pharisaism"—that is, as it represents a “moral illusion”—then as the other side—namely, as it corresponds to “epistemological error." Finally, I consider the specific moral context in light of where it naturally leads Scheler: to the principle of solidarity. (shrink)

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is devoted to the topic of human happiness. Yet, although Aristotle's conception of happiness is central to his whole philosophical project, there is much controversy surrounding it. Hope May offers a new interpretation of Aristotle's account of happiness - one which incorporates Aristotle's views about the biological development of human beings. May argues that the relationship amongst the moral virtues, the intellectual virtues, and happiness, is best understood through the lens of developmentalism. On this view, happiness (...) emerges from the cultivation of a number of virtues that are developmentally related. May goes on to show how contemporary scholarship in psychology, ethical theory and legal philosophy signals a return to Aristotelian ethics. Specifically, May shows how a theory of motivation known as Self-Determination Theory and recent research on goal attainment have deep affinities to Aristotle's ethical theory. May argues that this recent work can ground a contemporary virtue theory that acknowledges the centrality of autonomy in a way that captures the fundamental tenets of Aristotle's ethics. (shrink)

This chapter examines the main issues in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The discussions cover his views on happiness, virtues of character, virtues of thought, moral responsibility, moral dilemmas, practical reasoning, choice, akrasia, pleasure, and friendship.

In this fascinating introduction, David Bostock presents a fresh perspective on one of the great classics of moral philosophy: Aristotle's Nicomachaen Ethics. He argues that it is, and deserves to be, Aristotle's most widely studied work, for much of what it has to say is still important for today's debate on the problems of ethics. Here, Bostock guides the reader through explanations and evaluations of all the main themes of the work, exploring questions of interpretation and the differing (...) views of a range of commentators. He also emphasizes the philosophical merits and faults of the doctrines that emerge, critically discussing them in a simple, straightforward way. Each chapter concludes with suggestions for further reading on the themes discussed within the chapter, and the book finishes with an evaluation of the Ethics as a whole. The ideal companion for study of Aristotle's great insights, this book helps the reader to engage with his ideas and arguments as living philosophy. (shrink)

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics had a profound influence on generations of later philosophers, not only in the ancient era but also in the medieval period and beyond. In this book, Anthony Celano explores how medieval authors recast Aristotle's Ethics according to their own moral ideals. He argues that the moral standard for the Ethics is a human one, which is based upon the ethical tradition and the best practices of a given society. In the Middle Ages, this human (...) standard was replaced by one that is universally applicable, since its foundation is eternal immutable divine law. Celano resolves the conflicting accounts of happiness in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, demonstrates the importance of the virtue of phronesis, and shows how the medieval view of moral reasoning alters Aristotle's concept of moral wisdom. (shrink)

This article examines Aristotle’s use of the term philia. As a basis for the analysis, the author employs the communicative component of this notion. This allows us to consider friendship as a process, distinguishing it from everything else that cannot be identified as such. This “residue” is something that comes from nature, common to all living creatures, and is at the root of all types of positive communication. The goal of this article is to show that the content identified (...) as such can be understood as a separate concept. (shrink)

Although telos has been important in farm animal ethics for several decades, clearer understanding of it may be gained from the close reading of Aristotle’s primary texts on animals. Aristotle observed and classified animals informally in daily life and through planned evidence gathering and collection development. During this work he theorized his concept of telos, which includes species flourishing and a good life, and drew on extensive and detailed assessments of animal physiology, diet and behaviour. Aristotle believed that (...) animals, like humans, have purpose, and that telos is natural and unchanging. Moreover, he greatly valued the economic, political and defence contributions of farmers to their communities. In his stockperson ethics, animals are ordered to rational human purposes through husbandry, and good practice is established and shared by experience, habituation and training. Aristotle provides a useful and demanding framework for farm animal ethics that goes well beyond negative theories of welfare as freedom from harms. (shrink)

I Virtue 1. Moral Virtue 2. Continence, Endurance, and Virtue 3. Desert 4. The Intellectual Virtues II The Good Life 5. The Good for Man 6. Happiness 7. Production and Action 8. Action and Contemplation 9. Teleology III Friendship 10. What friendship is 11. Kinds of friendship 12. The friend as another self 13. The need for friends IV Political science V Some reflections..

Book Description\n\nIn Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy, Claudia Baracchi demonstrates\nthe indissoluble links between practical and theoretical wisdom in\nAristotle's thinking. Baracchi shows how the theoretical is always\ninformed by a set of practices, and, specifically, how one's encounter\nwith phenomena, the world, or nature in the broadest sense, is always\na matter of ethos. \n\nAbout the Author\n\nClaudia Baracchi is a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the Universit...\ndi Milano-Bicocca, Italy and the author of Of Myth, Life, and War\nin Plato's Republic.

The ethics of Aristotle, and virtue ethics in general, have enjoyed a resurgence of interest over the past few decades. Aristotelian themes, with such issues as the importance of friendship and emotions in a good life, the role of moral perception in wise choice, the nature of happiness and its constitution, moral education and habituation, are finding an important place in contemporary moral debates. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide a close analysis of central arguments in (...) Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and show the enduring interest of the questions Aristotle raises. (shrink)

This paper seeks to defend the Aristotelian idea that the concern of ethics is health of the soul; and that this consists in reasonableness/virtue.

In this chapter I take up the question of how Aristotle understood the relationship between the contemplative life and the active life in contributing to human flourishing and to the political regime. While the connections between Aristotle’s ethics and politics are abundant, there exists a prevalent assumption in the inclusive/dominant debate concerning the interpretation of eudaimonia (human flourishing) that Aristotle’s Politics cannot or should not play a prominent role in helping to understand eudaimonia. On the ‘inclusivist’ reading, (...) eudaimonia is understood as being a composite of all human goods or virtues. On the ‘dominant’ reading, eudaimonia is understood as being a single dominant good, theōria (contemplation). With this chapter I offer a competing interpretation which is in some ways similar to the recent ‘all-inclusive’ reading, but which relies heavily on the connection between Aristotle’s ethics and politics in order to explain how theōria fits into humans’ composite and political nature. (shrink)

Aristotle's doctrine that human beings are political animals is, in part, an empirical thesis, and posits an inclination to enter into cooperative relationships, even apart from the instrumental benefits of doing so. Aristotle's insight is that human cooperation rests on a non-rational propensity to trust even strangers, when conditions are favorable. Turning to broader questions about the role of nature in human development, I situate Aristotle's attitude towards our natural propensities between two extremes: he rejects both the view that we (...) must bow to whatever nature dictates, and also the view that nature is generally or always to be suppressed or overcome. This middle position requires that Aristotle hold nature and goodness apart, so that the latter can serve as a standard for evaluating the former. He holds that nature does not treat all human beings alike: just as some are handicapped in their development by a deficiency in their natural abilities or propensities, others are extraordinarily fortunate and have so powerful a disposition to act well that they easily acquire good habits and skills of practical reasoning. Further, he recognizes that sociable inclinations and natural virtues have to compete in the human soul with other natural forces that make ethical life extraordinarily difficult. That is why things so often go so badly for us: we need not only to subdue the external environment, but to overcome certain inner natural obstacles as well. Even so, for Aristotle ethical life is not generally alienated from nature, as it is for other philosophers. Footnotesa I am grateful to David Keyt and Fred Miller, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their helpful comments on the previous draft of this paper. (shrink)

From the Hellenistic period we have two extensive texts of great interest which draw on Aristotle’s ethical works. One is Antiochus’ system of ethics in Cicero’s De Finibus V; the other is the long account of “the ethics of Aristotle and the other Peripatetics” in Stobaeus’ Eclogae II, 116-152, plausibly ascribed to Arius Didymus. Antiochus’ ethics is consciously “eclectic” in the sense that he is using a variety of ethical material and approaches, Aristotelian and other, to (...) create something of his own. Arius, however, professes to be telling us what Aristotelian ethics is, and scholars have been disconcerted to find something so different from any idea we have of Aristotelian ethics. We find a text in which material clearly taken from the ethical works and the Politics has been not just summarized but recast in terms that are clearly Stoic. Most strikingly, before we get to what we recognize as Aristotelian material we find a long section developing in an Aristotelian context what seems clearly to be the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. Either Arius, or more likely the Peripatetic source he is following, has presented Aristotle’s ethics in a very changed form. Since we have no hope of pinpointing a particular Peripatetic source for the passage, I shall for convenience refer to “Arius” or “the Arius passage,” but the person or people with whom we are concerned are more likely to be, in fact, Arius’ source or sources. (shrink)

Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences. Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect the fact that in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We study ethics in order to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is the nature of human well-being. Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical virtues (...) (justice, courage, temperance and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects Plato's idea that a training in the sciences and metaphysics is a necessary prerequisite for a full understanding of our good. What we need, in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion. (shrink)

Celano’s book focuses on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and thirteenth-century scholastic appropriations of it. Its objectives are to unravel the inconsistencies in Aristotle’s accounts of eudaimonia, to establish the prominence of phronesis, and to reveal alterations of Aristotle’s phronesis in medieval moral thought. Celano’s textual analyses are laborious, and some features of his story may be considered stimulating insights. His construal of phronesis as primary to Aristotle’s moral conception, his emphasis on Albert’s contribution to medieval moral (...) thought, and his inclusion of the largely uncharted anonymous Erfurt commentary... (shrink)

It is a well-known feature of Aristotle’s biology that he resorts to the analogy with human art to explain the concept of final causality operative in living things. In this Aristotle’s theory of biology is explicitly anti-Empedoclean: whereas for Empedocles a randomly generated animal part is preserved if it happens to suit an expedient function, for Aristotle the formal nature produces an animal part with a useful function in view. In this article, by contrast, I focus on those (...) cases in Aristotle’s biology in which nature adapts an apparently purposeless part to some useful function. I argue that such cases not only indicate a partial return of Empedocles’ logic of generation but are also thought by Aristotle by analogy with human prudence. To consider Aristotle’s account of nature as prudent is not only to disclose a hitherto underappreciated aspect of his biology but also to gain a more comprehensive understanding of prudence in his ethics. (shrink)

Few will deny that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is the best-known work on moral philosophy. It is a well-trodden field for the commentator. Indeed one occasionally has the feeling that it is the very proliferation of commentary that makes further guidance necessary and justifies a new commentator. But one hastens to add that the author of the present volume does very much more than simply sort out the differences between the interpretations offered by his predecessors in the field. That (...) not unimportant task he does very skilfully. But his main preoccupation is ‘to give an account of Aristotle’s main ethical doctrines, and to justify interpretations by the detailed scrutiny of particular passages, often very familiar passages’. He goes on to remark that in the study of Aristotle familiarity can be an obstacle to understanding. (shrink)

A study in the best tradition of classical scholarship, showing mastery of commentary and scholarship in eight languages, this book argues that the Ethics is integral to a series of politically oriented philosophical addresses aimed at morally mature political leaders. Bodeus's critical review of the major approaches to Aristotle's texts is an excellent introduction to the subject.

More attention has been paid in recent years to the relationship between Aristotle’s science and his ethics, but little effort has been directed toward constructing a concrete model of a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I offer a proposal about how we might go about constructing a science of Aristotle’s ethics. I argue that constructing an axiomatic model for a portion of Aristotle’s ethics is not only possible, but helpful in making explicit relationships (...) among concepts at the core of Aristotle’s theory. The model of an axiomatic approach to Aristotle’s ethics, which I propose in this paper, is only a small first step in constructing a full-blown science of Aristotle’s ethics, but taking this first step goes a long way toward showing that this project is promising. (shrink)