In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractual exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensational exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be (...) no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to analyze the role that peer support plays in the incidence relationships between sociometric popularity and general self-concept based on sociometer theory. A total of 676 randomly selected secondary school students from the Basque Country between 12 and 18 years of age participated voluntarily. All of them completed a sociometric questionnaire, the Family and Friends Support Questionnaire, and the Dimensional Self-concept Questionnaire. Several models of structural equations were tested. The results indicate that sociometric popularity (...) is linked to self-concept through the perceived social support of peers. These results are discussed within the framework of positive psychology and its practical implications in the school context. (shrink)

(1991). Life as emergence: The roots of a new paradigm in theoretical biology. World Futures: Vol. 32, Creative Evolution in Nature, Mind, and Society, pp. 133-149.

Height preferences reflecting positive assortative mating for height—wherein an individual’s own height positively predicts the preferred height of their mate—have been observed in several distinct human populations and are thought to increase reproductive fitness. However, the extent to which assortative preferences for height differ strategically for short-term versus long-term relationship partners, as they do for numerous other indices of mate quality, remains unclear. We explore this possibility in a large representative sample of over 500 men and women aged 15–77 from (...) Canada, Cuba, Norway and the United States. Participants’ own heights were measured, and they indicated their height preferences for a long-term and short-term mate using graphic stimuli containing metric indices. Replicating the “male-taller norm,” participants on average preferred taller-than-average male mates, and shorter-than-average female mates. Positive assortative preferences for height were observed across sexes and samples, however the strength of these height preferences varied with relationship context for men, and not for women. Taller men preferred relatively shorter women for short-term relationships than for long-term relationships, indicating stronger assortative preferences for height in a long-term context. These results provide preliminary evidence that, in addition to mate preferences for other physical traits related to mate quality such as masculinity in the body, face, and voice, assortative preferences for height do vary as a function of expected relationship length, but this was surprisingly only observed in preferences for female height. (shrink)

The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...) and introduces the reader to some of the general issues that frame the discussion of subsequent chapters. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of how existential phenomenology has influenced qualitative research methods across a range of disciplines across the social, health, educational, and psychological sciences. It focuses specifically on how the concepts of “existential structures,” or “existentials”—such as selfhood, temporality, spatiality, affectivity, and embodiment—have been used in qualitative research. After providing a brief introduction to what qualitative research is and why philosophers should be interested in it, the chapter provides clear, straightforward examples of how qualitative researchers have used (...) existentials to analyze qualitative data and design qualitative studies. The chapter is intended to introduce philosophers to existential approaches to phenomenological qualitative research, with the aim of facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration. (shrink)

At least for those who uphold the rationality of morality, ethics and practical reason are not two distinct topics: an ethically sound agent is one whose practical reason functions as it should. Take, for instance, the greatest historical figures. Aristotle claimed that no virtue of character can exist without practical wisdom—the excellence of practical, deliberative reason. And Kant thought that the categorical imperative, the ultimate moral principle that governs a good will, was at the same time the fundamental principlof practical (...) reasoning because the will simply ispractical reason. Even before any philosophical theory of the connection between acting well and the exercise of a rational power is in view, our moral practices strongly suggest that there is one. For we take it for granted that, in an important range of cases, when an agent fails to act as she should, something has gone awry with the agent and not just with her acts, and, furthermore, that the agent herself may be held responsible for this. In calling an agent who acts unethically "irrational," we are saying these two things. (shrink)

b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not (...) reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness. (shrink)

La escuela de la Teoría Crítica de la sociedad tuvo como baluarte el texto "Dialéctica de la Ilustración" escrito por Max Horkheimer y Teodoro Adorno. En él, los autores se lamentan del deplorable estado de la tradición científica occidental, ya que los avances de la actividad científica modern.

This paper aims to offer an account of affective experiences within Predictive Processing, a novel framework that considers the brain to be a dynamical, hierarchical, Bayesian hypothesis-testing mechanism. We begin by outlining a set of common features of affective experiences that a PP-theory should aim to explain: feelings are conscious, they have valence, they motivate behaviour, and they are intentional states with particular and formal objects. We then review existing theories of affective experiences within Predictive Processing and delineate two families (...) of theories: Interoceptive Inference Theories and Error Dynamics Theories. We highlight the strengths and shortcomings of each family of theories and develop a synthesis: the Affective Inference Theory. Affective Inference Theory claims that valence corresponds to the expected rate of prediction error reduction. In turn, the particular object of a feeling is the object predicted to be the most likely cause of expected changes in prediction error rate, and the formal object of a feeling is a predictive model of the expected changes in prediction error rate caused by a given particular object. Finally, our theory shows how affective experiences bias action selection, directing the organism towards allostasis and towards optimal levels of uncertainty in order to minimise prediction error over time. (shrink)

Starting from Proust’s distinction between the self-attributive and self-evaluative views on metacognition, this paper presents a third view: self-mindshaping. Based on the notion of mindshaping as the core of social cognition, the self-mindshaping view contends that mindshaping abilities can be turned on one’s own mind. Against the self-attributive view, metacognition is not a matter of accessing representations to metarepresent them but of giving shape to those representations themselves. Against the self-evaluative view, metacognition is not blind to content but relies heavily (...) on it. We characterize our view in terms of four issues that, according to Proust, distinguish the previous approaches, namely, whether metacognitive mechanisms are the same as those employed to access other minds, whether metacognitive control requires conceptual representation, whether metacognition is propositional, and whether metacognitive access is linked to mental action. After describing some of the mechanisms for self-mindshaping, we show how this view regards metacognition as grounded on social interaction mechanisms, conceptually driven, possibly, but not necessarily, propositional, and engaged in the practical regulation of mental states. Finally, we examine the prospects for the primacy of self-mindshaping as the primary metacognitive function. We argue that self-attributive processes typically subserve the practical goals emphasized by the mindshaping view, and that the evaluative role played by procedural metacognition can be grounded on social cues rather than on experiential feelings. Even if this is not enough to claim the primacy of self-mindshaping, it still appears as a third kind of metacognition, not reducible to the other two. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) developments are proliferating at an astonishing rate. Unsurprisingly, the number of meaningful studies addressing the social impacts of AI applications in several fields has been remarkable. More recently, several contributions have started exploring the ecological impacts of AI. Machine learning systems do not have a neutral environmental cost, so it is important to unravel the ecological footprint of these techno-scientific developments. In this chapter, we discuss the sustainability of AI from environmental ethics approaches. We examine the moral (...) trade-offs that AI may cause in different moral dimensions and analyse prominent conflicts that may arise from human and more-than-human-centred concerns. (shrink)

Part One defends the thesis, first advanced by Aristotle, that the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, and argues for its philosophical significance. Opposition to the thesis rests on a contestable way of distinguishing between acts and contents of reasoning and on a picture of normative principles as external to the actions that fall under them. The resulting view forces us to choose between the efficacious, world-changing character of practical thought and its subjection to objective rational standards. This is (...) a false choice. Aristotle's own understanding of the thesis points the way to an alternative conception of practical reason on which it is at once a power to effect changes in the world and to get things right. Practical reasoning endows the action performed on its basis with a principle that is not imposed on it from outside: instead, it makes the action what it is. Properly understood in terms of the relevant acts of a rational subject, the thesis is defensible and philosophically attractive. Furthermore, it helps us understand the continuity and discontinuity that exists between the motions of human beings and those of other animals, as Aristotle showed. (shrink)

A continuación se plantean las bases epistemológicas de un modelo que busca explicar y guiar el tratamiento informativo de los conflictos en la prensa. El aporte teórico parte del discurso; desde el lenguaje y hacia el lenguaje. Se recomienda el estudio de las estrategias lingüístico-comunicativas q..

Esta es una época de revueltas, pero ya no de revoluciones. ¿Ya no o aún no? Depende también seguramente de nuestras imágenes de lo que es una revolución.Hay mil prácticas cotidianas de transformación social, movimientos y luchas muy importantes, otras maneras de pensar lo político. Pero suceden a veces sin lenguajes y formas propias, bajo el umbral de algunas imágenes congeladas del pasado: la vanguardia consciente, organizada en Partido, al asalto del Palacio de Invierno.Ese desacople entre imágenes y prácticas, entre (...) lenguajes y experiencias, es una de las razones del actual "impasse" de la política de emancipación: el capital conquista día a día nuevas capas del ser, barriendo las medidas puramente reactivas y defensivas. ¿Cómo se para?Tomar la iniciativa, una nueva ofensiva, pasa por afirmar otras imágenes de cambio, por "reconcebir la revolución". (shrink)

Más allá del principio del poder es el título de la contribución de Derrida al homenaje a Foucault, que realizó la Universidad de New York tras la muerte del filósofo. Acerca de su contenido trata este pequeño ensayo. En su intervención, Derrida pone en relación las ideas de Freud y las de Foucault, con las suyas propias, a propósito de la relación entre saber, poder y sexualidad.Su objetivo final es hacer hablar, pero al mismo tiempo acallar la voluntad de destrucción, (...) encontrando la forma de imponer la vida a la muerte, aún en la misma muerte y más allá de la muerte. Este es el imposible que ha de imponerse a la voluntad de destrucción del otro, a la persistente búsqueda de su absoluta sumisión aniquiladora, que conllevaría a su vez el aniquilamiento del verdugo. (shrink)

El proceso de atención de enfermería es la aplicación del método científico en la práctica asistencial de la disciplina, de modo que se pueda ofrecer cuidados sistematizados, lógicos y racionales. El artículo que presentamos tiene como objetivo describir un sistema de acciones y operaciones para desarrollar la habilidad diagnosticar en el proceso de atención de enfermería y ser aplicado en la docencia de manera que contribuya en la calidad del egresado. A partir del análisis del perfil profesional y del grado (...) de desarrollo científico-técnico alcanzado y su relación con la identificación de los problemas que constituyen la base del plan de cuidados en el proceso de atención de enfermería se estructuran las acciones y operaciones con una secuencia lógica para llegar al diagnóstico. The process of nursing primary health care is the application of the scientific method in the assistencial practice of this discipline in such a way that it can offer systematic, logical and rational care. The present article has the objective to describe a system of actions and procedures to develop the ability of diagnosing in the process of nursery primary health care and be applied in teaching to favour the increasement of the egressed quality. Actions and procedures have been structured with a logical secuence to reach the diagnosing, starting with the analysis of the professional profile, the level of scientific and technical development reached and its relation with the identification of problems that constitute the base of the patient plan of care in the process of nursery primary health care. (shrink)

In this article are treated, in general strokes, the methodological foundations of the Diccionario de conceptos políticos y sociales de la España de los siglos XIX y XX which has been published recently under the direction of the above mentioned editors. This dictionary in which nearly 200 authors of different Spanish universities and centres of research have collaborated collects more than 100 articles. It is partly inspired by the German Begriffsgeschichte. Its editors, however, have also taken into account the contribution (...) of the famous school of Cambridge by adapting the influences of several methodological currents to the specific claims of their work, i. e. to the elaboration of a dictionary which, on the basis of a huge volume of sources, pretends to cartograph, in an alphabetical order, the principal ideological lines – the discoursive and conceptual ones – of the Spanish 19th century. The article ends with a discussion of certain difficulties and aspects which are treated controversally in the intellectual history. It also claims to give a reflexion on the suitability and meaning which can – in the actual situation of the social sciences – pretend to determine the studies of political languages, especially the basic essays concerning the comparative history of political and social thinking under a conceptual perspective. (shrink)

A veces suceden cosas altamente traumáticas que cambian drásticamente nuestra vida, intuitivamente pensamos que ante tales circunstancias nos encontramos indefensos y que nuestra vida debe cambiar para peor, pero no necesariamente es así. Desde el siglo XIX en que surge el interés por el concepto de trauma, se entiende éste como una experiencia psicológicamente extrema, desbordante y desestabilizadora para cualquier persona. Las reacciones serían crisis de ansiedad, sintomatología depresiva e incluso cuadros de estrés postraumático.

Understanding how the chordate body plan originated and evolved is still controversial. The discovery by Spemann and Mangold in 1924 of the vertebrate organizer and its inductive properties in patterning the AP and DV axis was followed by a long gap until the 1960s when scientists started characterizing the molecular events responsible for such inductions. However, the evolutionary origin of the organizer itself remained obscure until very recently; did it appear together with the origin and radiation of vertebrates, or was (...) it a chordate affair? A recent study by Yu and collaborators,1 which analyses the expression of several organizer‐specific genes in amphioxus together with recent phylogenetic data that reversed the position of invertebrate extant chordates (e.g. urochordates and cephalochordates), indicates that the organizer probably appeared in early chordates. It likely had separate signalling centres generating BMP and Wnt signalling gradients along the DV and AP axis. The organizer was then lost in the urochordate lineage, most probably as an adaptation to a rapid and determinate development. BioEssays 29:619–624, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

To advance the task of designing robots capable of performing collective tasks with humans, studies in human–robot interaction often turn to psychology, philosophy of mind and neuroscience for inspiration. In the same vein, this chapter explores how the notion of recognition and commitment can help confront some of the current problems in addressing robot-human interaction in joint tasks. First, we argue that joint actions require mutual recognition, which cannot be established without the attribution and maintenance of commitments. Second, we argue (...) that commitments require affective states such as social motivations or shared emotions. Finally, we conclude by assessing three possible proposals for how social robotics could implement an architecture of commitments by taking such an affective components into consideration. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to uncover some of the limitations that critical contextual empiricism, and in particular Longino's contextualism, faces when trying to provide a normative account of scientific knowledge that is relevant to current scientific research. After presenting the four norms of effective criticism, I show how the norms have limited scope when dealing with cases of current scientific practices. I then present some historical evidence for the claim that the organization of science has changed in recent (...) decades, and I argue that the uncovered limitations emerge from this larger phenomenon. Finally, I conclude by suggesting two ways to overcome the previously uncovered limitations. (shrink)

El autor realiza una lectura en clave perspectivista de la neurofenomenología, enfoque transdisciplinar y metodológico iniciado a mediados de los 90 por el neurobiólogo Francisco J. Varela desde el ámbito experimental de las ciencias de la mente. La originalidad del artículo reside en que estudia comparativamente el problemático entrecruce de la neurofenomenología de Varela con el perspectivismo científico de Ronald N. Giere, mostrándonos que la neurofenomenología no sólo lo antecedió cronológicamente, sino que fue mucho más radical al tener en cuenta (...) la la dimensión fenomenológica y trascendental de la experiencia vivida humana y al aplicarla en los protocolos de las neurociencias cognitivas. // The author makes a perspectivist reading of neurophenomenology, a transdisciplinary and methodological approach pioneered in the 90’s by the neurobiologist Francisco J. Varela, who worked in the experimental field of the science of mind. The originality of the article consists in studying with a comparative method the problematic intertwine of Varela’s neurophenomenology and the scientific perspectivism recently defended by Ronald N. Giere. In this way, the autor shows how neurophenomenology notonly came before Giere’s proposal but also how it was more radical in considering the phenomenological and transcendental human dimension and in trying an implementation in cognitive neuroscience protocols. (shrink)

In this chapter, we explain how Karl Jaspers’ concept of empathy can be expanded by drawing upon the tradition of philosophical phenomenology. In the first section, we offer an account of Jaspers' concepts of empathy and incomprehensibility as he develops them in General Psychopathology and “The Phenomenological Approach in Psychopathology.” In the second section, we survey the recent literature on overcoming Jaspers' notion of incomprehensibility and expanding his concept of empathy. In the third section, we outline the levels of investigation (...) at which phenomenological inquiries into psychopathology may proceed. These levels of human existence are, in descending order of depth, (1) phenomenal experiences, (2) interpretive frameworks, (3) modes of existence, and (4) existentials. In the fourth and final section, we argue that to fully empathically comprehend patients with schizophrenia and other mental disorders, the possibility of alterations at all four levels of existence must be acknowledged. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This article analyzes Claude McKay's last novel, Amiable with Big Teeth—recently discovered in 2017—as a piece of postcolonial utopianist writing. The novel participates in an important debate on the role of utopias and utopian writing as ideological mechanisms that perpetuate colonial structures such as the nation-state. Through a critique of the Popular Front project in the black community of 1930s Harlem, Amiable with Big Teeth vindicates local knowledges and the assessment of the specific conditions of the present—ever-changing and transformable—in the (...) development of strategies for resistance. As such, the spiritual role of Ethiopia for the community depicted, rather than constitute yet another national utopia, fulfills the same role as it did for the Jamaican Rastafarians: it is a mechanism for group self-assertion and the promotion of self-esteem that subaltern communities need in order to achieve full agency. (shrink)

This essay explores some concerns about the quality of informed consent in patients whose autonomy is diminished by fatal illness. It argues that patients with diminished autonomy cannot give free and voluntary consent, and that recruitment of such patients as subjects in human experimentation exploits their vulnerability in a morally objectionable way. Two options are given to overcome this objection: (i) recruit only those patients who desire to contribute to medical knowledge, rather than gain access to experimental treatment, or (ii) (...) provide prospective subjects the choice to participate in standard doubleblind study or receive the experimental treatment. Either option would guarantee that patients in desperate conditions are given a more meaningful choice and a richer freedom, and thus a higher quality of informed consent, than under standard randomized trials. (shrink)

En este artículo se esboza un mapa fenomenológico de la afectividad a partir de la clasificación propuesta por Scheler en la que se distingue el "percibir afectivo" (Fühlen), que es intencional y tiene por objeto los valores, y los "estados sentimentales" (Gefühlszustände), que carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo. Las clásicas emociones se inscriben en los estados sentimentales divididas en dos grupos: las "respuestas afectivas" y las "meras emociones" (las "reacciones de respuesta emocionales" [emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen'] y las "emociones" (...) [Affekte], en terminología scheleriana). Las respuestas afectivas carecen de la intencionalidad estricta del percibir afectivo, pero poseen una "intencionalidad secundaria" que es correcta por adecuarse al percibir afectivo; en las meras emociones la intencionalidad secundaria es incorrecta o llega incluso a desaparecer. This article outlines a phenomenological map of affectivity, based on the classification proposed by Scheler. Two faculties are distinguished: "affective perception" (Fühlen) -which is intentional and aims to values- and "emotional states" (Gefühlszustände) -which lack the strict intentionality of affective perception-. Classic emotions are included in emotional states and divided into two groups: "affective responses" and "mere emotions" (emotionale 'Antwortsreaktionen' and Affekte in Scheler's terminology). Affective responses lack the strict intentionality of affective perception but possess a "secondary intentionality" which is "right" due to its adequacy to affective perception; in mere emotions the secondary intentionality is "unright" or even disappears. (shrink)