I call illocutionary externalism (IE) the approach to the study of illocutionary force that I favor. IE is inspired by Austin's seminal ideas on performatives and speech acts. According to IE, in the analysis of a paradigmatic illocutionary force we must essentially mention some aspects of the social and natural environment that cannot be reduced to the (de dicto) speakers' mental states, no matter how these are individuated. A difficult problem for IE derives from the possibility of making explicit the (...) force of an utterance. This fact invites us to focus our attention on the utterer (the person who makes the force explicit) and his mental states (illocutionary intentions), and to support a mentalist approach in the study of forces. In this article I shall argue for the compatibility of IE with the phenomenon of the explicitability of illocutionary force. (shrink)

In this essential rereading of Spinoza's (1632-1677) philosophical and political writings, Negri positions this thinker within the historical context of the development of the modern state and its attendant political economy.

The study of Buddhist texts can inform us of the way scriptures were composed, as well as illuminate the reasons behind their production. This study examines the phenomenon of borrowing and reusing portions of texts without attributing them to their ‘legitimate authors’ within the Buddhist world of contemporary Tibet. It shows that not only is such a practice not at all infrequent and is often socially accepted, but that it is used in this case as a platform to advance specific (...) claims and promote an explicit agenda. Therefore, rather than considering these as instances of plagiarism, this essay looks at the practice of copying and borrowing as an exercise in intertextuality, intended as the faithful retransmission of ancient truths, and as an indication of the public domain of texts in Tibet. (shrink)

Recent neuro-psychoanalytic literature has emphasized the view that our subjective identity rests on ancient subcortical neuro-psychic processes expressing unthinking forms of experience, which are “affectively intense without being known” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012). Devoid of internal representations, the emotional states of our “core-Self” (Panksepp, 1998b) are entirely “projected” towards the external world and tend to be discharged through instinctual action-patterns. However, due to the close connections between the subcortical and the cortical midline brain, the emotional drives may also find a (...) way to be reflected within an intrinsic self-referential processing, evident when the organism is not actively engaged with the external world. Thanks to such endogenous functioning, the core-Self emotional dispositions are not overtly executed, but they are organized within coherent dynamic mental structures, called “feeling-toned complexes” by C.G. Jung and “unconscious phantasies” by Melanie Klein. The intrinsic self-referential dynamism of the ‘brainmind’ originated from REM sleep arousal and then evolved in the resting-state activity of a complex of cortico-limbic midline brain structures (CMS), also called Default Mode Network (DMN). From our neuro-ethological perspective, it is sustained by an “introverted” SEEKING activity leading to the subjective exploration of internally constructed virtual scenarios. This “mind wandering” function, implicated in dreaming, fantasy processing, remembering and thinking, is the essence of the imaginative function and constitutes the first form of reflection, where intentions and drives gain a primordial form of conscious (but not self-conscious) representation. During postnatal development, this original (“archetypal”) imaginative function is slowly attuned in a relational “transitional” space and may be expressed first in non-verbal and eventually in abstract-verbal social communicative patterns. Our view has noticeable implications for psychotherapy. Instead of trying to directly modify interpersonal, extrinsic relationships (a top-down approach), dysfunctional emotional-relational patterns may be modified by a process in which the patient is helped to let-go of the perceived feeling-objects in favor of an immersion, via the actual feeling, from the superficial level of perception towards a void feeling-state, empty of images. Only starting from this “anoetic” feeling-state, the deep imaginal creative and re-structuring self-referential activity may be reactivated by a process of spontaneous imagination. (shrink)

die besagten Begriffe zunachst als synonyme Bezeichnungen fUr die Methode der Philosophie betrachtet werden konnen. Erst am Ende der Abhandlung zeichnet sich die Moglichkeit einer Bedeutungstren nung zwischen EpocM und Reduktion ab - allerdings nicht mehr ganz im Sinne HusserIs. Die Aufgabe, Philosophie als absolute Wissenschaft zu begriinden, ist fUr HusserI im Grunde das Problem der Gewinnung eines Ver fahrens, durch das der sich philosophisch Besinnende die absolute Ge wiBheit erIangt, daB er im Gang seiner Besinnungen keine ungepriif ten, unkritisch (...) hingenommenen Erkenntnisse voraussetzt, kein Vorur teil mitgelten laBt, das die wissenschaftliche Reinheit des gedanklichen Gebaudes zerstOren wiirde. DaB die Philosophie es bisher nicht fertig gebracht hat, sich als solche absolut gerechtfertigte Wissenschaft zu konstituieren, bezeugt fUr HusserI ihre Unfahigkeit, in voller Radika litat alle Voraussetzungen aus dem Wege zu raumen, die der Voraus setzungslosigkeit einer absoluten Wissenschaft im Wege stehen. Ihrem eingeborenen Telos der Letztverantwortung hat die Philosophie nie gerecht werden konnen, obschon in ihrer Geschichte zu alIer Zeit ein Streben, eine intentio auf dieses ihr Ziel der absoluten Reinheit hin wirksam war. Diese intentio war stets die "Motivation", der "Ent wicklungstrieb" des philosophischen Denkens: "In einigen Philoso phien zeitweilig relativ befriedigt, und doch nie letztbefriedigt, wird die Philosophie zu immer neuen methodischen Besinnungen fortgetrieben; sie nimmt immer neue methodische Gestalten an und kommt dabei doch nie zu Ende. (shrink)

San Isidoro de Sevilla destaca por poseer un saber universal. Esta universalidad de su saber también es expresada en su reflexión sobre el ministerio sacerdotal. A través de una triple aproximación «teológica», «pastoral» y «espiritual», invita a los obispos y presbíteros a vivir su ministerio de una forma «eclesial», «virtuosa» y «santa».

Este artículo muestra que el arte es para Cassirer una forma simbólica, no una copia de la realidad. La forma simbólica representauna peculiar síntesis entre un elemento sensible y un significado,de manera que el significado no existe al margen de la formasimbólica, sino que es ella misma. Por esta razón el símbolo provocaa pensar constantemente. El símbolo funda el sentido.Aquellacapacidad simbólica de síntesis es el poder de la metáfora. Lasformas simbólicas son formas del pensamiento metafórico. El arte,como modelo perfecto de (...) esa síntesis, es también modelo de pensamientometafórico, y por eso la obra de arte no puede ser sustituidapor filosofía. (shrink)

La construcción de la Fenomenología del espíritu de Hegel se vio afectada por la naciente conciencia histórica postilustrada, y por la historicidad de la razón que Hegel elabora allí. El contraste entre el final de la «Introducción» y el final del «Saber absoluto» deja ver que Hegel ofreció al final de la obra algo de lo que anunciaba al principio. Lo que se le abre al «yo» del final de la Introducción cuando llega al saber absoluto no es sólo el (...) sistema de la ciencia, sino la historia contingente organizada en la ciencia del saber que aparece. Se propone finalmente leer esta historicidad de la conciencia como aguda conciencia del presente. (shrink)

Although Aristotle attributes to metaphor - as an instrument that makes poetic imitation possible to the highest degree - an important function, he does not arrive at the conclusion that the essence of poetics is the metaphor. This is due, on the one hand, to the almost total identification of the poem with the tragedy, showing little interest in what we consider lyric poetry; on the other hand, for the little attention given to religious poetry. If the Stagirite had analyzed (...) these genres, he would have discovered that both have in common the attempt to express the ineffable. Metaphor is the privileged tool to talk about something that we can not conceptualize, because it is partially unknown to us - subjectivity - or because this reality (the divine) transcends all kinds of sensible experience. Hence, the metaphor becomes not only an analogical knowledge of sensible reality, but also communication of ineffable realities. (shrink)

This paper argues that though Derrida is correct to bring to the fore the undecidability that is contained in his political notion of the democracy to come, his account does not extend the aporia of undecidable politics far enough. Derrida himself makes evident this gap. Though politics may be structured with undecidability, there are times when direct, decisive and definitive political interventions are required. In his campaign against capital punishment, the blitzing campaigns in Bosnia and Iraq, and in his call (...) for les villes-refuges, Derrida makes decisive appeals which somehow seem to contradict the undecidability he sees as arch-structuring. Alain Badiou’s thinking about time as a subjective, decisive intervention executed within his ontological framework of undecidability and multiplicity can serve to extend the aporia of undecidability inherent in politics, ultimately giving an account for both the undecidability that structures politics and the decisive timely interventions that would seem to contradict Derridean undecidability. (shrink)