In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking by Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. UmbelDallas J. GinglesBonhoeffer the Assassin? Challenging the Myth, Recovering His Call to Peacemaking Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel grand rapids, mi: baker academic, 2013. 272 pp. $29.99In their new book Bonhoeffer the Assassin?, Mark Thiessen Nation, Anthony (...) G. Siegrist, and Daniel P. Umbel painstakingly reread primary texts in order to challenge the widely held belief that Dietrich Bonhoeffer participated in an attempt to assassinate Adolf Hitler. Their alternative to the usual narrative of Bonhoeffer’s life holds that early in his career, long before the crisis of the Confessing Church and the rise of Nazism, Bonhoeffer made a commitment to [End Page 205] Christian pacifism that endured even through the war years and his resistance to Hitler.To argue for this alternative telling, the authors analyze Bonhoeffer’s three main “ethical” texts: the early “Barcelona lectures,” Discipleship, and finally Ethics. On their telling, while the early ethics lectures were theologically deficient, by the time that Bonhoeffer wrote Discipleship he had developed “integration,” which was “the primary theological catalyst for the ethical transition from Barcelona to Discipleship” (129). Discipleship is, they conclude, the pinnacle of Bonhoeffer’s thought, and anything that comes after it, including Ethics, cannot in any fundamental way differ from it.Alongside this diachronic analysis of Bonhoeffer’s main ethics texts, the authors emphasize two letters that Bonhoeffer wrote in 1935 and 1936. In the first, Bonhoeffer asserts that, because of his theology, he is “sometimes perceived as fanatical” (223). The second he wrote describing his “conversion experience” in 1930, in relation to the Sermon on the Mount and “Christian pacifism.” Read singly, these letters are interesting examples of Bonhoeffer’s thought and life of faith. As the authors present the argument, though, the letters comprise a unified narrative and function as an interpretive lens by which the primary texts should be understood. They think that the “fanaticism” of the first letter refers to the faith brought about in the conversion experience described in the second. The “fanaticism” letter is important because in it he asserts that, “if he were to become more ‘reasonable,’ he would have to ‘chuck [his] entire theology’” (223).Because Bonhoeffer wrote that he would have to “chuck” his theology if he made it more “reasonable,” the authors think that the theology that emerged from the conversion experience has a foundational role in his later works. Whatever Bonhoeffer wrote in Ethics, then, simply cannot disagree with the “fanaticism” that “is most fully articulated in … Discipleship” (223). Because of the importance of the “Christian pacifism” of the conversion and Discipleship, it is thus impossible—or at least highly unlikely—that Bonhoeffer participated in the assassination attempts.Bonhoeffer scholars and nonspecialists alike will find this text provocative and interesting. The conclusions, though, are finally unconvincing. For the authors, the “conversion experience” is the central key to understanding Bonhoeffer, and it is clear that they understand “Christian pacifism” to be of primary importance in the conversion, but they never tell us to what variety of Christian pacifism Bonhoeffer converted. It is very likely that Bonhoeffer’s Christian pacifism was different in kind than the Christian pacifism that the authors seem to endorse. That anachronistic reading alone renders the conclusions of the text suspect.Apart from simple historical questions, the methodology the authors use to construct their hermeneutical lens is also problematic. It is difficult to submit [End Page 206] Bonhoeffer’s entire corpus to two earlier letters that he wrote a full year apart. While readers may understand and agree that Bonhoeffer was not, in reality, an assassin (the minor claim), it will be hard to convince readers of the impassibility of his “Christian pacifism” (the major claim).Dallas J. GinglesSouthern Methodist UniversityCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople’s resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk (...) sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs. (shrink)

If emotion is not an arbitrary compilation of fixed types of (descriptive, conceptual, conative, prescriptive) content, nor a state that can be reduced to other types of pre-existing (perceptual, cognitive, behavioral) states, then what sort of thing is it really? Tom Cochrane has proposed that emotions are valent representations of situated concerns. Valent representation is a type of mental content whose function is to detect the presence or absence of certain conditions; what makes that type of content valent is that (...) without needing the mediation of any other state, a response is triggered that is disposed to increase or decrease the presence of the condition represented. I raise doubts about the plausibility of that account in light of recent work in philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This paper reviews the recent history of a subset of research in dynamical cognitive science, in particular that subset that allies itself with the sciences of complexity and casts cognitive systems as interaction dominant, noncomputational, and nonmodular. I look at this history in the light of C.S. Peirce's understanding of scientific reasoning as progressing from abduction to deduction to induction. In particular, I examine the development of a controversy concerning the use of the interaction dominance of human cognitive systems as (...) an explanation of the ubiquitous 1/f noise, multifractality, and complexity matching in human behavior. (shrink)

Two notable limitations exist on the use of personhood arguments in establishing moral status. Firstly, although the attribution of personhood may give us sufficient reason to grant something moral status, it is not a necessary condition. Secondly, even if a person is that which has the ‘highest’ moral status, this does not mean that any interests of a person are justifiable grounds to kill something that has a ‘lower’ moral status. Additional justification is needed to overcome a basic wrongness associated (...) with killing something possessing moral status. There are clear arguments already available in this regard in the case of a foetus that are not available in the case of a newborn infant. Hence, there is scope to consistently hold that abortion may be permissible but that after-birth abortion may not be permissible. (shrink)

In both The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics, W. D. Ross maintains that any amount of the non-instrumental value of virtue outweighs any amount of the non-instrumental value of pleasure or avoidance of pain. The chapter raises two challenges to the status that Ross accords the value of virtue relative to the value of pleasure (pain). First, it argues that Ross fails to provide a good argument for thinking that virtue is always better than pleasure and that (...) it is in any case implausible to think that any amount of virtue (or avoidance of vice) is better than the avoidance of any amount of pain or suffering. Second, it argues that the inflexibility of Ross’s value theory exhibited in his claim about the relative value of virtue produces tension with and mars the attractive heterarchical structure of his theory of rightness or prima facie duties. (shrink)

According to internalism about prudential value, the token states of affairs that are basically good for you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your positive attitudes. It is commonly thought that any theory of welfare that implies internalism is guaranteed to respect the alienation constraint, the doctrine that you cannot be alienated from that which is basically good for you. The assumption is that because internalism requires a necessary connection between a subject’s positive attitudes and each state (...) of basic benefit to that subject, theories that imply internalism will only postulate goods that resonate with the subject. In this paper, I show that extant formulations of internalism do not have this desirable feature. The central defect of traditional formulations is that they do not respect an important but overlooked truth about alienation: namely, that even if a state of affairs is suitably connected to your positive attitudes, your negative attitudes can nonetheless render you alienated from it. By taking into account the relevance of the negative attitudes, I propose the new internalism—the view that x is basically good for you only if you have a net positive attitude towards it—as a way to advance our thinking about what is required to avoid alienating theories of welfare. (shrink)

Several philosophers have suggested that certain aspects of people’s experience of agency partly explains why people tend to report that it seems to them, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. In turn, it has been suggested that people come to believe that time robustly passes on the basis of its seeming to them in experience that it does. We argue that what require explaining is not just that people report that it seems to them as though time robustly (...) passes, and that they believe that it does, but rather, the substantial variation (a) in people’s reports regarding whether it seems as though time robustly passes, and (b) their beliefs about whether time robustly passes. We empirically investigate the agentive explanation of (a), according to which variation in people’s agentive experiences explains variation in people’s reports regarding whether it seems to them as though time robustly passes. We also empirically investigate the experiential seeming explanation of belief, according to which variation in people’s beliefs about whether time robustly passes is explained by variation in their reports regarding whether it seems in experience as though time robustly passes. We found empirical support for the agentive explanation, but not for the experiential seeming explanation of passage beliefs. We consider the implications of our results for three views about temporal experience and temporal beliefs: dynamism, passage illusionism and deflationism. (shrink)

Over the last three decades, social theory has become an increasingly important subdiscipline within sociology. Social theory has attempted to elucidate the philosophical basis of sociology by defining the nature of social reality. According to social theory, society consists of objective institutions, structure, on the one hand, and individuals, agency on the other, it promotes human social relations, insisting that in every instance social reality consists of these relations.

John Rawls's form of constructivism can easily be ramped up into a fullblown metaethics. In this chapter, the author explores an alternative interpretive framework, which basically inverts the roles that the construction of the original position and the reliance on reflective equilibrium play in Rawls's argument. The author sketches out the basic contours of Rawls's thinking if we treat constructivism as his method for theory construction and reflective equilibrium as his metaethics. Metaethics is clearly a part of moral philosophy outside (...) of moral theory. At every major turn in the articulation of Rawls's theory there is a new or more developed account of reflective equilibrium and in particular its justificatory role in the theory. Giving one's argument a form that allows it to more easily appeal to a particular audience, is the job of rhetoric. So it turns out that constructivism is not a metaethical position, but a rhetorical strategy. (shrink)

It has been proposed that performance in the think – no think task represents a laboratory analogue of the voluntary form of memory repression. The central prediction of this repression hypothesis is that performance in the TNT task will be influenced by emotional characteristics of the material to be remembered. This prediction was tested in two experiments by asking participants to learn paired associates in which the first item was either emotionally positive or emotionally negative . The second word was (...) always emotionally neutral . Consistent with the repression hypothesis, significant memory suppression was observed in both experiments following ‘no think’ instructions for memories associated with emotionally negative material. No suppression was observed for memories associated with emotionally positive information. Implications of these findings for the relationship between performance in the TNT task and the controversial notion of memory repression are considered. (shrink)

This article addresses a tendency within postcolonial studies to place the work of Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon in opposition. This has obscured the real, and potentially very productive, similarities between them. The most important of these links has to do with their shared critique of the sovereign subject of humanism: for Fanon and Foucault, this critique of the traditional humanist subject provides a way of opposing what they both see as the dangerous nostalgia for a lost moment of origin. (...) Furthermore, Fanon and Foucault both end in a moment of ethics, but it is an ethics without the sort of stable subjects assumed by humanism. I offer a consideration of some of the links that can be found in several texts by Fanon and Foucault. I then attempt to define the term I will be using to describe their shared strategy of an ethics without subjects: the “humanism effect.” I conclude by trying to suggest some of the strategic possibilities of an ethics without subjects in the postcolonial context. (shrink)

National identity is often cited as a contributing factor to many of the world's worst trouble spots, for example the troubles in Israel, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. This book addresses the issue of how national identity differs from racial, ethnic and regional identity.

The book’s argument divides into three parts. In the first, Wellman sets out an account of legal rights, and then uses it to work out an account of nonlegal institutional rights and noninstitutional moral rights. The second focuses on the question of whether various alleged right-holders are possible right-holders. The third then turns to conflicts of both rights and duties, and argues, on the basis of the conclusions of the first two parts, that although some conflicts between rights are real, (...) many supposed conflicts can be dissolved once we recognize that one of the rights is unreal or is limited in some way. Because most of the controversial argumentative work is done in the first two sections, I will focus on them. (shrink)

Theories of rational choice focus on the question of how to choose what to do. They are, that is, concerned with the selection of one among a set of possible actions. Furthermore, they tell us how to make such a choice rationally. They accomplish this aspect of their task by telling us how to choose ‘in order to achieve our aims as well as possible.’Theories of reasonable deliberation, as I describe them in this paper, analyze a different domain of reasoning (...) in the service of action. First, their subject matter is the deliberation that leads to action, rather than the final selection of the action itself. Second, they ask about the intrinsic character of a deliberative path, rather than its likely outcome. That is, they are theories of the reasonableness of deliberation, rather than its rationality. To see the distinctiveness of this theoretical domain, it helps to approach it by backing away from the domain of rational choice theories one step at a time. (shrink)

Based on the communication ethics of Ptahhotep and other inclusivist communication value systems, including several additional non-Western (Confucian, Buddhist, Aborigine, Cree, San, Māori, Ubuntu, and Islamic) as well as Western ones (Stoic, Christian, Kantian, socialist, liberal, and journalistic), we propose seven principles as common ground for the future regulation of media communication on a global scale. All seven are formulated in a manner similar to Ptahhotep’s, providing a flexible range of norms allowing, for example, hate speech to be dealt with (...) by criminalization, or in civil law, or by means of ethics rules and self-regulation, depending on the severity of the involved threats to humanity, to human beings, or to other core values. We reject an often-paralyzing comparative intercultural juxtaposition of individualism versus collectivism, instead suggesting an inclusivist and interculturally principled common ground for the regulation of communication. (shrink)

L’édition de l’ Histoire du marxisme n’aura pas lieu en France. Pourtant le projet que mena à bien Einaudi en Italie au tournant des années 1970-1980 était un projet franco-italien, et même international, impliquant entre autres Eric Hobsbawm et Perry Anderson, qui garderont une rancœur tenace envers leurs homologues français. Cet article retrace, archives et entretiens à l’appui, la généalogie de ce projet avorté, voire, à tout croire, sabordé. La réalité est plus nuancée, et impose de tenir compte des stratégies (...) fluctuantes d’acteurs institutionnels, du monde de l’édition et de l’université, au gré des modes parisiennes, des opportunités culturelles, et des adversités politiques en France et dans l’espace international. Une attention particulière est portée aux dilemmes des acteurs individuels, portant ou bloquant ce projet, d’abord Lucien Goldmann et ses réseaux européens de théoriciens critiques (École de Francfort, gramsciens, humanistes d’Europe de l’Est), puis Pierre Nora, François Furet, Jacques Le Goff avec une équipe d’historiens internationaux, tournée vers les États-Unis, d’Arno Mayer à Moshe Lewin. (shrink)

This study examines J.S. Sanni’s argument on the role of religion in promoting silence and extortion in contemporary African (Nigerian) society, leveraging on the name of God, with a view to determining the strengths and weaknesses of this argument. Sanni posits that religion (Christianity and Islam) have played crucial roles in promoting silence and extortion in Africa, with particular reference to Nigeria. He argues that the colonial debris of disempowerment, injustices, manipulation and extortion, using the instrumentality of religion, are still (...) very much part of African society today. According to him, the above manipulations, extortions and injustices, perpetrated by the colonial masters on African societies using the tool of religion, is still very much part of the contemporary African society and have only assumed new outlooks and language and consequently plunged many Africans into silence in the face of what is often presented as sacred and holy. The study examines the strengths and weaknesses of this argument. The paper adopts historical hermeneutics and textual analysis methods. (shrink)

The author argues that the distinctive aspects of political liberalism have historical roots in the republican tradition that is often described as “neo-roman,” and recently given articulation in the work of Q. Skinner and P. Pettit. The primary task of this paper will be to layout these correlations, to provide, as it were, a mapping between the vocabulary of the neo-roman theory and that of political liberalism. By tracing the genealogy of political liberalism, the author argues that we ought to (...) rethink the history, the vocabulary, and conceptual framework of contemporary political philosophy. In particular, seeing political liberalism as a form of republican theory as well as a form of liberal theory changes how we understand it: it brings out certain distinctive features of the structure of the view that are often overlooked, such as its stress on certain civic duties and its conception of freedom as a freedom of the city. If leading republican and liberal thinkers turn out to have much in common, then we will have to rethink also our intellectual geography: we will have to sketch in some land-bridges between the continents. (shrink)

Collective action occurs when people voluntarily join with one another for obtaining collective goods, such as rights and equality, that institutions fail to provide or bloc them from getting. Collective action has to overcome obstacles due to free riding, recruitment, participation, costs of organizing, and social control by the opposition. Collective actions range from episodic protests and hostile crowds to sustained social movements and civil strife.Collective action theory in the tradition of methodological individualism assumes that individuals make adaptive decisions under (...) uncertainty, contingent on expectations about the decisions of peers, opponents and bystanders. The four key variables of participation are number of participants, costs of participation, the value of the collective good, and the production function for different tactics and modes of contestation.The reduction of uncertainty is achieved by strategies of resource mobilization, selective incentives, solidarity, bloc mobilization, political opportunity, shared culture, mass media effects, signaling of information, and pace setter-follower diffusion dynamics. The theory explains unconventional political and social advocacy in democratic and autocratic regimes, from routine politics, strikes, demonstrations, hostile crowds to social movements and other modes of confrontation. (shrink)

One might wonder whether the essence of love involves self-transcendence. If it does, then philosophers who speak of self-love could not really be addressing love at all. Perhaps they address a related phenomenon, maybe even a good, positive reality, but not love itself. Since St. Thomas Aquinas speaks to the legitimacy of the love of self, philosophers who argue the essence of love involves self-transcendence criticize the scholastic’s position. This is the exact criticism Dietrich von Hildebrand advances in The Nature (...) of Love. This paper defends Aquinas against von Hildebrand’s suggestion that “self-love” is not really love at all. I will argue that, based on both natural and supernatural principles, Aquinas’s notion of the love of self, as far as it relates to the love of God, involves transcendence. (shrink)

Agamben’s self-professed epigonism underwrites his entire project, serving as an even more fundamental methodological concept than the signature, paradigm, and archeology. In Infancy and History, Agamben maintains that transcendental experience is no longer a viable source of philosophical insight; philosophers go astray referring their thinking back to an authentic yet esoteric experience that, itself unspeakable, grounds positive philosophical assertions. Neither mysterious nor ineffable, the experience founding philosophy is the completely patent, non-latent, experience of language’s pure exteriority. Rather than “deconstructing” metaphysics (...) by exposing its hidden contradictions, philosophy must “deconfabulate,” telling fables about philosophy to undo its enchantments, since it is through the fable that the spell of silence, which itself originates in fable, can be broken. This “epigonal” method, which follows after the tradition rather than seeking a new grounding, is itself justified through Agamben’s account, in The End of the Poem, of the Italian, as opposed to Germanic, physiognomy and of a specifically Italian relation to language going back to Dante. To be Italian is to embrace the “deadness” of one’s own language, rejecting the myth of the resurrection of the original potencies of a dead classical language through a living, modern language. (shrink)

Leadership in Education, Corrections and Law Enforcement: A Commitment to Ethics, Equity and Excellence fills a unique gap in the knowledge base - the juncture between leadership, ethics, law, and how public institutions/organizations understand and practice the essence of all three. Authors from law enforcement, corrections education, and educational leadership present different yet overlapping constructs around ethics and law, and make an important step towards reconciling these differing views to demonstrate the significance of collaboration and partnerships for a common purpose.

The concept of structure is central to Giddens’s structuration theory because it apparently accounts for the reproduction of the social system without derogating the lay actor in functionalist or structuralist fashion. In fact, the concept of structure involves the very derogation of the lay actor which Giddens highlights as the principal error of these objectivist social theories and which he wishes to avoid. However, although Giddens fails to recognize it, the concept of “practical consciousness” which Giddens also regards as central (...) to structuration theory avoids this relapse into objectivism and offers a route to a sustainable social theory which highlights the agency of social actors. (shrink)

This paper examines the concepts of desert and luck, familiar in political theory but neglected by sociologists. I argue that the idea of desert is composed of both personal performance and the degree of responsibility a person has over that performance. Distribution ought to be in accordance with the indebtedness created by the person's performance. This can be compromised by luck; that is, personal desert is undermined where lack of performance scuttles the applicability of the contributory model. This paper examines (...) recent work, focusing on establishing desert criteria for each person's ends and life‐plans, and a formula for distribution according to personal welfare. (shrink)

Two types of interleukin 1 (IL‐1α and IL‐1β) have been defined by purifying the molecules from activated human peripheral blood cells, followed by cloning and expressing the molecules in Escherichia coli. Both types of IL‐1 stimulate proliferation and differentiation of T‐ and B‐lymphocytes and induce cartilage proteoglycan degradation but differ in other properties. For example, demineralization and appears to be a major mediator in the pathogenesis of joint erosion in rheumatoid arthritis. Synthetic adjuvants elicit the production of IL‐1 separate from (...) endogenous pyrogen, and this property is required for the new generation of vaccines based on antigens produced by recombinant DNA technology. (shrink)

It is often argued that associations are intelligent organisms with minds and intentional states of their own. It is also argued that groups are merely a plurality of individuals who are related or associated only in a specific and limited sense. This paper draws on both classical and contemporary scholarship to develop an ontological account of persons which has real-world legal and ethical implications.

This article is an attempt to develop a practical politico-jurisprudential account of the corporate person, which it does by building on contemporary ideas about collective and shared intentions. It argues for a model of shared intentions, which posits a set of interlocking preferences, and other supporting attitudes. It examines the work of Bratman, Gilbert, Hurley, and Sugden and addresses issues of choice, coercion and will.

Ethical reflection has always considered how it is we should live together. That task must now be addressed amid a time of unprecedented and concatenating global crises. Efforts to comprehend the situation have generated new analytical approaches to crisis analysis – among them, the polycrisis. Missing from much of this work however is critical engagement with the normative dimensions of the various crises and reflection on the ethical frames required to navigate our way forward together. Addressing this deficit in both (...) theoretical and practical work is a critical contribution to be made by future oriented scholars of global ethics. (shrink)

A volume in Educational Leadership for Social Justice Series Editor Jeffrey S. Brooks, University of Idaho, Denise E. Armstrong, Brock University; Ira Bogotch, Florida Atlantic University; Sandra Harris, Lamar University; Whitney H. Sherman, Virginia Commonwealth University; George Theoharis, Syracuse University The purpose of this book is to examine and learn lessons from the way leadership for social justice is conceptualized in several disciplines and to consider how these lessons might improve the preparation and practice of school leaders. In particular, we (...) examine philosophy, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, public policy, and psychology. Our contention is that the field of educational leadership might consider taking a step backward in order to take several forward. That is, educational leadership researchers might re-examine social justice, both in terms of social and individual dynamics and as disciplinary-specific, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary phenomenon. By adopting this approach, we can connect and extend long-established lines of conceptual and empirical inquiry and thereby gain insights that may otherwise be overlooked or assumed. This holds great promise for generating, refining, and testing theories of social justice in educational leadership and will help strengthen already vibrant lines of inquiry. That is, rather than citing a single, or a few, works out of their disciplinary context it might be more fruitful to situate educational leadership for social justice research in their respective traditions. This could be carried out by extending extant lines of inquiry in educational leadership research and then incorporating lessons gleaned from this work into innovative practice. For example, why not more clearly establish lines of educational leadership and justice research into the Philosophy of Social Justice, Economics of Social Justice, Political Studies of Social Justice, Sociology of Social Justice, Anthropology of Social Justice, and the Public Policy of Social Justice as focused and discrete areas of inquiry? Once this new orientation toward the knowledge base of social justice and educational leadership is laid, we might then seek to explore some of the natural connections between traditions before ultimately investigating justice in educational leadership through a free association of ideas as the worlds of practice and research co-construct a "new" language they can use to discuss educational leadership. Such an endeavor may demand reconceptualization of both the processes and products of collaborative research and the communication of findings, but it will demand a breaking-down of methodological and epistemological biases and a more meaningful level and type of engagement between primary and applied knowledge bases. (shrink)

For this new anthology, Anthony Bonner has chosen central texts from his acclaimed two-volume compilation Selected Works of Ramon Llull. Available for the first time in an affordable format, these works serve as an introduction to the life and writings of the Catalan philosopher, mystic, and theologian who lived from 1232 to 1316. Founder of a school of Arabic and other languages, Llull was also a poet and novelist and one of the creators of literary Catalan.This volume contains three (...) prefaces on Llull's life, thought, and reputation. Of Llull's works, it offers Book of the Gentile and the Three Wise Men, his seminal Christian apology; the Ars brevis, a summary of his philosophical system; The Book of the Lover and the Beloved, a celebration of mystical love in the courtly tradition; and his wittily scathing Book of the Beasts. (shrink)