A magisterial exploration of poetry’s place in the fine arts by one of the twentieth century's leading poets In this book, eminent poet Anthony Hecht explores the art of poetry and its relationship to the other fine arts. While the problems he treats entail both philosophic and theoretical discussion, he never allows abstract speculation to overshadow his delight in the written texts that he introduces, or in the specific examples of painting and music to which he refers. After (...) discussing literature’s links with painting and music, Hecht investigates the theme of paradise and wilderness, especially in Shakespeare’s The Tempest. He then turns to the question of public and private art, exploring the ways in which all the arts participate in balances between private and public modes of discourse, and between an exclusive or elitist role and the openly political. Beginning with a discussion of architecture as an illustration of a more general theme of discord and balance, the penultimate lecture probes the inner contradictions of works of art and our reactions to them, while the final piece concerns art and morality. (shrink)

What is the significance of that loose collective enterprise, sprung up in the aftermath of the sixties, known as L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Writing? To answer this question I will be taking, initially, a somewhat oblique route. And I shall assume an agreement on several important social and political matters: first, that the United States, following the Second World War, assumed definitive leadership of a capitalist empire; second, that its position of leadership generated a network of internal social contradictions which persist to this (...) day ; third, that this postwar period has been characterized, at the international level, by an extended cold war shadowed by the threat of a global catastrophe, whether deliberate or accidental. Whatever one’s political allegiances, these truths, surely, we hold as self-evident.Postwar American poetry is deployed within that general arena, and to the degree that it is “political” at all, it reflects and responds to that set of overriding circumstances.1 In my view the period ought to be seen as falling into two phases. The first phase stretches from about 1946 to 1973 . This period is dominated by a conflict between various lines of traditional poetry, on one hand, and the countering urgencies of the “New American Poetry” on the other. In the diversity of this last group Donald Allen argued for a unifying “characteristic”: “a total rejection of all those qualities typical of academic verse.”2Of course, this representation of the conflict between “tradition” and “innovation” obscures nearly as much as it clarifies. The New American poets were, in general, must moe inclined to experimentalism than were writers like Richard Wilbur, Anthony Hecht, Louis Simpson, or Donald Justice. But Allen’s declaration can easily conceal the academic and literary characteristics of the innovators. Robert Duncan and Charles Olson, for example, key figures in the New American Poetry, can hardly not be called “literary” or even “academic” poets. If they opened certain new areas in the field of poetic style, no less could and has been said of Lowell, even in his early work. And if Frank O’Hara seems the antithesis of academic work, John Ashbery is, in his own way, its epitome. Yet both appear in Allen’s New American Poetry anthology. Moreover, who can say, between O’Hara and Ashbery, which is the more innovative of the two—so different are their styles of experimentation? 1. Black and feminist writing in the United States often confines the focus of the political engagement to a more restricted national theater. Nevertheless, even in these cases engagement is necessarily carried out within the global framework I have sketched above.2. The New American Poetry: 1945-1960, ed. Donald M. Allen , p. xi. Jerome J. McGann is Commonwealth Professor of English, University of Virginia. His most recent critical work, Buildings of Loss: The Knowledge of Imaginative Texts, will appear in 1987. “Some Forms of Critics Discourse” and “The Religious Poetry of Christina Rosetti” are among his previous contributions to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

What place has poetry in the teaching or reflection of ethicists? Even poetry that has no obvious political edge can play an important role in refining a poetics of the will, where will is understood at once as the motive power of action and as the seat of both our freedom and our bondage. Poems by W. H. Auden, Anthony Hecht, Galway Kinnell, William Carols Williams, and others are examined against a background provided by the work of Erazim (...) Kohák, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Paul Ricoeur. A poetics of the will requires attention to affirmation, beauty, and wonder, but also to concrete embodiment, full recognition of the complex reality of persons and situations, and mature resistance to the temptation to righteousness and the seduction of despair. (shrink)

Two notable limitations exist on the use of personhood arguments in establishing moral status. Firstly, although the attribution of personhood may give us sufficient reason to grant something moral status, it is not a necessary condition. Secondly, even if a person is that which has the ‘highest’ moral status, this does not mean that any interests of a person are justifiable grounds to kill something that has a ‘lower’ moral status. Additional justification is needed to overcome a basic wrongness associated (...) with killing something possessing moral status. There are clear arguments already available in this regard in the case of a foetus that are not available in the case of a newborn infant. Hence, there is scope to consistently hold that abortion may be permissible but that after-birth abortion may not be permissible. (shrink)

Over the last three decades, social theory has become an increasingly important subdiscipline within sociology. Social theory has attempted to elucidate the philosophical basis of sociology by defining the nature of social reality. According to social theory, society consists of objective institutions, structure, on the one hand, and individuals, agency on the other, it promotes human social relations, insisting that in every instance social reality consists of these relations.

John Rawls's form of constructivism can easily be ramped up into a fullblown metaethics. In this chapter, the author explores an alternative interpretive framework, which basically inverts the roles that the construction of the original position and the reliance on reflective equilibrium play in Rawls's argument. The author sketches out the basic contours of Rawls's thinking if we treat constructivism as his method for theory construction and reflective equilibrium as his metaethics. Metaethics is clearly a part of moral philosophy outside (...) of moral theory. At every major turn in the articulation of Rawls's theory there is a new or more developed account of reflective equilibrium and in particular its justificatory role in the theory. Giving one's argument a form that allows it to more easily appeal to a particular audience, is the job of rhetoric. So it turns out that constructivism is not a metaethical position, but a rhetorical strategy. (shrink)

It has been proposed that performance in the think – no think task represents a laboratory analogue of the voluntary form of memory repression. The central prediction of this repression hypothesis is that performance in the TNT task will be influenced by emotional characteristics of the material to be remembered. This prediction was tested in two experiments by asking participants to learn paired associates in which the first item was either emotionally positive or emotionally negative . The second word was (...) always emotionally neutral . Consistent with the repression hypothesis, significant memory suppression was observed in both experiments following ‘no think’ instructions for memories associated with emotionally negative material. No suppression was observed for memories associated with emotionally positive information. Implications of these findings for the relationship between performance in the TNT task and the controversial notion of memory repression are considered. (shrink)

This article addresses a tendency within postcolonial studies to place the work of Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon in opposition. This has obscured the real, and potentially very productive, similarities between them. The most important of these links has to do with their shared critique of the sovereign subject of humanism: for Fanon and Foucault, this critique of the traditional humanist subject provides a way of opposing what they both see as the dangerous nostalgia for a lost moment of origin. (...) Furthermore, Fanon and Foucault both end in a moment of ethics, but it is an ethics without the sort of stable subjects assumed by humanism. I offer a consideration of some of the links that can be found in several texts by Fanon and Foucault. I then attempt to define the term I will be using to describe their shared strategy of an ethics without subjects: the “humanism effect.” I conclude by trying to suggest some of the strategic possibilities of an ethics without subjects in the postcolonial context. (shrink)

Contemporary nonanthropocentic environmental ethics is profoundly shaped by the very anthropocentrism that it tries to transcend. New values only slowly struggle free of old contexts. Recognizing this struggle, however, opens a space for—indeed, necessitates—alternative models for contemporary environmental ethics. Rather than trying to unify or fine-tune our theories, we require more pluralistic andexploratory methods. We cannot reach theoretical finality; we can only co-evolve an ethic with transformed practices.

The book’s argument divides into three parts. In the first, Wellman sets out an account of legal rights, and then uses it to work out an account of nonlegal institutional rights and noninstitutional moral rights. The second focuses on the question of whether various alleged right-holders are possible right-holders. The third then turns to conflicts of both rights and duties, and argues, on the basis of the conclusions of the first two parts, that although some conflicts between rights are real, (...) many supposed conflicts can be dissolved once we recognize that one of the rights is unreal or is limited in some way. Because most of the controversial argumentative work is done in the first two sections, I will focus on them. (shrink)

Theories of rational choice focus on the question of how to choose what to do. They are, that is, concerned with the selection of one among a set of possible actions. Furthermore, they tell us how to make such a choice rationally. They accomplish this aspect of their task by telling us how to choose ‘in order to achieve our aims as well as possible.’Theories of reasonable deliberation, as I describe them in this paper, analyze a different domain of reasoning (...) in the service of action. First, their subject matter is the deliberation that leads to action, rather than the final selection of the action itself. Second, they ask about the intrinsic character of a deliberative path, rather than its likely outcome. That is, they are theories of the reasonableness of deliberation, rather than its rationality. To see the distinctiveness of this theoretical domain, it helps to approach it by backing away from the domain of rational choice theories one step at a time. (shrink)

The author argues that the distinctive aspects of political liberalism have historical roots in the republican tradition that is often described as “neo-roman,” and recently given articulation in the work of Q. Skinner and P. Pettit. The primary task of this paper will be to layout these correlations, to provide, as it were, a mapping between the vocabulary of the neo-roman theory and that of political liberalism. By tracing the genealogy of political liberalism, the author argues that we ought to (...) rethink the history, the vocabulary, and conceptual framework of contemporary political philosophy. In particular, seeing political liberalism as a form of republican theory as well as a form of liberal theory changes how we understand it: it brings out certain distinctive features of the structure of the view that are often overlooked, such as its stress on certain civic duties and its conception of freedom as a freedom of the city. If leading republican and liberal thinkers turn out to have much in common, then we will have to rethink also our intellectual geography: we will have to sketch in some land-bridges between the continents. (shrink)

In his 1961 monograph, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority , the late phenomenologist, Emmanuel Levinas, noted that “everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality” (1961/1969, p. 21). What follows thereafter is an extensive attempt to ground a quasi-Kantian existential ethics based on interpersonal, face to face, relations (Beavers 2001). That philosophy should invite such an attempt already signifies that we might be in trouble where ethics (...) are concerned. After all, when one looks back over history, it appears that we have not made much progress in this area. (shrink)

The concept of structure is central to Giddens’s structuration theory because it apparently accounts for the reproduction of the social system without derogating the lay actor in functionalist or structuralist fashion. In fact, the concept of structure involves the very derogation of the lay actor which Giddens highlights as the principal error of these objectivist social theories and which he wishes to avoid. However, although Giddens fails to recognize it, the concept of “practical consciousness” which Giddens also regards as central (...) to structuration theory avoids this relapse into objectivism and offers a route to a sustainable social theory which highlights the agency of social actors. (shrink)

A multi-method, multi-informant method was used to collect data from diverse stakeholders about school climate to inform school improvement efforts as part of the Positive Behaviour Intervention Supports framework. Teachers, administrators, school staff and students completed surveys and parents participated in focus groups to gather perspectives about school climate. Respondents identified safety as a strength at the school, staff and student results suggested interpersonal relationships as an area for improvement and staff identified parent involvement as an area for growth. Both (...) positive and negative perceptions of school climate emerged from the parent focus group. While there are limitations to the generalisability of the results, this case study provides a useful approach for schools to assess their school climate and establish goals for improvement. (shrink)

This paper examines the concepts of desert and luck, familiar in political theory but neglected by sociologists. I argue that the idea of desert is composed of both personal performance and the degree of responsibility a person has over that performance. Distribution ought to be in accordance with the indebtedness created by the person's performance. This can be compromised by luck; that is, personal desert is undermined where lack of performance scuttles the applicability of the contributory model. This paper examines (...) recent work, focusing on establishing desert criteria for each person's ends and life‐plans, and a formula for distribution according to personal welfare. (shrink)

James Lovelock’s “Gaia hypothesis”-the suggestion that life on Earth functions in essential ways as one organism, as a single living entity-is extraordinarily suggestive for environmental philosophy. What exactly it suggests, however, is not yet so clear. Although many of Lovelock’s own ethical conclusions are rather distressing for environmental ethics, there are other possible approaches to the Gaia Hypothesis. Ethical philosophers might take Gaia to be analogous to a “person” and thus to have the same sorts of values that more familiar (...) sorts of persons have. Deep ecologists might find in the Gaia hypothesis a means by which to transform and reunderstand our concrete experience of the world. This essay canvasses some of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of each approach. (shrink)

Those who are optimistic about the prospects of a science of consciousness, and those who believe that it lies beyond the reach of standard scientific methods, have something in common: both groups view consciousness as posing a special challenge for science. In this paper, we take a close look at the nature of this challenge. We show that popular conceptions of the problem of consciousness, epitomized by David Chalmers’ formulation of the ‘hard problem’, can be best explained as a cognitive (...) illusion, which arises as a by-product of our cognitive architecture. We present evidence from numerous sources to support our claim that we have a specialized system for thinking about phenomenal states, and that an inhibitory relationship exists between this system and the system we use to think about physical mechanisms. Even though the ‘hard problem’ is an illusion, unfortunately it appears that our cognitive architecture forces a closely related problem upon us. The ‘genuine problem’ of consciousness shares many features with the hard problem, and it also represents a special challenge for psychology. Nonetheless, researchers should be careful not to mistake the hard problem for the genuine problem, since the strategies appropriate for dealing with these problems differ in important respects. (shrink)

Two types of interleukin 1 (IL‐1α and IL‐1β) have been defined by purifying the molecules from activated human peripheral blood cells, followed by cloning and expressing the molecules in Escherichia coli. Both types of IL‐1 stimulate proliferation and differentiation of T‐ and B‐lymphocytes and induce cartilage proteoglycan degradation but differ in other properties. For example, demineralization and appears to be a major mediator in the pathogenesis of joint erosion in rheumatoid arthritis. Synthetic adjuvants elicit the production of IL‐1 separate from (...) endogenous pyrogen, and this property is required for the new generation of vaccines based on antigens produced by recombinant DNA technology. (shrink)

It is often argued that associations are intelligent organisms with minds and intentional states of their own. It is also argued that groups are merely a plurality of individuals who are related or associated only in a specific and limited sense. This paper draws on both classical and contemporary scholarship to develop an ontological account of persons which has real-world legal and ethical implications.

This article is an attempt to develop a practical politico-jurisprudential account of the corporate person, which it does by building on contemporary ideas about collective and shared intentions. It argues for a model of shared intentions, which posits a set of interlocking preferences, and other supporting attitudes. It examines the work of Bratman, Gilbert, Hurley, and Sugden and addresses issues of choice, coercion and will.

ABSTRACT In an article in Encounter, Antony Flew usefully opens up the issue of what racism is by giving three ‘concepts’: (1) ‘unjustified discrimination’; (2) ‘heretical belief; and (3) ‘institutionalised racism’. He rejects senses (2) and (3) in favour of (1) and finds much ‘anti‐racism’in fact guilty of it. This article, while benefiting from Flew's account, argues that it basically misconceives and underestimates racism by ignoring its complex ideological (sense 2) and institutional (sense 3) character. In regard to (2) it (...) is argued that we need to distinguish scalar and statistical claims from the binary ‘us/them’essentialism characteristic of racism. In regard to (3) it is argued both that affirmative action is required by justice and that it entails ‘collateral injustice’as well as consequential uncertainties. (shrink)

Ethical reflection has always considered how it is we should live together. That task must now be addressed amid a time of unprecedented and concatenating global crises. Efforts to comprehend the situation have generated new analytical approaches to crisis analysis – among them, the polycrisis. Missing from much of this work however is critical engagement with the normative dimensions of the various crises and reflection on the ethical frames required to navigate our way forward together. Addressing this deficit in both (...) theoretical and practical work is a critical contribution to be made by future oriented scholars of global ethics. (shrink)

A volume in Educational Leadership for Social Justice Series Editor Jeffrey S. Brooks, University of Idaho, Denise E. Armstrong, Brock University; Ira Bogotch, Florida Atlantic University; Sandra Harris, Lamar University; Whitney H. Sherman, Virginia Commonwealth University; George Theoharis, Syracuse University The purpose of this book is to examine and learn lessons from the way leadership for social justice is conceptualized in several disciplines and to consider how these lessons might improve the preparation and practice of school leaders. In particular, we (...) examine philosophy, anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, public policy, and psychology. Our contention is that the field of educational leadership might consider taking a step backward in order to take several forward. That is, educational leadership researchers might re-examine social justice, both in terms of social and individual dynamics and as disciplinary-specific, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary phenomenon. By adopting this approach, we can connect and extend long-established lines of conceptual and empirical inquiry and thereby gain insights that may otherwise be overlooked or assumed. This holds great promise for generating, refining, and testing theories of social justice in educational leadership and will help strengthen already vibrant lines of inquiry. That is, rather than citing a single, or a few, works out of their disciplinary context it might be more fruitful to situate educational leadership for social justice research in their respective traditions. This could be carried out by extending extant lines of inquiry in educational leadership research and then incorporating lessons gleaned from this work into innovative practice. For example, why not more clearly establish lines of educational leadership and justice research into the Philosophy of Social Justice, Economics of Social Justice, Political Studies of Social Justice, Sociology of Social Justice, Anthropology of Social Justice, and the Public Policy of Social Justice as focused and discrete areas of inquiry? Once this new orientation toward the knowledge base of social justice and educational leadership is laid, we might then seek to explore some of the natural connections between traditions before ultimately investigating justice in educational leadership through a free association of ideas as the worlds of practice and research co-construct a "new" language they can use to discuss educational leadership. Such an endeavor may demand reconceptualization of both the processes and products of collaborative research and the communication of findings, but it will demand a breaking-down of methodological and epistemological biases and a more meaningful level and type of engagement between primary and applied knowledge bases. (shrink)

IN PHYSICS 2, Aristotle defines nature as the source and cause of being moved and of being at rest. Yet some recent translations have moved Aristotle's "being moved" into an active form. I shall argue that an active translation of this definition is potentially misleading, and that the implications of such a reading have had their place in the history of Aristotelian debate.

The conversation argument for actual intentionalism compares our encounters with artworks to conversations to support the interpretive policy that artists’ intentions should constrain our interpretations of their artworks. Andrew Huddleston argues that intentionalists cannot appeal to conversation, because either the metaphor is inapt or, if the metaphor is more aptly construed , it will be incompatible with the intentionalist’s interpretive policy. I argue that, once constraint is understood properly, Huddleston’s conversational requirements obtain; thus the conversation metaphor is apt. I then (...) argue that the meta-level dialogue’s goal of ‘best interpretation’ presupposes aesthetically best rather than epistemically best; if so, intentionalists cannot appeal to such a conversation. I suggest construing ‘best’ more sensibly as epistemically and aesthetically optimal and recasting the meta-level dialogue as a cooperative enquiry rather than a competition. The result is a conversation to which intentionalists can appeal. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 12, December 2019, Page 35-37.