We study the relationship between risk managers’ dark triad personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and their selective hedging activities. Using a primary survey of 412 professional risk managers, we find that managers with dark personality traits are more likely to engage in selective hedging than those without. This effect is particularly pronounced for older, male, and less experienced risk managers. The effect is also stronger in smaller firms, less centralized risk management departments, and family-owned firms.

The Covid-19 pandemic creates an unprecedented threatening situation worldwide with an urgent need for critical reflection and new knowledge production, but also a need for imminent action despite prevailing knowledge gaps and multilevel uncertainty. With regard to the role of research ethics in these pandemic times some argue in favor of exceptionalism, others, including the authors of this paper, emphasize the urgent need to remain committed to core ethical principles and fundamental human rights obligations all reflected in research regulations and (...) guidelines carefully crafted over time. In this paper we disentangle some of the arguments put forward in the ongoing debate about Covid-19 human challenge studies (CHIs) and the concomitant role of health-related research ethics in pandemic times. We suggest it might be helpful to think through a lens differentiating between risk, strict uncertainty and ignorance. We provide some examples of lessons learned by harm done in the name of research in the past and discuss the relevance of this legacy in the current situation. (shrink)

Our intention is to contribute to the development of Canadian Nursing and Medical Education (NursMed) and efforts to redress deepening, intersecting health and social inequities. This paper addresses the following two research questions: (1) What are the ways in which Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies can inform Canadian NursMed Education with a focus on critically examining settler‐colonialism, health equity, and social justice? (2) What are the potential struggles and adaptations required to integrate Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies within Canadian NursMed Education in service of (...) redressing intersecting health and social inequities? Briefly, Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies are philosophies of learning that encourage teachers and students to reflect on health through the lenses of settler‐colonialism, health equity, and social justice. Drawing on critical ethnographic research methods, we conducted in‐depth interviews with 25 faculty members and engaged in participant observation of classrooms in university‐based Canadian NursMed Education. The research findings are organized into three major themes, beginning with common institutional features influencing pedagogical approaches. The next set of findings addresses the complex strategies participants apply to integrate Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies. Lastly, the findings illustrate the emotional and spiritual toll some faculty members face when attempting to deliver Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies. We conclude that through the application of Decolonial, Intersectional Pedagogies teachers and students can support movements towards health equity, social justice, and unlearning/undoing settler‐colonialism. This study contributes new knowledge to stimulate dialog and action regarding the role of health professions education, specifically Nursing and Medicine as an upstream determinant of health in settler‐colonial nations such as Canada, United States, Australia, and New Zealand. (shrink)

This article raises the question of whether bioethics qualifies as a discipline. According to a standard definition of discipline as “a field of study following specific and well-established methodological rules” bioethics is not a specific discipline as there are no explicit “well-established methodological rules.” The article investigates whether the methodological rules can be implicit, and whether bioethics can follow specific methodological rules within subdisciplines or for specific tasks. As this does not appear to be the case, the article examines whether (...) bioethics’ adherence to specific quality criteria (instead of methodological rules) or pursuing of a common goal can make it qualify as a discipline. Unfortunately, the result is negative. Then, the article scrutinizes whether referring to bioethics institutions and professional qualifications can ascertain bioethics as a discipline. However, this makes the definition of bioethics circular. The article ends by admitting that bioethics can qualify as a discipline according to broader definitions of discipline, for example, as an “area of knowledge, research and education.” However, this would reduce bioethics’ potential for demarcation and identity-building. Thus, to consolidate the discipline of bioethics and increase its impact, we should explicate and elaborate on its methodology. (shrink)

According to the expressivist argument the choice to use biotechnologies to prevent the birth of individuals with specific disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with this disability. The argument has stirred a lively debate and has recently received renewed attention. This article starts with presenting the expressivist argument and its core elements. It then goes on to present and examine the counter-arguments before it addresses some aspects that have gained surprisingly little attention. The analysis demonstrates that the (...) expressivist argument has a wide range of underpinnings and that counter-arguments tend to focus on only a few of these. It also reveals an important aspect that appears to have been ignored, i.e., that people do not select foetuses based on chromosomes or other biological traits, but based on characteristics of living persons with specific disabilities. This makes it more difficult to undermine the claim that negative selection of foetuses expresses a disvaluing of persons with such disabilities. It leaves the expressivist argument with a strong bite still. (shrink)

As recently stakeholders complain about the use of conflict minerals in consumer products that are often invisible to them in final products, firms across industries implement conflict mineral management practices. Conflict minerals are those, whose systemic exploitation and trade contribute to human right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas. Particularly, supply chain managers in the Western world are challenged taking reasonable steps to identify and prevent risks associated with these resources due to the globally dispersed nature of (...) supply chains and the opacity of the origin of commodities. Supply chain due diligence represents a holistic concept to proactively manage supply chains reducing the likelihood of the use of conflict minerals effectively. Based on an exploratory study with 27 semi-structured interviews within five European industries, we provide insights into patterns of implementation, key motivational factors, barriers and enablers, and impacts of SCDD in mineral supply chains. Our results contribute to both theory and practice as we provide first insights to SCDD practices and make recommendations for an industry-wide implementation of SCDD. Altogether, this study provides the basis for future theory testing research in the context of SCDD and conflict mineral management. (shrink)

The concept of disease has been the subject ofa vast, vivid and versatile debate. Categoriessuch as ``realist'', ``nominalist'', ``ontologist'',``physiologist'', ``normativist'' and``descriptivist'' have been applied to classifydisease concepts. These categories refer tounderlying theoretical frameworks of thedebate. The objective of this review is toanalyse these frameworks. It is argued that thecategories applied in the debate refer toprofound philosophical issues, and that thecomplexity of the debate reflects thecomplexity of the concept itself: disease is acomplex concept, and does not easily lenditself to definition.

Overdiagnosis and disease are related concepts. Widened conceptions of disease increase overdiagnosis and vice versa. This is partly because there is a close and complex relationship between disease and overdiagnosis. In order to address the problems with overdiagnosis, we may benefit from a closer understanding this relationship. Accordingly, the objective of this article is to elucidate the relationship between disease and overdiagnosis. To do so, the article starts with scrutinizing how overdiagnosis can explain the expansion of the concept of disease. (...) Then it investigates how definitions of disease address various challenges of overdiagnosis. The article specifically investigates recent attempts to clarify the relationship between the concepts of disease and overdiagnosis. Several shortcomings are identified and lead to a closer analysis of overdiagnosis in the diagnostic process. Contrary to recent contributions to the field, it is argued that cases of overdiagnosis are not cases of disease. They are non-verified labelling of disease. It is revealed how overdiagnosis establishes an unwarranted link between indicative phenomena, such as polyps or cell changes, and harm, and thereby generates a link to disease. One implication of this study is that we should stop attributing disease language to indicative phenomena. That is, we should stop calling it “cancer screening” when we are actually searching for polyps. Another implications is that we should strive for scientific progress in differentiating phenomena that are of negative value to us from those that are not. In overdiagnosis we diagnose something that is not disease: it is over-diagnosis. (shrink)

There is a profound paradox in modern medical knowledge production: The more we know, the more we know that we (still) do not know. Nowhere is this more visible than in diagnostics and early detection of disease. As we identify ever more markers, predictors, precursors, and risk factors of disease ever earlier, we realize that we need knowledge about whether they develop into something experienced by the person and threatening to the person’s health. This study investigates how advancements in science (...) and technology alter one type of uncertainty, i.e., temporal uncertainty of disease diagnosis. As diagnosis is related to anamnesis and prognosis it identifies how uncertainties in all these fields are interconnected. In particular, the study finds that uncertainty in disease diagnosis has become more subject to prognostic uncertainty because diagnosis is more connected to technologically detected indicators and less closely connected to manifest and experienced disease. These temporal uncertainties pose basic epistemological and ethical challenges as they can result in overdiagnosis, overtreatment, unnecessary anxiety and fear, useless and even harmful diagnostic odysseys, as well as vast opportunity costs. The point is not to stop our quest for knowledge about disease but to encourage real diagnostic improvements that help more people in ever better manner as early as possible. To do so, we need to pay careful attention to specific types of temporal uncertainty in modern diagnostics. (shrink)

The first part of this paper reveals a conflict between the core principles of deterministic causation and the standard method of difference, which is widely seen as a correct method of causally analyzing deterministic structures. We show that applying the method of difference to deterministic structures can give rise to causal inferences that contradict the principles of deterministic causation. The second part then locates the source of this conflict in an inference rule implemented in the method of difference according to (...) which factors that can make a difference to investigated effects relative to one particular test setup are to be identified as causes, provided the causal background of the corresponding setup is homogeneous. The paper ends by modifying the method of difference in a way that renders it compatible with the principles of deterministic causation. (shrink)

The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the (...) issue of facts). Then I will show that the right truthmaker principle that vindicates facts is superior to the modified truthmaker principle that Lewis has proposed. This will lead into the topic of being and existence. It turns out that truthmaking and facts are plausible, well suited for one another, and very coherent with a plausible conception of being. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to investigate ethical aspects of technology through the moral term “paternalism”. The field of investigation is medicine. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, “paternalism” has gained moral relevance through modern medicine, where physicians have been accused of behaving paternalistic and threatening patients’ autonomy. Secondly, medicine is a brilliant area to scrutinise the evaluative aspects of technology. It is argued that paternalism is a morally relevant term for the ethics of technology, but that its (...) traditional conception is not adequate to address the challenges of modern technology. A modification towards a “technological paternalism” is necessary. That is, “technological paternalism” is a fruitful term in the ethics of technology. Moreover, it is suited to point out the deficiencies of the traditional concept of paternalism and to reform and vitalise the conception of paternalism in ethics in order to handle the challenges of technology. (shrink)

As documented in Part I, monogenism, the descent of all human beings from Adam and Eve, was closely linked to the Catholic doctrine of original sin throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Theological reservations about polygenism, the more scientifically supported account of human origins through a transitional population, was brought to a head by Pius XII’s 1950 encyclical Humani generis. Although the encyclical allowed discussion of human evolution, polygenism was prohibited because “It does not appear how such a (...) view can be reconciled with the doctrine of original sin.” Nevertheless, during and after Vatican II de facto theological acceptance of polygenism became commonplace even though the prohibition was not withdrawn. While some modern conceptions of original sin make a reliance upon monogenism unnecessary, another school of thought emphasizes a spiritual rather than a biological understanding of the concept. It remains to be seen whether polygenism can be unanimously accepted as a scientific phenomenon that is not theologically threatening. Reflection on the Vatican’s long period of ambivalence about the motion of the earth suggests that a similar prospect can be foreseen for polygenism even though it is subject to development in a manner that geostasis was not. (shrink)

In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categorical (...) difference in history between Data-like robots on the one hand and human beings on the other hand defeats the ceteris paribus assumption, which can be seen by various considerations. So the inference rule cannot be applied. We should not attribute phenomenal consciousness to robots like Data. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly, the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem. A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality as a constraint (...) on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises, since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal powers and causation. (shrink)

In this original and interesting article,1 Phil Reed argues that the objections launched against expressivism at the beginning of life do not apply to expressivism at the end of life. Moreover, he claims that the expressivist argument adds to and substantiates the arguments against physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia (PAS/E). In this commentary, I will 1. Briefly examine whether the comparison between expressivism at the beginning and at the end holds. 2. Scrutinise whether there is a trickle down-effect of expressivism at (...) the end of life on other arguments against PAS/E. 3. Examine one version of the expressivist argument that is not discussed by Reed both at the beginning and at the end of life. Although Phil Reed certainly advances the expressivist debate, it is not clear that the objections to the expressivist argument are so different at the end compared with the beginning of life or that this adds to and substantiates the arguments against physician assisted suicide and euthanasia. Moreover, it is not obvious that the traditional objections to the expressivist argument, for example, that there is no message, no sender, and no receiver, have such a strong bite – neither at the beginning nor at the end of life. Biotechnologies are normative in many ways. We implement them normatively to obtain certain goals. At the same time, they facilitate certain actions and establish practices which form our norms and values, either intended or unintended. In either case, we need to pay attention to them, as …. (shrink)

The term "paradox'' signifies a contradiction of some sort. Modern health care appears to be rich in contradictions, and it is claimed to be paradoxical in a number of ways.In particular health care is held to be a paradox itself: it is supposed to do good, but is accused of doing harm. The objective of this article is to investigate whether the concept of paradox can serve as a framework for analysing pressing problems in modern healthcare. To pursue this, three (...) distinctive levels of paradox are identified: resolvable paradoxes, antinomies and aporias. The analysis reveals that when facing the challenges of modern health care the focus of attention should be to resolve the resolvable paradoxes,to acknowledge the antinomies and to learn to live with the aporias. (shrink)

Cet article, dans une perspective sémiopragmatique, interroge la disposition graphique des textes comme élément d'interface avec le lecteur. Il s'agit plus précisément d'examiner comment les signes organisateursde l'écrit - cadres, bords et marges- interviennent dans l'acte de lecture.What does the graphic organization of texts have to do with the mental construction of the reader ? How do indexical signs give him a direction ? Between semiotics and psychology, they remind us that the body and perception are important even through the (...) use of codified social models. (shrink)

The paper presents and defends a new account of reasoning. Reasoning is essentially subject to a constitutive norm, the norm of following sufficient normative reasons. Instead of rule-following, following normative reasons is essential. After clarifying the view, three arguments in its support will be presented. They concern the scope of (correct) reasoning, the value of (correct) reasoning, and the relation between reasoning and treating a consideration as a reason. Two objections – concerning the knowledge norm of belief and cases of (...) improperly treating a consideration as a reason – will be dealt with. (shrink)

Health and disease are core concepts in health care and have attracted substantial interest and controversy. In recent and interesting contributions to the debate it has been argued that the challenges with the concept of disease can be resolved by a prototype concept of disease. As a robin is a more prototypical of a bird than a penguin, some diseases are more prototypical than others. If disease is a prototype concept, it would change nosology, but also health care and the (...) study of health and disease. However, the statement that “disease is a prototype concept” forms an empirically testable hypothesis. Therefore, this study aims to test the hypothesis that health professionals have a prototype concept of disease. Two hundred twenty-three health care professionals in Norway were invited to participate in a survey where they were asked to rank a wide range of diseases according to how typical they considered them to be as diseases. Results were analysed with descriptive statistics. The response rate was 90%. Lung cancer, leukemia, colon cancer, myocardial infarction, and AIDS are the diseases ranged to be most typical, while homosexuality, pregnancy, drapetomania, dissidence, and nostalgia are considered to be the least typical diseases. The results also show that the answers to how typical various diseases are vary greatly, even amongst a relatively homogenous group of health professionals. This study falsifies the hypothesis that disease is a prototype concept for health professionals. This has implications for the debate on core concepts for health care. If health professionals do not have a prototype concept of disease, it is unlikely that there is a prototype concept of disease in general. Consequently, nosologies should not be based on prototypes. (shrink)

Given that biases can distort bioethics work, it has received surprisingly little and fragmented attention compared to in other fields of research. This article provides an overview of potentially relevant biases in bioethics, such as cognitive biases, affective biases, imperatives, and moral biases. Special attention is given to moral biases, which are discussed in terms of (1) Framings, (2) Moral theory bias, (3) Analysis bias, (4) Argumentation bias, and (5) Decision bias. While the overview is not exhaustive and the taxonomy (...) by no means is absolute, it provides initial guidance with respect to assessing the relevance of various biases for specific kinds of bioethics work. One reason why we should identify and address biases in bioethics is that it can help us assess and improve the quality of bioethics work. (shrink)

Kairos has been a key concept in medicine for millennia and is frequently understood as “the right time” in relation to treatment. In this study we scrutinize kairos in the context of diagnostics. This has become highly topical as technological developments have caused diagnostics to be performed ever earlier in the disease development. Detecting risk factors, precursors, and predictors of disease (in biomarkers, pre-disease, and pre-pre-disease) has resulted in too early diagnoses, i.e., overdiagnoses. Nonetheless, despite vast advances in science and (...) technology, diagnoses also come too late. Accordingly, timing diagnostics right is crucial. In this article we start with giving a brief overview of the etymology and general use of the concepts of kairos and diagnosis. Then we delimit kairos in diagnostics by analysing “too early” and “too late” diagnosis and by scrutinizing various phases of diagnostics. This leads us to define kairos of diagnostics as the time when there is potential for sufficient information for making a diagnosis that is most helpful for the person. It allows us to conclude that kairos is as important in diagnostics as in therapeutics. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Wahrheit, Perspektive, Interpretation" verfügbar.

Background Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary euthanasia remain highly debated topics in society, drawing attention due to their ethical, legal, and emotional complexities. Within this debate, the loss of a loved one through suicide may shape the attitudes of survivors, resulting in more or less favorable attitudes towards this topic. Aims This study aims to explore and compare the attitudes towards PAS and voluntary euthanasia in a population of suicide loss survivors and the general population, while also considering socio-demographic factors. (...) Methods A total of 529 participants, 168 of whom were survivors of suicide loss, completed an online questionnaire on their attitudes (NOBAS) and opinions (open response format) towards PAS and voluntary euthanasia, as well as regarding their legalization in Germany. The analysis consisted of both quantitative and qualitative components. Results The entire sample showed positive attitudes towards PAS and voluntary euthanasia in terminally ill persons. Participants were more divided in their attitudes towards PAS in the case of a mental health disorder. Individuals without experienced suicide loss were more liberal regarding legalization in Germany and were more likely to understand the wish for PAS. Survivors of suicide loss were mainly concerned about the consequences for relatives. However, differences between both groups are small. Discussion The experience of a loss by suicide influences attitudes towards PAS and voluntary euthanasia. Both groups showed an accepting attitude towards PAS and voluntary euthanasia, but also expressed concerns and fears regarding easy accessibility and consequences for grieving relatives. (shrink)

According to Antonia Barkes version of contextualism, epistemic contextualism, a context is defined by a method and its associated assumptions. The subject has to make the assumption that the method is adequate or reliable and that good working conditions hold in order to arrive at knowledge by employing the method. I will criticize Barkes claim that epistemic contextualism can provide a more satisfactory explanation or motivation for context shifts than conversational contextualism (in particular, David Lewiss contextualism). Two more points of (...) criticizm will be presented, which are meant to show that epistemic contextualism presupposes epistemic internalism, and that (epistemic) contextualism leads to an implausible view about which parameters the special achievement that is constitutive of knowledge depends on. I suggest that, contra (epistemic) contextualism, knowledge is a more robust phenomenon that does not depend on whether anyone calls into question any assumptions or raises skeptical doubts in conversation or in his or her mind (as, for example, Fred Dretskes account says). I indicate how this can be reconciled with the phenomenon that knowledge attributions are somewhat unstable and seemingly context-dependent. (shrink)

SummaryThe article takes issue with W. G. Runciman's contention, in Great Books, Bad Arguments, that modern political development has moved beyond both theory and practice of governance by a sovereign power over subjects as expounded in Hobbes's Leviathan. Runciman's allegations that Hobbes overrates education, that he fails to recognise the potential for dissent and revolt in a polity under a sovereign, and that he ignores society's pre-political scope and its post-absolutist, eventually democratic prospects, are checked against the text and argument (...) of Leviathan. Runciman's contention that government without subjection has been achieved in modern constitutions is confronted with Hobbes's resistance. (shrink)

Summary A large survey of German and Israeli younger and older adolescents was conducted to reveal their opinions and attitudes towards violence and aggression, their personal engagement in aggressive and violent behaviors in and outside the school environment, their attitudes toward physical activity, their engagement in physical activity, and the linkage between physical activity engagement and conductance of violence and aggression. The findings point out that there are more similarities than differences between German and Israeli adolescents concerning violence and aggression (...) in and outside schools. No linkage between physical activity involvement and the extent of violent and/or aggressive acts is found. The findings pertaining adolescents’ opinions and attitudes toward aggression and violence and their behaviors in and outside school are encouraging. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die antithetische Struktur des Bewußtseins" verfügbar.

Hovedregelen for å kunne gi helsehjelp i Norge er at pasienter samtykker. I henhold til pasientrettighetsloven er det helsepersonell som skal avgjøre om pasienter har samtykkekompetanse. Dersom pasienter ikke er samtykkekompetente, kan de behandles mot deres uttrykte ønske. Dette reiser det viktige og vanskelige spørsmålet: På hvilket grunnlag skal helsepersonell vurdere samtykkekompetansen? Det finnes ulike, psykologiske, tester. Disse brukes ikke i Norge, hvor vurderingene i stor grad er basert på skjønn. Denne artikkelen undersøker en del sentrale moralske føringer for hvordan (...) man bør vurdere samtykkekompetanse dersom målsettingen er å respektere personers selvbestemmelse. Samtykkekompetansen bør vurderes uavhengig av hvordan vi vurderer det personen bestemmer seg for, men ikke uavhengig av situasjonen vedkommende er i. Kravene til samtykkekompetanse bør ikke variere med kompleksitet, risiko og nytte av helsetiltak, mens kravene til vurderingens pålitelighet kan variere. (shrink)