In this article, a concise argument for computational rationality as a basis for artificial moral agency is advanced. Some ethicists have long argued that rational agents can become artificial moral agents. However, most of their views have come from purely philosophical perspectives, thus making it difficult to transfer their arguments to a scientific and analytical frame of reference. The result has been a disintegrated approach to the conceptualisation and design of artificial moral agents. In this article, I make the argument (...) for computational rationality as an integrative element that effectively combines the philosophical and computational aspects of artificial moral agency. This logically leads to a philosophically coherent and scientifically consistent model for building artificial moral agents. Besides providing a possible answer to the question of how to build artificial moral agents, this model also invites sound debate from multiple disciplines, which should help to advance the field of machine ethics forward. (shrink)

How do people’s social roles change others’ perceptions of their intentions to cause harm? Three preregistered vignette-based experiments (N = 788) manipulated the social role of someone causing harm and measured how intentional people thought the harm was. Results indicate that people judge harmful consequences as intentional when they think the actor unjustifiably caused harm. Social roles were shown to alter intention judgments by making people responsible for preventing harm (thereby endering the harm as an intentional neglect of one’s responsibilities) (...) or for causing the harm (thereby excusing it as an unintentional byproduct of the role). Additionally, Experiment 3 conceptually replicated and moderated the side-effect effect—revealing that people think harmful side effects are intentional when the harm is unjustified but not when a role’s responsibility justifies it. We discuss the importance of social information—including roles—in how people judge others’ intentions. (shrink)

The biological and neurological capacity to symbolize, and the products of behavioral, cognitive, sociocultural, linguistic, and technological uses of symbols (symbolism), are fundamental to every aspect of human life. The Oxford Handbook of Human Symbolic Evolution explores the origins of our characteristically human abilities - our ability to speak, create images, play music, and read and write. The book investigates how symbolization evolved in human evolution and how symbolism is expressed across the various areas of human life. The field is (...) intrinsically interdisciplinary - considering findings from fossil studies, scientific research from primatology, developmental psychology, and of course linguistics. Written by world leading experts, thirty-eight topical chapters are grouped into six thematic parts that respectively focus on epistemological, psychological, anthropological, ethological, linguistic, and social-technological aspects of human symbolic evolution. The handbook presents an in-depth but comprehensive and interdisciplinary overview of the of the state of the art in the science of human symbolic evolution. This work will be of interest to academics and students active in all fields contributing to the study of human evolution. (shrink)

This article applies the thesis of the extended mind to ambient smart environments. These systems are characterised by an environment, such as a home or classroom, infused with multiple, highly networked streams of smart technology working in the background, learning about the user and operating without an explicit interface or any intentional sensorimotor engagement from the user. We analyse these systems in the context of work on the “classical” extended mind, characterised by conditions such as “trust and glue” and phenomenal (...) transparency, and find that these conditions are ill-suited to describing our engagement with ambient smart environments. We then draw from the active inference framework, a theory of brain function which casts cognition as a process of embodied uncertainty minimisation, to develop a version of the extended mind grounded in a process ontology, where the boundaries of mind are understood to be multiple and always shifting. Given this more fluid account of the extended mind, we argue that ambient smart environments should be thought of as extended allostatic control systems, operating more or less invisibly to support an agent’s biological capacity for minimising uncertainty over multiple, interlocking timescales. Thus, we account for the functionality of ambient smart environments as extended systems, and in so doing, utilise a markedly different version of the classical thesis of extended mind. (shrink)

Intercellular signaling plays an important role in spatially regulated developmental processes. Myxococcus xanthus C signal transmission during fruiting body formation requires motile, densely packed, well aligned cells. tThe fruiting body consists of two domains: an outer domain which has densely packed, well aligned, motile cells: and an inner domain of more loosely packed, non‐motile, sporulating cells. The two domains are characterized by different patterns of C‐dependent gene expression, which begins in the outer domain where C‐signaling is most efficient, and reaches (...) its maximum in the inner domain. These domains may be maintained by a dynamic mechanism which relies on passive transport of the sporulating cells from the outer domain, where sporulation is initiated, to the inner domain by the motile cells in the outer domain. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Sahotra Sarkar compares the Standard Dynamical interpretation of natural selection with the Information-Theoretic interpretation from Steven A. Frank. I address Sarkar’s three arguments against Frank’s interpretation. I show that Sarkar’s major argument that a key component of Frank’s account “does not have any natural biological interpretation” is premised on a contradiction stemming from a mathematical error. Consequently, Sarkar’s major argument is unsound. I also address Sarkar’s claim that a central equation in Frank’s interpretation is dynamically insufficient (...) and his claim that Frank’s interpretation uses nonintuitive parameters to simply rewrite familiar results. (shrink)

In the minds of many, Hox gene null mutant phenotypes have confirmed the direct role that these genes play in specifying the pattern of vertebrate embryos. The genes are envisaged as defining discrete spatial domains and, subsequently, conferring specific segmental identities on cells undergoing differentiation along the antero‐posterior axis. However, several aspects of the observed mutant phenotypes are inconsistent with this view. These include: the appearance of other, unexpected transformations along the dorsal axis; the occurrence of mirror‐image duplications; and the (...) development of anomalies outside the established domains of normal Hox gene expression. In this paper, Hox gene disruptions are shown to elicit regeneration‐like responses in tissues confronted with discontinuities in axial identity. The polarities and orientations of transformed segments which emerge as a consequence of this response obey the rules of distal transformation and intercalary regeneration. In addition, the incidence of periodic anomalies suggests that the initial steps of Hox‐mediated patterning occurs in Hensen's node. As gastrulation proceeds, mesoderm cell cycle kinetics impose constraints upon subsequent cellular differentiation. This results in the delayed manifestation of transformations along the antero‐posterior axis. Finally, a paradigm is sketched in which temporal, rather than spatial axial determinants direct differentiation. Specific, testable predictions are made about the role of Hox genes in the establishment of segmental identity. (shrink)

This essay seeks to define and conceptualize cinematic quotation against scholarship that positions the auteur as the locus of meaning for a given film, especially with respect to any intertextual references. By troubling a reliance on frameworks of pathological, singular control and revealing their inability to define the specific characteristics of quotation - beyond merely thinking of it as one form of allusion or intertextuality - this essay argues that an ontological friction is inherent to instances of cinematic quotation. By (...) utilizing Jean-Luc Nancy's ontology, I am able to reveal the problematic nature of positing a singular, authorial voice in cinema or, more broadly, of assuming a singular subject at all. What is at stake in instances of cinematic quotation, as this essay shows, is the revelation that our being cannot be thought of in singular terms because we are always already both singular and plural, despite our attempts to escape such knowledge. (shrink)

When someone believes something that is justified for her, what part does the subject play in her state of being justified? I will answer this question by developing a strong internalist account of justification according to which the justification of a believing for a subject consists in her having grounds for her belief, and holding the belief in recognition of those grounds. But the internalist theory I defend incorporates key elements of reliabilism into its account. Using perception as a model (...) for justification, I show how ordinary perceivers would appeal to external factors to support their perceptual beliefs, and normally suppose that their beliefs are reliably connected to the objects their beliefs are about. I find in this feature of our common justificatory practice a sufficient basis for positing an externalist condition on justification—namely that subjects are only justified if their beliefs are reliably connected to their objects. (shrink)