Task-unrelated thought (TUT) occurs frequently in our daily lives and across a range of tasks, but we know little about how this phenomenon arises during and influences the way we communicate. Conversations also provide a novel opportunity to assess the alignment (or divergence) in TUT during dyadic interactions. We conducted a study to determine: (a) the frequency of TUT during conversation as well as how partners align/diverge in their rates of TUT, (b) the subjective and behavioral correlates of TUT and (...) TUT divergence during conversation, and (c) if perceived social group identity impacts TUT and TUT divergence during conversation. We used a minimal groups induction procedure to assign participants (N = 126) to either an ingroup, outgroup, or control condition. We then asked them to converse with one another via a computer-mediated text chat application for 10 min while self-reporting TUTs. On average, participants reported TUT about once every 2 min; however, this rate was lower for participants in the ingroup condition, compared to the control condition. Conversational pairs in the ingroup condition were also aligned more in their rates of TUT compared to the outgroup condition. Finally, we discuss subjective and behavioral correlates of TUT and TUT divergence in conversations, such as valence, turn-taking ratios, and topic shifts. (shrink)

Few ideas have excited greater interest among theologians in recent decades than the idea of 'participation'. In thinking about creation, it is the notion that everything comes from, and depends upon, God, inviting the language of sharing, or of an exemplar and its images; in thinking about redemption, it points to the restoration of that image, and is expressed in the language of communion with God and with the redeemed community. In this volume, Andrew Davison considers these themes in (...) unprecedented breadth, investigating the fundamental character of participation as it can be applied to a wide range of theological topics. Exploring what it means to know, to love, to do good, and to live together well, he shows how these ideas animate a particular understanding of human life and how we relate to the world around us. His book offers the most comprehensive survey of participation to date, contributing to detailed discussions of these themes among academic theologians. (shrink)

Andrew Davis; 8. Reliability, Validity and Criterion-referencing, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 123–143, https://d.

Andrew Davis; 1. The Need for a Philosophical Treatment of Assessment, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 32, Issue 1, 7 March 2003, Pages 1–18, https:/.

Recasts Kantian philosophy along poststructuralist lines, particularly showing how Kantian ethics can be reformulated to take into account criticisms leveled by Foucault, Lacan, Deleuze, Derrida, and others.

Corporate social responsibility reporting is becoming mainstream, yet there is limited research on whether and how CSR reports communicate value relevant information. We examine the effects of CSR report readability and tone on future CSR performance and the market reaction around the release of CSR reports. Using a hand-collected dataset of Fortune 500 companies that published stand-alone CSR reports from 2002 to 2014, we find that 1-year-ahead CSR performance is positively associated with the changes in both CSR report readability and (...) tone, suggesting that more readable text and more optimistic tone in a firm’s CSR report are indicative of better future CSR performance. Furthermore, consistent with the view that CSR reports communicate important value relevant information to the market, we document significant market reactions to report readability and tone around the release of CSR reports. Additional analyses suggest that CSR report readability enhances the association between the abnormal returns and the change in CSR report tone, and that the market reaction to CSR report readability is more pronounced for firms with lower analyst following and higher financial opacity. Taken together, our results substantiate the important roles of CSR report readability and tone in communicating future CSR performance and imparting value relevant information to the market. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Psychological Courage”Andrew Moore (bio)Putman’s abstract tells us that “philosophy has never addressed the type of courage involved in facing the fears generated by our habits and emotions.” Later he says “almost never.” I think either claim overstates the case. True, Aristotle’s main concern is with courage as a martial virtue, and his central case is the soldier at war. Most translations of Nicomachean Ethics thus talk (...) of “bravery,” rather than “courage.” Aristotle also says, however, that “certainly the brave person is also intrepid... in sickness” (1115b1–2). In sickness, we often face pain and suffering, fear of further sickness, and death. Aristotle takes these to be central concerns: “Then what sorts of frightening conditions concern the brave person? Surely the most frightening; for no one stands firmer against terrifying conditions. Now death is most frightening of all....” (1115a25–26). We may conclude that in Aristotle at least, some attention is paid to psychological bravery or courage. Even if Aristotle had paid no attention to psychological courage, it is still an open question whether his general account of bravery or courage in Book 3, chapters 6–9 of Nicomachean Ethics could be applied also to Putman’s psychological cases, in which the source of fear and object of courage are internal to the agent’s psychology. Even if not, the Aristotelian might still try, as Putman himself notes, to absorb psychological courage into the virtue of “temperance.” I shall not pursue any of these possibilities further here.I turn now to Putman’s general account of courage, and to the way he distinguishes its psychological from its other varieties. His view is that types of courage are to be distinguished from one another in terms of the fear to be faced, and the goal to be attained. Physical courage responds to a fear of death or physical harm. Moral courage responds to a fear of loss of ethical integrity or authenticity. Psychological courage addresses fear of psychic instability or loss of self. It involves us in facing our irrational fears and anxieties, ranging from bad habits and compulsions to phobias. Different kinds of psychological courage then arise from the different sources of the fear of psychic instability. Quick generalizations about the goal to be obtained from various kinds of courage are harder to come by, but in one way or another, they all concern facing up to or confronting fear.A problem for Putman’s general theoretical framework is that fear seems in fact to be inessential to courage. Socrates was a paradigm case of the morally courageous person, as Putman notes, and yet (as Putman also notes) this consisted at least in part in his fearless defense of his moral convictions, even in the face of death. Plato’s Socrates did not face fear.If he had, he would not have had Socratic virtue. We must conclude either that he lacked [End Page 13] courage, or that fear is not necessary to courage. I favor the latter view.If courage is not necessarily a matter of facing fear, then what is it? I suggest that is a matter of facing personal risk or threat. Usually, of course, we respond fearfully to personal threat or risk. But that is not always or essentially so. Socrates and others can still be courageous, even if they face their personal risk or threat without fear. A risk-based conception of courage can also distinguish physical, moral, and psychological courage from one another, in terms of the source of the risk to which they respond. For example, psychological courage is at issue wherever a person is facing up to personal risks generated by her or his own habits, dispositions, commitments, and so on. Note too that fears are not the only elements of one’s own psychology that might generate personal risk. My innocent kindness, for example, might be an ingrained disposition which puts me at risk of cruel exploitation. Facing up to this trait of mine seems to me to be an instance of courage, just as is facing up to my debilitating fears. I probably do not fear my own innocent kindness, though if I strongly identify... (shrink)

Reframes philosophical understanding of, and engagement with, tragedy. In The Tragedy of Philosophy Andrew Cooper challenges the prevailing idea of the death of tragedy, arguing that this assumption reflects a problematic view of both tragedy and philosophy—one that stifles the profound contribution that tragedy could provide to philosophy today. To build this case, Cooper presents a novel reading of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Although this text is normally understood as the final attempt to seal philosophy from the threat (...) of tragedy, Cooper argues that Kant’s project is rather a creative engagement with a tragedy that is specific to philosophy, namely, the inevitable failure of attempts to master nature through knowledge. Kant’s encounter with the tragedy of philosophy turns philosophy’s gaze from an exclusive focus on knowledge to matters of living well in a world that does not bend itself to our desires. Tracing the impact of Kant’s Critique of Judgment on some of the most famous theories of tragedy, including those of G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Cornelius Castoriadis, Cooper demonstrates how these philosophers extend the project found in both Kant and the Greek tragedies: the attempt to grasp nature as a domain hospitable to human life. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor begins chapter one of The Language of Thought with two claims. The first claim is that “[T]he only psychological models of cognitive processes that seem remotely plausible represent such processes as computational.” The second claim is that “[C]omputation presupposes a medium of computation: a representational system.” Together these two claims suggest one of the central theses of many contemporary representationalist theories of mind, viz. that the only remotely plausible psychology that could succeed in explaining the intentionally characterized abilities (...) and activities of sentient creatures must refer to computationally related representations. Although “[R]emotely plausible theories are”, according to Fodor, “better than no theories at all”, representationalism is not universally regarded as a “remotely plausible theory”. In what follows I will consider what many people believe to be a significant problem facing representationalism. I will then examine two different ways that this problem can be resolved, one based on the writings of Daniel Dennett, the other on ideas found in the later writings of Wittgenstein. I will conclude that although the resolution based on Dennett’s writings fails, a resolution based on ideas found in the later writings of Wittgenstein succeeds. (shrink)

The cosmological-meteorological writings of Paracelsus (1493-1541), presented here for the first time in the most reliable German versions with facing-page translations and thorough text-based and historical commentary, are essential documents of the transition from the medieval to the modern era.

Bonhoeffer’s New Beginning investigates Dietrich Bonhoeffer's life-affirming answer to how we begin again after devastation. Combining scholarly rigor and existential honesty, DeCort argues that Bonhoeffer offers an ethical and moral vision of radical hope vis-à-vis the perceived absence of God in the face of devastation.

This short article provides a response to Nowotny and Wynne's commentary on an earlier article by the author that examined the relation between science and technology studies and science policy. The article offers a reply with respect to understanding the domain of science policy; how Nowotny and Wynne seek to broaden the scope and so critical leverage of STS beyond the “policy room”; and the implications this has for the ways in which an STS/non-sts nexus might be configured in the (...) future. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Lyngzeidetson [1990] has claimed that a type of parallel computer called the ‘Connection Machine’ instantiates architectural principles which will ‘revolutionize which "functions" of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata.’ In particular, he claims that the Connection Machine architecture shows the anti-mechanist argument from Gödel's theorem to be false for at least one kind of parallel computer. In the first part of this paper, I argue that Lyngzeidetson's claims are not supported (...) by his arguments; in the second part I consider some other aspects of parallel computation which may be of theoretical significance in cognitive science. (shrink)

The authors do the field of cultural evolution a service by exploring the role of non-social cognition in human cumulative technological culture, truly neglected in comparison with socio-cognitive abilities frequently assumed to be the primary drivers. Some specifics of their delineation of the critical factors are problematic, however. I highlight recent chimpanzee–human comparative findings that should help refine such analyses.

In this essay, I introduce Ikkyū Sōjun’s amoralism under the heading of negative ethics. I do so in the light of contemporary accounts of what some have called “Zen ethics.” Pushing away from such readings, the essay raises the issue of authority in Zen, whether it is construed as the authority of the dharma, the sangha, or the Buddha. Turning to the poetry of Ikkyū, I demonstrate that any such construing misses themark. As an alternative, I offer a reading of (...) Ikkyū that takes meta-ethics as its starting point. I read Ikkyū’s amoralism as a particular form of negative ethics. This point is drawn out further with an examination of the reversibility of seeming opposites. (shrink)

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with (...) ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Philosophical Gaze into the Writings of the Zodiac Killer Who is the Zodiac Killer? Peek‐A‐Boo: You Are Doomed! This is the Zodiac Speaking Conclusion.

Aristotle ends Metaphysics books M–N with an account of how one can get the impression that Platonic Form-numbers can be causes. Though these passages are all admittedly polemic against the Platonic understanding, there is an undercurrent wherein Aristotle seems to want to explain in his own terms the evidence the Platonist might perceive as supporting his view, and give any possible credit where credit is due. Indeed, underlying this explanation of how the Platonist may have formed his impression, we discover (...) Aristotle's own understanding of what we today might call the mathematical structure of nature. Mathematicals are, to Aristotle, abstractions of order, symmetry, and definiteness, which are in turn aspects of the formal cause of goodness and beauty. This is a lens through which an Aristotelian could view modern mathematical physics as an important aspect of natural philosophy, and which is foundational for an Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The theoretical solid-state physicist Walter Kohn was awarded one-half of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his mid-1960s creation of an approach to the many-particle problem in quantum mechanics called density functional theory (DFT). In its exact form, DFT establishes that the total charge density of any system of electrons and nuclei provides all the information needed for a complete description of that system. This was a breakthrough for the study of atoms, molecules, gases, liquids, and solids. Before DFT, (...) it was thought that knowledge of the vastly more complicated many-electron wave function was essential for a complete description of such systems. Today, 50 years after its introduction, DFT (in one of its approximate forms) is the method of choice used by most scientists to calculate the physical properties of materials of all kinds. In this paper, I present a biographical essay of Kohn’s educational experiences and professional career up to and including the creation of DFT. My account begins with Kohn’s student years in Austria, England, and Canada during World War II and continues with his graduate and postgraduate training at Harvard University and Niels Bohr’s Institute for Theoretical Physics in Copenhagen. I then study the research choices he made during the first 10 years of his career (when he was a faculty member at the Carnegie Institute of Technology and a frequent visitor to the Bell Telephone Laboratories) in the context of the theoretical solid-state physics agenda of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Subsequent sections discuss his move to the University of California, San Diego, identify the research issue which led directly to DFT, and analyze the two foundational papers of the theory. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the chemists came to award “their” Nobel Prize to the physicist Kohn and a discussion of why he was unusually well suited to create the theory in the first place. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.2 (2000) 43-69 [Access article in PDF] Tracing Ricoeur Dudley Andrew François Dosse. Paul Ricoeur: Les Sens D'une Vie. Paris: La Découverte, 1997. [PR] The Time of the Tortoise Gilles Deleuze chose not to see the end of the century that Michel Foucault claimed would be named after him, a century that began just as philosophy registered the aftershocks caused by the work of his closest progenitors, (...) Nietzsche and Bergson. Amplifying the waves they made with tempests of his own, Deleuze tried to capsize the flat-bottom boat of academic philosophy by insisting that it look beyond its own discourse for both the life and the vocabulary to account for life that should be its only mission. Scanning French philosophy for what it might contribute to art, fiction, and cinema, I invoke the stirring character of Deleuze, but I do so to deflect attention to another figure, Paul Ricoeur, whom Deleuze conveniently sets off by contrast.Less than a decade since his death, Deleuze is in danger of having ceded his claim to Ricoeur, the real long-distance runner, who is now pressing his publications into the new century, moving relentlessly beyond his exhausted reviewers. Last year, a fanfare of publicity greeted La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli, another magisterial tome appearing too late to be included in François Dosse's intellectual biography or in my overview here, which lifts off from that biography. Ricoeur, destined to keep writing--unable to conclude his conversation with philosophy--has outlasted Deleuze, whose notoriety derives from the radical break he makes with the thought of our times, for his abrupt deviations and more abrupt conclusions. Ricoeur's reputation rests seldom on anything conclusive but instead on his persistent interaction with and deployment of so much of that thought. By accident or by savvy design, Ricoeur's trajectory (initiated in the phenomenological atmosphere of the prewar era) has taken him through myth criticism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, language philosophy, analytic philosophy, deconstruction, poetics, historiography, ethics, and epistemology. He carries his learning forward to each new endeavor, not believing in "the radical break" or the prefix post-.François Dosse tracks Ricoeur in a magnificent account that places its subject in relation to each of these movements. But Parisian academic fashion forms only one facet of a life whose brilliance is refracted as well by theology, politics, and a remarkable social network. The thickness of his life evidently provides Ricoeur the necessary ballast to maintain his orientation on the stormy seas of intellectual debate. In fact, across a span of seventy years of uninterrupted reading and writing, he has anticipated, invoked, or debated virtually every important school of French thought, doing so in a way that both establishes their value and serves his own agenda. Ricoeur profits from the productive tension that results, even--indeed, especially--when this brings about a dislocation of his views. These exchanges inevitably leave his own ideas clearer, more defensible, and invulnerable to charges of parochialism. Although Ricoeur concludes his three-volume Time and Narrative with an aggressive chapter explicitly asking, [End Page 43] "Should We Renounce Hegel?," there is something deeply Hegelian about this strategy of taking on, then managing to assimilate, all comers so as to emerge stronger. Ricoeur may not share Hegel's limitless arrogance (literally arrogating everything to himself), but his humility is equally ambitious.There was never any question for Deleuze about renouncing Hegel. His antipathy to this "philosophe de l'État" was immediate, total, and itself completely arrogant. As for Ricoeur, Deleuze apparently avoided the man Dosse dubs "philosophe de la Cité," at least before 1986. Then, he links their names after each had just published a multivolume treatise on temporality and fabulation, Deleuze's cinema books picking up the notion of "bifurcated time" that Ricoeur had just developed in Time and Narrative. Proust was explicitly a key source for both of their studies. But apparently, and outwardly, it gets no closer than this. In concatenating these two French philosophers, I follow the lead of Olivier Mongin, who finds them both to be supreme philosophers of time, yet incompatible on... (shrink)

The ability to reflect on practice is a fundamental component of effective medical practice. In a sector increasingly focused on professionalism and patient-centred care, Developing Reflective Practice is a timely publication providing practical guidance on how to acquire the reflective skills necessary to become a successful clinician. This new title draws from a wide range of theoretical and practical multidisciplinary perspectives to assist students, practitioners and educators in embedding reflection in everyday activities. It also offers structures and ideas for more (...) purposeful and meaningful formal reflections and professional development. Developing Reflective Practice: Focuses on the developing practitioner and their lifelong learning and the development of professional identity through reflection Provides practical how-to information for students, practitioners and educators, including realistic case examples and practice-based hints and tips Examines and explains the theoretical and conceptual approaches to reflective practice, including its models and frameworks"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Russell Hardin’s theory of constitutions as conventions implies several conclusions that are striking, deep, important, counterintuitive, and very hard to deny. Nevertheless, they have had little influence on the field of political theory. This chapter seeks to explain that through two theses. The theory embarrasses the prevailing schools of political thought not just by denying their doctrines but by suggesting the irrelevance of many of their favorite questions. The theory seems, as Hardin presents it, more pessimistic and quietist than it (...) needs to be. This chapter suggests that the theory contains within it under-stressed resources that make room for constant institutional progress and political reform. (shrink)