We thoughtlessly use the Nietzschean language of values to encompass our moral principles, our intuitions of the holy and the beautiful, our need for truth. Yet Nietzsche showed that “values” are the creations or products of human will, not discoveries of intelligence, illuminations of love, or exigencies of need. We hear talk of “absolute values” or “objective values” as if there can be values without evaluation: Nietzsche was clear that nothing is intrinsically good or valuable in itself; values are human (...) choices, estimations, decisions, the expressions of human will. An alternative language is more appropriate to communicate what we hold to be intrinsically valuable, namely Würde . Human beings have value if we can use them for our own purposes but they have an invaluable dignity beyond whatever purposes we may have in mind for them. Activities may have an intrinsic worthiness whatever the market demand or current estimation establishes their value to be. (shrink)

Republicanism and imperialism are typically understood to be located at opposite ends of the political spectrum. In Imperial Republics, Edward G. Andrew challenges the supposed incompatibility of these theories with regard to seventeenth- and eighteenth-century revolutions in England, the United States, and France. Many scholars have noted the influence of the Roman state on the ideology of republican revolutionaries, especially in the model it provided for transforming subordinate subjects into autonomous citizens. Andrew finds an equally important parallel (...) between Rome's expansionary dynamic — in contrast to that of Athens, Sparta, or Carthage — and the imperial rivalries that emerged between the United States, France, and England in the age of revolutions. Imperial Republics is a sophisticated, wide-ranging examination of the intellectual origins of republican movements, and explains why revolutionaries felt the need to 'don the toga' in laying the foundation for their own uprisings. (shrink)

Chandran Kukathas has written a thoughtfully provocative book on perhaps the major issue of our time, namely, mass migration versus the world-wide desire for border controls, which, he argues, unju...

Christos Yannaras wrote The Inhumanity of Right in 1998 in the wake of NATO’s bombing of Serbs “who were defending their ancestral homes from the machinations of Croats and Bosnian Muslims (1992–96...

Volume 24, Issue 6, September 2019, Page 662-683.

An eloquent and passionate examination of the opposition between Protestant conscience and Enlightenment reason in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

George Grant’s bleak assessment of the prospects of technological civilization owed a lot to his reading of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul. However, Grant understood technological development within the context of liberal theory and capitalist practice. Grant explained why liberalism is the doctrine most appropriate to the development of productive forces, or the most complete exploitation of natural and human resources. Unlike most North American conservatives, Grant was not a friend of capitalism but of civil servants who restrain capitalist accumulation (...) in the name of the common good or national community. Grant was what Gad Horowitz called a Red Tory and offered a unique perspective of how American technique has closed us off from love and contemplation, leaving us with the one-dimensional problem-solving mentality of the social engineer. (shrink)

SUMMARYPocock's Machiavellian Moment is monumental in its erudition, and thus one may be surprised that Pocock virtually ignored Macpherson's Political Theory of Possessive Individualism in his assessment of seventeenth-century political thought, and ignored Strauss's Thoughts on Machiavelli. Pocock noted that ‘the schools of Marx, Strauss and Voegelin concur’ in holding Locke to be a bourgeois or possessive individualist. Pocock elaborated a paradigm of republicanism as civic humanism as a contrast to liberalism as possessive individualism. Pocock seemed to accept tacitly Macpherson's (...) and Strauss's view that Locke inverted the Aristotelian view of property as a means to political participation, whereby politics became a means to the protection and accumulation of property. Macphersonian scholars have criticised Pocock for misinterpreting the function of property in the Atlantic republican tradition and Straussian scholars have criticised The Machiavellian Moment for its failure to distinguish ancient from modern republics, and for Pocock's failure to appreciate the epochal significance of Machiavelli's call to master fortune or dominate nature through technique. But it is questionable whether or not it is incumbent on an intellectual historian to address present preoccupations about capitalism or global technique. (shrink)

This paper examines the tensions in classical liberal theory ? particularly that of Locke and Kant ? between reason and conscience, and in contemporary liberal theory between the demands of reasonableness and the dictates of conscience. We intend to show that the relationship between reasonableness and conscience is both unstable and necessary; on occasions there seems to exist a moral obligation to provide public reasons for our conduct and at other times the silent call of conscience precludes public justification of (...) conscientious objection or dissent. (shrink)

Teresa Bejan’s Mere Civility is a scholarly, thoughtful, provocative, witty and well-written book with intellectual biographies of Roger Williams, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke to illustrate differ...

Patrons of Enlightenment emphasizes the dependency of thinkers upon patrons and compares the patron-client relationships in the French, English, and Scottish republics of letters.

Eric Nelson has confidently revealed to us God’s justice. God is not an oppressive tyrant but a king subject to the laws of justice. The celestial realm is monarchical, not republican or ruled by a...

John T. Scott has written a scholarly assessment of Rousseau’s psychological and theological thought. Following in the path of Leo Strauss and his followers such as Allan Bloom, Roger Masters, Arth...

Until the time of Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, philosophers generally held economics to be an integral element of moral philosophy. These days, the language of values—moral, aesthetic, and cognitive—dominates philosophic discourse, even though contemporary philosophers rarely hold economics to be integral to moral philosophy. Examining the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the art of Marcel Proust, Edward Andrew provides the first sustained critical analysis of values discourse, an analysis that deconstructs its content and its form.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Senecan Moment:Patronage and Philosophy in the Eighteenth CenturyEdward AndrewThis piece examines the place of patronage in eighteenth-century thought and specifically Diderot's analysis of Seneca's philosophy of the art of graceful giving and grateful receiving.1 Patronage, in Burke's definition, is "the tribute which opulence owes to genius."2 However, the patronage of thought has been rarely discussed by political theorists, and when mentioned favorably by thinkers such as Rousseau or (...) Burke, their accounts were not a central theme of their work. When patronage was a central theme, such as Johnson's letter to Lord Chesterfield or D'Alembert's Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands, the practice is deprecated as obsolete.3 Thinkers who pride themselves on their independence of thought have usually been reluctant to declare their dependence upon patrons. However, most of the thinkers of the eighteenth century who preached intellectual independence depended upon royal or aristocratic patronage.4 Indeed, one might say that the ideal of intellectual [End Page 277] autonomy was forged in conditions of intellectual dependence on royal or aristocratic patrons.Francis Bacon wrote that "books, such as are worthy of the name of books, ought to have no other patrons but truth and reason." Yet Bacon's Advancement of Learning, dedicated to James I, is forthright in admitting that most scholars are not independently wealthy and thus must court the rich and must submit to the powerful. In the same work Bacon denounced Seneca as a "Trencher Philosopher" who served and supped well at a royal court.5 Seneca's De Benefiis, the classic text on patronage, was often translated into English and French in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries6 ; and it was highly regarded by eighteenth-century thinkers, such as La Mettrie, Lagrange, Rousseau, D'Holbach, Hume, Smith, and Diderot.7 Since Rousseau shared Hume's admiration for Seneca, Hume concluded his account of Rousseau's ingratitude for Hume's patronage, Exposé succinct de la contestation que s'est élevée entre M. Hume et M. Rousseau, with a quotation from Seneca's De Beneficiis.8 Diderot's Essai sur la vie de Sénèque le philosophe, sur ses écrits, et sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron and Essai sur les règnes de Claude et de Néron et sur les Moeurs et les Écrits de Sénèque were unique among eighteenth-century thinkers in providing an extended defense of patronage. Diderot's work is a sustained analysis of Seneca's important treatise on the arts of graceful giving, graceful receiving, and graceful requiting, the three graces that made the world go around.In Rameau's Nephew Diderot and Rameau agreed that everyone has to get into unnatural postures and jump through hoops to please their patrons. But, Diderot added, "there is one human being who is exempted from this pantomime. That is the philosopher who has nothing and asks for nothing."9 Diderot seems to celebrate the self-sufficient Cynic Diogenes who lived from nature: "Whom does the savage beg from? The earth, the animals and fishes, the trees and plants and roots and streams." But Diderot knew that Diogenes was not [End Page 278] one of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's self-sufficient savages; Diogenes lived by begging from his fellow citizens and taking what he needed from others—for all property is common for the wise man. Indeed, the honest Diogenes lived much as did the truth-telling sponge, Rameau. Moreover, Diderot agreed with Rameau's form of Epicureanism—not that money is the chief good but that money is essential for life's vital pleasures. Diderot wrote: "I am far from despising sensual pleasures. I have a palate too and it is tickled by a delicate wine or dish" as well as by beautiful women and drunken parties with his friends.10In short, Diogenes's life would not have satisfied Diderot. The more useful model of the philosophic life was the immensely rich Stoic, Seneca. Diderot devoted two of his last and longest works to a justification of the life of Seneca, and the place of patronage... (shrink)

The Black Circle explores the Russian roots of one of the most brilliant and seminal thinkers of the twentieth century. The subtitle, A Life of Alexandre Kojève, is perhaps misleading because Jeff...