Are there any prima facie reasons that democracies might have for disenfranchising older citizens? This question reflects increasingly salient, but often incompletely theorized complaints that members of democratic publics advance about older citizens’ electoral influence. Rather than rejecting these complaints out of hand, we explore whether, suitably reconstructed, they withstand democratic scrutiny. More specifically, we examine whether the account of political equality that seems to most fittingly capture the logic of these complaints – namely, equal opportunity of political influence over (...) electoral outcomes – can justify disenfranchising older citizens. We conclude that equal opportunity of influence cannot ground a blanket disenfranchisement of older people and that, taken in conjunction with other general considerations that apply to all sound electoral policies, partial disenfranchisement proposals (i.e. proposals for reducing the electoral influence of older citizens via age-weighted voting) are both quasi-inapplicable and practically unrobust across a relevant range of political contexts. (shrink)

This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...) to nonreductive physicalism, including versions of the exclusion argument. This paper examines some features of three recent versions of intralevelism defended by John Gibbons, Markus Schlosser, and Amie Thomasson. This paper shows that the distinctive problems faced by these three representative versions of intralevelism suggest that the intralevelist strategy does not provide a viable solution to the exclusion problem. (shrink)

Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made (...) true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.RésuméDe nombreux réalistes des pouvoirs supposent que les pouvoirs des objets sont identiques aux dispositions des objets et, par conséquent, que le « pouvoir » et la « disposition » sont interchangeables. Dans cet article, j'ai pour objectif de démêler les dispositions des pouvoirs dans le but d'avoir une meilleure idée de la façon dont les pouvoirs et les dispositions se rapportent les uns aux autres. Je présente et défends un réalisme des dispositions modeste fondées sur un réalisme des pouvoirs standard fort. Je soutiens que chaque disposition-ascription correcte que nous pouvons faire d'un objet est rendue vraie par les manifestations vers lesquelles un pouvoir donné ou une collection de pouvoirs de l'objet est dirigé. (shrink)

Extended Abstract This book introduces and develops a new, universal method of the scientific comprehension of reality providing the objective, ...

In Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary debates about the fundamental nature of law—an issue that has been at the heart of legal philosophy for centuries. What the law is seems to be a matter of fact, but this fact has normative significance: it tells people what they ought to do. Marmor argues that the myriad questions raised by the factual and normative features of law actually depend on the possibility of reduction—whether the legal (...) domain can be explained in terms of something else, more foundational in nature. In addition to exploring the major issues in contemporary legal thought, Philosophy of Law provides a critical analysis of the people and ideas that have dominated the field in past centuries. It will be essential reading for anyone curious about the nature of law. (shrink)

This paper is a brief survey of the history of Altai shamanism in the 20th Century, and of the main influences, both from "inside" (from within the Altai community) and from the outside onto shamanic beliefs and practices of the Altai, especially onto the shamanic revival. Based on my experiences living in 1988 and 1989 in Gorny Altai, the paper reports on aspects of present‐day shamanism, and the emergence of neo‐shamanism in the post‐Soviet period. The decline of shamanism due to (...) the impact of the Old Believers, the Orthodox Church and the emergence of Burkhanism in 1904, as well as the repression during the Soviet period, is described and is noted as influential in contributing to the current revival of shamanism in its "neo‐shamanistic" form. Several factors that facilitate the regeneration of shamanism are identified and discussed. (shrink)

An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behaviour; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgements is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent (...) nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with the analysis of fragments of a discourse or text that express arguments suspected of being denials of the antecedent. I first argue that one needs to distinguish between two senses of ‘the argument expressed’. Second, I show that, with respect to one of these senses, given a Gricean account of the pragmatics of conditionals, some such fragments systematically express arguments that are valid.

Andrei Pop argues that Frege's distinction between sense and reference, concept and object, and asserted and unasserted thought provides a superior account of the overlapping categories of fiction and art. This book also tackles case studies in Fregean art history and theory.

Tommie Shelby articulates a nonideal theory of black US ghettos that casts them as consequences of an intolerably unjust institutional structure. I argue that, despite some of its significant merits, Shelby’s theory is weakened by his rejection of integration as a principle for reforming disadvantaged ghettos and correcting structural injustices in the US. In particular, I argue that Shelby unwarrantedly downplays the socio-economic efficiency of integrationist policies and fails to consider some of the ways in which integration might count as (...) a duty of justice. (shrink)

The articles in this issue are devoted to the question of whether consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality. In recent years the physicalist orthodoxy in the science and philosophy of consciousness has been challenged by a panpsychist insurgency (Chalmers, 2016; Goff, 2017; 2019), panpsychism being the view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical universe. This new wave of panpsychists claim that their view avoids the deep challenges faced by physicalism as well as those faced (...) by dualism, the traditional rival of physicalism. The best way to test whether panpsychism lives up to its promise is for philosophers and scientists to explore the pros and cons of panpsychism in discussion and in writing. Most of these articles were presented in some form at a workshop on the theme of 'Consciousness as Fundamental' at Marist College in Poughkeepsie, New York, in September of 2023. This was one of two workshops that are part of a John Templeton Foundation funded project (Grant #62683) co-directed by Andrei A. Buckareff and Philip Goff on the theme of 'Panpsychism and Pan(en)theism: Philosophy of Mind Meets Philosophy of Religion'. Yanssel Garcia's article, entitled 'Is Consciousness Fundamental?', was the winner of an essay competition hosted by the project. These articles address the theme of whether consciousness is fundamental from a variety of perspectives, most focusing on different puzzles that arise if we assume a panpsychist framework in trying to explain consciousness. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence (...) levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. (shrink)

The paper gives an overview of the Russian higher education history, outlines its current state, the challenges and opportunities for its modernization in the nearest future. A special emphasis is made on the role of international cooperation in the higher education development and prospects for Russia’s integration into the global educational space. Andrei Kortunov is President of the Moscow based New Eurasia Foundation. He has managed a number of education-focused programs in Russia, working closely with governmental agencies, higher education (...) institutions, international consultancies and foreign foundations. (shrink)

Andrei Timotin | : L’objectif de cette étude est de dégager la structure générale et les articulations de la théorie de la prière de Jamblique et de préciser sa place dans l’histoire du platonisme. Elle montre comment la doctrine de la prière remplace, chez Jamblique, la démonologie médio-platonicienne en tant que théorie de la médiation entre les hommes et les dieux. Cette transformation permet de comprendre l’évolution de la théorie de la prière, dans le cadre de l’histoire du platonisme, (...) d’une pratique religieuse à caractère philosophique vers une réalité d’ordre métaphysique. | : The goal of this study is to bring out the general structure and the articulations of Iamblichus’ theory of prayer and to define its place in the history of Platonism. It shows how the doctrine of prayer replaces, in Iamblichus, the Middle-Platonic demonology as a theory of mediation between men and gods. This transformation allows us to understand the evolution of the theories of prayer in the context of the history of Platonism from a religious practice with philosophical meaning to a metaphysical reality. (shrink)

Social conventions are those arbitrary rules and norms governing the countless behaviors all of us engage in every day without necessarily thinking about them, from shaking hands when greeting someone to driving on the right side of the road. In this book, Andrei Marmor offers a pathbreaking and comprehensive philosophical analysis of conventions and the roles they play in social life and practical reason, and in doing so challenges the dominant view of social conventions first laid out by David (...) Lewis. Marmor begins by giving a general account of the nature of conventions, explaining the differences between coordinative and constitutive conventions and between deep and surface conventions. He then applies this analysis to explain how conventions work in language, morality, and law. Marmor clearly demonstrates that many important semantic and pragmatic aspects of language assumed by many theorists to be conventional are in fact not, and that the role of conventions in the moral domain is surprisingly complex, playing mostly an auxiliary and supportive role. Importantly, he casts new light on the conventional foundations of law, arguing that the distinction between deep and surface conventions can be used to answer the prevalent objections to legal conventionalism. Social Conventions is a much-needed reappraisal of the nature of the rules that regulate virtually every aspect of human conduct. (shrink)

Law in the Age of Pluralism contains a collection of essays on the intersection of legal and political philosophy. Written within the analytical tradition in jurisprudence, the collection covers a wide range of topics, such as the nature of law and legal theory, the rule of law, the values of democracy and constitutionalism, moral aspects of legal interpretation, the nature of rights, economic equality, and more. The essays in this volume explore issues where law, morality and politics meet, and discuss (...) some of the key challenges facing liberal democracies. Marmor posits that a liberal state must first and foremost respect people's personal autonomy and their differing, though reasonable, conceptions of the good and the just. This basic respect for pluralism is shown to entail a rather skeptical attitude towards grand theories of law and state, such as contemporary constitutionalism or Dworkin's conception of 'law as integrity'. The values of pluralism and respect for autonomy, however, are also employed to justify some of the main aspects of a liberal state, such as the value of democracy, the rule of law, and certain conceptions of equality. The essays are organized in three groups: the first considers the rule of law, democracy and constitutionalism. The second group consists of several essays on the nature of law, legal theory, and their relations to morality. Finally, the collection concludes with essays on the nature of rights, the limits of rights discourse, and the value of economic equality. (shrink)

In her recent paper, “A Defense of Substance Causation,” Ann Whittle makes a case for substance causation. In this paper, assuming that causation is a generative or productive relation, I argue that Whittle’s argument is not successful. While substances are causally relevant in causal processes owing to outcomes being counterfactually dependent upon their role in such occurrences, the real productive work in causal processes is accomplished by the causal powers of substances.

The book provides a novel account of the ontological foundations of institutional facts, and argues that there are some important epistemic and methodological implications that follow from this ontology. The first part of the book offers a detailed reductive account of institutional facts by way of metaphysical grounding. It shows that an ontology of institutional facts requires an ontology of social rules, and the latter depends on a reductive account of collective attitudes. The book offers a grounding-reductive account of collective (...) attitudes that comports with methodological individualism. It argues for a functional explanation of the constitutive relations between rules and practices, challenging John Searle’s influential distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. The second part of the book aims to show that there are a number of important epistemic and methodological conclusions that follow from the ontology of institutional facts. First, that there are certain types of widespread errors about the socially constructed aspects of reality that are not metaphysically possible. The second methodological argument is that a metaphysical account of institutional reality does not have to provide an explanation of the relevant social practices in terms that would rationalize the practice for the participants themselves. Finally, the last chapter explains the idea of hierarchical practices, arguing that basic social power-structuring rules function to transform brute power into an elaborate normative framework, constituting authoritative institutions that are central to our institutional reality. (shrink)

We propose that human reasoning relies on an inherence heuristic, an implicit cognitive process that leads people to explain observed patterns (e.g., girls wear pink) in terms of the inherent features of their constituents (e.g., pink is an inherently feminine color). We then demonstrate how this proposed heuristic can provide a unified account for a broad set of findings spanning areas of research that might at first appear unrelated (e.g., system justification, nominal realism, is–ought errors in moral reasoning). By revealing (...) the deep commonalities among the diverse phenomena that fall under its scope, our account is able to generate new insights into these phenomena, as well as new empirical predictions. A second main goal of this paper, aside from introducing the inherence heuristic, is to articulate the proposal that the heuristic serves as a foundation for the development of psychological essentialism. More specifically, we propose that essentialism—which is the common belief that natural and social categories are underlain by hidden, causally powerful “essences”—emerges over the first few years of life as an elaboration of the earlier, and more open-ended, intuitions supplied by the inherence heuristic. In the final part of the paper, we distinguish our proposal from competing accounts (e.g., Strevens' K-laws) and clarify the relationship between the inherence heuristic and related cognitive tendencies (e.g., the correspondence bias). In sum, this paper illuminates a basic cognitive process that emerges early in life and is likely to have profound effects on many aspects of human psychology. (shrink)

This Element focuses on some core conceptual and ontological issues related to pantheistic conceptions of God by engaging with recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on this topic. The conceptual and ontological commitments of pantheism are contrasted with those of other conceptions of God. The concept of God assumed by pantheism is clarified and the question about what type of unity the universe must exhibit in order to be identical with God receives the most attention. It is argued that (...) the sort of unity the universe must display is the sort of unity characteristic of conscious cognitive systems. Some alternative ontological frameworks for grounding such cognitive unity are considered. Further, the question of whether God can be understood as personal on pantheism is explored. (shrink)

We perform a frequency analysis of the EPR-Bell argumentation. One of the main consequences of our investigation is that the existence of probability distributions of the Kolmogorov-type which was supposed by some authors is a mathematical assumption which may not be supported by actual physical quantum processes. In fact, frequencies for hidden variables for quantum particles and measurement devices may fluctuate from run to run of an experiment. These fluctuations of frequencies for micro-parameters need not contradict to the stabilization of (...) frequencies for physical observables. If, nevertheless, micro-parameters are also statistically stable, then violations of Bell's inequality and its generalizations may be a consequence of dependence of collectives corresponding to two different measurement devices. Such a dependence implies the violation of the factorization rule for the simultaneous probability distribution. Formally this rule coincides with the well known BCHS locality condition (or outcome independence condition). However, the frequency approach implies totally different interpretation of dependence. It is not dependence of events, but it is dependence of collectives. Such a dependence may be induced by the same preparation procedure. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 3, Page 334-356, July 2022.

We prove that for a natural class of first-order formulas the validity problem is Π p 2 -complete.

This collection brings together the best contemporary philosophical work in the area of intersection between philosophy of language and the law. Some of the contributors are philosophers of language who are interested in applying advances in philosophy of language to legal issues, and some of the participants are philosophers of law who are interested in applying insights and theories from philosophy of language to their work on the nature of law and legal interpretation. By making this body of recent work (...) available in a single volume, readers will gain both a general overview of the various interactions between language and law, and also detailed analyses of particular areas in which these interactions manifest. The contributions to this volume are grouped under three main general areas: The first area concerns a critical assessment, in light of recent advances in philosophy of language, of the foundational role of language in understanding the nature of law itself. The second main area concerns a number of ways in which an understanding of language can resolve some of the issues prevalent in legal interpretation, such as the various ways in which semantic content can differ from law's assertive content; the contribution of presuppositions and pragmatic implicatures in understanding what the law conveys; the role of vagueness in legal language, for example. The third general topic concerns the role of language in the context of particular legal doctrines and legal solutions to practical problems, such as the legal definitions of inchoate crimes, the legal definition of torture, or the contractual doctrines concerning default rules. Together, these three key issues cover a wide range of philosophical interests in law that can be elucidated by a better understanding of language and linguistic communication. (shrink)

Viebahn (2018) has recently argued that several tests for ambiguity, such as the conjunction-reduction test, are not reliable as tests for polysemy, but only as tests for homonymy. I look at the more fine-grained distinction between regular and irregular polysemy and I argue for a more nuanced conclusion: the tests under discussion provide systematic evidence for homonymy and irregular polysemy but need to be used with more care to test for regular polysemy. I put this conclusion at work in the (...) context of the debate over the alleged referential-attributive ambiguity of the definite article. In reply to various criticisms, defenders of the ambiguity view argue that this is a case of polysemy. But opponents object that the dual use of the definite article fails tests for ambiguity. The debate seems to have come to stalemate, unless the relevance of the tests is determined for cases of alleged polysemy. I conclude that the balance of considerations incline towards rejecting the ambiguity thesis. (shrink)

We analyze the interrelation of quantum and classical entanglement. The latter notion is widely used in classical optic simulation of some quantum-like features of light. We criticize the common interpretation that “quantum nonlocality” is the basic factor differing quantum and classical realizations of entanglement. Instead, we point to the breakthrough Grangier et al. experiment on coincidence detection which was done in 1986 and played the crucial role in rejection of classical field models in favor of quantum mechanics. Classical entanglement sources (...) produce light beams with the coefficient of second order coherence \} \ge 1.\) This feature of classical entanglement is obscured by using intensities of signals in different channels, instead of counting clicks of photo-detectors. The interplay between intensity and clicks counting is not just a technicality. We elevate this issue to the high foundational level. (shrink)

Alter elaborates and defends an ambitious argument advanced by Chalmers against physicalism. As Alter notes, the argument is valid. But I will argue that not all its premises are true. In particular, it is false that all physical truths are purely structural. In denying this, I focus not on the objects of pure physical theory but on the homely, macroscopic objects of our daily lives.

We presented a contextual statistical model of the probabilistic description of physical reality. Here contexts (complexes of physical conditions) are considered as basic elements of reality. There is discussed the relation with QM. We propose a realistic analogue of Bohr’s principle of complementarity. In the opposite to the Bohr’s principle, our principle has no direct relation with mutual exclusivity for observables. To distinguish our principle from the Bohr’s principle and to give better characterization, we change the terminology and speak about (...) supplementarity, instead of complementarity. Supplementarity is based on the interference of probabilities. It has quantitative expression trough a coefficient which can be easily calculated from experimental statistical data. We need not appeal to the Hilbert space formalism and noncommutativity of operators representing observables. Moreover, in our model there exists pairs of supplementary observables which cannot be represented in the complex Hilbert space. There are discussed applications of the principle of supplementarity outside quantum physics. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive defence of legal positivism on the basis of a novel account of social conventions. Marmor argues that the law is founded on constitutive conventions, and that consequently moral values cannot determine what the law is.

Within the semiotic approach to explaining human behavior, individual actions can be understood as signs expressing senses of other actions. Such an understanding makes it possible to combine the description of actions in the individual and systemic societal perspective. The individual sense of an action refers to a finite number of other actions given to a person both in consciousness and in bodily experience as a whole. Social senses link actions into a single chain and are extracted from the senses (...) of previous actions. This model, while generally correct, is too abstract and requires a more detailed explanation of exactly how senses are extracted. The suggested possible explanation is that actions are mediated by situations in accordance with the formula of K. Lewin: the actual form of behavior is a function of the situation, understood as a set of properties of the acting person and her circumstances. The idea being expressed in the form of rules, according to which a typical form of behavior is performed by a person with a typical social status, being in a typical psychophysiological state and typical circumstances, gets a variant of the so-called “grammar of behavior”, explicating innate predispositions and implicit rules of culture. The question of how to understand the forms of behavior and situations typical for a particular culture can be solved on the basis of the biosemantics of R.G. Millikan. They can be understood as natural conventions — such that two conditions are sufficient for their existence: that they reproduce, and that this reproduction be based on the weight of precedents. Conventional language constructs are understood in biosemantics as lineages of tokens that were copied from each other and copies of which were used for repeated solutions to the same problem. They may have appeared by accident, but they survive and proliferate due to the performance of a vital function. At the same time, it is not at all necessary that the absolute majority of people conform to these conventions, just as the conventions do not have to be explicit prescriptions. Ideas about what forms of behavior are most appropriate in a given situation cannot be the same for different people, but this does not prevent the proliferation of conventional behavior. (shrink)

Bekenstein proposed that the spectrum of horizon area of quantized black holes must be discrete and uniformly spaced. We examine this proposal in the context of spherically symmetric charged black holes in a general class of gravity theories. By imposing suitable boundary conditions on the reduced phase space of the theory to incorporate the thermodynamic properties of these black holes and then performing a simplifying canonical transformation, we are able to quantize the system exactly. The resulting spectra of horizon area, (...) as well as that of charge are indeed discrete. Within this quantization scheme, near-extremal black holes (of any mass) turn out to be highly quantum objects, whereas extremal black holes do not appear in the spectrum, a result that is consistent with the postulated third law of black hole thermodynamics. (shrink)