Our words are vague, yet the world is precise. This dissertation consists of three essays that jointly attempt to articulate, explore, and defend this claim. In the first essay, I present my positive proposal for a non-metaphysical treatment of vagueness. Inspired by research on the Problem of the Many, I claim that we are speaking many perfectly precise languages simultaneously and that each speech act involves uttering many perfectly precise sentences. This position, which I call supersententialism, is the most plausible (...) alternative to metaphysical vagueness: it provides a fully reductive account of vagueness that preserves the T-schema. The second essay aims to address a rampant, albeit unnoticed, argument schema that purports to show that non-metaphysical accounts of vagueness cannot explain vagueness in fundamental, or perfectly natural, properties. In response, I propose a position that I call ersatz metaphysical vagueness according to which the term ‘perfectly natural’ is vague. Ersatz metaphysical vagueness retains the idea that the world is precise, but replicates the advantages of genuine metaphysical vagueness. I show how, by adopting this hypothesis, there can be vagueness in attributions of perfectly natural properties arising from the vagueness in our notion of perfect naturalness rather than from ‘the world itself’. Ersatz metaphysical vagueness thus provides us with a highly general alternative to genuine metaphysical vagueness. The final essay explores the relationship between metaphysical vagueness and ontological deflationism. Ontological deflationist positions treat the quantifier as having a highly plastic meaning. This plasticity naturally leads to vagueness in the quantifier. Thus, ontological deflationists are committed to vague existence. Is this vague existence ‘metaphysical vagueness’ or ‘vagueness in the world’? The rest of the essay clarifies this question and answers it under various clarifications. (shrink)

As capitalist economies have shifted their primary focus from providing goods and services for all, to concentrating wealth at the top echelons of societies, social entrepreneurs have been one source of re-capturing the original intent of capitalism. Social entrepreneurs have combined the efficiency and effectiveness of business organizations with the social concerns of many non-profit and governmental agencies. As a result, social entrepreneurship is viewed as having significant potential for alleviating many of the social ills we now face. To accomplish (...) this mission, however, will require expansion of social enterprises beyond their current footprints. We explore alternate methods of expansion, scaling and replication, and then examine potential catalysts, which can enable social entrepreneurs to attain their goals of social improvement. The catalysts we identify are effectual logic, enhanced legitimacy through appropriate reporting metrics, and information technology. We conclude with two brief case studies that exemplify how these catalysts are currently working to enhance the effectiveness of social start-ups. (shrink)

La Décennie des Nations unies pour les femmes (1975‑1985) a coïncidé avec une brève période d’ouverture au cours de la guerre froide, lorsque les nations nouvellement décolonisées semblèrent avoir le dessus, ayant pris le contrôle de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies et de plusieurs agences de l’ONU, où elles promouvaient l’idée d’un nouvel ordre économique international. Cet article examine brièvement deux réseaux d’intellectuelles activistes basées dans le Sud qui ont émergé à la fin de cette décennie. L’Association des femmes africaines (...) pour la recherche et le développement (AFARD/ AAWORD), créée en 1977, a démontré qu’il était possible de réorienter radicalement les programmes de développement vers le bienêtre et la durabilité plutôt que vers la productivité et la croissance. L’association Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), fondée en 1984, partageait les objectifs de l’AFARD et en incluait quelques-unes des membres, mais elle reflétait un nouveau contexte de la guerre froide où le développement s’est réorienté vers des solutions néolibérales. (shrink)

Nous vivons présentement un nouveau moment historique du capita­lisme avec la montée en puissance de sa financiarisation , avec la chute du mur de Berlin et l’implosion du communisme , avec le retour des religions à l’avant-scène de l’espace public mondial , avec l’échec du développement dans les pays du Sud simultanément à la montée dans les pays du Nord de la précarité du travail, avec l’urgence écologique, notamment avec le réchauffement climatique, menace de toutes les menaces sur ce plan. (...) Ces tendances fortes ont ébranlé les certitudes de la deuxième partie du xxe siècle. Mais, partout dans le monde, nous avons éga­lement assisté à l’émergence ou au renouvellement de mouvements sociaux qui exigent plus de démocratie, de contrôle des communautés sur leur développe­ment, de justice sociale et de transition écologique de leur économie. Un véritable changement de paradigme, de politique et de stratégie prend peut-être place progressivement. Espoir réinventé ? De quoi s’agit-il plus précisément ? (shrink)

This article studies the evolution of the urban space of Boksburg, a neighbour-town to Johannesburg. The forms of political activism developed to resist apartheid, as well as the very needs of the segregated economy, had tied a number of links which dissolved during the 1990s. Is a city like Boksburg condemned to fragmentation as the only alternative to segregation? Can this situation be remedied by policies of urbanism based on participative democracy? Or should we look for urbanity somewhere else, in (...) a specific relation to time and space, as constitutive of the urban identity? (shrink)

Free will has been the object of debate in the context of addiction given that addiction could compromise an individual’s ability to choose freely between alternative courses of action. Proponents of the brain-disease model of addiction have argued that a neuroscience perspective on addiction reduces the attribution of free will because it relocates the cause of the disorder to the brain rather than to the person, thereby diminishing the blame attributed to the person with an addiction. Others have worried that (...) such displacement of free will attribution would make the person with a drug addiction less responsible. Using the paradigmatic literature on the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations, we tested whether neuroscience information diminishes attributions of free will in the context of addiction and whether respondent characteristics influence these attributions and modulate the effect of neuroscience information. We performed a large-scale, web-based experiment with 2,378 German participants to explore how attributions of free will in the context of addiction to either alcohol or cocaine are affected by: (1) a text with a neurobiological explanation of addiction, (2) a neuroimage showing effects of addiction on the brain, and (3) a combination of a text and a neuroimage, in comparison to a control group that received no information. Belief in free will was measured using the FAD-Plus scale and was, subsequent to factor analysis, separated into two factors: responsibility and volition. The investigated respondent characteristics included gender, age, education, self-reported knowledge of neuroscience, substance-use disorder (SUD), and having a friend with SUD. We found that attributions of volition (in the cocaine-subsample) were reduced in the text and neuroimage-treatment compared to the control group. However, respondent characteristics such as education and self-reported knowledge of neuroscience were associated with lower attributions of responsibility for both substances, and education was associated with lower attribution of volition for the alcohol sub-sample. Interaction analyses showed that knowledge of neuroscience was found to generally decrease attribution of responsibility. Further research on attribution of free will should consider the effects of context and respondent characteristics, which appeared surprisingly larger than those induced by experimental treatments. (shrink)

Ayahuasca is a psychedelic beverage from the Amazon rainforest, used in spiritual and religious settings for medical purposes. Since the 1990s onwards, several religious and neo‐shamanic groups have been using it in Uruguay within the psychospiritual networks. Some participants go to rituals of ayahuasca looking for therapeutic alternatives to certain ailments, such as substance use disorders (SUDs). In this chapter, three cases of former patients who recovered in a neo‐shamanic center that uses ayahuasca for the treatment of SUDs are (...) described and analyzed. The center is conducted by a psychologist trained in the Peruvian vegetalismo tradition. An ethnographic description of the ritual setting as well as the process of psychotherapeutic intervention of the center are described. In‐depth interviews were used to collect the narratives of the three patients. A medical anthropology perspective is used, focusing on different subjective trajectories: the general biographic trajectory, SUDs trajectory, spiritual trajectory, and the trajectory under the entheogenic field, ayahuasca included. As we discuss, the impact of ayahuasca rituals ceremonies should be explained not only by ayahuasca as a psychedelic compound, but as a psychotherapeutic tool immersed in a social, cultural, and spiritual setting aimed at the treatment of SUDs. (shrink)

Parental substance use is a major risk factor for child development, heightening the risk of drug problems in adolescence and young adulthood, and exposing offspring to several types of traumatic event. First, prenatal drug exposure can be considered a form of trauma itself, with subtle but long-lasting sequalae at the neuro-behavioural level. Second, parents’ addiction often entails a childrearing environment characterised by poor parenting skills, disadvantaged contexts and adverse childhood experiences, leading to dysfunctional outcomes. Young adults born from/raised by parents (...) with drug problems and who develop a Substance Used Disorder (SUD) themselves might display a particularly severe condition in terms of cognitive deficits and impaired personality function. This preliminary study aims to investigate the role of early exposure to drugs as a traumatic event, capable of affecting the psychological status of young drug addicts. In particular, it intends to examine the neuropsychological functioning and personality profile of young adults with severe SUDs who were exposed to drugs early in their family context. The research involved 3 groups each consisting of 15 young adults (aged 18-24): a group of inpatients diagnosed with SUDs and exposed to drugs early, a comparison group of non-exposed inpatients and a group of non-exposed youth without SUDs. A neuropsychological battery (Esame Neuropsicologico Breve-2), an assessment procedure for personality disorders (Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure-200) and the Symptom CheckList-90-Revised were administered. According to present preliminary results, young drug addicts exposed to drugs during their developmental age were characterised by elevated rates of neuropsychological impairments, especially at the expense of attentive and executive functions; personality disorders were also common but did not differentiate them from non-exposed young people with SUDs. Alternative multi-focused prevention and intervention programs are needed for children of drug-misusing parents, addressing executive functions and adopting a trauma-focused approach. (shrink)

The authors argue that a free market paradigm facilitates wealth creation but does little to distribute that wealth in a just manner. In order to achieve the social goal of distributive justice, the concept of a fair market is introduced and explored. The authors then examine three drivers that can help improve the lives of all people, especially the poor: civil society, its institutions, and business. After exploring the roles these drivers might play in developing fair markets, we describe three (...) enablers that serve as catalysts for change: the effects of globalization, the impact of technology, and the emergence of entrepreneurial activity. We conclude by making recommendations for establishing fair markets and provide exemplars of two firms that embody the arguments made in the article. (shrink)

According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

A relatively small segment of business, known as social entrepreneurship (SE), is increasingly being acknowledged as an effective source of solutions for a variety of social problems. Because society tends to view "new" solutions as "the" solution, we are concerned that SE will soon be expected to provide answers to our most pressing social ills. In this paper we call into question the ability of SE, by itself, to provide solutions on a scope necessary to address large-scale social issues. SE (...) cannot reasonably be expected to solve social problems on a large scale for a variety of reasons. The first we label the orga nizational legitimacy argument. This argument leads to our second argument, the isomorphism argument. We also advance three other claims, the moral y political and structural arguments. After making our arguments, we explore ways in which SE, in concert with other social institutions, can effectively address social ills. We also present two examples of successful ventures in which SEs partnered with governments and other institutions. (shrink)

According to the plurivaluationist, our vague discourse doesn’t have a single meaning. Instead, it has many meanings, each of which is precise—and it is this plurality of meanings that is the source of vagueness. I believe plurivaluationist positions are underdeveloped and for this reason unpopular. This paper attempts to correct this situation by offering a particular development of plurivaluationism that I call supersententialism. The supersententialist leverages lessons from another area of research—the Problem of the Many—in service of the plurivaluationist position. (...) The Problem reveals theoretical reasons to accept that there are many cats where we thought there was one; the supersententialist claims that we are in a similar situation with respect to languages, propositions and sentences. I argue that the parallel suggested by the supersententialist reveals unappreciated advantages and lines of defense for plurivaluationism. (shrink)

Does moral vagueness require ontic vagueness? A central challenge for nonontic treatments of moral vagueness arises from the referential stability of moral terms across small changes in how they are applied: if moral vagueness is not ontic vagueness, it’s hard to explain this referential stability. Pointing to this challenge, Miriam Schoenfield has argued that moral vagueness is ontic vagueness, at least for a moral realist. I disagree. I argue that a moral realist can use a conceptual role semantics for moral (...) terms to give a purely semantic treatment of moral vagueness. (shrink)

We provide an overview of the meta-ontological position known as "Quantifier Variance".

This paper investigates a structural void that, especially in the context of poor or developing nations, prevents economic growth from being more inclusive and benefiting wider sections of society. The authors initially examine the imperative for inclusive growth, one encompassing a focus on poverty and development. Utilizing social choice theory, and a capability deprivation perspective, we observe that the poor experience deprivations due to a deficiency in their personal autonomy. This in turn is deeply interwoven with the concept of identity. (...) Legally recognizing the poor as individuals, and providing them with proof of their identity, will empower them and facilitate inclusive growth and poverty alleviation. These conceptual arguments are illustrated with the description of a biometric-linked developmental initiative that is providing proof of identity to 1.2 billion residents of India. By establishing a robust identity management system, the project aims to ensure more inclusive growth and efficiently target welfare programs. The authors further investigate how the establishment of identity rights facilitates financial inclusion, property ownership, and necessity-driven entrepreneurial action. Biometric identification on this scale is, however, fraught with dangers to civil liberties and has other serious ethical consequences. In the last section, issues around privacy and security are debated while highlighting the need for external review and independent monitoring to define the project’s boundaries and usages. (shrink)

Adam Elga (Philosophers’ Imprint, 10(5), 1–11, 2010) presents a diachronic puzzle to supporters of imprecise credences and argues that no acceptable decision rule for imprecise credences can deliver the intuitively correct result. Elga concludes that agents should not hold imprecise credences. In this paper, I argue for a two-part thesis. First, I show that Elga’s argument is incomplete: there is an acceptable decision rule that delivers the intuitive result. Next, I repair the argument by offering a more elaborate diachronic puzzle (...) that is more difficult for imprecise Bayesians to avoid. (shrink)

This paper asks: Is the quantifier variantist committed to metaphysical vagueness? My investigation of this question goes via a study of vague existence. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist is committed to vague existence and that the vague existence posited by the variantist requires a puzzling sort of metaphysical vagueness. Specifically, I distinguish between (what I call) positive and negative metaphysical vagueness. Positive metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) the claim that there is vagueness in the world; negative metaphysical vagueness is (roughly) (...) the claim that there is vagueness that is not in our language or thought. I’ll argue that the quantifier variantist’s commitment to vague existence comes with positive metaphysical vagueness -- even if it doesn't require negative metaphysical vagueness. (shrink)

Many accept David Lewis's (1983) claim that, among the candidate meanings for our predicates, some are more natural than others -- they do better or worse at ``carving nature at its joints''. Call this claim predicate naturalism. Disagreement remains over whether the notion of naturalness extends ``beyond the predicate'' (à la Sider, 2011). Are the candidate meanings of logical vocabulary also more or less natural? Call this claim logical naturalism. -/- One motivation for predicate naturalism comes from its supposed ability (...) to help rebut various radical indeterminacy arguments associated with Hilary Putnam (1977, 1980, 1981). It does so in combination with a popular meta-semantic theory called reference magnetism. I argue that the same threats of Putnam-style radical indeterminacy rearise for proponents of predicate naturalism -- threats which logical naturalism helps rebuts. So, if we accept predicate naturalism because it helps fend off threats of indeterminacy, we should also accept logical naturalism. (shrink)

I propose a view that I call "Ersatz Metaphysical Vagueness" according to which the term "perfectly natural" can be semantically vague. As its name suggests, the view mimics traditional metaphysical vagueness without the radical metaphysical underpinnings. In particular, the ersatzer avoids a widely accepted argument schema (advanced by JRG Williams, Ted Sider, Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne and others) according to which, if there is no metaphysical vagueness, F-ness cannot be both perfectly natural and vague.

One desideratum for a theory of fundamentality is to give us the conceptual tools to articulate fruitful metaphysical distinctions between the assortment of ‘realist’ and ‘anti-realist’ positions in a given domain such as meta-ethics. The ability to articulate such distinctions gives us a way to assess rival theories of fundamentality, such as Fine’s grounding theory and Sider’s metaphysical semantic theory. Indeed, Sider has argued that metaphysical semantic theories have an edge with respect to this desideratum and takes this as an (...) important reason to prefer those theories over rival grounding theories. This paper takes a closer look at how the rival theories compare with respect to questions of realism and defends the grounding theorist’s ability to meet the desideratum. (shrink)

We propose that firms that engage in morally imaginative sensemaking will manage society's changing ethical expectations more effectively than those engaging in habituated sensemaking. Specifically, we argue that managers engaging in habituated sensemaking will tend to view changes in expectations as threats and respond to them defensively. In contrast, morally imaginative managers will tend to see these same changes as opportunities and address them by proactively or interactively engaging stakeholders in learning processes. We contribute to the literature on moral imagination (...) by highlighting the value of moral imagination relative to conventional sensemaking, and by positioning moral imagination as an ongoing mode of sensemaking. While we recognize that managers' capacity to continuously address changing ethical expectations using moral imagination is constrained by cognitive limitations, we posit that morally imaginative sensemaking may economize on cognitive resources over time by enabling managers to avoid managing ethical issues unproductively based on habit. We also contribute to the issues management literature by calling attention to two underlying factors, managerial sensemaking mode and firm enterprise strategy, that drive companies' approaches to issues management. (shrink)

While investigating the role of business and accepting that profitable partnerships are the primary solution for poverty alleviation, we voice certain concerns that we hope will extend the authors’ discourse in Alleviating Poverty through Profitable Partnerships . We present a model that we believe can serve as an effective framework for addressing these issues. We then establish the imperative of inclusive growth. Here, we engage with the necessity of formulating strategies that focus on the pace and, importantly, the pattern of (...) economic growth, including its social and cultural dimensions. We also deliberate on the parameters of inclusive growth with the overriding objective of ensuring that multiple strata of society share the benefits of globalization. Turning to the critical role of institutions in promoting social welfare, we explore the impact of government policy vis-à-vis the leverage enjoyed by other social institutions. Despite the reality that state and private interests often operate at cross purposes, we argue that government must still be an integral part of the solution matrix. With direction from other social institutions, entrepreneurial forces can be unleashed to tackle endemic poverty prevalent in the base of the pyramid. We then provide an in-depth case study in which the availability of telecommunications in rural areas was utilized as a means to foster development and ensure inclusive growth. The conclusion examines lessons learned while operationalizing the model, and spells out the impact of our enablers at ground level. (shrink)

An ongoing argument often made by business ethicists is that a singular preoccupation on profitability, will lead, in the long run, to disvalue for all the stakeholders and the communities it affects, and often, economic challenges for the company. On the other hand, we argue, a preoccupation with ethics and CSR as the primary aims of a for-profit company, it is, on its own, like a preoccupation with profitability, unsustainable. Indeed, without economic viability, a company will fail. Both of these (...) contentions point to our conclusion that one must take care in changing habits and rethinking business models. We illustrate through case examples, that merely being ethical and socially responsible is insufficient for the long-term well-being of business just as a preoccupation with profits for their own sake also is insufficient. What is realistic, practical, pragmatic, sustainable and profitable for corporations, and what also serves the interests of multiple stakeholders including those in the communities they serve, is a true balance of ethics, CSR, and economic value-added. Expanding on the recent work of Husted and Allen, we call this a strategic global strategy approach. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic communities. I (...) introduce the notion of an epistemic environment, roughly the totality of resources and circumstances relevant to assessing the epistemically interesting statuses, such as knowledge. Fake news degrades our epistemic environment by undermining confidence in epistemic institutions and altering epistemic habits, thereby making the environment less conducive to achieving positive epistemic statuses. This is problematic even if the decrease in confidence and the altering of habits are rational. I end by considering solutions to these problems, stressing the importance of reproaching each other for proliferating fake news. I argue that we should reproach even faultless purveyors of fake news. This is because fake news typically arises in abnormal epistemic contexts, where there is widespread ignorance of, and noncompliance with, correct epistemic norms. (shrink)

The function of philosophy may be circumscribed as consisting in ma king a keen analysis of the peculiar nature of the crisis-situation, as it has existed among men throughout the centuries of human history, and as it manifested itself in definite ways at the various stages of this his tory. That is to say, philosophy may be regarded as the discipline which, again and again, will have to determine the authenticity of man's ex istence in the light of the changing (...) conditions of life, i. e. , man's chang ing needs and interests. Fundamentally, these needs may be regarded as being of a material, an intellectual, an aesthetical and a spiritual kind. On the grounds of the crisis, which inevitably exists among men on ac count of the controversial nature of their various truth-perspectives, as they are postulated on a personal level, in the sciences, in history, in the fine arts and in theology, man creates and re-creates the goods of civilization and the cultural values. The task of philosophy consists then in making an ever new assessment of man's changing needs, in terests and aspirations on the basis of the specific conflicts and prob lems with which man wrestles at a certain historical stage. It is in this way that the important philosophical systems were constructed, which we still admire to-day. (shrink)

Stanford, in Exceeding Our Grasp , presents a powerful version of the pessimistic meta-induction. He claims that theories typically have empirically inequivalent but nonetheless well-confirmed, serious alternatives which are unconceived. This claim should be uncontroversial. But it alone is no threat to scientific realism. The threat comes from Stanford’s further crucial claim, supported by historical examples, that a theory’s unconceived alternatives are “radically distinct” from it; there is no “continuity”. A standard realist reply to the meta-induction is that (...) past failures do not imply present ones because present theories are more successful than past ones. I have preferred to emphasize that present methodology is better than past ones. Stanford’s response to the standard reply is surprisingly brief and inadequate. He defends the inference from the uncontroversial claim but not that from the crucial one. He does not show that past discontinuity implies present discontinuity. Realism survives. (shrink)

Two visual world experiments investigated the processing of the implicature associated with some using a “gumball paradigm.” On each trial, participants saw an image of a gumball machine with an upper chamber with orange and blue gumballs and an empty lower chamber. Gumballs dropped to the lower chamber, creating a contrast between a partitioned set of gumballs of one color and an unpartitioned set of the other. Participants then evaluated spoken statements, such as “You got some of the blue gumballs.” (...) Experiment 1 investigated the time course of the pragmatic enrichment from some to not all when the only utterance alternatives available to refer to the different sets were some and all. In Experiment 2, the number terms two, three, four, and five were also included in the set of alternatives. Scalar implicatures were delayed relative to the interpretation of literal statements with all only when number terms were available. The results are interpreted as evidence for a constraint-based account of scalar implicature processing. (shrink)

Natural language conditionals seem to be subject to three logical requirements: they invalidate Antecedent Strengthening, they validate so-called Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents, and they allow for the replacement of logically equivalent clauses in antecedent position. Unfortunately, these requirements are jointly inconsistent. Conservative solutions to the puzzle drop Simplification, treating it as a pragmatic inference. I show that pragmatic accounts of Simplification fail, and develop a truthmaker semantics for conditionals that captures all the relevant data. Differently from existing truthmaker semantics, my (...) semantics extends, rather than replaces, standard possible worlds semantics. The main innovation is the notion of a truthmaker in play: this notion is cognitive, rather than metaphysical, and can be defined in a purely syntactic way. (shrink)

Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative (...) to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis. 1 Introduction2 The Conceptual Framework3 The No Alternatives Argument4 Discussion I: A Quantitative Analysis of the No Alternatives Argument5 Discussion II: The Number of Alternatives and the Problem of Underdetermination6 ConclusionsAppendix AAppendix B. (shrink)

There has been a probabilistic turn in contemporary cognitive science. Far and away, most of the work in this vein is Bayesian, at least in name. Coinciding with this development, philosophers have increasingly promoted Bayesianism as the best normative account of how humans ought to reason. In this paper, we make a push for exploring the probabilistic terrain outside of Bayesianism. Non-Bayesian, but still probabilistic, theories provide plausible competitors both to descriptive and normative Bayesian accounts. We argue for this general (...) idea via recent work on explanationist models of updating, which are fundamentally probabilistic but assign a substantial, non-Bayesian role to explanatory considerations. (shrink)

Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, (...) excluding alternatives that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations. (shrink)

Many political philosophers hold the Feasible Alternatives Principle (FAP): justice demands that we implement some reform of international institutions P only if P is feasible and P improves upon the status quo from the standpoint of justice. The FAP implies that any argument for a moral requirement to implement P must incorporate claims whose content pertains to the causal processes that explain the current state of affairs. Yet, philosophers routinely neglect the need to attend to actual causal processes. This (...) undermines their arguments concerning moral requirements to reform international institutions. The upshot is that philosophers’ arguments must engage in causal analysis to a greater extent than is typical. -/- [Supplement: Handout available at http://db.tt/fyuVW3Xv]. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the distribution and interpretation of a non-temporal use of the future tense in Italian, called ‘presumptive’ or ‘epistemic’, which we label here PF. We first distinguish PF from its closest modal relatives, namely epistemic necessity/possibility/likelihood modals, as well as weak necessity modals. We then propose an account of PF in declaratives and interrogatives that treats it as a special comparative subjective likelihood modal, and test its empirical predictions. A theoretical lesson drawn from this detailed study (...) of the semantics of PF is that semantics needs sharpened theoretical tools to be able to capture the fine-grained distinctions languages make when it comes to signaling modulated epistemic commitment to a proposition. (shrink)

The epistemology of risk examines how risks bear on epistemic properties. A common framework for examining the epistemology of risk holds that strength of evidential support is best modelled as numerical probability given the available evidence. In this essay I develop and motivate a rival ‘relevant alternatives’ framework for theorising about the epistemology of risk. I describe three loci for thinking about the epistemology of risk. The first locus concerns consequences of relying on a belief for action, where those (...) consequences are significant if the belief is false. The second locus concerns whether beliefs themselves—regardless of action—can be risky, costly, or harmful. The third locus concerns epistemic risks we confront as social epistemic agents. I aim to motivate the relevant alternatives framework as a fruitful approach to the epistemology of risk. I first articulate a ‘relevant alternatives’ model of the relationship between stakes, evidence, and action. I then employ the relevant alternatives framework to undermine the motivation for moral encroachment. Finally, I argue the relevant alternatives framework illuminates epistemic phenomena such as gaslighting, conspiracy theories, and crying wolf, and I draw on the framework to diagnose the undue skepticism endemic to rape accusations. (shrink)

Current philosophies of art remain sadly dominated by visions of its end and lamentations of decline. Defining the very notions of art and the aesthetic as special products of Western modernity, they suggest that postmodern challenges to traditional high culture pose a devastating danger to Art's future. Richard Shusterman's new book cuts through the seductive confusions of these views by tracing the earthy roots of aesthetic experience and showing how the recent flourishing of aesthetic forms outside modernity's sacralized realm of (...) fine art evince the persistent presence of an artistic impulse far deeper and more durable than the modernist moment. Performing Live defends the abiding power of aesthetic experience by exploring its diverse roles, methods, and meanings, especially in fields marginal to traditional aesthetics but now most vibrantly alive in today's culture and new media. Ranging from rap, techno, and country music to cinema, cyberspace and urban design, Shusterman develops his radical theory of "somaesthetics," charting the complex network of bodily arts so prominent in contemporary life and self-styling. By blending concrete aesthetic analysis with insightful social critique, Shusterman, a well-known pragmatist philosopher, provides a rich menu and critical guide for today's pursuit of the art of living. (shrink)

This essay examines several varieties of libertarian accounts of free will. Some require free actions to be uncaused, some require agent causation, and some require non-deterministic event causation. Difficulties are raised for all of these varieties.

Traditionally, skeptics as well as their opponents have agreed that in order to know that p one must be able, by some preferred means, to rule out all the alternatives to p. Recently, however, some philosophers have attempted to avert skepticism not (merely) by weakening the preferred means but rather by articulating a subset of the alternatives to p — the so-called relevant alternatives — and insisting that knowledge that p requires only that we be able (by (...) the preferred means) to rule out members of the set. In this paper I argue that a precise formulation of this new approach reveals it inadequate as a solution to skepticism. (shrink)

In this paper we extend the NeutroAlgebra & AntiAlgebra to the geometric spaces, by founding the NeutroGeometry & AntiGeometry. While the Non-Euclidean Geometries resulted from the total negation of one specific axiom (Euclid’s Fifth Postulate), the AntiGeometry results from the total negation of any axiom or even of more axioms from any geometric axiomatic system (Euclid’s, Hilbert’s, etc.) and from any type of geometry such as (Euclidean, Projective, Finite, Affine, Differential, Algebraic, Complex, Discrete, Computational, Molecular, Convex, etc.) Geometry, and the (...) NeutroGeometry results from the partial negation of one or more axioms [and no total negation of no axiom] from any geometric axiomatic system and from any type of geometry. Generally, instead of a classical geometric Axiom, one may take any classical geometric Theorem from any axiomatic system and from any type of geometry, and transform it by NeutroSophication or AntiSophication into a NeutroTheorem or AntiTheorem respectively in order to construct a NeutroGeometry or AntiGeometry. Therefore, the NeutroGeometry and AntiGeometry are respectively alternatives and generalizations of the Non-Euclidean Geometries. In the second part, we recall the evolution from Paradoxism to Neutrosophy, then to NeutroAlgebra & AntiAlgebra, afterwards to NeutroGeometry & AntiGeometry, and in general to NeutroStructure & AntiStructure that naturally arise in any field of knowledge. At the end, we present applications of many NeutroStructures in our real world. (shrink)

According to the Relevant Alternatives (RA) Theory of knowledge, knowing that something is the case involves ruling out (only) the relevant alternatives. The conception of knowledge in epistemic logic also involves the elimination of possibilities, but without an explicit distinction, among the possibilities consistent with an agent’s information, between those relevant possibilities that an agent must rule out in order to know and those remote, far-fetched or otherwise irrelevant possibilities. In this article, I propose formalizations of two versions (...) of the RA theory. Doing so clarifies a famous debate in epistemology, pitting Fred Dretske against David Lewis, about whether the RA theorist should accept the principle that knowledge is closed under known implication, familiar as the K axiom in epistemic logic. Dretske’s case against closure under known implication leads to a study of other closure principles, while Lewis’s defense of closure by appeal to the claimed context sensitivity of knowledge attributions leads to a study of the dynamics of context. Having followed the first lead at length in other work, here I focus more on the second, especially on logical issues associated with developing a dynamic epistemic logic of context change over models for the RA theory. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel argumentation framework to support Issue-Based Information System style debates on design alternatives, by providing an automatic quantitative evaluation of the positions put forward. It also identifies several formal properties of the proposed quantitative argumentation framework and compares it with existing non-numerical abstract argumentation formalisms. Finally, the paper describes the integration of the proposed approach within the design Visual Understanding Environment software tool along with three case studies in engineering design. The case studies show the (...) potential for a competitive advantage of the proposed approach with respect to state-of-the-art engineering design methods. (shrink)

Mandarin focus particles systematically have heterogeneous uses. By examining details of two focus particles jiu ‘only’ and dou ‘even’, this paper explores the hypothesis that varieties of alternatives give rise to systematic ‘ambiguities’. Specifically, by positing sum-based alternative sets and atom-based ones, it maintains unambiguous semantics of jiu as onlyweak and dou as even, while deriving their variability through interaction with alternatives. Independently motivated analyses of distributive/collective readings and contrastive topics, combined with varieties of alternatives, deliver the (...) full range of facts concerning jiu and dou. Theoretically, the paper illustrates an integration of Link, Landman’s theory of pluralites into Rooth’s alternative semantics. (shrink)