Lors de la récente « rétrospective » de l’œuvre de Bertrand Lavier au Centre Georges Pompidou à Paris, on pouvait voir, dans une des dernières salles de l’exposition, comme une « sorte » de peinture gestuelle, une toile ou un panneau, présentant de longs gestes enroulés, blancs, comme dans les plus « belles » des peintures de l’abstraction lyrique. La relation entre le support et la matière laisse à peine entrevoir qu’il ne s’agit pas tout à fait d’une peinture à (...) proprement parler. En examina... (shrink)

En 1785, Alexander Cozens publie un court traité, un manuel à l’usage des jeunes peintres les invitant à utiliser la tache et le hasard comme préalable à la composition de paysages. En 1969, Jean Messagier élabore une technique, « le Gel », pour parfaire un certain nombre de ses compositions. Cet article s’articule autour d’une mise en perspective de ces deux expériences. Il vise à porter un regard sur les rapports que l’art du paysage entretient avec l’abstraction, avant même qu’elle (...) n’existe ou au cœur de son plein épanouissement et propose de réfléchir à l’utilité ou la vacuité d’un tel débat. Il brosse une histoire rapide de l’utilisation de la tache et du hasard dans l’histoire de la création et enfin, il présente la position singulière de Jean Messagier au sein de l’histoire de la peinture abstraite et propose d’engager une étude plus fine de l’œuvre de ce dernier. (shrink)

Com a Lógica hegeliana propõe-se uma série de encadeamentos categoriais que expressam o próprio movimento do real. A filosofia nada mais seria senão a compreensão desse processo de auto-exposição, que significa também uma auto-apresentação do absoluto. Tal processo consistiria em uma exposição de categorias, seqüencialmente progressivas, que vão da indeterminação primeira de ser/nada até a completude da idéia absoluta. Buscaremos apresentar como o idealismo absoluto hegeliano prova sua tese de que o mundo é racional e que estas categorias apresentadas são, (...) não apenas categorias do pensar, mas categorias do ser. (shrink)

Les Parisiennes du XIIIe siècle ont mauvaise réputation. Non contentes de mal se tenir à table, elles se gavent et s’enivrent, parlent des vins en professionnelles de l’œnologie, suggérant une longue expérience de beuveries, et, surtout, se passent des hommes pour festoyer. Exclus de la convivialité féminine, ceux-ci se vengent en vers : c’est l’objet d’un poème comique, un fabliau, qui leur promet un sort funeste : le coma éthylique des trois dames de Paris les fait enterrer vives au cimetière (...) des Innocents! Encore une leçon de morale, sous couvert d’en rire, aux femmes qui ne veulent pas se contenir…. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar o projeto arquitetônico de fundamentação da ética do discurso desenvolvido por Karl-Otto Apel, a partir da década de 70. Pretendemos mostrar que Apel, a partir da linguagem, buscará desenvolver uma ética da responsabilidade para a sociedade global. Neste sentido, a linguagem enquanto médium intransponível de toda reflexão teórica e prática fundamenta uma intersubjetividade, que torna possível uma ética do acordo mútuo. Esta ética buscará dar conta, não apenas do plano normativo, mas, levará em consideração, (...) também, o âmbito prático de fundamentação. (shrink)

Note du traducteur: La transcription rend fidèlement l’orthographe de l’inédit autographe de Helmholtz, et cela jusqu’à l’oubli du « t » dans le mot « nicht », erreur que l’auteur ne semble pas avoir remarquée ou à laquelle il ne devait pas accorder d’importance, vu qu’il s’agissait, probablement, d’une ébauche très avancée du rapport qui aurait dû, ou pu, être copiée, après correction, pour l’envoi en Italie.Dans la transcription ainsi que dans la traduction, l’espace laissé en blanc d’une...

Cybernétique et psychanalyse, deux mots qui formeraient presque un oxymore. Pourtant cet ouvrage propose de repenser les liens entre la psychanalyse et l'informatique. Il révèle que les apports de la psychanalyse à l'épistémologie et l'histoire de l'informatique sont restés enfouis depuis près de soixante ans, alors même qu'elle fut une des premières disciplines à conceptualiser l'informatique, qui ne portait pas encore ce nom. Il s'agit alors à la fois de montrer l'apport pour la psychanalyse des recherches de l'informatique naissante, et (...) la particularité de l'approche psychanalytique de l'informatique, plus particulièrement chez Jacques Lacan. Cet ouvrage propose des outils et des concepts au lecteur pour prendre des distances par rapport à la trop simple opposition entre les sciences cognitives, voire les neurosciences, qui seraient la psychologie à l'ère du numérique, et la psychanalyse contemporaine. (shrink)

Trata-se nesse artigo de expor alguns dos principais conceitos da ciência (filosofia natural) hobbesiana, notadamente os conceitos de corpo, movimento, matéria, forma, acidente, essência. Devido a essa re-significação, é possível, para Hobbes, aproximar metodologicamente as definições de filosofia e ciência e a partir de então estabelecer novas bases para o conhecimento, amparado agora numa ciência mecânica de caráter fisicalista.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s passion for nature is well known. Less known is the fact that Rousseau devoted himself to the study of botany in the last years of his life. This article investigates how the themes of denaturation and monstrosity - classical themes of Rousseau’s thought - appear in his reflections on plants and the vegetal kingdom. After a brief incursion into the second Discourse and Émile, we will focus on the analysis of the so-called Elementary Letters on Botany, sent to (...) Madeleine-Catherine Delessert, and the letters sent to the Duchess of Portland. In the first set of letters we find Rousseau’s views on double flowers and grafting. In the second set of letters, in turn, we find Rousseau’s views on gardens and the cultivation of exotic plants. Since Rousseau’s reflections on denaturation are entirely due to his reading of Buffon, the article also addresses the contributions of this author. We conclude with some reflections on the current state of our teratological tendency, well identified by the authors we discussed throughout the text. (shrink)

S’appuyant sur trois enquêtes de terrain qui portent sur le façonnage d’êtres numériques, le présent article traite des relectures méthodologiques que l’on peut faire de trois contributions de Latour à l’enquête ethnographique. 1. Il montre que l’accent mis sur les séquences d’action permet d’engager une enquête systématique qui rend compte de trajectoires. 2. Il avance que le concept d’actant sensibilise à l’éventail des entités agissantes qui infléchissent ces trajectoires, de même qu’au peuplement de situations apparemment inoccupées. 3. Il soutient que (...) les concepts d’association, de traduction et de médiation permettent de connecter différentes situations et actions localisées. Ultimement, ces trois apports éclairent les agencements et les réagencements.Rooted in three fieldwork studies that examine the shaping of digital information, this article discusses new methodological readings of three of Latour’s contributions to ethnographic inquiry. 1. It shows that focusing on sequences of action allows one to engage in a systematic investigation that accounts for trajectories. 2. It proposes that the concept of actant makes one aware of the whole set of active entities that influence these trajectories on the one hand, and the populating of apparently empty situations on the other. 3. It maintains that the concepts of association, translation, and mediation make it possible to connect various localized situations and actions. Ultimately, these three contributions shed light on arrangements and rearrangements. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017) and Linguistic Bodies (Di Paolo et al. 2018). We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them in order to show an important point of convergence, namely, (...) that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasizes the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto & Myin's (2013) Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. (2018) that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements. (shrink)

This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions (...) does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism. (shrink)

Rajan Gurukkal is a leading social scientist and is currently the Sundararajan Visiting Professor at Centre for Contemporary Studies, Indian Institute of Science. He has been the former Vice Chancellor, M. G. University, Kottayam, Kerala. An avid reader, critical theorist and a prolific writer, he has authored several monographs, research articles and has been actively engaged with several projects in association with UGC, the Ford Foundation to name a few. His research interests explore the historiographic dimensions and dialectical processes involving (...) the state and society. He can be reached at [email protected]. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre;'s great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre;'s thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre; was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des (...) Hautes Études (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

Alexandre Koyré. of the fixed stars is infinite commit a contradiction in adjecto. In truth, an infinite body cannot be comprehended by thought. For the concepts of the mind concerning the infinite are either about the meaning oftheterm "infinite,"  ...

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same (...) way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous. (shrink)

Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – (...) what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. (shrink)

Though there are many challenges to Ekman’s thesis that there are basic emotions with universal corresponding facial expressions, our main criticism revolves around the extent to which grounding situations alter how people read faces. To that end, we recruit testifying experimental studies that show identical faces expressing varying emotions when contextualized differently. Rather than dismissing these as illusions, we start with the position—generally favored by embodied thinkers—that situations are primary: they are where specifiable and hence knowable properties first show up. (...) We further argue that situationally inflected emotional expressions are informationally meaningful. We reject the idea that reading expressions is primarily about ascertaining internal mental states, arguing instead that people are registering overall situations when looking at faces. However, if mind is understood as a situated phenomenon that extends into active ecological frames, then one can still argue that mindreading is going on. Although we do not claim isolated things like cliffs or cars have agency, we speculate networked systems with cliffs, people, cars, bears, etc., collectively function with intentionality, more so if advancing a robust situated mind thesis, contra figures like Dennett who argue that people over-impute mind to things. Our position has practical implications insofar as it casts doubts on recent attempts to develop AI systems that extract emotional intent out of facial expressions since many of these systems are grounded on Ekman’s basic view. (shrink)

Sundar Sarukkai is a philosopher and is currently associated with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore as a Professor of Philosophy. His research interests range from philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, postmodernism, phenomenology to philosophy of art. A critical philosopher whocan, with élan, and a certain sense of analytical rigour, transverse the philosophical terrains between the Western and Indian traditions. He has authored several books, such as Translating the World: Science and Language, Philosophy of Symmetry and Indian Philosophy (...) and Philosophy of Science. Hehas earned his doctoral degree from Purdue University, USA following which he has been associated with several institutes such as Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Manipal University and National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He has been the Founder-Director, Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University, Manipal. He can be reached at [email protected]. (shrink)

Kurt Lewin's essay “Gesetz und Experiment in der Psychologie” of 1927, published in this issue of SiC for the first time in English translation, and his “Der Übergang von der aristotelischen zur galileischen Denkweise in Biologie und Psychologie” of 19311 have together contributed most to shape his image as a metatheorist of psychology. A careful examination of what has occasionally been called the “Lewinian tradition,”2 however, reveals that Lewin's metascientific contributions have been much more influential in Europe than in the (...) United States, where he lived and taught as a Jewish refugee from 1934 until his early death on 2 February, 1947. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

Cauchy’s contribution to the foundations of analysis is often viewed through the lens of developments that occurred some decades later, namely the formalisation of analysis on the basis of the epsilon-delta doctrine in the context of an Archimedean continuum. What does one see if one refrains from viewing Cauchy as if he had read Weierstrass already? One sees, with Felix Klein, a parallel thread for the development of analysis, in the context of an infinitesimal-enriched continuum. One sees, with Emile Borel, (...) the seeds of the theory of rates of growth of functions as developed by Paul du Bois-Reymond. One sees, with E. G. Björling, an infinitesimal definition of the criterion of uniform convergence. Cauchy’s foundational stance is hereby reconsidered. (shrink)

Information is a central notion for cognitive sciences and neurosciences, but there is no agreement on what it means for a cognitive system to acquire information about its surroundings. In this paper, we approximate three influential views on information: the one at play in ecological psychology, which is sometimes called information for action; the notion of information as covariance as developed by some enactivists, and the idea of information as minimization of uncertainty as presented by Shannon. Our main thesis is (...) that information for action can be construed as covariant information, and that learning to perceive covariant information is a matter of minimizing uncertainty through skilled performance. We argue that the agent’s cognitive system conveys information for acting in an environment by minimizing uncertainty about how to achieve her intended goals in that environment. We conclude by reviewing empirical findings that support our view and by showing how direct learning, seen as instance of ecological rationality at work, is how mere possibilities for action are turned into embodied know-how. Finally, we indicate the affinity between direct learning and sense-making activity. (shrink)

Enactivism is a family of theories that construe action as constitutive of cognition and reject the need to postulate representations in order to explain all cognitive activities. Acknowledging a biologically basic, non-representational mode of cognition, however, raises the question of how to explain higher or more complex cognitive acts, what we call explanatory integration challenge. In this paper, we critically discuss some attempts to meet that challenge through scaling up basic cognition and through scaling down complex cognition within the enactivist (...) research program. (shrink)

It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (Sect. 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one’s engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (Sect. 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological (...) devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (Sect. 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, _allusion_, which means that the subject acts _as if_ the virtual experiences are real (Sect. 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind—given the current state of technology—between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science. (shrink)