Using the Chinese Ring Puzzle (Kotovsky & Simon, Citation1990; P. J. Reber & Kotovsky, Citation1997), we studied the effect on rule discovery of having to plan actions or not in order to reach a goal state. This was done by asking participants to predict legal moves as in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1) and by asking participants to make legal moves as in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Our hypothesis was that having a specific goal state to reach has a dual (...) effect on rule discovery. The first effect is positive and related to feedback from moves done in order to attain the goal: generalising the results of action and associating them to the conditions in which they were obtained allows discovery of the rule and learning it. The second effect is negative. In attempting to reach a specific goal, participants first tend to reduce the distance that separates the current state from the goal state (hill climbing) and so neglect the kind of exploration that facilitates rule and procedure discovery because this would seem to be a detour from the goal. Results show that having to plan actions improved performance in implicit learning tasks (Experiment 1), yet it impaired performance in problem-solving tasks (Experiment 2). Although implicit learning and problem solving are based on rule discovery, and entail noticing regularities in the material, in both cases, rule discovery processes appear to be task-dependent. (shrink)

This article is product of a research work that was developed between 2006 and 2009 in the city of Córdoba, Argentina. One of its main objectives was to analyze the representations of gender norms in men and women, and relate them with the interviewed social agents’ objective conditions of existence. In this paper we show articulations between social representations and objective conditions –specifically those related to possession/dispossession of economic and cultural capital– stressing the resistance of traditional representations related to gender (...) norms. (shrink)

Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a 'typical' dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light --a different light-- on philosophical debates on the laws of (...) nature. In the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

Animals populate our artistic and philosophical discourses in critical ways. From Jacques Derrida's or Karen Barad's cat, to Donna Haraway's dog, to the fish in Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel's Leviathan, these animals feature heavily in discussions regarding limits – the limits of the human and thus its relation with non-humans, but also the limits of knowledge itself. Cute or dangerous, real or fantasised, dead or alive: in this article, I juxtapose the various ways that such animals confront us with (...) what Jacques Derrida describes as “the point of view of the absolute other”. Similarly, recent texts stage encounters with animals – thus distributing agency towards a larger variety of beings, carving out space for a previously excluded non-human other. Yet these encounters are mediated in profoundly different ways. In researching how encounters with the animal are differentially inflected and “defracted” respective to the medium in which they are staged, this article invokes questions of form and style within the critical dialogue that attempts to centre non-human animals. Highlighting how formal decisions are not accidental, but rather integral, to the praxis of the philosophy of animality, this article aims to draw attention to how specific forms and styles allow for a moment of contact with a non-human other. To this end, this article examines three oft-cited encounters: Derrida's encounter with his cat, an intense stare with a fish in Leviathan, and Barad's inflection of Schrödinger's cat. This juxtaposition gives insight into the limits of certain styles of producing thought and critically reflects on these works in their discussion of non-human life and agency. (shrink)

This article demonstrates the value of French philosophy of science for medical practice through an exposition of Michel Serres’s philosophy of the body. It explores how Serres’s examination of the similarity between scientific models and works of art can provide insight into different conceptions of the human body. What makes Serres’s method of unique is that it does not see art and literature as subordinate to the natural sciences: they are both involved in mapping the communication lines of the body. (...) Since early modernity, we can roughly speak of three successive communication models of the body: mechanical, thermodynamic and informational. This article finally discusses the relationship between those different conceptions and explains how they help to articulate different aspects of the body, health, and medical ethics. (shrink)

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...) many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws. (shrink)

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a ‘Humean system’—a generic dynamical system without guiding laws—and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens [2003], which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since (...) this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random—that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity. (shrink)

In the following interview with Manlio Iofrida, Aldo Giorgio Gargani retraces the fundamental moments and key phases of his intellectual development: his early childhood and adolescence in Genoa, strongly marked by the influence of his artist father and of the social context of the immediate post-war situation; his studies at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, and subsequently at the University of Oxford, which resulted to his first book on Wittgenstein; the achievement during the 1960s of a distinctive philosophical (...) position of his own, reflected in the publication of the book Il sapere senza fondamenti [Knowledge without Foundations]; the renewal of philosophical culture in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, in which Gargani himself was one of the main protagonists; the return to an engagement with Wittgenstein, after a period in which he had dedicated himself principally to literary questions and concerns, one pursued specifically in the context of the new issues raised at the beginning of the 21st century. This historical and autobiographical reconstruction of his intellectual career is accompanied at every turn by philosophical reflections on our contemporary situation and by specific critical responses to other contemporary philosophical trends and developments: the interview thus constitutes a telling summation of the fundamental themes and aspects of the author’s thought in general. (shrink)

La temática que examina este artículo es, en principio, sencilla, a saber, lo absoluto como principio de unidad y nombre característico del pensamiento de Hegel. Sin embargo, ¿qué nombra la palabra absoluto? Las más de las veces absoluto ni siquiera es, en rigor, un nombre propio, sino un adjetivo con el que Hegel dota algunos conceptos con una suerte de especificidad e importancia señaladas. La complejidad que hay en este nombre, así como sus diversos sentidos e, igualmente, las posibilidades que (...) trae consigo el reconocimiento de lo absoluto a lo largo de la historia de la filosofía son los aspectos por analizar en las siguientes páginas con el objetivo de abrirse paso en el asunto. (shrink)

In our paper, monadic modal pseudocomplemented De Morgan algebras are considered following Halmos’ studies on monadic Boolean algebras. Hence, their topological representation theory is used successfully. Lattice congruences of an mmpM is characterized and the variety of mmpMs is proven semisimple via topological representation. Furthermore and among other things, the poset of principal congruences is investigated and proven to be a Boolean algebra; therefore, every principal congruence is a Boolean congruence. All these conclusions contrast sharply with known results for monadic (...) De Morgan algebras. Finally, we show that the above results for mmpM are verified for monadic tetravalent modal algebras. (shrink)

This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (2017), whoargue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean metaphysics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Supervenience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism. This undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion that Humean Supervenience and the Growing-Block theory are (...) incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maximalism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. Finally, I point out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is disputable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion and supporting the moral that metaphysical theories—or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little constrained by truthmaking commitments. (shrink)

In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle takes up the position of those who hold that all knowledge is demonstrable, and, hence, scientific. Such people are said to base their arguments on the fact that some demonstrations are circular or reciprocal (72b251). As Aristotle makes clear in the text, a circular demonstration consists of an argument (form) in which the conclusion is equivalent to one of the premises. But as Aristotle hastens to point out, demonstrations cannot be circular, for the essence of (...) demonstration is to proceed from what is prior to what is posterior, and the same things cannot be both prior and posterior. A circular demonstration has the form ‘if A is, then B must be;’ and ‘if B is, then A must be’: “consequently, the upholders of circular demonstration are in the position of saying that if A is, A must be—a simple way of proving anything” (73a5). (shrink)

With the use of a particular metaphor, which appears at the end of the Cratylus and is taken up with perfect symmetry at the beginning of the Theaetetus, Plato certainly wanted to indicate the succession of Cratylus–Theaetetus as an order for reading the two dialogues, which Trasillus faithfully reproduced in structuring the second tetralogy of Platonic dialogues. The claim of the theory of ideas, with which the Cratylus ends, must therefore be considered the background in which to place not only (...) the analysis of the name carried out in the Cratylus, but also the discussion and criticism of the epistemological theories examined and refuted in the Theaetetus. The transition from the discussion of the name to that of the logos is another important theoretical element that connects the two dialogues. Another one is the theory of knowledge, already precisely elaborated in the Cratylus, and taken up and deepened in the Theaetetus. Finally, the theme of false and error is a third theoretical element common to the two dialogues, which, starting from Euthydemus, finds its solution in the Sophist. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière la centralité du thème de la vie, et du rapport entre vie et pensée, dans la philosophie de Socrate. Ce thème est étroitement lié chez Socrate à la justification du sens de sa propre philosophie, qui repose non pas sur un certain « mode de vie », mais sur une série de principes théoriques forts et clairement définis. Or ces principes ne peuvent se réaliser que lorsqu’ils trouvent leur matière d’actualisation et leur (...) instrument de contrôle dans la réalité de la vie. Cela implique l’élaboration d’un nouveau concept de « vie », ainsi que du concept fondamental de « vivre en philosophant » : ce dernier indique une sorte de déplacement continu du plan de la pensée au plan de la vie, et vice versa, du particulier à l’universel, et vice versa, car seul, chacun des deux est insuffisant. (shrink)

In 2015, tense n × m-valued Lukasiewicz–Moisil algebras were introduced by A. V. Figallo and G. Pelaitay as an generalization of tense n-valued Łukasiewicz–Moisil algebras. In this paper we continue the study of tense LMn×m-algebras. More precisely, we determine a Priestley-style duality for these algebras. This duality enables us not only to describe the tense LMn×m-congruences on a tense LMn×m-algebra, but also to characterize the simple and subdirectly irreducible tense LMn×m-algebras.

Beginning with an analysis of the notion of repetition as an essential factor shaping linguistic, logical, mathematical and scientific procedures some parallels are drawn between Psychoanalysis and Wittgensteinian Philosophy. The view is put forward that in the case of Freud's concept of neurosis as well as in Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following there is not just a monotonous and unvarying replay of one and the same content but rather a steady modification. Thus generating new moments again and again both in Wittgenstein's (...) procedure of philosophical investigation and in Freudian analysis the aesthetical becomes an important aspect. Finally ethical moments are considered in comparing suppression with Wittgenstein's statements on superficial philosophical theorizing. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma abordagem inicial sobre a caracterização do campo meta-teórico de pesquisa em educação inclusiva e, em particular, examina as forças que produzem seu discurso na pesquisa documental. É reconhecida a necessidade de avançar na exploração de uma perspectiva epistêmica que permita superar o absentismo teórico enfrentado pela educação inclusiva em tempos complexos. O desenvolvimento atual da pesquisa em educação inclusiva é alimentado por vários campos de confluência fora da pedagogia, o que resultou na cristalização de um discurso (...) crítico e não crítico sobre si mesmo. As diferenças entre as perspectivas crítica e acrítica residem na ausência de raciocínio para politizar a discussão sobre a inclusão como mecanismo de transformação de todos os campos da vida do cidadão. Isso confirma a presença de políticas de produção de conhecimento que impõem fundamentos intelectuais binários e poucos pontos de fuga para problematizar as relações estruturais da desigualdade. Soma-se a isso as fortes raízes de padrões que impõem modelos epistêmicos quebrados para pensar nas opressões objeto das diversas identidades que chegam ao espaço escolar e demarcam novas formas de expressão cidadã. Conclui-se com base em um modelo pré-construído de tipo normativo para refletir sobre as questões fundamentais do desenvolvimento humano e cidadão. É necessário promover um processo de descolonização em todos os campos da Ciência da Educação, bem como uma crítica genealógica dos fundamentos híbridos que este modelo propõe, dada a uniformidade de seu discurso em todos os ciclos e níveis de ensino. Palavras-chave: educação inclusiva, políticas de produção de conhecimento, epistemologia, identidades e temas educacionais. (shrink)

El término nuestroamericano —utilizado por Horacio Cerutti— tiene sus fundamentos en el concepto "Nuestra América". Este hilo conductor de pensamiento tiene como hecho ineludible el hacerse cargo de la realidad en que se vive y del lugar en donde se está, hecho expresado en un permanente interés en la identidad cultural y nacional, como también por una lectura crítica y explicativa del desarrollo de las ideas. En el caso de Chile, a nuestro juicio, la memoria filosófica nuestroamericana ha tendido a (...) ser borrada, olvidada, siendo obnubilada por un fuerte eurocentrismo, lo que ha dado como resultado un escaso número de filósofos preocupados por "lo latinoamericano". Así, este trabajo indaga sobre los orígenes de la vertiente latinoamericanista en la filosofía chilena en la segunda mitad del siglo XX. A modo de conclusión, proponemos que no es sino hasta los años ochenta cuando, desde el Círculo de Filosofía de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, se genera un punto de inflexión con la tradición filosófica chilena, dando origen de forma más nítida a la vertiente nuestroamericana que, antes de esto, solo habría tenido pequeñas huellas dispersas. (shrink)