The negative impacts of agriculture on the environment and the inequity that limits access to healthy food for the entire population impede sustainable development. This article reflects contributions to food security and alternatives for transitioning to sustainable food systems. It is concluded that food, as a human right, is a complex and transdisciplinary issue, which must be integrated as a transversal axis in the economic, social, environmental, governance, and cultural dimensions to contribute to sustainable development and therefore the convenience of (...) making the transition from the concept of food security to that of food sustainability. (shrink)

Resumo Este artigo estuda o projecto pessoano acerca da confederação ibérica. A Ibéria imperial é concebida como um imperialismo cosmopolita por – e para – poetas. O símbolo e a analogia conduzem a um drama. Pensa-se em um drama que avança através do “pensar trágico” e do “sentir poético” que desemboca no onírico. Um sonho em que se associa três dos famosos heterónimos pessoanos, Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis e Álvaro de Campos, e as três nações ibéricas irmãs: Portugal, Espanha (...) e Catalunha. Palavras-chave : cosmopolitanismo, cultura, Ibéria, imperialismo, PessoaThis paper studies Pessoa’s project about the Iberian Confederation. Imperial Iberia is considered a cosmopolitan empire from – and for – poets. Symbol and Analogy lead to Drama. It is thought a Drama that begins with “tragic thinking” and “poetic feeling”; ending in an oniric sense. A dream that associates the three famous pessoa’s heteronims, Alberto Caeiro, Ricardo Reis and Álvaro de Campos, and the three Iberian nations: Portugal, Spain and Catalonia. Keywords : cosmopolitanism, culture, Iberia, imperialism, Pessoa. (shrink)

This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...) both a make-believe theoretical element and a set-theoretical element. The fictional entity is constructed by imagining the existence of an individual with certain properties and adding a set-theoretical element consisting of the set of properties corresponding to the properties of the imagined entity. Moreover, the book advances a new combined semantic and ontological defence of the existence of fictional entities. (shrink)

What is depiction? This is a venerable question that has received many different answers throughout the whole history of philosophy, especially in contemporary times. A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction elaborates a new account on this matter by providing a theory of depiction that tries to combine the merits of the previous theories while dropping their defects. It is argued that a picture is a representation in a pictorial or figurative mode, and its 'figurativity' is given by a special perception, perceiving-in, (...) whose nature is reconceived. Such a perception inter alia grasps some properties which the picture's vehicle has in common with what is perceived in it; by so doing, that perception provides the picture with a figurative content. In contrast, the picture's representational value, its subject or its pictorial content, is given by a conventionally or causally based selection out of that figurative content. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...) be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145). (shrink)

Temporal logic is one of the many areas in which a possible world semantics is adopted. Prior's Ockhamist and Peircean semantics for branching-time, though, depart from the genuine Kripke semantics in that they involve a quantification over histories, which is a second-order quantification over sets of possible worlds. In the paper, variants of the original Prior's semantics will be considered and it will be shown that all of them can be viewed as first-order counterparts of the original semantics.

In this paper, against a new imagination-based account defended by Anna Ichino in some recent works, I defend the intuitive and traditional idea that so-called religious beliefs are indeed those doxastic attitudes that they are traditionally taken to be, i.e., bona fide beliefs. Yet I take that the objects of such beliefs amount to be different from what religious believers consciously take them to be; namely, they are mythological characters, a species of fictional characters – namely, fictional characters not consciously (...) recognized as such – instead of being concrete individuals possibly endowed with supernatural powers. Yet religious believers also unconsciously recognize the fictional nature of religious objects of belief as mythological characters, as their behavior ultimately shows. This account indeed allows me to give a different yet still doxastic explanation of the two main reasons that Ichino advocates in favor of her account; namely, the incompatibility of so-called religious beliefs with other beliefs and their imperviousness to evidence, especially of a negative kind. (shrink)

In this paper I will first contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entities—like those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian camp—are ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, specifically addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a definite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently specific kind, i.e. _intentionalia_, broadly conceived as things (...) that may actually exist as well as actually not exist. Finally, I will try to explain why that argument proves the existence of only some sorts of _intentionalia_, by showing how this is related to the fact that, as some have correctly maintained, _intentionalia_ have no intrinsic nature. (shrink)

Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...) some people, these consequences will sound as plagues against the position; for some others, especially realists on ficta, they are welcome results. Although I hold that all forms of genuine creationism have these consequences, I will conclude by explaining why I take moderate creationism, according to which ficta are created by means of a reflexive stance on the make-believe practice grounding them, to be the best of these forms. (shrink)

The Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics states that grammars are theories of abstract objects. In this paper I will focus on the Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics as stated in Katz's "An Outline of Platonist Grammar" (1984) and Soames' "Linguistics and Psychology" (1984) and "Semantics and Psychology" (1985). I will begin explaining which are the core ideas of the Platonist view in philosophy of linguistics. Then, I will comment on the argument offered by Katz's in order to argue (...) for the Platonist view. Finally, I will explain Soames' arguments in order to show that psychology and linguistics are conceptually and empirically different. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to hold, first, that a treatment of Frege cases in terms of a difference in cognitive phenomenology of the involved experiential mental states is not viable. Second, I will put forward another treatment of such cases that appeals to a difference in intentional objects metaphysically conceived not as exotica, but as schematic objects, that is, as objects that have no metaphysical nature qua objects of thought. This allows their nature to be settled independently of their (...) being thought of, in particular as concrete entities in the sense of entities that may be spatiotemporal occupiers. Yet third, as to Frege cases, cognitive phenomenology may return from the back door. For the realization that, if correct, solves any such case cannot but have a proprietary, though neither distinctive nor individuative, phenomenology. In my account, this is the realization that the different schematic intentional objects involved are none other than the same entity. (shrink)

Il saggio si interroga sul rapporto tra immagine di libro e lettura, muovendo dalla constatazione che solo la trasformazione dei lettori in ambito umanistico (con il rifiuto della glossa) ha cambiato l’idea del libro diffusa nel Medioevo. Il nuovo disegno della pagina, di maggiore ordine e leggibilità, si è consolidato nei secoli, e la nuova immagine di libro è rimasta immutata, nonostante le innovazioni, nell’editoria moderna. Solo l’avvento delle nuove tecnologie digitali ha suggerito una nuova immagine, che, tuttavia, non è (...) ancora né pienamente definita né ben consolidata; alle posizioni di chi ha individuato il libro nuovo nella forma dell’ipertesto (letto anche sui vecchi pc), il saggio affianca le riflessioni di chi cerca l’immagine nuova nell’e-book letto su un e-reader, sottolineando tuttavia che si è solo agli inizi di una lunga trasformazione. This essay concerns the relationship between the image of the book and how it reads. It begins from the observation that only the change of the readers during the humanistic age has transformed the widespread perception of the book in the Middle Ages. The new layout of the page, neater and more readable, became well established in the following centuries, and that image of the book in the modern publishing industry has remained unchanged, in spite of innovations. New digital technologies have proposed a new image, that however is neither clearly defined nor well established. The essay underlines the observations of those who believe that the hypertext form is the new book, even readable on the old pc, and the observations of those that think of e-book as a new image, that can be read only on the e-reader. The essay ends with the idea that we are at the beginning of a long change. (shrink)

At several places in this paper we have made use of a well-known rhetorical device: an argument was made; a character —dubbed “fictional reader” — was then evoked who voiced some objections against that particular argument; and finally, we answered those objections, thus bringing to a close, at least temporarily, our argument. The use of this device raises a question: “How is the presence of the ‘fictional reader” to be understood?” Is it a “mere” rhetorical tool, or does this character (...) designate some particular target? For instance, depending on the context, it could be seen as aimed at different straw men: traditionally minded sociologists, Whiggish historians, well-intentioned philosophers of science. Actually, none of these characters is behind the “fictional reader”. Rather, it refers, potentially, to any of the scientific actors (Milstein, Schwaber, Koprowski, Cohn, and so on) who inhabit our set of narratives. In other words, the “fictional reader” is an icon for the “native” reader/writer who simultaneously produces and questions the products of that particular literary activity known as scientific texts, by explicitly and implicitly raising the issue of the distinction between fact and technique.By following actors in their disputes about the novelty of K & M's contribution, it became apparent that it is not exactly clear which of the different elements of “hybridoma technology” should be regarded as “novel.” Was it the use of the P3 myeloma line? Was it the theoretical framework related to the notion of allelic exclusion? Was it ...? In each and every case, arguments can be made for or against the existence of a certain continuity or discontinuity with previous work. And in each case, the determination of novelty, as translated through the continuity/discontinuity issue, appeared to be hanging on the previous attribution of an epistemological status to the object that had allegedly been discovered: was it a fact or a technique?If one focuses on the relatively narrow network of immunogenetics, it could be argued that within that particular evidential context a series of “facts” had been established which, when transferred to other fields, such as the virological research being pursued in Koprowski's institute, were translated into a technique. However, as we have seen, even from an immunogenetic point of view the production of monoclonal antibodies can be viewed as being simultaneously a fact and a technique to establish that fact. Not only, as he himself noted,139 was Milstein not seeking to develop a technique for the production of monoclonal antibodies when the original experiments were carried out, but the significance later imputed to those experiments was not immediately attributed to them. The paper was seen as one among other papers that used cell fusion techniques to dissect the genetic control of antibody diversity. Distinctions that now appear crucial (e.g.: were the fusion partners two myelomas or a myeloma and a spleen cell?) were easily overlooked. At some point, around 1977, the production of monoclonal antibodies became a goal in itself, no longer linked to the initial immunogenetic network. The transformation of [MILSTEIN 75] into the foundational event of “hybridoma technology” was thus achieved. This transformation did not flow naturally from the original experiments. Rather, it involved specific investments which mobilized the activity of a large number of other scientific and industrial actors.140A tentative generalization can be deduced from our case study. The dichotomy between fact and technique that underlines much of contemporary science studies seem to be fundamentally misconceived, insofar as the determination of what counts as a fact and what counts as a technique is not possible on a priori grounds. Historians and sociologists of science are confronted with a field of heterogeneous interventions where particular pieces of work are constituted as discrete entities and simultaneously attributed a technical or a factual identity. “Novelty” and “innovation” are precisely the result of such polymorphic attributional processes. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are (...) constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally. (shrink)

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism and Crane’s psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished (...) from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions. (shrink)

Most theorisations of fascism, Marxist and otherwise, have taken for granted its idolatry of the state and phobia of freedom. This analytical common sense has also inhibited the identification of continuities with contemporary movements of the far Right, with their libertarian and anti-statist affectations, not to mention their embeddedness in neoliberal policies and subjectivities. Drawing on a range of diverse sources – from Johann Chapoutot’s histories of Nazi intellectuals to Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s theorisation of the anti-state state, and from Marcuse’s (...) explorations of fascist competitive individualism to debates on neoliberal authoritarianism – this essay sketches the counter-intuitive but disturbingly timely image of a fascism enamoured of freedom and at odds with the state. (shrink)

What, if anything, does singular causal language teach us about causation? I start with some observations about causal language and then explore some lessons about causation. This note has two major parts. First, I rehearse and reinforce some arguments that purport to show that the context-sensitivity of causal language is semantic. Second, I discuss how this could inform the metaphysics of causation, ultimately arguing that it leads to a novel form of causal pluralism. The main claim is conditional: if the (...) context- sensitivity of causal language is semantic, there are more concepts of causation than we previously thought. I conclude with some speculations regarding where this leaves the classic metaphysical debate about the nature of causation. (shrink)

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein seems to appeal to the idea that thoughts manage to explain how sentences, primarily elementary sentences, can be such that their subsentential elements refer to objects. In this respect, he seems indeed to appeal to the claim that thoughts, qua endowed with not only original, but also intrinsic, intentionality, lend this intentionality to names, by transforming them into ‘names-of’, i.e., symbols endowed with intrinsic intentionality as well. Such a claim, however, entails that there must be necessary (...) superfacts. Since according to the Tractatus’ ontology there cannot be necessary facts in the world, but at most only in its logical scaffolding, the most likely chance is that such facts are facts for the limit of the world, i.e., the transcendental subject. Curiously enough, in his later critique, in the Investigations, of mentalist semantics, Wittgenstein fails to appeal to this claim, which can block the infinite regress that he there changes the mentalist position with. Since in the Investigations necessary facts seem to be allowed, this failure is even more striking. (shrink)

As many people have underlined, as regards pictures there are at least two different layers of content. In Voltolini, these layers are: i) the figurative content of a picture, i.e., what one can see in it viz. what the picture presents; ii) the pictorial content of a picture, i.e., what the picture represents, as constrained by its figurative content. As regards ii), there undoubtedly ispictorial misrepresentation. Having the possibility of misrepresenting things is a standard condition in order for a picture (...) to be a representation. Yet as regards i), things are more problematic. First, if one intends that a picture is seen in a way that is impossible for the picture to be seen, there definitely is intentional failure, but there is no figurative mispresentation. Second, alleged cases in which one literally sees in a picture something that does not match what the picture presents are not cases of figurative presentational failure either. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to tackle the Molyneux question thoroughly, by addressing it in terms of both ordinary perception and pictorial perception: if a congenitally blind person recovered sight, could she recognize visually the 3D shapes she already recognized tactilely, both when such shapes are given to her directly and when they are given to her pictorially, i.e., as depicted shapes? We want to claim that empirical evidence suggests that the question can be positively answered in both cases. For (...) in the first case, such evidence shows that perception of 3D shapes is supramodal; namely, it can be equivalently achieved in different sense modalities, notably touch and vision, independently of the sensory input such shapes are accessed. While in the second case, such evidence shows that one can satisfy both in vision and in touch the condition for depicted shapes, which are typically not where the perceiver is, to be grasped by that perceiver in a picture’s subject, i.e., what the picture presents. This condition states that the picture’s vehicle, i.e., the typically 2D physical basis of a picture, is enriched by adding to its properties the 3D grouping properties that allow for a figure/ground segmentation to be performed in that vehicle’s elements. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta sintéticamente la manera en la que Adorno fundamenta su concepto de sociedad en una socialización mediada por el intercambio de mercancías (en el primer apartado) y propone (en el segundo apartado) tres aspectos de su argumentación que merecen discutirse y/o desarrollarse. Estos tres aspectos son: (1) el escaso desarrollo de su noción clave de “principio del intercambio”; (2) la influencia de la concepción del “capitalismo de Estado” en su pensamiento, que resulta incompatible con su concepción de una (...) sociedad socializada a través del intercambio; y (3) la ausencia de un desarrollo de la forma jurídica de ese intercambio, complementaria de su forma económica. La fuente principal del artículo son sus escritos, conferencias y seminarios sociológicos, filosófico-sociológicos o filosóficos escritos y dictados en las décadas de 1950-60. El concepto de sociedad de este último Adorno es, en nuestra opinión, el más elaborado con el que cuenta la teoría crítica de la sociedad para orientar sus investigaciones sobre la sociedad capitalista. La intención de este artículo es, en consecuencia, contribuir a una apropiación crítica de dicho concepto identificando aquellos problemas e indicando caminos posibles para su solución. 129-151. (shrink)

The present study is based on the work by Sara Maitland entitled A Book of Silence and seeks to reflect on this theme in the line of high spirituality by crossing it with the figures of the imaginary that form the silence itself. To this end, we seek in the first part, devoted to silence, to understand the nature of silence in its manifestations, types and images, as it was thought and studied by Sara Maitland in her A Book of (...) Silence. Then, in the second part, reflect on the meaning of this constellation of images to try to delineate the imaginary of silence. In the third part, taking into account the developments of the first and second parts, we will reflect on the trilogy of silence-imaginary-creativity. We will conclude with some reflections and questions raised by the analysis of the author’s work. (shrink)

Entre 1991 e 2000, a porcentagem de católicos caiu de 83,3% para 73,9%, a dos evangélicos cresceu de 9% para 15,6% e a dos “sem religião” subiu de 4,7% para 7,4%. Como entender essas mudanças? Qual a responsabilidade da Igreja católica? O artigo apresenta, primeiramente, a visão sobre a diversidade religiosa, as mudanças ocorridas nas últimas décadas. Discute a seguir sobre a “Força e fraqueza da presença católica”, construindo um “mapa do catolicismo”. O terceiro enfoque reflete sobre as causas desse (...) “enfraquecimento”, especialmente, os movimentos migratórios da população brasileira e os problemas da resposta da Igreja para acompanhar essa mudança, tanto nas “novas frentes migratórias” quanto nas periferias dos grandes centros. Deixando o campo católico, analisa-se a diversidade das igrejas evangélicas ou os protestantes tradicionais e depois a “expansão pentecostal”, em sua enorme diversidade, com destaque ao neopentecostalismo e seu profissionalismo empresarial. Finalmente, aborda-se o fenômeno das “outras religiões” e o crescimento dos “sem-religião”. Palabras clave: Religião; Diversidade religiosa; Panorama religioso brasileiro; Censo 2000; Igreja católica. ABSTRACT Between 1991 and 2000, the percentage of catholics dropped from 83,3% to 73,9%, that o the evangelicalsgrew from 9% to 15,6%, and that of people ‘without a religion’ rose from 4,7% to 7,4%. How can we understand those changes? How far is the Catholic church responsible? This article starts with a view of religious diversity and the changes that took place in the last decades. It then goes on to discuss the ‘power and weakness of the Catholic presence’, drawing a ‘map of Catholicism’. O terceiro The third part focuses on the causes of that ‘weakening’, mainly the migratory flows of the Brazilian population and the problems of the church response to those changes, in the ‘new migratory fronts’ as well as in the periphery of big urban centres. Beyond the Catholic scope, it analyses the diversity of evangelical churches r traditional protestants, and then ‘pentecostal expansion’, in its enormous diversity, with emphasis on neopentecostalism and its entrepreneurial professionalism. Finally, it considers the phenomenon of ‘other religions’ and the growing number of those ‘without a religion’. Key words: Religion; Religious diversity; Brazilian religious panorama; 2000 Census; Catholic Church. (shrink)

This paper is a preliminary study focused on the astronomical manuscript Marcianus latinus VIII.31 (2614) and its socio-historical context of use and production, the Venetian colony of Crete in the 15th century. It is a relevant source for the study of scientific interactions in colonial, multilinguistic, and interreligious contexts in the Eastern Mediterranean for at least two reasons: (a) it contains an unpublished translation into Latin of a popular Byzantine handbook on how to use a set of astronomical tables stemming (...) from Islamic sources, namely the so-called Paradosis of the Persian Tables, a work extensively copied and annotated by very significant Byzantine and Jewish scholars active in Constantinople; and (b) it provides evidence of a Byzantine product being the object of exchange in the interactions between Christians and Jews in the Cretan territory under Venetian rule. (shrink)

Resumen: El propósito de este artículo es explorar la conexión entre autognosis y autobiografía en Giambattista Vico. El artículo comienza con una explicación del significado de la autognosis filosófica como método de la Ciencia nueva de Vico. Luego, la autognosis política es considerada como un objeto de esa ciencia. Por último, es formulado el problema de la conexión de estas dos formas de autognosis con la Autobiografía de Vico. Palabras clave: Vico, Autognosis como método, Autognosis como objeto, Autobiografía, Porcia. Autognose (...) e periautografia em Giambattista Vico Resumo: O propósito deste artigo é explorar a conexão entre autognose e autobiografia em Giambattista Vico. O artigo começa com uma explicação do significado da autognose filosófica como método da Ciência nova de Vico. Em seguida, a autognose política é considerada como um objeto dessa ciência. Por último, é formulado o problema da conexão dessas duas formas de autognose com a Autobiografia de Vico. Palavras-chave: Vico, Autognose como método, Autognose como objeto, Autobiografia, Porcia. Self-knowledge and periautografía in Giambattista Vico Abstract: The aim of this paper is to explore the connection between self-knowledge and autobiography in Giambattista Vico. The paper begins with an explanation of the meaning of the philosophical self-knowledge as method of Vico’s New science. After that, the political self-knowledge is considered as an object of this science. At last is formulated the problem of the connection between this both kinds of self-knowledge and Vico’s Autobiography. Key words: Vico, Self-knowledge as method, Self-knowledge as object, Autobiography, Porcia. Data de registro: 28/04/2023 Data de aceite: 20/09/2023. (shrink)

Whether it's a question of "human philosophy" or of the Christian understanding of action in a regime of efficacious grace, for Pascal despair is always the effect of an error of appreciation. We overestimate our misery and powerlessness, we make them the whole of our being and our action, and so we consider ourselves only miserable and totally powerless. Despair should therefore be prevented and neutralised when it takes hold of the soul, never advocated or fed. Never - except perhaps (...) in one case, and it is this case that we would like to address in this paper. A case that is all the more paradoxical because it is precisely in its proper place, where it is opportune and necessary, that despair appears difficult if not almost impossible to produce. (shrink)