This essay explores human collective intelligence as the creative force shaping our lives. By collective I mean that intelligence lies in its interaction, in relationship. Intelligence is beyond the individual or the collective. I focus on one of its two levels: the intelligence of need, which centres on fulfilling humanity’s needs and interests and is crucial to economic processes. Business are central to the current way of living, hence, from its good working depends human wellbeing With the rapid growth of (...) human populations and nature’s limited resources, we must cultivate a frugal intelligence of need that moves away from viewing economic growth as synonymous with prosperity. As Socrates said: “The secret of happiness, you see, is not found in seeking more, but in developing the capacity to enjoy less.” My goal is to show that the effective operation of the intelligence of need for everyone’s benefit requires it to work in harmony with a foundational yet often overlooked intelligence, which I call the intelligence of freedom, or liberating intelligence. The reforms of the intelligence of need, in particular of the economy, usually proposed are insufficient to ensure wellbeing for all. We need the awakening of the liberating intelligence, the intelligence of freedom, beauty and love, on which I will insist along this essay. (shrink)

The development of a free, creative, and wise collective intelligence that is harmonious in its functional, axiological, and liberating dimensions has never received the priority, attention, and means required as the interactive agent it is, which constitutes human life by creating the cultures in which we live. Rather than prioritizing the development of our innate intelligence, our true power, we have sought security and well-being in submitting to supernatural powers and in the production, possession, and accumulation of goods, including knowledge. (...) This has created an unsustainable, ever-growing economy that has led to divisive and violent societies with enormous inequalities and ruled by domination and exploitation. Therefore, we have ended up living in an ill culture that threatens human survival and life on Earth. (shrink)

I refer to the social embodiment of creative intelligence as creative democracies. Today’s world pose great challenges and serious threats to human life and cannot be faced by just having new ideas or more knowledge and thoughts. Today’s world requires the power to face the unknown, a key feature of intelligence. Hence the urgent need of societies to mutate into creative democracies. We need to begin with a strong base. We need an understanding and development of human life from its (...) foundations and the simplicity of its origin in the creative freedom of reality and its intra-active intelligence, the power of all humans in our global world to meet and share meaning and interests. This essaysuccinctly highlights their foundations, prefaced by three cautionary reflections. (shrink)

My several decades of research into artificial intelligence have given rise to two fundamental concerns. Firstly, the awareness of the unacceptable but very likely possibility that humanity will become subject to a subtle but powerful digital dictatorship. Secondly, there is a pressing need to gain a better understanding of human intelligence, which is crucial to understanding ourselves from moment to moment, from day to day and act consequently. We need to find out where actual intelligence lies and see clearly that (...) the power of domination and the corresponding submission to it or lack of actual freedom is the main obstacle to intelligence’s healthy development, the main illness that intelligence can fall prey to. In this essay intelligence is viewed as the embodied interactive agent that creates life, fulfils its needs and harmonizes its interactive diversity - in particular as to human life. (shrink)

Filosofía y política en los siglos XVII y XVIII.--Hobbes, T. El Leviatán (selección).--Locke, J. Segundo tratado de gobierno (selección).--Montesquieu. El espíritu de las leyes (selección).--Orígenes de la conciencia estética y análisis crítico de sus fundamentos.--Kant, E. Crítica del juicio (selección).--Schiller, F. La educación estética del hombre (selección).--Hegel, J. G. F. De lo bello y sus formas (selección).

J. L. Ackrill; VIII*—Aristotle's Definitions of Psuche, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 119–134, https://doi.org.

This paper explores the development of mathematics on a quantum logical base when mathematical postulates are taken as necessary truths. First it is shown that first-order Peano arithmetic formulated with quantum logic has the same theorems as classical first-order Peano arithmetic. Distribution for first-order arithmetical formulas is a theorem not of quantum logic but rather of arithmetic. Second, it is shown that distribution fails for second-order Peano arithmetic without extensionality. Third, it is shown that distribution holds for second-order Peano arithmetic (...) (second-order quantum logic) with extensionality. Some remarks about extensions to quantum set theory are made. (shrink)

J. L. Ackrill's work on Plato and Aristotle has had a considerable influence upon ancient philosophical studies in the late twentieth century. In his writings the rigour and clarity of contemporary analytic philosophy are brought to bear upon ancient thought; in many cases he has provided thefirst analytic treatment of a key issue. Gathered now in this volume are the best of Ackrill's essays on the two greatest philosophers of antiquity. With philosophical acuity and philological expertise he examines a wide (...) range of texts and topics--from ethics and logic to epistemology andmetaphysics--which continue to be in the focus of debate. (shrink)

J. C. Dybikowski; VII*—Lord Devlin's Morality and its Enforcement, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 75, Issue 1, 1 June 1975, Pages 89–110, https.

From March to September 2020, researchers working at a biomedical scientific campus in Spain faced two lockdowns and various mobility restrictions that affected their social and professional lifestyles. The working group “Women in Science,” which acts as an independent observatory of scientific gender inequalities on campus launched an online survey to assess the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on scientific activity, domestic and caregiving tasks, and psychological status. The survey revealed differences in scientific performance by gender: while male researchers participated in (...) a larger number of scientific activities for career development, female researchers performed more invisible scientific tasks, including peer review or outreach activities. Mental impact was greater in researchers caring for children or dependents, and this was aggravated for women. Results spot a disproportionate impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on female scientific career development, and urges for equity measures to mitigate the consequences of an increase in the gender gap in biomedical sciences for current and future pandemics. (shrink)

The definition of acedia presents unique conceptual problems among the eight Evagrian logismoi. Its descriptions are so complex and varied as to render the concept seemingly incoherent. This article argues that the conceptual unity of acedia has been obscured by the translation of Evagrian logismoi into the ‘deadly sins’ tradition, resulting in a category error. Acedia is more properly understood, not as a psychological state or a sin, but rather as an array of demonic temptations with the unifying end-goal of (...) interrupting the anchoritic ideal of sustained contemplation. (shrink)

Is the existence of God a question of fact? To the majority of theists, both now and in the past, I think it has seemed clear that, if the phrase ‘God exists’ is to be meaningful, then it is a fact, either that God exists or that he does not. This assertion may even seem trivially true; and yet it has evidently been denied, in recent years, by many theologians. The reasons for such a denial are, in part, to be (...) found in the general reaction against metaphysical philosophy, which was characteristic of the early years of this century, and which is, in Britain, epitomised by A. J. Ayer's stipulation that no proposition can be factually significant unless it is verifiable; unless, in principle at least, some series of observations could conceivably show it to be true. By restricting ‘observation’ to the senses of the physical body, and by emphasising the fact that God, as transcendent by definition, was not a possible object of the senses, some philosophically sensitive theologians were startled into denying that ‘God’ was, even in principle, verifiable; and consequently into denying that propositions purporting to assert his existence were factual. (shrink)

Although the theory of definability had many important antecedents—such as the descriptive set theory initiated by the French semi-intuitionists in the early 1900s—the main ideas were first laid out in precise mathematical terms by Alfred Tarski beginning in 1929. We review here the basic notions of languages, explicit definability, and grammatical complexity, and emphasize common themes in the theories of definability for four important languages underlying, respectively, descriptive set theory, recursive function theory, classical pure logic, and finite-universe logic. We review (...) the history of previous studies of the similarities and differences in the theories of definability of the first three of these four languages. A seminal role leading toward unification of the theories has been played by the separation principles introduced by Nikolai Luzin in 1927. Emphasizing analogies and driving toward further unification embracing finite-universe logic we concentrate on a simple example—the first and second separation principles for existential-universal first-order sentences . Using this as a test case for the fundamental problem of how to “finitize” arguments in classical pure logic to the finite-universe case, we are led to the analogous negative solution by using the theory of certain special graphs: a graph is - special for any positive integers m , n , p , q iff it is bipartite with m red points and n blue points and for every p -tuple of red points there is a blue point to which they are all connected . As an aside we introduce for further study a natural “Ramseyesque” increasing sequence A of positive integers, where A is the least positive integer n for which an -special graph exists. (shrink)

In Not God Enough, J.D. Greear explains that the thing between you and the vibrant faith you want isn't answers to all our spiritual questions, but an escape from the small God we've imagined in place of an actual encounter with the real, awesome, glorious God of the Bible.

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

The opening chapter of the Categories fails to reveal whether it is introducing a grammatical, a logical, or a metaphysical treatise. It deals with equivocals and univocals and ends with a definition of paronyms. The definition of paronyms is given in purely grammatical terms. Paronyms derive their name from an identical source with a difference only in case ending, as bravery and the brave, grammar and the grammarian. The second chapter, however, proceeds to state that an expression can be either (...) complex or simple--complex like "a man runs," or simple like "man" or "runs." Then it immediately passes over to beings. Of the things that are, it states, some are asserted of a subject, but are not in any subject. The example given is that "man" is asserted of a particular man. To supply for Aristotle a current instance of what is here meant, one might use the sentence "Bertrand Russell is a man." This type of statement, to take the Aristotelian text literally, is dealing with beings and is asserting something of a subject. What is asserted, "man," is not in any subject even though it is asserted of a subject. In other words, the logically proper name "Bertrand Russell" denotes a substance and not an accident. (shrink)

Introduction, by J. L. Hevesi.--Days of reading, by M. Proust.--Poetry and abstract thought, by P. Valèry.--Jacob Cow the pirate; or, Whether words are signs, by J. Paulhan.--Concerning the pebble, by F. Ponge.--The journey and the return, by J. P. Sartre.--The power of words, by B. Parain.

In ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’, 1961, J. R. Lucas proposed that Godel's theorem made possible a refutation of mechanism—the thesis that mind is wholly comprehensible as a consistent, rule-governed machine. A sympathetic reading of Lucas's argument might run something as follows: ‘If I am a machine then it will be possible in principle to give a specification of the consistent formal system, L, that represents me. If this formal system were handed to me, I would be able to prove a (...) Gödel sentence, G, which L could not generate—that is, L could not model my proving G. But since I have proved G, L is inadequate as a model of my cognitive process.’. (shrink)

With an intellectual autobiography by Hans J. Morgenthau.

This article gives new information about the social, cultural, and political beliefs of Thomas Wilson, the first Secretary and Treasurer of the Yorkshire Geological and Polytechnic Society founded in 1837. Wilson's private correspondence was not available to J. W. Davis, who wrote the standard history of the Society to celebrate its jubilee. Davis's history underestimates the part played by Wilson and overestimates the importance of Thomas William Embleton, whose private papers were placed at Davis's disposal. It is shown that Wilson, (...) and not Embleton, was the driving force in forming and consolidating the Society, especially with respect to its early difficulties in defining even its title and aims. (shrink)

Retrospective rule-making has few supporters and many opponents. Defenders of retrospective laws generally do so on the basis that they are a necessary evil in specific or limited circumstances, for example to close tax loopholes, to deal with terrorists or to prosecute fallen tyrants. Yet the reality of retrospective rule making is far more widespread than this, and ranges from ’corrective’ legislation to ’interpretive regulations’ to judicial decision making. The search for a rational justification for retrospective rule-making necessitates a reconsideration (...) of the very nature of the rule of law and the kind of law that can rule, and will provide new insights into the nature of law and the parameters of societal order. This book examines the various ways in which laws may be seen as retrospective and analyses the problems in defining retrospectivity. In his analysis Dr Charles Sampford asserts that the definitive argument against retrospective rule-making is the expectation of individuals that, if their actions today are considered by a future court, the applicable law was discoverable at the time the action was performed. The book goes on to suggest that although the strength of this ’rule of law’ argument should prevail in general, exceptions are sometimes necessary, and that there may even be occasions when analysis of the rule of law may provide the foundation for the application of retrospective laws. (shrink)

THERE are two conflicting motives in Husserlian phenomenology, one of which leads, in my view, to a more genuinely transcendental philosophy. According to one of its original programs, phenomenology was to be a descriptive science of essences and essential structures of various regions of phenomena and also of the empty region of object in general. The concern with meanings, as contradistinguished from essences, is equally original; it pervades the Prolegomena and the first three of the logical investigations and, of course, (...) the first volume of the Ideas. But the specifically phenomenological enterprise of clarification of meanings—and this is the second of the two motives-slowly moves to the forefront, for a while overshadowed by the essentialism of the beginning, but later on freed from it and reasserting its primacy as the philosophical activity par excellence. The concern with essences affiliates phenomenology to the classical rationalistic tradition, while the concern with meanings brings it closer to the empiricistic tradition. If in the former enterprise phenomenology appears to be an essentialism of Aristotelian sort, in the latter, Hume remains its acknowledged precursor. One of my contentions, which I will try to substantiate in the following pages, is that the peculiarly Husserlian sort of transcendental phenomenology develops out of the second concern rather than from the first. This rather broad claim needs to be qualified in various ways, which I will be doing as we proceed. For the present, I may perhaps add this much: there is a conception of transcendental subjectivity which can be reached only through an eidetic phenomenology of essences: on such a theory, transcendental subjectivity is the essence of empirical consciousness, transcendental ego is the essence of the empirical ego. But this is not exactly Husserl’s conception of ‘transcendental'. The transcendental according to Husserl is not the essence of the empirical, but the domain in which the meanings constituting the empirical have their origin. However, I should add that these two points of view are intertwined, in Husserl’s thought, in such a strange manner that my efforts to separate them may seem futile. They influence each other: there are, as a matter of fact, two conceptions of essence in Husserl, one of which is, in my view, closer than the other one to the specifically Husserlian conception of transcendental subjectivity. So also in the theory of meaning, the early essentialism did cast its shadow, but as soon as it is freed from essentialism it lays the foundation of a more truly phenomenological transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

William Alston's Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience is a most significant contribution to the philosophy of religion. The product of 50 years' reflection on its topic , this work provides a very thorough explication and defence of what Alston calls the ‘mystical perceptual practice’ – the practice of forming beliefs about the Ultimate on the basis of putative ‘direct experiential awareness’ thereof . Alston argues, in particular, for the rationality of engaging in the Christian form of MP . (...) On his view, those who participate in CMP are justified in forming beliefs as they do because their practice is ‘socially established’, has a ‘functioning overrider system’ and a ‘significant degree of self-support’; and because of the ‘lack of sufficient reasons to take the practice as unreliable’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 279-289 [Access article in PDF] Dice and Facie: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 1.7.23 And 9.4.39 J. Bradford Churchill In his discussion of orthography in book 1 of his Institutio Oratoria Quintilian mentions several examples of archaic spelling conventions, among them a practice of the Elder Cato, which I present here with readings I shall propose and defend during the course of this essay: Non (...) Cato Censorius dicam et faciam dice et facie scripsit eundemque in ceteris quae similiter cadunt modum tenuit? (Inst. 1.7.23 5 Cato, Inc. Lib. fr. 55 Jordan, p. 90) Dice et facie is the reading of one manuscript (N); two other manuscripts (BH) have dicae et faciae; the other major manuscripts (APMS) have the similar but obviously corrupt dice et face. The vast discrepancies between the readings accepted by various editors demonstrate the need for a clarification of the evidence: dice et facie; 1 dicem et faciem; 2 dicae et faciae; 3. 4 The reading dicae et faciae found its way into the most recent edition, the Oxford Classical Text of Michael Winterbottom ([1970] 1989). A close examination of the evidence will confirm that this is not the correct reading. It is time to put to rest a good deal of needless controversy by showing that Cato and his contemporaries used a distinct first-person form in the future indicative of the third conjugation and that they usually or always spelled the active form without the final -m. The reading dice et facie accepted by Radermacher (1959), Fierville (1890), and Halm (1869, 367) should stand. [End Page 279]A century ago (1898) Moore argued, in a brief note influential enough to be cited in Winterbottom's apparatus, that behind Quintilian's citation as preserved lies an innovative orthographical practice not otherwise attested. Moore constructed his hypothesis on the assumption that the variants adduced were simply different ways of spelling the forms dicam and faciam. 5 Cato was not satisfied, Moore proposed, simply to follow the usual practice of the time and omit spelling the final -m, which was in many environments only partly articulated. Since the -m did, however, have some impact on the sound, Cato invented a new custom, turning M on its side at the end of the word to indicate the nasal quality of the final vowel. This anomalous symbol was preserved by Quintilian but later misconstrued as E. In this way Moore attempted to render the otherwise nonsensical forms dicae and faciae comprehensible as textual corruptions of Cato's innovation.Klotz (1931) dealt in greater depth with the problem, and although his solution is almost certainly inadequate, he touched on most of the evidence needed to solve it. Because Quintilian quotes Cato's archaic spelling convention again in book 9 (Inst. 9.4.39) in a discussion of sounds which are not spelled, Klotz conjectured (142) that Verrius Flaccus had quoted Cato as a precedent for his own practice of indicating the attenuated pronunciation of an elided final -m by writing only the first half of the letter. So, Klotz's argument continues, it was from Verrius Flaccus (GL 7.80) that Messala drew the example, and from him Quintilian derived the extant version. The "half-M" was misconstrued by Quintilian as E, and so the textual tradition preserves what he wrote: dicae et faciae.Both Moore and Klotz have read Quintilian too narrowly. Each of their arguments is predicated on the assumption (in Moore's case) or argument (in Klotz's) that Cato's forms were morphologically identical to Quintilian's dicam and faciam. They dismissed the possibility that Cato was spelling forms distinct from the classical counterparts listed by Quintilian. This is not a surprising dismissal: among the examples cited by Quintilian, these are the only ones which turn out (if the current argument is accepted) to have been morphologically distinct from the [End Page 280] classical "equivalents." Nevertheless, a careful examination of all the evidence, and in particular a close reading of the cognate passage... (shrink)

A contribution to the renewed German and French discussion about the important German philosopher of this century, Martin Heidegger, and about his relation to national socialism. To deal with the ideological and personal partake of the thinker in the activity of NSDAP is deserves our attention from the two points of view. First, Heidegger's attitude towards his own past after 1945 is typical for the spiritual position that continually shaped the history of the Federal Republic of Germany up to the (...) 60's. Second, each tradition, which made people blind to the nazi regime, is to be critically adopted. J. Habermas asks if there was an inner connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his political perception of the situation. He summarizes the views of O. Poggeler, W. Franzen, H. Ott, and he refers to other writings and newspaper articles as well. The author emphasizes that any moral evaluation of the behaviour and the acting during the nazi epoch is possible only when based on a historical approach. Heidegger's work, on the other hand, disconnected itself from his personality already long time ago, and especially the Being and Time is placed so eminently in the philosophical thought of our century, that it cannot be discredited at all by his engagement on the part of fascism. (shrink)

From Greek antiquity to the latest theories, this historical survey of political philosophy not only covers the major thinkers in the field but also explores the theme of how political philosophy relates to the nature of man. It illustrates how the great political thinkers have always grounded their political thought in what the author terms a "normative anthropology," which typically has not only ethical but metaphysical and/or theological components. Starting with the ancient Greek Sophists, author Michael J. White examines how (...) thinkers over the centuries have approached such political and philosophical concerns as justice, morality, and human flourishing, offering substantial studies of--among others--Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, Marx, and J. S. Mill. White highlights the impact of Christianity on political philosophy, illustrating the diversity of that impact by studies of Augustine, Aquinas, and Marsilius of Padua. Concluding with an in-depth analysis of John Rawls and contemporary liberal political philosophy, this text blends insight and information in a refreshing and useful manner. A brief Epilogue considers both the value and the limitations of political philosophy and its study. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt was the most famous and controversial defender of political theology in the twentieth century. But in his best-known work, _The Concept of the Political_, issued in 1927, 1932, and 1933, political considerations led him to conceal the dependence of his political theory on his faith in divine revelation. In 1932 Leo Strauss published a critical review of _Concept _that initiated an extremely subtle exchange between Schmitt and Strauss regarding Schmitt’s critique of liberalism. Although Schmitt never answered Strauss publicly, (...) in the third edition of his book he changed a number of passages in response to Strauss’s criticisms. Now, in this elegant translation by J. Harvey Lomax, Heinrich Meier shows us what the remarkable dialogue between Schmitt and Strauss reveals about the development of these two seminal thinkers. Meier contends that their exchange only ostensibly revolves around liberalism. At its heart, their “hidden dialogue” explores the fundamental conflict between political theology and political philosophy, between revelation and reason­and ultimately, the vital question of how human beings ought to live their lives. “Heinrich Meier’s treatment of Schmitt’s writings is morally analytical without moralizing, a remarkable feat in view of Schmitt’s past. He wishes to understand what Schmitt was after rather than to dismiss him out of hand or bowdlerize his thoughts for contemporary political purposes.”—Mark Lilla, _New York__ Review of Books _. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:714 BOOK REVIEWS learning; the Jesuits lean to the voluntarist. Possessed of a unitary academic model, he is really arguing for Aristotle's analogy of attribution. Apparently, no one of his 200 plus Jesuit contacts told him that Nastri prefer St. Thomas and his analogy of proper proportionality. The historian Daniel Boorstin spent 25 yeari!l writing his trilogy on The Americans. What emerges from this analysis? Boorstin points out that (...) Americans like ambiguity, that they function best amid flux; ambivalence becomes their proper medium. For this reason, I have accepted Nathaniel Hawthorne as our most central writer. He situates American questions within a landscape of chiaroscuro. The Jesuit experience in the United States belongs essentially to the same landscape. But today, as formerly, it remains a landscape of questions. McDonough, on the other hand, has too many certitudes, too many answers, too much high definition-what Henry Adams regards as "mere facts." Instead of illuminating the landscape from within, his study inevitably recedes into the larger ambiguity reserved for what Wallace Stevens has called, " Prologues to what is possible." Saint Paul University Ottawa, Ontario JOHN P. McINTYRE, S.J. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. By LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. viii + 215 pp. $29.95. As a Christian and a philosopher, Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski wants to understand why it is reasonable to affirm that we remain free despite God's infallible knowledge of our future acts. Moreover, she is not content simply to demonstrate that this affirmation involves no logical con· tradiction, for "reasonable people expect more" (p. 33) than a merely negative result. Hence the author sets herself the more ambitious task of working toward a positive solution that would explain why the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is plausible and not a bare logical possibility. The hook sorts out recent opinions on the subject and sketches an original position that she hopes will advance the discussion. Zagzehski begins by constructing the most formidable version of the dilemma. Assuming that God is infallible and essentially omniscient, that the past has a kind of necessity that the future lacks ("accidental necessity"), and that this necessity can he transferred (in some sense) from the antecedent to the consequent of a conditional proposition, the dilemma may he stated as follows: BOOK REVIEWS (1) Necessarily, God believes at time t 1 that I will do S at t 3 if and only if I do S at t 3. (2) It is accidentally necessary at t 2 that God believes at t 1 that I will do S at t 3. (3) If (1) and (2) are true, then it is accidentally necessary at t 2 that I do Sat t 3. (4) It follows that it is accidentally necessary at t 2 that I do S at t 3. (5) But if it is accidentally necessary at t 2 that I do S at t 3, I do not do S at t 3 freely. (6) Therefore, I do not do S at t 3 freely. 715 Much of the first chapter is devoted to establishing that this form of the dilemma is more resistant to solution than any other, especially the so-called problem of future truth. Zagzebski goes on to evaluate three broad approaches to solving the dilemma. In Chapter 2 she takes up the " timelessness " solution. Its proponents, among whom the author numbers Boethius, Thomas Aquinas, Eleonore Stump, and Norman Kretzmann, negate premise (2) of the foreknowledge dilemma by contending that God is not in time. Zagzebski considers this an acceptable negative solution to the dilemma and sees in it the potential to ground a more comprehensive, positive solution. Nonetheless, she refrains from subscribing wholeheartedly to the timelessness solution because it confronts one with a dilemma at least as perplexing as the one it solves. She puts the problem this way: like the past, eternity is fixed, for it is constituted by a state of affairs about which we cannot do anything; therefore my future acts are determined no less by God's timeless knowledge than by God's foreknowing them in a strictly temporal sense. In Chapter 3, Zagzebski considers... (shrink)