Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that theform of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. (...) While the position I present does not constitute a complete teleological account of value, it points toward a way of integrating directed reasons into a practice-based account of value. The position presented also remains consistent with the so called Compelling Idea that often motivates consequentialism: it is always permissible for an agent to do what will lead to the outcome that is best. (shrink)

It will be argued that the virtual agent (VA) can be characterized using phenomenological descriptive tools and other conceptual means within related paradigms of the analysis of subjectivity. From such a point of view, the main features of VA are: •VA is constituted by its communicative valencies; •VA is intentionally active in perception, and it is the case also at the intersubjective level; •VA establishes and supports the truth of its statements, which come out as a creative boundary, an (...) "unquestionable point of contact" between virtual "I" and virtual reality; •communicative intersubjectivity in cyberspace is better describedthrough recursive ontologies. Peirce's conception of the Subject as a species of semiosis can be helpful to clarify these points. Unlike the traditional concept of subject where communication stands at a level resting on an underlying level of being, for Peirce communication is inherent in mind itself. Along these lines, I argue for the open multivalence of the signified as overdetermined by communicative acts. (shrink)

One of the enduring concerns of moral philosophy is deciding who or what is deserving of ethical consideration. This special issue of Philosophy and Technology investigates whether and to what extent machines, of various designs and configurations, can or should be considered moral subjects, defined here as either a moral agent, a moral patient, or both. The articles that comprise the issue were competitively selected from papers initially prepared for and presented at a symposium on this subject (...) matter convened during the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, held in at the University of Birmingham in Birmingham, UK. (shrink)

I propose the hypothesis that our knowledge of our own mental states derives from our knowledge of our intentions, and that our knowledge of our intentions is part of having those intentions. I enumerate various aspects of the question to be answered and various aspects of my answer. The hypothesis begins to explain various aspects of self-knowledge, such as its fallibility and its variability from one kind of mental state to another. Self-knowledge is also grounded in our common antecedent knowledge (...) of the functionalist nature of mental states and the integrity of our mental life and above all mind’s link with action in the world. The hypothesis helps pluck philosophy from the fairy-land of Lockean and Kantian inner sense. (shrink)

The Seed Thoughts proposed by YU Youngmo and HAM Sukhun may each be summed up by propositions expressed in “People are a May-fly seed” and “Seeds embody the eternal meaning”. They used “seed” to refer to humans or people on the one hand and placed the notion of seed in the holistic context of the Eastern Asian tradition on the other. Then, I seek to connect the anthropological notion and the holistic notion via cheng(誠) or integration. 『The Doctrine of the (...) Mean』says that any ultimate integration(至誠) reflects the total nature of objects involved(盡性) by showing that self realization and all other realizations are one and not two(成己成物) and by arriving at the stage of holiness (聖). Then, I may be allowed to say that cheng is a mind or a power not only of humans but also of all other things. Important elements of cheng intentionality can be read out of the two thinker’s various conceptual aspects. YU’s interpretation of history to be internalistic, his view of Hangul(Korean written language) as a revealational medium, his hermeneutics of Christian God as the Vacuum cannot be understood on the dichotomous model of human-nature. HAM’s seed holism, his beliefs that humans’s minds are the heavenly mind and that all things under the heaven should come to be unified are best to be understood on the model of cheng intentionality of integration. (shrink)

Agent-based modelling has become a well-established method in social epistemology and philosophy of science but the question of what kind of explanations these models provide remains largely open. This paper is dedicated to this issue. It starts by distinguishing between real-world phenomena, real-world possibilities, and logical possibilities as different kinds of targets which agent-based models can represent. I argue that models representing the former two kinds provide how-actually explanations or causal how-possibly explanations. In contrast, models that represent (...) logical possibilities provide epistemically opaque how-possibly explanations. While highly idealised ABMs in the form in which they are initially proposed typically fall into the last category, the epistemic opaqueness of explanations they provide can be reduced by validation procedures. To this purpose, an examination of results of simulations in terms of classes of models can be particularly helpful. I illustrate this point by discussing a class of ABMs of scientific interaction and the claim that a high degree of interaction can impede scientific inquiry. (shrink)

I argue here that sophisticated AI systems, with the exception of those aimed at the psychological modeling of human cognition, must be based on general philosophical theories of rationality and, conversely, philosophical theories of rationality should be tested by implementing them in AI systems. So the philosophy and the AI go hand in hand. I compare human and generic rationality within a broad philosophy of AI and conclude by suggesting that ultimately, virtually all familiar philosophical problems will turn (...) out to be at least indirectly relevant to the task of building an autonomous rational agent, and conversely, the AI enterprise has the potential to throw light at least indirectly on most philosophical problems. (shrink)

The focus of the following paper is the phenomenon of the collective agent; what constitutes the appearance of a collective agent? I begin by investigating one simple argument for the existence of collective agents. Two critical issues emerge: does it make sense to hold a collective agent blameworthy, and, what is the motivation for doing so, one way or the other? I then dissolve these issues with a distinction, that between blameworthiness and responsibility. In light of this (...) distinction, there appears to be no use for the introduction of collectives as agents in their own right, outside of expedience of reference and deference of blame. (shrink)

In 2000, Mark Palmer, one of the National Endowment for Democracy’s founders and Vice Chairman of Freedom House—an organization funded entirely by the U.S. Congress—founded a new government-supported group, Friends of Falun Gong. By perusing FoFG’s annual tax filings, one discovers that FoFG has contributed funds to Sounds of Hope Radio, New Tang Dynasty TV, and the Epoch Times—all Falun Gong media outlets. FoFG has also contributed to Dragon Springs and to Shen Yun, as well as to Falun Gong’s PR (...) arm. In order to contextualize the U.S. government’s funding of Falun Gong, it will also be helpful to examine a handful of additional U.S. agency activities, such as the NED’s funding of Liu Xiaobo, the Hong Kong protests, and other China-related and Tibet-related groups. (shrink)

This paper examines the relation between philosophy and literature through an analysis of claims made by Martha Nussbaum regarding the contribution novels can make to moral philosophy. Perhaps her most controversial assertion is that some novels are themselves works of moral philosophy. I contrast Nussbaum’s view with that of Iris Murdoch. I discuss three claims which are fundamental to Nussbaum’s position: the relation between writing style and content; philosophy’s inadequacy in preparing agents for moral life because (...) of its reliance on rules; and the usefulness of the moral work engaged in by readers of novels. The evaluation of these claims requires a discussion of the nature of philosophy. I find that Murdoch and Nussbaum agree on the ability of literature to contribute to moral understanding, but disagree on the issue of what philosophy is. Therefore, they disagree on the question of whether certain works of fiction are also works of philosophy. I argue that the task Nussbaum assigns philosophy is too broad. Through the use of critical and reflective methods, philosophy should examine and sort moral claims. Literary, philosophical and religious texts contribute to moral eduction; keeping them separate helps us appreciate their distinct contributions, as well as respect their distinct aims and methods. Therefore, I conclude that Nussbaum’s inclusion of certain novels in philosophy cannot be sustained. (shrink)

This book is an anthology about transformation processes. It brings together contributions that were made during the 16th International Congress of the German Society for Semiotics 2021. Due to the Corona pandemic, it was finally not held in attendance at the TU Chemnitz, in Germany, but took place online. 11 sections with different focuses from archaeology, architecture, design, digital humanities, on the body, from the field of literature & youth and subcultures, media, fashion, environment, and carto/atlas semiotics and sign (...) class='Hi'>philosophy had each published their own call for papers. -/- The focus of the IMAGE & Cultural study sections' call, published with the volume, was to understand images as agents - according to art and cultural studies scholar Aby M. Warburg - and to recognize and understand not only their potential for cognition, but also their potential for action. As an active part of culture, they not only convey it, but at the same time stimulate action. In this respect, images can be understood not only as documents and testimonies of collective history, but also as active carriers and repositories of affectively effective elements of communication. As agents of cultural transformation processes, images take on a status of their own within the human capacity for expression and action. The essays in this volume bear eloquent witness to this. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: Choice and Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics ALFRED R. MELE COM~rNTATORS ON THr Nicomachean Ethics (NE) have long been laboring under the influence of a serious misunderstanding of one of the key terms in Aristotle's moral philosophy and theory of action. This term is prohairesis (choice), the importance of which is indicated by Aristotle's assertions that choice is the proximate efficient cause of action (NE 6. 1139a31--32) (...) and that in which "the essential elements of virtue and character" lie (NE 8. x163a2'~-23). The accepted view is that Aristotle employs two importantly different notions of choice in the NE, one on which the term refers exclusively to means or things which are pros (toward, related to)' ends and another on which it does not have this reference? This "two notion" interpretation is motivated by the following three considerations: i. Aristotle's good or virtuous agent is said (NE 2. 11o5a28-33, cf. NE 6. 1144ax8-2o ) to choose actions for their own sakes; but, according to the This paper is derived in part from a chapter of my doctoral dissertation, which was submitted to the University of Michigan in January of 1979. 1 would like to express my gratitttde to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Nicholas P. White, for his comments and criticisms on the relevant sections during the preparation of my dissertation and to theJHP's anonymous reviewers for their helpful criticisms and queries. ' It has often been pointed out that things which are pros an end are not necessarily "means," in the ordinary sense of the word. E.g., constituents of an end are pros the end, but they are not means to it. See, e.g., Nicomachean Ethics, Book 6, trans. Leonard H. G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19o9), pp. 46-47, 53ff.: and John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 1o-22. ' Among the many proponents of this "two notion" interpretation are William D. Ross and Donald J. Allan. See Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, t953), p. 2oo. See Allan, The Philosophy of Aristotle, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 197o), p. 132; idem, "Aristotle 's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," Xlth International Congress of Philosophy 12 (1953):124; idem, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote, Studies for A. Mansion (Louvain : Publications Universitaires, 1955). Richard Sorabji, in "Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue" (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 l t973-74]:t t6), says that he has noticed sixteen commentators who take this view. [4o5] 406 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY so-called formal account of prohairesis (NE 3. 2-3, 6. 2), the object of choice is what has been decided upon by deliberation (bouleuais), and what is decided upon by deliberation is a "means" to an end. 2. Aristotle says that choice is "closely bound up with virtue" and "discriminates characters better than actions do" (1 1t lb5; cf. t i lob3t, 1117a 5, 1163a22, 1t64bi); but commentators argue that these claims about choice are false unless choice is "of ends." 3. Though Aristotle holds that the impetuous akrat~s (incontinent agent) does not deliberate (e.g., t 152a 18-19), he says that the akrat~s' choice is good (1152ax5--17; cf. l l51a5-- 7, 29--32); and this appears to contradict his position in Book 3 that the object of choice is what is decided upon by deliberation, s In this paper I shall show that only one (philosophically significant) notion ofprohairesis is employed in the NE, namely, the notion developed in the "formal account" of deliberation and choice (3- 2-3, 6. 2), according to which choice is specifically of things which are pros ends. This point has several interesting applications. For example, it makes it easier to find in Aristotle (as I shall briefly explain) a comprehensive theory of practical reasoning or inference rather than several unconnected accounts of what practical inference is like in different types of cases; and it is helpful in clarifying what is involved in the evaluation of character on Aristotle's view (see Sec. ~). However, though I do think that the main point to be made... (shrink)

Modern philosophy—perhaps better described as post-Enlightenment philosophy—began to emerge in the later half of the nineteenth century and continued to gain strength in its opposition to the Enlightenment’s insistence on the central role of reason and rational discourse in philosophy. The recent attacks on reason in the name of this or that ideology or “ism” do not strengthen but rather weaken the foundations of equality for women and minorities established through the use of reason. Philosophers—male and female (...) of all races—may take justifiable pride in having been by rational argument, agents of liberation for women and minorities. This achievement should not be jeopardized by the rejection of rational argument and evidence in the name of any currently fashionable movement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Evangelical Peacemakers: Gospel Engagement in a War-Torn World ed. by David P. GusheeLisa Sowle CahillEvangelical Peacemakers: Gospel Engagement in a War-Torn World Edited by David P. Gushee EUGENE, OR: WIPF AND STOCK, 2013. 135 PP. $21.00This short volume collects papers from a 2012 Evangelicals for Peace conference at Georgetown University. This should not mislead potential readers as to the book's timeliness, coherence, significance, or ecumenical and interreligious appeal. (...) Much of its incisive analysis owes to the editor's preface, introductory chapter, and concluding critical discussion of the positions represented, including his own.Four chapters lay out the Christian arguments for just war, biblical pacifism, and the late Glen Stassen's "just peacemaking theory," presenting ten practices to deter or transform violent conflict. Although Gushee's chapter would have to be placed among just war theorists, he stresses that war must be a last resort to defend innocent life, carried out with the least violence possible. Gushee appreciates the paradox of expressing love through acts of violence. Lisa Sharon Harper insists this goes beyond paradox to outright denial of the redemption Jesus brings, failing to honor the image of God in all persons. Following Anglican theologian Oliver O'Donovan, Erik Patterson sees publicly authorized force to protect society as a positive Christian duty. Striving to unite these two sides in practice, Stassen derives alternative, nonviolent strategies from the Sermon on the Mount to transform conflict at the local, national, regional, and international levels.But are such efforts successful? Can and do Christian peacemakers actually bring about significant societal and political change? Twelve further chapters offer experience-based evidence from Evangelical organizations and ministries that the answer is yes. Authors describe initiatives at home and abroad, giving special attention to Christian–Muslim outreach and understanding. Examples range from Evangelical pastors and churches welcoming Muslims and mosques; to educational ventures in Pakistani madrassas; to organizing Afghan youth as "peace volunteers"; to conflict mediation in Egypt and Indonesia; and the memoir of a Lockerbie bombing victim's sister, who went personally to reconcile with Muammar Gaddafi. Sojourners editor Jim Wallis gives plenty of illustrations of the power in the United States of massive civil disobedience and efforts to pressure Congress or the president through letter and phone campaigns, protests, media attention, and high-level advocacy. Christian political resistance and mobilization can no longer be dismissed as utopian, naïve, or marginal. In many cases, it works.Gushee honestly and acutely articulates why pacifism and just war have had longstanding places in Christian political ethics, and why their adherents are [End Page 206] not easily reconciled. First, Jesus was nonviolent, and even those who construe rare and restrained violence as a form of neighbor love cannot deny that Jesus himself never expressed love in this way (121). Second, although Jesus calls disciples to participate in God's reign, that reign is but "eschatologically" present in a fallen world (119). Violence-transforming practices do not always work (125). Reconciling love may define kingdom discipleship, but when do we gauge love-in-action by the "present" reality of the kingdom, and when by the "not yet"? Third, according to Gushee, there is a difference (not separation) between church and government. This yields the conundrum that although their roles are different, Christians participate in both spheres, responsible not only for the peacemaking activities of the church but also for their social effects and for building just structures (5–6).Gushee does not claim to resolve these paradoxes. The collection underscores a more urgent challenge: to embody and expand Evangelical peacemaking as an integral dimension of discipleship and a powerful form of real-world politics. This book furthers theological-ethical analysis while leading scholars, students, and congregations to become active agents of change.Lisa Sowle CahillBoston CollegeCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The paper analyzes recognition in relation to the global legal arrangements. It articulates of an extra-territorial recognition of right-holders by means of the development of a philosophical theory of recognition on the global level. It examines contemporary possibilities of extra-territorial recognition that are bound to the nation-states hitherto. The paper indicates an increasing influence of various transnational agents in order to show (1) the possibilities and limits of extra-territorial recognition based on a state-centric approach, and (2) a demand of supranational (...) recognition. Therefore, it maps the development from thecontemporary international system to the system that can contain also important supranational elements. In its practical consequences, it leads not only to rethinking social, political and legal philosophy but also to a philosophical reinvention of the United Nations because a new supranational stage of recognition requires not only a responsibility of the nation-states but also a direct responsibility of non-state transnationalagents. (shrink)

In a fascinating paper, “Ask the Philosopher,” Dimitrios Dentsoras shows how philosophers were once integrally engaged in society as agents of practical advice on how to govern and indeed on how to live. Over the centuries, beginning in Roman times, this social role has diminished to a point where professional philosophers are largely socially irrelevant. What has changed? This paper outlines an argument that identifies a central contribution to its own demise that professional philosophy itself has made. That contribution (...) has to do with how philosophical critique is conceived and operates. Philosophical teaching and publishing focus is on undermining opposing positions, or on eliminating opposition, rather than seeking deeper and genuine understanding. Examining certain elements of this eliminative function presents a possibility of seeing a renewal of philosophy’s previous functions of truth-seeking and accessing the Good. (shrink)

Our paper examines the impact of the intersection of cultural and gender identity on moral reasoning. Much research has been done on gender differences in moral thinking/reasoning, and increasingly research has also examined cultural differences in moral thinking. In agreement with a number of scholars we support the following claims about culture, moral reasoning, and concepts of self: concepts of self and approaches to moral reasoning are connected, concepts of self are differing by gender and culture, moral reasoning differs by (...) gender and culture. We propose that philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, follow the lead of psychology and strive to be as inclusive as possible by including the full range of human diversity and experience. For philosophers, this would mean embracing – indeed, starting from – a multicultural, feminist approach to moral theories and questions; this approach would not only be sensitive to gender and cultural bias, but also offer an alternative model to the paradigmatic rational, autonomous, independent agent of traditional moral theory. The implications of this go far beyond moral reasoning, but also have implications for other areas of philosophy as well, such as recent work in philosophy of mind on the idea of extended cognition. (shrink)

The United States Constitution is, in form and fact, a kind of fiduciary instrument, and government officials acting pursuant to that document are subject to the background rules of fiduciary obligation that underlie all such documents. One of the most basic eighteenth-century fiduciary rules was the presumptive rule against subdelegation of discretionary authority. The rule was presumptive only; there were recognized exceptions that permitted subdelegation when it was specifically authorized by the instrument of agency, when it was validated by custom (...) or tradition, and when it was necessary for accomplishment of the agent’s authorized purposes. To what extent might that third exception justify broad subdelegation of legislative authority by Congress to administrative agencies? Part of the answer, which is beyond the aims of this essay, depends on ascertaining the nature of the job entrusted to Congress under the Constitution, which means ascertaining the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. Another part of the answer depends on the extent to which expertise can and may serve as justification for entrusting others with tasks with which one has previously been entrusted. What would a responsible fiduciary approach to expertise—whether for purposes of advice or subdelegation—look like in the modern administrative state? The answer requires a careful examination of the idea of expertise and how it can be applied, and misapplied, in modern governance. This essay offers only the briefest introduction to that problem by trying to frame the questions that responsible fiduciaries need to ask before subdelegating authority. Such questions include: (1) What are the limits of the principal’s own knowledge? (2) What reason is there to think that gaps in that knowledge can, even in principle, be filled by experts? (3) Will application of expert knowledge lead in any particular instance lead to better decisions, given the ubiquitous problem of second-best? and (4) Have you picked the right experts, and will they actually apply expertise rather than using their claim to expertise as a cover for pursuing other goals? These questions in the context of the modern administrative state are just one aspect of a broader problem of nonexperts trying to evaluate—both before and after the fact—the work product of experts. (shrink)

One much discussed issue in contemporary philosophy is the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Philosophers debate whether consciousness and intentionality are somehow ‘connected’; whether we have reason to be more optimistic about an ‘objective,’ ‘scientific’ or ‘third person’ ‘account’ of intentionality than about an analogous account of consciousness. This paper is intended as a limited contribution to that debate. I shall be concerned only with the intentionality of action. Not everything which is true of intentionality of action is true (...) of intentionality of other phenomena, such as beliefs. I shall discuss the question, ‘What is the intentionality of action?’ More specifically, I shall discuss one partial answer to this question: that a necessary condition of an agent performing a certain intentional action is that the agent is conscious of performing that action. This answer is fairly unpopular in contemporary philosophy. In this paper, I shall try to say something about the ground for the rather wide-spread philosophical resistance to the answer, and I shall also outline the kind of considerations that I think are required to judge whether a wedge can or cannot be driven between consciousness and intentionality of action. (shrink)

One of the factors that contributes to an agent’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness - his or her moral worth – is effort. On the one hand, agents who act effortlessly seem to have high moral worth. On the other hand, agents who act effortfully seem to have high moral worth as well. I explain this pair of intuitions and explore the contour of our views about cases in between them. This paper uses conceptual graphs for clarity and, in additional work (...) I have done on value theory, as arguments. Conceptual graphs reflect a way of doing philosophy that is new and powerful, as reflected in work over the past several decades by Derek Parfit, Shelly Kagan, Larry Temkin, and Thomas Hurka. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION In any society relatively few disputes are brought to judges for resolution. Most are handled informally or forgotten. Fewer still are cases that go to trial. Most are settled. Compromises are reached even in cases where issues are hotly contested and where millions or billions of dollars in damages are claimed. Recently, for example, one of the most controversial lawsuits of our time, the Agent Orange case, was settled. In that case, veterans of the Vietnam War, their spouses, (...) and their children alleged that a defoliant — Agent Orange – used in Southeast Asia contained dioxin and was responsible for deaths, debilities, miscarriages, and birth defects suffered by members of the plaintiff class. Class members argued that the manufacturers of the defoliant, seven major chemical companies, knew that it was tainted and should be made to compensate them for their injuries, claiming billions of dollars in damages. The case received national exposure and became a rallying point for veterans, a means they hoped to use to publicize their plight and to spur Congress to come to their aid. On the eve of trial, the case was settled. The defendants, who denied liability throughout the pretrial period, agreed to pay the veterans $180 million. In turn, the plaintiff class agreed to drop the suit. Thus ended a controversy which not only presented novel legal issues and tested the ability of the federal courts to handle complex lawsuits, but concerned the well-being of a large number of veterans, their spouses, and their handicapped children as well. (shrink)

Tanabe Hajime, another pole of the so-called Kyoto-School of Philosophy of modern Japan, attempts to construct a dialectical, triadic logic of genus, species and individual as a creative synthesis between Eastern and Western philosophy. Although the formal pattern of his method is influenced by the Hegelian dialectic, the way of his thinking is rather prevailed by Kantian dualism. This makes a sharp contrast to his mentor Nishida Kitaro, whose logic of Topos or Place qua Absolute Nothingness is criticized (...) as all-embracing and static in character by him. The difference between them might be parallel to that of Greek and Latin theology concerning the Trinity. Tanabe never presupposes any preexistent entity as the primordial One in the eternal dimension, but rather maintains the individuality as the free subjective agent in the field of history. The dichotomy between the universal and the individual is overcome in and through the mediation of the third term— the species — as the negatively self-realized, specific form of the genus. The species, however, turns out to be the self-estrangement, when it loses the perpetually negative mediation of the free subjective activity of the individual. (shrink)

I review a familiar skeptical argument from Hume, and conclude that it requires us to accept that there is no necessary relation between beliefs about the world and their evidential grounds; that is, there is no logical or quasi-logical relation between empirical beliefs and their grounds, such that their grounds entail them, or even make them probable. I then argue that generic reliabilism can accommodate this fact about evidential grounds in a non-skeptical way. According to reliabilism, the grounds for our (...) beliefs constitute good evidence so long as they are contingently reliable. Next I argue that agent reliabilism successfully addresses two related problems for other versions of reliabilism: the fact that beliefs can be reliably formed by accident, and the need for subjective justification. Finally, I explain why agent reliabilism is properly conceived as a version of virtue epistemology. (shrink)

Obviously, “To know” is different to “be informed”. For “to know”, we have a motivation to reach certain proposition we thought is meaningful to us; however, for “be informed”, we just passively receive propositions or we gain certain propositions without much deliberation in which these propositions may be useful to us. The proposition “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” seems information but not knowledge to us, in the sense that we just be given this proposition and (...) we exploited it to entertain our friends around us. However, in the case of I am a sport agent; “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” is surely knowledge but not just information for me, in the sense that I have a motivation to reach this proposition to do my work best. I “know” thatWang collected 19 and “inform” the team to consider his contribution to the New York Yankee. The Yankee of course “knows” Wang’s performance, I the sport agent “inform” the Yankee the fact of 19 just push the Yankee to reconsider this information seriously or tell them the significance of this information. What I want to tell them or remind them is what we said knowledge, not just information. Knowledge then has more elements than information does in our daily usage. It is less direct that there exists a distinction between the proposition of knowledge and that of information. The content of the two may be totally the same, the difference of the two may be vague; but the distinction of the two is necessary, at least they have different meanings in our daily usage. I think the epistemic reliabilism or externalism is not capable to bring out that point. The result leads to reliabilism any proposition that is just the information be qualified as the knowledge. But we think intuitively that the value of knowledge is more than the value of information, therefore, we need a better account of the knowledge which we are favorable. (shrink)

Many wonder at the abundance of disputes, opposing views and schools in philosophy. This abundance is surprising in view of the fact that philosophers are known for their striving and high regard for rationality. (There are, of course, philosophers who attempt to oppose, mostly by rational argumentation, the view that philosophy should be a rational discipline.) Why are all these admirably smart and rational people in so much disagreement with each other? Suvar Köseraif argues that the explanation of (...) this phenomenon may lie in the fact that when two perfectly rational agents A 1 and A 2 disagree about matters of truth, there seems no way they can settle their dispute in purely rational ways. For suppose A1 believes in the truth of claim Q on the basis of premises P and a valid argument P.'.Q, and A 2 believes that ~Q on the basis of premises R and a valid argument R.'. ~Q. Then it would seem on logical, hence rational, grounds that A 1 must reject A2's reasons R, since P.'. ~R is also valid. Thus the reasons P, which led Ai to rationally accept Q, also constitute rational reasons for A 1 to reject R, and consequently reject the argument A2 adduces for ~Q. Symmetrically, A 2 cannot but reject the reasoning A1 adduces for Q. So the dispute between A1 and A 2 concerning the truth of Q cannot be resolved—unless either side compromises its rationality and yields to such nonrational methods as threats, brainwashing, offers of money, etc. If all this is right, we have (rational) reason to be pessimistic about the value of rationality not only in philosophy, but in any sphere of thought, including science. I attempt to offer a rational counterargument against Köseraif's. (shrink)

In comparing humans and animals, we may use humans as the standard to measure animals, or conversely, animals as the standard to measure humans. While most philosophers have adopted the former approach, David Hume is among those few who use the comparison with animals as means to throw light on human nature. I focus on Hume’s treatment of human and animal reason. The cognitive processes and states that Hume holds to be common to humans and animals may be called situated, (...) that is, embedded in the process of guiding actions that is actually going on and consequently relative to the agent’s current position in space-time. Hume’s treatment of causal reasoning underlines the centrality of situated cognition in the workings of human, as well as animal minds. Taking situated reasoning and beliefs as the paradigm of human cognition enables us to look from an alternative point of view, at the features supposedly unique to human cognition, like the use of general words and concepts. Thus we can find a confirmation of the practical import of general words and concepts in Hume’s account of the obligation of promises, where words play an essential role in extending our control over objects and actions beyond what is present and particular into what is absent or not yet actualized. This is also a confirmation of how deeply our cognitive abilities in general are rooted in our practical needs. (shrink)

Moral responsibility requires control of one’s behavior. But there are different kinds of control. One sort of control entails the existence of genuinely accessible alternative possibilities. I call this regulative control. I believe that an agent can control his or her behavior without having control over it. In such a circumstance, the agent enjoys what I call guidance control, but not regulative control. He guides his behavior in the way characteristic of agents who act freely, yet he does (...) not have alternative possibilities with respect to his decision or action. I contend that moral responsibility requires guidance control, but not regulative control. In this paper, I wish to provide a measure of intuitive appeal to the claim that guidance control is all the control (or freedom) necessary for moral responsibility by sketching the picture that supports this claim. (shrink)

Teleosemantic theories of content constitute a mixed family of different proposals and accounts about what consists mental content. In the present paper, I would like examine the scope and limits of a particular and well defined teleosemantic theory such as Millikan’s account. My aim entails presenting arguments in order to show how her theory of mental content is unnable of giving a complete account of the whole mental life almost for adult human agents without commiting certain adaptationist assumptions. I am (...) going to present my arguments in the following order. In section 1 I present an outline of the Millikan’s theory of mental content. In section 2, after defining useless content I pay attention to her treatment of it. In section 3 I set out my queries concerning to the fixation of useless content defended by Millikan. Finally, I conclude that the theory about useless content doesn’t identify content in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. (shrink)

In most countries, failed criminal attempts are punished less severely than those that succeed. Many philosophers, including myself, have argued that differential punishment can be justified. However, in a recent paper, Hanna raises objections to defenses of differential punishments, claiming that such policy goes against our “desert intuitions” and also cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds. I argue in this paper that Hanna’s desert-based and utilitarian objections can be undermined. Further, they are valid only within moral theories that take the (...) agent to be an independent self, whose responsibility rests on his or her intentions and deliberations alone. However, differential punishment can be justified in a different kind of moral theory, in which there are good reasons to giveluck a role to play. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that normativity in its pure form is a matter of gap. I will elucidate this idea in three aspects. First, I will suggest that the ‘ought’ is the unique creation of human language to deal with the contingencies and the complexity of the world. And the particular merit of the nature of ‘ought’ or the normativity is not what it positively can offer or do, but what it negatively leaves rooms for, because the ‘ought’ (...) opens up some space for reason or action. Second, every normative system must transform the real human being into its own normative construction of person. I call it the subjugation process. Third, the normativity can show its force more deeply through the escape, resistance and refusal, in another word, through struggle for recognition of the agents. This aspect has certain connection with the critical theory. (shrink)

Explorationism (see www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Logi/LogiFaus.htm, WCP XX, “Conflict without Contradiction”) is a perspective concerning human knowledge: as yet, our ignorance of the Real World remains great. With this perspective, all our knowledge is so far only partial and tentative. Evidence Logic (EL) (see “The Concept of Evidence”, INTER. JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 15 (2000), 477‐493) provides an example of a reasonable Base Logic for Explorationism:EL provides machinery for the representation and processing of gradational evidential predications. Syntactically, for any evidence level e, for (...) a proposition symbol P, Pc:e asserts that there is level e confirmatory evidence regarding P, while Pr:e asserts level e refutatory evidence (n‐ary predications, for n>0, are handled similarly). Semantically, EL has similarly enriched model spaces. The Boolean sentence algebras of the variety of EL languages, varying across stipulated families of predicate and functions symbols, have been analyzed, and EL is sound and complete. Belief Systems, we will argue, are all unnecessary: in science, as well as in all broader domains of human relations and activity, it is always sufficient to have simply commitments, which entail no assertion of Truth but rather simply entail agreed‐upon consequent actions. (Agent A believes a sentence S if A asserts S is True although A does not know (have absolute evidence) that S is True.) We will further seek to explore ways in which such a perspective may help in engendering more enhanced discourse, less absolutist and shrill advocacy and violence, and more rationality, in the Global Village of the new century. (shrink)

The logical form of an inductive step figures as a deductive fallacy: concluding the antecedent from affirming a conditional and its consequent. In the sphere of practical rationality, however, where concerned with the presuppositions of action and the interactions between beliefs and desires, certain schemata have been proposed that express rational demands on agents who desire things to happen in the world. In this context, if agent A desires to φ and believes that ψ brings about φ, then, A (...) is rationally expected to desire to ψ. But it is equally rational to expect that A’s desire to φ presupposes her belief that a certain state of affairs obtains where φ is a possibility. It then follows that assuming a desire to φ and a belief that ψ brings about φ, we can derive an logical form that approximates that of the above inductive step: the beliefs that φ is possible and that ψ brings about φ entail the belief that ψ is possible. It remains an open question whether this conclusion adequately supports the rationality of the exact inductive schema. (shrink)

The article reflects on the symbolic forms of domination developed in the social environment and the real games of power that they are hidden behind the representations in nowadays. It approaches the relation that the medias has in the representation context, being an instrument of domination for the processes ofconstruction of the important meanings for the structure of a society. The study calls the attention for the problematic theoretician presented for the philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, writing on the agent and (...) society, through the antagonism and exclusion between itself. Others two philosophers worked in the research are Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. Thinking on individuals separately, we have that as the participant ones to be responsible in all the constructionof ethical values, politicians, cultural among others that they guide the collective context. However, we will only get success in this question, if we know how to analyze the “search of the real”. (shrink)

According to author, value of human dignity has its place in his ethics of social consequences which is a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism. This is so because it is compatible with the value of positive consequences that creates one of the crucial criteria in ethics of social consequences. There exist two aspects of human dignity in this ethical theory. The first is related to the value of life that is worthy of esteem and respect, which brings positive consequences (moral biocentrism), (...) second aspect is related to the fact that human dignity is a function of the positive consequences of our action and behavior prevailing over the negative consequences of our action and behavior. This creates a basis for assigning moral agents with an additional, qualitative value of human dignity. In caseof human beings without developed consciousness and who are only potential moral agents, the first aspect of human dignity is dominant in our judgments about them. In the judgments concerning moral agents the second aspect of human dignity dominates. (shrink)

Hard determinism is hardly a new position, but the most common arguments are not widely convincing. Theological arguments rest on the oversight or control of a supernatural entity, and so are not convincing to any who do not share the metaphysical assumptions latent in the argument. Psychological arguments reston putatively scientific claims that, if examined more closely, seem not to be scientific at all. A doxastic argument avoids these pitfalls. According to this doxastic argument, beliefs are not freely chosen, for (...) to believe X is to be convinced of X, and it is not up to the agent to find something convincing or unconvincing. If an agent's allegedly free actions are based on beliefs, and if those beliefs cannot freely be chosen by the agent, then that agent's actions are not ultimately free. (shrink)

Rawls' original position is a thought experiment by which we are asked to imagine ourselves as rational agents choosing the principles of justice under specific informational and motivational constraints. In this paper, I am concerned only with the informational constraints and I shall argue that the way Rawls designed them reveals an implausible conception of mind and knowledge. This conception, of a mind separable from knowledge, as well as one of its correlates which I will call epistemic egalitarianism, is not (...) an objection one may address uniquely to the original position. However, the failure to construct the original position as a one-solution problem renders its epistemology not only implausible but of no use for moral reasoning. (shrink)

Weakness of the Will can impose a problem for most theories of rationality, since they try to assess rationality in the framework of one theory. Here, Akrasia is divides in three different types and each analyzed separately. First, someone changes her mind on her action. Second, someone “forced” to change her action without changing her mind. This force is alien to the will and can be a psychological cause. Finally, third, the same alien force is working upon the agent, (...) but theagent thinks it to be her will. (shrink)

In the context of his advanced theory of ethics Aristotle like later Kant seems considering the Golden Rule as trivial and not bound to be articulated. It is possible that Aristotle did not feel necessity to mention the Golden Rule, because the very Golden Rule was spread out in his ethics. Though he did not use the formula ofthe Golden Rule in his texts, he often expressed his understanding of virtuous character and virtuous relations using intellective constructions evidently relevant to (...) the Golden Rule. The analysis of Aristotle’s reasoning on shame, social intercourse and, mainly, friendship shows that his ethics is saturated with the content andspirit of the Golden Rule, including such features agent’s initiative, activity, commitment and thus her/his responsibility for establishing relations, their potential reversibility, mutuality, and universalizability. (shrink)

How to interpret autonomy plays a crucial role that leads to different readings in Kant’s moral metaphysics, philosophy of religion and moral psychology. In this paper I argue for a two-layered conception of autonomy with varying degrees of justification for each: autonomy as a capacity and autonomy as a paragon-like paradigm. I argue that all healthy rational humans possess the inalienable capacity of autonomy, i. e. share the universal ground for the communicability of objective basic moral principles. This initial (...) understanding stands for autonomy as a capacity about which we can talk of universal validity and justification. Nevertheless, the way a person fully actualizes herself, her freedom, namely autonomy, is shaped by her initial conception of autonomy and moral view of the world. Autonomy as an organic experience of real moral agents, which means an ongoing, non-static, irreducible and inexplicable judgmental process concerning one’s actualization of oneself gives way to consider autonomy as a godlike state of the soul even though one cannot provide objective validity for this. (shrink)

Recent discussions on the nature of freedom have suggested that freedom of action depends on freedom of the will and that the conditions for the freedom of the will preclude the possibility of the antecedents of free actions being determined or alternatively require that the agent be responsible for those antecedents. In this paper, it is argued that the first thesis is correct but that the second on either interpretation is wrong. What I argue is that if we take (...) one essential component of the antecedents of action, namely belief, and look at the conditions for freedom of belief, or better, autonomy of belief, we will see that rather than determinism being precluded as a condition for autonomy, a certain sort of determinism would make best sense of that autonomy. It is argued that contrary to oft-cited intuitions, were this form of determinism to obtain, our autonomy would be enhanced. (shrink)

A genuine bioethics would be fiercely devoted to human life (bios) and would express that devotion by articulating as well as advocating moral virtues that rigorously protect that value against the temptation to see life in purely instrumental terms. In my view, no genuine bioethics exists today. In what follows, I will question two fundamental assumptions often presumed in discussions of euthanasia and assisted suicide. These are (i) the agent does will her victim (i.e., her putative beneficiary) some significant (...) human good, e.g., relief from pain, escape from becoming a burden to loved ones, a dignified death, or simply self-determination; (ii) in purposely helping someone to kill herself or in killing her for her own good, the agent wills her no serious harm. Put differently, I question the assumption of ‘mercy’ in so-called ‘mercy-killing’. (shrink)

According to Michael Smith’s practicality requirement, if an agent judges that there is reason for her to f in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to f in C or she is practically irrational. As a number of critics have noted, however, it is far from clear that this is correct, for if an agent’s normative judgments have often proven unreliable before, or seem otherwise suspect now, it is not always clear what practical rationality demands of her. (...) I therefore begin by proposing a friendly amendment to Smith’s requirement, one that makes it much easier to defend. I then go on to argue that this requirement is actually much harder to satisfy than Smith thinks it is, and in fact that there is good reason to doubt that it could be satisfied if desires were nothing more than the purely functional states that Smith claims they are. (shrink)

A debt of good will is incurred when a person becomes the beneficiary of significant assistance or favor given by another. Usually, the beneficiary is in acute need of the assistance given or favor granted. This provides an opportunity for the giving of help to serve as a vehicle for the expression of sympathy or concern. The debt could then be appreciated as one of good will because, by catering to another person's pressing need, the benefactor is able to express (...) positive dispositions towards the beneficiary. It is not merely the receipt of the assistance or favor that puts the recipient in a position of indebtedness. The indebtedness is created by the benefactor's kagandahang loob. An act can be considered to convey kagandahang loob only if it is done out of kusang loob ; and can only be considered to have been done out of kusang loob if the agent is not acting under external compulsion, is motivated by positive feelings towards the beneficiary, and is not motivated by the anticipation of reward. These conditions entail debt-of-goodwill relationships where the benefactor has no right to demand reciprocity but the beneficiary has a "self-imposed" obligation to repay kagandahang loob with kagandahang loob. Debts of good will are about some forms of justice. But we should not reduce all talk about debts of good will to talk about justice. (shrink)

We tend to think every ought statement implies that an actual agent can comply. However, our uses of “ought” suggest that some ought statements fail to have this implication: it is possible that the actual agent ought to do something she has no chance of accomplishing even if she intends to do so. Rather they imply that if the agent and her circumstances were defect-free, she could and would perform the prescribed action. There are two types of (...) evaluation for ought statements. One type of evaluation addresses the question of what to do given the agent’s peculiar capacity and condition. The point of this evaluation is giving personalized action guidance, and so recommends only what the actual agent can do under the actual condition. Another type of evaluation addresses a different question, that of what to do as a type of agents. The point of this evaluation is the coordination of individuals by selecting a shared norm for them: the standard that prescribes all of them to perform the same action and classifies for all of them the same traits as defect. This is why it endorses the ought statements that some actual agents cannot comply with, but that a normal agent could and would do so under normal conditions. (shrink)

Can a mass of networked neurons produce moral human agents? I shall argue that it can; a brain can be morally excellent. A connectionist account of how the brain works can explain how a person might be morally excellent in Aristotle's sense of the term. According to connectionism, the brain is a maze of interconnections trained to recognize and respond to patterns of stimulation. According to Aristotle, a morally excellent human is a practically wise person trained in good habits. What (...) an Aristotelian theory of ethics and a connectionist theory of mind have in common is the assumption that the successful mind/brain has the disposition to behave appropriately in appropriate circumstances. According to Aristotle, the good person knows the right end, desires and chooses to pursue it, and recognizes the right means to it. Thus the good person's brain must be able to form certain moral concepts, develop appropriate behavioral dispositions, and learn practical reasoning skills. I shall argue that this collection of the brain's cognitive capacities is best accounted for by a connectionist theory of the mind/brain. The human condition is both material and moral; we are brain-controlled bodies with ethical values. My essay seeks to understand the relationship between our brains and our values, between how the brain works and how we make moral decisions. (shrink)

In Davidson's example of causal deviancy, a climber knows that he can save himself from plummeting to his death by letting go of a rope connecting him to a companion who has lost his footing, but the thought of the contemplated act so upsets him that he lets go unintentionally. Causation of behavior by intentional states that rationalize it is not enough for it to count as acting. Therefore, the behavior must be caused in 'the right way' or by the (...) Right Kind of Cause. The immediate cause in Davidson's and other examples of causal immediacy is the agent's awareness or contemplation of what he or she is intending or thinking of doing, which is either caused by, or implicit in the agent's awareness of, his or her intentions or beliefs and desires. I argue that RKC can only be a mechanism-the Will-whose operation we are not directly aware of, but only indirectly once the action is underway. (shrink)