This article defends a theory of diffuse attention and distinguishes it from focal attention. My view is motivated by evidence from psychology and neuroscience, which suggests that we can deploy visual selective attention in at least two ways: by focusing on a small number of items, or by diffusing attention over a group of items taken as a whole. I argue that diffuse attention is selective and can be object‐based. It enables a subject to select an object to guide behavior, (...) albeit in a different way than focusing does. (shrink)

The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for S is no more and no less than to desire S while believing S is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature or function of hope: that hope helps one resist the temptation to despair;2 that hope engages the sophisticated capacities of (...) human agency, such as planning;3 or that hope involves the imagination in ways desire need not.4 Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope, and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting. (shrink)

What exactly is hope and how does it influence our decisions? In How We Hope, Adrienne Martin presents a novel account of hope, the motivational resources it presupposes, and its function in our practical lives. She contends that hoping for an outcome means treating certain feelings, plans, and imaginings as justified, and that hope thereby involves sophisticated reflective and conceptual capacities. Martin develops this original perspective on hope--what she calls the "incorporation analysis"--in contrast to the two dominant philosophical conceptions (...) of hope: the orthodox definition, where hoping for an outcome is simply desiring it while thinking it possible, and agent-centered views, where hoping for an outcome is setting oneself to pursue it. In exploring how hope influences our decisions, she establishes that it is not always a positive motivational force and can render us complacent. She also examines the relationship between hope and faith, both religious and secular, and identifies a previously unnoted form of hope: normative or interpersonal hope. When we place normative hope in people, we relate to them as responsible agents and aspire for them to overcome challenges arising from situation or character. Demonstrating that hope merits rigorous philosophical investigation, both in its own right and in virtue of what it reveals about the nature of human emotion and motivation, How We Hope offers an original, sustained look at a largely neglected topic in philosophy. (shrink)

Résumé Après avoir distingué entre différents types de dette, cet article propose une réflexion de fond sur l’obsolescence de la façon dont nos calculs économiques comptabilisent la création de richesse. La crise de la dette est d’abord une crise de la mesure. L’analogie de la pollinisation permet de faire comprendre ce dont il s’agit : nous ne comptons que le miel produit par nos activités sans inclure la pollinisation, ni prendre soin de la survie des abeilles. La dette est un (...) artifice comptable, qui résulte de cette double cécité, dont certains abusent pour exploiter les autres. Elle risque de nous faire tous sombrer dans son aveuglement. (shrink)

Une chute dans la banalité du "dire", une déchéance, est à l'horizon de possibilité du secret, le tient éveillé, comme la boule de bronze dans la main d'Alexandre qui a décidé de lire et de ne pas dormir. Bien qu'il s'agisse d'un acte, aucune intention singulière n'y est prise ; il n'est que pesanteur " naturelle ", relâchement du poids du secret, ou mauvaise foi somnambule, dont la psychanalyse a su dénombrer la menue monnaie, avec les lapsus verbaux, sans explorer (...) la situation ou forme ontologique qui la rend possible : cette matière d'un dire n'importe quoi, n'importe comment, cette potentialité cadavéreuse, indéfiniment décomposable, c'est l'ombre, le tissu d'ombre de l'être et du taire, également libérés par la maladie et par la cure ; ils triomphent, c'est-à-dire bassement et vaguement occupent tout espace, dès que le maître défaille, s'absente. La seule différence entre la maladie et la cure c'est qu'à l'occasion de la libération des esclaves ou fantômes intimes, dans celle-ci, un pouvoir provisoire est désigné ou suggéré par le psychiatre ; une fausse reconnaissance, favorisée surtout par la vague conscience chez le malade qu'il est nécessaire d'en finir, procure l'illusion l'être guéri. (shrink)

Malgré tous les signaux négatifs quant à son avenir, l’Europe a retrouvé des raisons d’espérer grâce au refus français de s’aligner sur les populismes. L’intégration politique de l’Europe dans un fédéralisme qui permet de décider à une majorité qualifiée, au lieu de s’enliser dans l’unanimité actuelle, est indispensable pour sortir de l’austérité budgétaire, faire converger les fiscalités, et trouver de nouvelles ressources à investir. La revendication d’un revenu décent par les Gilets jaunes sera satisfaite par la mise en place d’un (...) revenu universel à l’échelle de l’Europe. (shrink)

Cet article examine pourquoi structurellement l’objectif politique d’un revenu d’existence individuel, inconditionnel, universel, cumulable avec une activité dépendante ou non du marché, d’un niveau équivalent au salaire minimum se substituant à ce dernier comme base de la protection sociale est apparu progressivement dans l’espace public depuis plus de 45 ans et se traduit de plus en plus en revendications ouvertes même si ces dernières restent souvent confuses notamment sur le niveau, la faisabilité et le financement. Il expose en deuxième partie (...) comment l’accélération des transformations du capitalisme, l’urgence planétaire de politiques résolument écologistes d’un côté, et les phénomènes révélés par la pandémie de la Covid-19 de l’autre, représentent une occasion exceptionnelle pour faire de cet objectif la charpente d’un programme unificateur de la Gauche dans l’élection présidentielle de 2022. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRecognising a facial expression is more difficult when the expresser's body conveys incongruent affect. Existing research has documented such interference for universally recognisable bodil...

People with disabilities use more medical care and see health professionals more often than do those of the same age, ethnic group, or economic class who do not have impairments. An indisputable medical goal is.

What should we make of someone whose beliefs prevent her from accurately understanding her medical needs and care? Should that person still make her own health care decisions? In fact, she probably lacks decision‐making capacity. But that does not mean she is not competent.

Apologies are strange. They are, in a certain sense, very small. An apology is just a gesture—a set of words, a physical posture, perhaps a gift. But an apology can also be very powerful—this power is implicit in the facts that it can be difficult to offer an apology and that, when we are wronged, we may want an apology very much. More, even we have been severely wronged, we are sometimes willing to forgive or pardon the wrongdoer, if we (...) receive a sincere apology. In this paper, I want to begin to figure out how a mere gesture can be so powerful. The philosophers who discuss apology generally do not go into much detail, and they discuss it almost exclusively in connection with forgiveness. 2 I, too, will discuss apology’s power to provide reason to forgive, but in order to provide the resources to examine another power. Some apologies, I will argue, fail to provide reason to forgive, but nevertheless do provide the recipient a reason to maintain a relationship with the wrongdoer, or to allow the wrongdoer to remain in her community. To be clear: the “powers” I am interested in are reason-giving powers, or powers to make certain beliefs, attitudes, or actions rational. Apologies also, no doubt, have a sort of bare causal power. The sight of a vicious, racist, cruel war criminal on his knees and in tears, sincerely begging forgiveness, may inspire in us pity or even compassion, in spite of what we believe we have reason to feel. “I can’t help but feel sorry for the bastard,” we may say, even while believing that.. (shrink)

I argue for adopting a conception of obligation that is broader than the conception commonly adopted by moral philosophers. According to this broader conception, the crucial marks of an obligatory action are, first, that the reasons for the obliged party to perform the action include an exclusionary reason and, second, that the obliged party is the appropriate target of blaming reactive attitudes, if they inexcusably fail to perform the obligatory action. An obligation is directed if the exclusionary reason depends on (...) the relationship between the obliged person and the person to whom they owe the obligatory action, and the latter person is positioned to personally blame the obligated person for inexcusably failing to perform the obligatory action. Some direc- ted obligations are not owed as a matter of right, and the person to whom the obligatory action is owed is the only person positioned to blame nonperformance. Other directed obligations are owed as a matter of right, and people who are not part of the relationship grounding the obligation nevertheless are also positioned to (impersonally) blame non-performance. Only the rights-based form of directed obligation has received signifi- cant attention from moral philosophers, yet the former—which is at the heart of what I call “personal bonds”—is a pervasive and significant theme of our ordinary interpersonal lives. (shrink)

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have renewed interest in the question of whether consciousness can arise in an artificial system, like a digital computer. The general consensus is that LLMs are not conscious. This paper evaluates the main arguments against artificial consciousness in LLMs and argues that none of them show what they intend. However strong our intuitions against artificial consciousness are, they currently lack rational support.

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, March 2006. Significant effort has been devoted to locating a good argument for Kant ’s Formula of Humanity. In this paper, I contrast two arguments, based on Kant ’s text, for the Formula of Humanity. The first, which I call the “Valued Ends” argument, is an influential and appealing argument developed most notably by Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood. Notwithstanding the appeal and influence of this argument, it ultimately fails on several counts. I therefore present as an (...) alternative the “Autonomy” argument, which is largely inspired by the failings of the Valued Ends argument. (shrink)

Résumé Les transformations simultanées dans la nature du travail, la substance et la forme de la valeur aboutissent à une instabilité fondamentale qui fait revenir le capitalisme dans son ensemble à une situation pré-keynésienne. Il y a du travail partout dans la société de la connaissance, mais de moins en moins d’emplois, si nous entendons par « emploi » la convention complexe qui détermine le temps de travail et protège le salarié. L’émergence d’un régime (c’est-à-dire de formes stables avec compromis (...) sociaux et politiques) de capitalisme cognitif se heurte donc à une contradiction. La forme emploi indispensable à stabiliser la nouvelle relation d’échange argent / activité (et pas simplement « travail » parce que le travail extorqué comme celui du temps du capitalisme industriel n’est qu’une petit partie de l’activité sucée par le vampirisme du capital) est le revenu garanti. Mais cet espace de liberté ainsi concédé détruit la forme de commandement capitaliste sur le travail vivant, ou biopolitique, celle du modèle du travail dépendant, sous le commandement d’autrui, ou hétéronome. En fait, il y a oscillation permanente du capitalisme cognitif entre l’ouverture aux aspects libérateurs de la garantie de revenu comme condition formelle de la captation des externalités positives (qui est la substance de la valeur aujourd’hui) et la répression par re-codification du temps de travail, des savoirs implicites. (shrink)

In cases of identity crowding, a subject consciously sees items in a figure, even though they are presented too closely together for her to shift attention to each item. Block uses such cases to challenge the view that attention is necessary for consciousness. I argue that in identity crowding cases, subjects really do attend to the items. Specifically, they attend to the figure as a global object that contains the individual items as parts. To support this view, I provide evidence (...) that attention can be directed to a global object or a local object. My response helps to defend the view that attention is necessary for conscious perception. (shrink)

At the outset of World War I - the "Great War" - Freud supported the Austro-Hungarian Empire for which his sons fought. But the cruel truths of that bloody conflict, wrought on the psyches as much as the bodies of the soldiers returning from the battlefield, caused him to rethink his stance and subsequently affected his theory: Psychoanalysis, a healing science, could tell us much about both the drive for war and the ways to undo the trauma that war inherently (...) breeds, but its principles could just as easily serve the enemy's desires to inculcate its own brand of "truth." Even a century later, psychoanalysis can still be used as much for the justifications of warfare and propaganda as it is for the defiance of and resistance to those same things. But it is in the investigation of the motives and methods behind these uses that psychoanalysis proves its greatest strength. To wit, this edited collection presents published and unpublished material by analysts, writers, and activists who have worked at the front lines of psychic life and war from various stances. Set at a point of tension and contradiction, they illustrate the paradoxical relation of psychoanalysis as both a site of resistance and healing and a necessary aspect of warmaking, propaganda, and militarism. In doing so, we venture from the home front - from the trauma of returning veterans to the APA's own complicity in CIA "black sites" - across international borders - from the treatment of women in Latin American dictatorships to the resistance to occupation in Palestine, from mind control to an ethics of responsibility. Throughout, a psychoanalytic sensibility deconstructs the very opposition that it inhabits, and seeks to reestablish psychoanalysis as the healing discipline it was conceived to be. (shrink)

We are interestingly ambivalent about romantic love, in a number of cases. Consider a man who abuses his wife, but is also passionate about her and easily distraught at the thought of losing her. There is some sense in which he loves her, but another in which he absolutely does not. Consider, too, a longtime partner who feels she has rather suddenly “fallen out of love” with the person to whom she was once devoted. She continues to feel there is (...) some sense in which she loves this person, but another in which she does not. And again, many people seem to both believe in love at first sight and think that the only true lovers are those whose feelings have withstood the tests of time and difficulty. In this paper, I propose that Kant’s conception of human feeling, desire, and motivation provides an unusually compelling account—both of ambiguous cases of romantic love and of love more generally. This proposal is not as shocking as it would have been 30 years ago, but I suspect it is still surprising to many, whom have been persuaded at most that there is room in Kant’s moral theory for feeling to play a positive supportive role in moral motivation; my proposal here is that Kant’s broader vision of human motivation—moral and nonmoral—tightly fits the phenomenon of love and, perhaps, emotions in general. (shrink)

The increasing use of opioid treatment agreements has prompted debate within the medical community about ethical challenges with respect to their implementation. The focus of debate is usually on the efficacy of OTAs at reducing opioid misuse, how OTAs may undermine trust between physicians and patients and the potential coercive nature of requiring patients to sign such agreements as a condition for receiving pain care. An important consideration missing from these conversations is the potential for racial bias in the current (...) way that OTAs are incorporated into clinical practice and in the amount of physician discretion that current opioid guidelines support. While the use of OTAs has become mandatory in some states for certain classes of patients, physicians are still afforded great leeway in how these OTAs are implemented in clinical practice and how their terms should be enforced. This paper uses the guidelines provided for OTA implementation by the states of Indiana and Pennsylvania as case studies in order to argue that giving physicians certain kinds of discretion may exacerbate racial health disparities. This problem cannot simply be addressed by minimising physician discretion in general, but rather by providing mechanisms to hold physicians accountable for how they treat patients on long-term opioid therapy to ensure that such treatment is equitable. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content. I argue that the representationalist can meet this challenge, but that doing so requires a new view of the representational content of perception. On this new view, the representational content of perception is always relative to a way of attending. (...) I call this the attention-indexed view of perceptual content. (shrink)