Both Sartre and Kohut use the idea of conflict in a positive sense to explain how authentic relations and viable therapy are possible, although there are important differences between the two thinkers on this topic. For Kohut it will be shown that optimal frustration is conceived of as a mechanism through which the healthy child, or the well-managed patient, learns to react in a calming and loving way to internal drive demands. Concomitantly, this individual learns to cope with a world (...) that is obdurate, one that will thwart his desires. By contrast, in the authentic case the child for Sartre is taught to accept the gulf between him/herself and the adult. Positive conflict becomes something the child not only accepts but also enjoys as he/ she learns to cope enthusiastically in the face of his environment's inevitable obduracy. Sartre's sense of joy and volition will be shown to go beyond Kohut's more guarded optimism in the face of the challenge of contingency. The above ideas of both Sartre and Kohut will also be used to criticize views of therapy in which understanding and empathy on the part of the therapist are taken to be the sine qua non of the therapeutic process. (shrink)

Die vorliegenden Untersuchungen beantworten die Frage, wann sich einem fiktionalen Text eine "Moral" zuschreiben lässt. Unter "Moral" wird dabei die Aufforderung verstanden, fiktionale moralische Urteile für wahr zu halten. Solche Aufforderungen werden im vorliegenden Band aus moralischen Urteilssätzen abgeleitet. Diese werden als Suchbefehle verstanden. Und es wird erörtert wie die Befolgung dieser Befehle nach Massgabe utilitarischer Zweckmässigkeitsüberlengungen zum Befund der "Moral" fiktionaler Texte führen kann. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass entsprechende Befunde es nicht nur erlauben, fiktionale Texte zu identifizieren. Als (...) Anleitung zur Gewinnung solcher Befunde wollen die hier unternommenen Bemühungen auch zur rationalen Diskussion der moralischen Beurteilung fiktionaler Werke beitragen." -- Back cover. (shrink)

In seinem Aufsatz “Transparency, Self-Consciousness, and Reflection” und in seinem Buch Transparency and Reflection entwickelt Boyle eine Lösung für das Problem der Transparenz. Antworten, die auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein gegeben werden, bringen demnach nur die Arten des Gegebenseins zum Ausdruck, die in Antworten auf weltbezogene Fragen schon enthalten sind. Diese sowie auch die Lösung für ein anderes Problem, das Boyle „the anti-egoist challenge“ nennt, gründen auf der Idee, dass eine Antwort auf eine weltbezogene Frage eine Art des Gegebenseins enthält, (...) die ihrerseits implizit auf das antwortende Subjekt referiert. Diese wird expliziert, wenn eine Frage über das Bewusstsein beantwortet wird. Mir scheint, dass diese Idee einen Fallstrick spannt. Denn damit die von Boyle vorgeschlagene Lösung gelingt, muss die relevante Referenz auf die erste Person in einer Art des Gegebenseins des Subjekts bestehen. Doch wenn diese Art des Gegebenseins die typische Fregeanische Spezifizierung erfüllt, dann ist sie privat, – und genauso privat ist dann auch die Art des Gegebenseins, in der sie enthalten ist. Folglich wird sich die Privatheit über diejenigen Antworten, die sich auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein richten, auf alle Antworten hinaus ausbreiten, die sich auf die mit ihnen verknüpften Fragen über die Welt richten. (shrink)

A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time is a concise and accessible survey of the history of philosophical and scientific developments in understanding time and our experience of time. It discusses prominent ideas about the nature of time, plus many subsidiary puzzles about time, from the classical period through the present.

The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is " _conceptualist_: " psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism.

This article analyses a specific piece of computer code, the Linux operating system kernel, as an example of how technical operationality figures in contemporary culture. The analysis works at two levels. First of all, it attempts to account for the increasing visibility and significance of code or software-related events. Second, it seeks to extend familiar concepts of performativity to include cultural processes in which the creation of meaning is not central, and in which processes of circulation play a primary role. (...) The analysis concentrates on the practices and patterns of circulation of Linux through versions, distributions, clones and reconfigurations. It argues that technical ‘culture-objects’ such as Linux take on a social existence within contemporary technological cultures because of the authorizing contexts in which the reading, writing and execution of code occur. The ‘force’ or performance of certain technical objects, their operationality, can be understood more as the stabilized nexus of diverse social practices, rules and personae than as a formal property of the objects themselves. (shrink)

I want to argue that self-deception is a species of a more general phenomenon, which I shall call pseudorationality, which in turn is necessitated by what I shall describe as our highest-order disposition to literal self-preservation. By "literal self-preservation," I mean preservation of the rational intelligibility of the self, in the face of recalcitrant facts that invariably threaten it.

The character of computational modelling of cognition depends on an underlying theory of representation. Classical cognitive science has exploited the syntax/semantics theory of representation that derives from logic. But this has had the consequence that the kind of psychological explanation supported by classical cognitive science is

_conceptualist_:

psychological phenomena are modelled in terms of relations that hold between concepts, and between the sensors/effectors and concepts. This kind of explanation is inappropriate for the Proper Treatment of Connectionism (Smolensky 1988).

We explored the neural mechanisms allowing humans to report the subjective onset times of conscious events. Magnetoencephalographic recordings of neural oscillations were obtained while human subjects introspected the timing of sensory, intentional, and motor events during a forced choice task. Brain activity was reconstructed with high spatio-temporal resolution. Event-time introspection was associated with specific neural activity at the time of subjective event onset which was spatially distinct from activity induced by the event itself. Different brain regions were selectively recruited for (...) introspection of different event types, e.g., the bilateral angular gyrus for introspection of intention. Our results suggest that event-time introspection engages specific neural networks to assess the contents of consciousness. Subjective event times should therefore be interpreted as the result of complex interactions between introspection and experience networks, rather than as direct reproduction of the individual’s conscious state or as a mere post hoc interpretation. (shrink)

Tim Crane University College London 1. Introduction P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of (...) the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…’ (1979: 97). In other words, in describing experience, we tend to describe the objects of experience – the things which we experience – and the ways they are when we are experiencing them. (shrink)

This essay was written for a special issue of Philosophical Topics on the links between Kant and analytic philosophy. It explores these links through consideration of: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; the logical positivism endorsed by Ayer; and the (very different) variation on that theme endorsed by Quine. It is argued that in all three cases we see analytic philosophers trying to attain and express a general philosophical understanding of why the bounds of sense should be drawn where they should—but thereby confronting the (...) aporia, which Kant too confronted, that it is impossible to do this without transgressing those very bounds. It is suggested in conclusion that the problem is in trying to attain and express such an understanding; in other words, that such an understanding is attainable, but not expressible. (shrink)

This discussion treats a set of familiar social derelictions as consequences of the perversion of a universalistic moral theory in the service of an ill-considered or insufficiently examined personal agenda.The set includes racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and class elitism, among other similar pathologies, under the general heading of discrimination. The perversion of moral theory from which these derelictions arise, I argue, involves restricting its scope of application to some preferred subgroup of the moral community of human beings. -/- The following (...) analysis of higher-order discrimination suggests that we often select the individuals who constitute such subgroups for reasons that we ourselves would reject on moral grounds were we to examine them carefully, but that we choose instead to put our rational resources in the service of avoiding any such examination at all costs. The implication is that arguments that truncate the scope of moral theory in fact justify bestowing the gift of moral treatment on a select few who deserve it no more than the many from whom we withhold it. Therefore, it would be precipitous to conclude that universalistic moral theory can be legitimately restricted in its practical scope of application in any way at all. (shrink)

When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not.

: Calls for ethics education for members of hospital ethics committees presume that the effects and benefits of such education are well-established. This is not the case. A review of the literature reveals that studies consistently have failed to uncover any significant effect of ethics education on the moral reasoning, moral competency, and/or moral development of medical professionals. The present paper discusses this negative result and describes the author's national study of the value priorities of members of hospital ethics committees. (...) This study discovered correlations between moral decision making and factors like age and type of institution where the committee operates. The results of this study also resemble those of previous studies in finding no correlation between ethics education and moral decision making. The author concludes that there is a need for more research on the effects of nonmoral personal, societal, and institutional factors on the moral reasoning of members of hospital ethics committees. Further, in the absence of any firm empirical basis, calls for ethics education for medical professionals and ethics committee members should be rethought. (shrink)

BackgroundThe foundation of health and medical research is data. Data sharing facilitates the progress of research and strengthens science. Data sharing in research is widely discussed in the literature; however, there are seemingly no evidence-based incentives that promote data sharing.MethodsA systematic review of the health and medical research literature was used to uncover any evidence-based incentives, with pre- and post-empirical data that examined data sharing rates. We were also interested in quantifying and classifying the number of opinion pieces on the (...) importance of incentives, the number observational studies that analysed data sharing rates and practices, and strategies aimed at increasing data sharing rates.ResultsOnly one incentive has been tested in health and medical research that examined data sharing rates. The number of opinion pieces out-weighed the number of article-testing strategies, and the number of observational studies exceeded them both.ConclusionsGiven that data is the foundation of evidence-based health and medical research, it is paradoxical that there is only one evidence-based incentive to promote data sharing. More well-designed studies are needed in order to increase the currently low rates of data sharing. (shrink)

This is the first and only dictionary dedicated to the work of Gilles Deleuze. It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential figures in continental philosophy. It defines and contextualises more than 150 terms that relate to Deleuze's philosophy and explains the main intellectual influences on Deleuze as well as the influence Deleuze has had on subjects such as feminism, cinema, postcolonial theory, geography and cultural studies. In this revised edition, there are expanded entries on (...) architecture, cinema and psychoanalysis - key areas where interest in Deleuze has grown in recent years. (shrink)

Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the (...) subject, at once, knows himself “as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity. (shrink)

La idea de que la fenomenología de Husserl representa una suerte de filosofía reflexiva, basada en una metodología que desarrolla la tradición cartesiana, se ha convertido en una creencia ampliamente difundida en la literatura filosófica. Este énfasis puesto por Husserl en la reflexión fue arduamente criticado por Heidegger. Desde entonces resulta frecuente encontrarse con la afirmación de que Husserl y Heidegger desarrollan dos conceptos de fe-nomenología diferentes, incluso antagónicos. No se trata de seguir alimentando esta discusión historiográfica. Aquí, por una (...) parte, se muestra el núcleo de la temprana crítica heideggeriana en el transcurso de sus primeras lecciones de Friburgo y Marburgo y, por otra, se sopesan algunas de las observaciones críticas de Heidegger a Husserl a la luz de evidencias textuales de la fenomenología husserliana, ignoradas no sólo por Heidegger, sino también por un sorprendente número de reconocidos especialistas en el campo de la filosofía, de las ciencias cognitivas y de la filosofía de la mente.The idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is a kind of reflective philosophy inspired by the Cartesian tradition has become a common-place in the philosophical literature. Heidegger was one of the first thinkers who criticized the Husserlian emphasis on reflection. Since then it is easy to find the affirmation that Husserl and Heidegger developed two different, even antagonistic concepts of phenomenology. Here is not the place to continue embracing this discussion. One the one hand, the present article shows Heidegger’s early criticism developed in the course of his first lectures in Freiburg and Marburg. On the other hand, it weighs up some of Heidegger’s critical remarks regarding the reflective nature of Husserlian phenomenology in the light of important textual evidences ignored not only by Heidegger, but also by a surprising number of specialists in the fields of philosophy, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

Philons Biographie Abrahams ist eine Werbeschrift fur das Judentum. Sie entstand vermutlich als literarisches Begleitprojekt zu Philons politischer Mission in Rom: In Alexandria waren Ausschreitungen gegen die judische Bevolkerung erfolgt, die Philon bei Kaiser Caligula zur Sprache bringen sollte. Der vorliegende Band fuhrt in diesen zeitgeschichtlichen Kontext ein und bietet den mit Anmerkungen versehenen Text der Schrift samt einer Neuubersetzung. Erlauternde Essays aus unterschiedlichen Fachperspektiven wurdigen Philon als Biograph und als Philosoph, ergrunden sein Tugendverstandnis und sein Frauenbild und beleuchten sein (...) Schriftverstandnis aus der Perspektive des antiken Orakelwesens. Abgerundet wird der Band durch einen Ausblick auf die Rezeption Abrahams im Islam, bei der sich bemerkenswerte Parallelen zu Philons allegorischen Auslegungen wiederfinden lassen. (shrink)

William Ames (1576-1633) a incarné une autorité fondamentale pour les puritains qui ont émigré en Nouvelle-Angleterre. Dans son œuvre, il a la singularité d’allier ses convictions religieuses à une mentalité ramiste. Ames considère la méthode de Ramus comme une manière adéquate de comprendre l’acquisition et la transmission des savoirs. Le système ramiste s’applique aussi au domaine de la théologie et à certaines questions liées au gouvernement de l’individu. Cet article vise à mettre en lumière cette combinaison entre le puritanisme et (...) le ramisme qui caractériserait une façon bien particulière de concevoir le gouvernement de l’individu : un modèle qui renforce la volonté de l’individu et sa capacité de contrôle, en tant qu’instruments essentiels de gouvernement, et qui renferme un objectif émancipateur et égalitaire. (shrink)

In Denmark and Sweden sperm donation is the most debated and contested of the reproductive technologies that are currently in use. Although the two countries are neighbouring welfare states with public healthcare in common, policies and practices of sperm banking and sperm donation differ strongly. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork, this article explores how the sperm used for donor insemination is narrated, chosen, produced and consumed at sperm banks in Denmark and Sweden.The analysis illustrates that marginalization and stigmatization of infertile men, (...) donors, single women, lesbians and donor children not only takes place in the media and during debates in the Danish and Swedish parliaments where the technology has historically been contested, but also at the sperm banks and fertility clinics. This article therefore calls for more inclusive stories on sperm donation to be narrated. (shrink)

Starting from the four principles of Pólya's problem-solving method, by analogy, in this paper we propose a new method of philosophical counseling. Thus, the objectives of this study are as follows: the review of several methods of philosophical counseling; justifying the need for a new method, which we called the IPAA method; developing the four principles – the principle of identification (I), the principle of planification (P), the principle of application (A) and the principle of assumption (A). In order to (...) achieve these, we took into account the fact that the nature of the philosophical problems faced by the clients of the philosophical counselors, whether they are existential, moral or metaphysical, can be solved on their own. Therefore, we argued that if in the first instance, clients really need the input of the philosophical counselors, as long as the latter uses the IPAA method – a problem-solving method – they can offer clients the opportunity to self-counsel. The novelty of the IPAA method consists in the fact that it offers the client, assisted and guided at the beginning by the counselor, the possibility to carry out the act of counseling outside the office, being empowered to apply the four methodical principles mentioned above. The present study is relevant in that the new IPAA method, a method focused on solving everyday problems, is a useful method for both philosophical counselors, as its application in the office helps them to train the clients in researching, understanding and assuming their own lives, as well as for the clients, because if they are assisted in the first instance by the counselor's expertise, they can independently clarify and solve their daily difficulties. (shrink)

What are the leading forces and ideas that are shaping our age? In the West, a decade of financial disruption, austerity, and stagnant wages has produced a popular rejection of market fundamentalism that prevailed for over forty years. Mass immigration and multiculturalism have contributed to rapid changes in both family and community life that leave many people feeling dispossessed or even humiliated. Unresponsive government is exacerbating people’s sense of powerlessness and anger. The revolt against the status quo is fuelling a (...) political insurgency against the establishment that replaces the old opposition of left versus right with a similarly simplistic dichotomy pitting the people against the elites. We are witnessing the failure of dualistic thinking and this will not be resolved by substituting one binary for another. Our contemporary conjuncture is such a period of interregnum and a war of position between the hitherto hegemonic ideology of liberalism and its populist rivals. The popular revolt against liberalism, which is driving the political insurgency across the West, highlights the collapse of the authority of the professional political class dominated by liberals. In what follows I shall argue that the emergent ideologies which are vying for hegemony are hyper-liberalism, nationalist traditionalism, and tech utopianism. All of them are variously anti-humanist, to which one can oppose updated versions of one-nation conservatism and ethical socialism. Before setting out the unfolding ‘war of position,’ I will first explore the new anti-humanism that underpins the main ideological movements. (shrink)

The expropriation of marginalized women’s labor is a key issue in business ethics in these times of global outsourcing and informal work arrangements. This has led to a transnational advocacy movement for securing the labor rights of homeworkers, who are poor women working on piece-rate contracts out of their homes. Drawing on materialist feminism, our paper critically explores the homeworker network in Pakistan, that was set up as part of a global push by international institutions and networks to localize the (...) issue across geographies. Our focus is the national women’s NGO that leads advocacy efforts on the issue in the country and its relationship with other actors. Through fieldwork spanning 3 years we find that the network employs a top-down ‘us versus them’ approach in advocacy and mobilization. The race-to-the-bottom between the network’s national and district-level actors for donor funding further undermines prospects for developing indigenous narratives of resistance. The network, while mission bound to enhance the collective agency of its constituency, has depoliticized what should have been a class-based feminist struggle. From a materialist perspective, we conclude that the NGOized network rests upon and feeds off of its constituency, creating an additional layer of primitive accumulation over the workers it represents. (shrink)

This essay argues that contemporary warfare seems to be religious but is in fact secular in nature and as such calls forth religious alternatives. The violence unleashed by Islamic terrorism and the ‘global war on terror’ is secular in this sense that it is unmediated and removes any universal ethical limits from conflicts: unrestrained violence is either a divine injunction which is blindly and fideistically believed; or it is waged in the name of the supremely sovereign state which deploys war (...) to uphold the constitutional order guaranteeing an exclusive state monopoly on the use of arbitrary physical force. The first part compares and contrasts two false universalisms; that of global market democracy and a revivified pan-Islamic Ummah. The second part explores the classical and modern origins of Islamic terrorism. The third part examines the perverted theology at the heart of the neo-conservative ‘global war on terror’. The fourth part analyses the permanent ‘state of exception’ which underpins the modern state and licenses unrestricted violence by the sovereign who stands outside and above the constitutional order of legality and legitimacy. The fifth and final part outlines religious alternatives to secular warfare; with specific reference to Islam and Christianity. (shrink)