The goal of this paper is primarily to pinpoint some substantial analytical and conceptual difficulties with the account of knowledge how proposed by (Stanley & Williamson, Knowing How, 2001) [henceforth S&W] and (Stanley, Knowing (How), 2011), (Stanley, Know How, 2011) based on (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984) [henceforth G&S] semantic analysis of embedded questions. In light of such difficulties, (1) we propose supplementing their account with an integrated approach of knowledge how, and suggest adding a mereological layer to the semantic framework (...) of embedded questions (2) we argue that the characteristics of what we call hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge strongly indicate reopening the issue of the proper account of questions towards the complementary relevant account of interrogation in communicative interactions, and the role of the context (in)forming knowledge-how. As a methodological principle, we remain neutral on the intellectualist vs anti-intellectualist debate. We also remain silent on the nature and explanation of the modes of presentations or ways of thinking that should be developed in order to adequately account for hybrid ways and hybrid knowledge. (shrink)

The article surveys the problem of the determinacy of reference in the contemporary philosophy of mathematics focusing on Peano arithmetic. I present the philosophical arguments behind the shift from the problem of the referential determinacy of singular mathematical terms to that of nonalgebraic/univocal theories. I examine Shaughan Lavine’s particular solution to this problem based on schematic theories and an internalized version of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano arithmetic. I will argue that Lavine’s detailed and sophisticated solution is unwarranted. However, some (...) of the arguments that I present are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all versions of internal categoricity conceived as a philosophical remedy for the problem of referential determinacy of arithmetical theories. (shrink)

The paper is thematically divided into two parts. In the first part, we will address the arguments raised against the anti-intellectualist thesis that ability is a necessary condition for knowledge-how, present Katherine Hawley’s proposed generic solution based on counterfactual success in order to overcome these arguments, followed by an analysis of Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument to Hawley’s counterfactual success thesis [CST]. We will conclude that Bengson & Moffett’s counterargument misses its target, so that, as far as we are concerned, Katherine (...) Hawley’s proposal, namely CST, is safe. In the second part of the paper, we will provide a statistical interpretation of one of Hawley’s more specific proposals, counterfactual success with occasional failure [CSTF], and assess a couple of philosophically challenging consequences that follow from such an interpretation. (shrink)

One of the philosophical uses of Dedekind’s categoricity theorem for Peano Arithmetic is to provide support for semantic realism. To this end, the logical framework in which the proof of the theorem is conducted becomes highly significant. I examine different proposals regarding these logical frameworks and focus on the philosophical benefits of adopting open-ended schemas in contrast to second order logic as the logical medium of the proof. I investigate Pederson and Rossberg’s critique of the ontological advantages of open-ended arithmetic (...) when it comes to establishing the categoricity of Peano Arithmetic and show that the critique is highly problematic. I argue that Pederson and Rossberg’s ontological criterion deliver the bizarre result that certain first order subsystems of Peano Arithmetic have a second order ontology. As a consequence, the application of the ontological criterion proposed by Pederson and Rossberg assigns a certain type of ontology to a theory, and a different, richer, ontology to one of its subtheories. (shrink)