Los servidores públicos no siempre actúan en función del interés de la comunidad a pesar de las amenazas y sanciones establecidas en el derecho; es necesario encontrar nuevas vías de actuación para resolver tan importante problema. En ese sentido, este artículo busca fundamentar los principios que deben regir la actuación de los mismos. Para ello, en primer lugar, se intenta establecer un método que permita la creación de estos principios, basándose en la teoría del valor de Luis Villoro y en (...) la ética de Immanuel Kant. Posteriormente, se identifica el interés público como aquel valor que se busca por él mismo sin necesidad de acudir a otros valores para cuyo fin esté dispuesto. A continuación, se derivan los valores de responsabilidad, objetividad, imparcialidad, razonabilidad, publicidad, solidaridad, prudencia e instrumentalidad, a partir de los cuáles se construyen principios éticos que puedan, posteriormente, ser positivizados en el derecho. (shrink)

The relationship between students and higher education is seen to have become increasingly transactional. We approach the study of the student–HE relationship in a novel way, by focusing on students’ behaviour post-university, rather than on student narratives. Conceptually, the article builds on multidimensional views of student engagement and the differentiation between psychological transactional contracts – where students who achieve better academic results are more likely to donate – and relational contracts – where students donate more following engagement in social experiences. (...) Making use of longitudinal data on donation behaviour from over 50,000 alumni from an English university over two decades, we find that while students who get better degree outcomes are more likely to donate, the association between participation in social experiences and donations is much stronger. This questions prevalent transactional models of HE and underlines the limitations of purely consumerist views of the relation between students and higher education institutions, even in the marketized UK context. (shrink)

Algunos autores estamos interesados por cierto ámbito o enfoque de la actividad filosófica usualmente denominado “filosofía experimental”. El objetivo fundamental de este artículo es analizar los rasgos principales que caracterizan a dicha especialidad, conforme al sentido en que comenzó a utilizarse esa etiqueta. Entre otras consideraciones, se constatará que la denominación “filosofía experimental” es parcialmente acertada, pero también parcialmente equívoca debido a dos razones. Una razón queda de manifiesto en discusiones contemporáneas que localizan antecedentes de ese enfoque en conexiones entre (...) la filosofía y las ciencias empíricas a través de los siglos. La segunda razón tiene mayor importancia; para identificarla será conveniente evaluar las funciones de la experimentación, tanto en las ciencias empíricas como en la filosofía. De especial relevancia será reflexionar sobre cierto tipo de experimentos: los experimentos mentales. (shrink)

RESUMEN Algunos autores estamos interesados por cierto ámbito o enfoque de la actividad filosófica usualmente denominado "filosofía experimental". El objetivo fundamental de este artículo es analizar los rasgos principales que caracterizan a dicha especialidad, conforme al sentido en que comenzó a utilizarse esa etiqueta. Entre otras consideraciones, se constatará que la denominación "filosofía experimental" es parcialmente acertada, pero también parcialmente equívoca debido a dos razones. Una razón queda de manifiesto en discusiones contemporáneas que localizan antecedentes de ese enfoque en conexiones (...) entre la filosofía y las ciencias empíricas a través de los siglos. La segunda razón tiene mayor importancia; para identificarla será conveniente evaluar las funciones de la experimentación, tanto en las ciencias empíricas como en la filosofía. De especial relevancia será reflexionar sobre cierto tipo de experimentos: los experimentos mentales. ABSTRACT Some of us are interested in a certain field or approach to philosophical activity usually called "experimental philosophy". The primary goal of this article is to analyze the main features that characterize this specialty, according to the sense in which the label began to be used. Among other considerations, we will see that the description "experimental philosophy" is partially correct, but also partially wrong, due to two reasons. The first can be tracked in contemporary discussions that locate antecedents of that approach in connections between philosophy and the empirical sciences through the centuries. To identify the second, more important reason, it will be convenient to evaluate the functions of experimentation, both in the empirical sciences and in philosophy. To reflect on certain types of experiments, mental experiments, will be crucially relevant. (shrink)

Contemporary debates concerning warrant transmission take for granted this thesis: when warrant transmission fails the argument fails. I challenge this thesis. An argument with conclusion C, addressed to subject S, can be cogent in the sense that recognition that the premises entail (or make highly likely) C can rationally foster in S the belief in C, without the warrant for C necessarily being gained (or reinforced) by such recognition. A key idea is to accept that some arguments should be understood (...) in a way that involves the abandonment of two characteristic idealizations imposed on rational thinkers by Bayesian modelling. (shrink)

We describe the role of morphosyntactic categories and syntactic dependencies in the process of semantically interpreting composite expressions. Special attention will be paid to the combinatorial properties conveyed by morphosyntactic categories such as nominals and verbs, as well as by syntactic dependencies like subject, direct object, or nominal modification. The semantic characterisation of these grammatical structures is based on cognitive abilities and abstract conceptualisations. This will provide us with theoretical arguments to review and extend some basic assumptions of Cognitive Grammar (...) and related work. (shrink)

En el contexto de este artículo denominaremos mentalismo a la conjunción de dos tesis diferentes: (i) para que las expresiones lingüísticas tengan significado es necesario que haya entidades de carácter mental; (ii) tales entidades mentales son suficientes para fijar el significado de las expresiones correspondientes (es decir, lo determinan). Es característico deI segundo Wittgenstein el rechazo a ambas tesis. Pero son sus argumentos contra (ii), especialmente a partir de las consideraciones sobre seguir una regla, los que han concentrado casi toda (...) la atención. En este trabajo presento el argumento principal de Wittgentein contra (i), diferenciándolo de sus objeciones a (ii).In this article mentalism will be used to denominate the conjunction of two thesis: (i) it is a necessary condition for linguistic expressions having meaning the existence of mental entities; (ii) these mental entities are sufficient to fix the meaning of the corresponding expressions (they determine it). The two thesis are rejected by the later Wittgenstein. Most of the attention, though, has been paid to his arguments against (ii), especially based on discussions of rule-following. In this paper I work out Wittgenstein’s main argument against (i), and I distinguish it from his objections to (ii). (shrink)

When discussing around his Gödel-Schmidt case, Kripke implicitly invoked our intuitive judgements about reference to argue against descriptivism on proper names. E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to attack Kripkean theses. In this article, I raise a new objection to this kind of criticism of anti-descriptivism. The participants in the surveys were presented with two possible answers to a determinate question. I show that the answer that Machery and his collaborators presuppose to be descriptivist is in fact (...) ambiguous, and it can be interpreted according to a reading that is perfectly compatible with anti-descriptivism. To argue for this thesis, I describe two ambiguities in the experimental setup that inspires their claims. Both ambiguities relate to the distinction between counterfactual and actualist readings of certain hypotheses, questions or statements. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have (...) reasons for believing what she believes. I defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke’s theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include (fallible) dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

In the context of agricultural activity intensification and rural abandonment, neo-rurality has emerged as a back-to-the-land migratory movement led by urban populations seeking alternative ways of life close to nature. Although the initiatives of the new peasantry are diverse, most are land related, such as agriculture and livestock farming. A priori, neorural people undertake agri-food system activities in ways that differ from the conventional model, following the principles of environmental and social sustainability. We conducted a systematic review of the literature (...) on the neo-rural phenomenon with the main objective of examining how neo-rurality has been found to support agroecological transitions. The corpus of neo-rural studies was analyzed from a social-ecological perspective, and a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was conducted to determine whether neo-rural agri-food system activities follow agroecological principles. The results indicate that neo-rural studies is an emerging research field that has received considerable attention in western countries. Diverse conceptualizations and terms have been used to address the phenomenon, but the literature agrees on political and environmental motivations and several barriers faced by neo-rural people. This population and in particular new peasants, are employing a wide variety of agroecological practices and strategies throughout the agri-food system. Overall, neo-rural people have been reported to contribute significantly to agroecological transition. (shrink)

Desarrollo varias hipótesis sobre los propósitos de la argumentación racional, parcialmente inspiradas en el análisis de Jackson sobre el concepto de petitio principii. Destaco como especialmente relevante entre tales propósitos la referencia a los potenciales destinatarios de una argumentación. Ilustro la discusión con un caso concreto: el argumento elaborado por Putnam para demostrar que no somos cerebros en una cubeta. Presento una versión de ese argumento y lo defiendo frente a una posible crítica que lo acusa de prejuzgar la cuestión.I (...) work out some hypothesis on the purposes of rational arguing, partly inspired by Jackson’s analysis of the concept of petitio principii. It is especially relevant among such purposes the reference to the potential intended addressee of an argument. The discussion is illustrated with a concrete example: Putnam’s proofthat we are not brains in a vat. I present a version of Putnam’s proof and defend it from a possible criticism which accuses it of begging the question. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to contribute to the clarification of the dialectics between compatibilists and incompatibilists on free action. I describe a new incompatibilist position that has been neglected in the literature. I also provide a proper rationale for such a position. First, I present a justification for incompatibilism that is composed of an old idea and a new one. The old idea is the FRAP principle: freedom requires alternative possibilities. Compatibilists and incompatibilists alike usually share a (...) Key Assumption about how the open alternative possibilities allowed by indeterminism are supposed to support the libertarian case: the existence of alternative possibilities should make a metaphysically relevant difference concerning the control and/or the authorship of the agent over the action. The other component in the justification for incompatibilism is the rejection of the Key Assumption. Why to preserve FRAP when the Key Assumption is dropped? The answer has three parts: we have a strong pre-theoretical intuition in favour of FRAP; a crucial anti-libertarian argument, known as the Luck Argument, can be interpreted as showing that FRAP and the Key Assumption cannot both be true; the Luck Argument doesn't work when directed against FRAP itself. (shrink)

En este artículo abordo uno de los problemas que pone de manifiesto la presunta incompatibilidad entre el externismo y el conocimiento que posee un sujeto sobre el contenido de sus pensamientos. El problema se basa en algunas supuestas consecuencias del externismo concernientes a la existencia de sustancias u objetos externos al sujeto pensante: si el externismo es a priori, entonces un sujeto puede saber a priori que existe el agua, meramente conociendo a priori su pensamiento sobre el agua. Las dos (...) respuestas compatibilistas principales que desarrollo explotan el papel desempeñado por la experiencia en el conocimiento a priori. Una vez se tiene en cuenta la experiencia requerida para poder tener los pensamientos relevantes resulta menos sorprendente que un sujeto pueda adquirir conocimiento a priori sobre la existencia del agua, o sobre una condición similar pero más débil que efectivamente se seguiría del externismo. I approach in this article one of the problems which purportedly would show the incompatibility of externalism and authoritative self-knowledge. The problem is based on some alleged consequences of externalism regarding the existence of substances or objects external to the thinker: if externalism is a priori, then a subject can know a priori that water exists by knowing a priori his thought about water. The two main compatibilist responses I work out exploit the role played by experience in a priori knowledge. Taking into account the experience required to entertain the relevant thoughts makes less puzzling that a subject could acquire a priori knowledge about water's existence, or about a weaker related condition which is the real commitment of externalism. (shrink)

I deal here with one of Boghossian’s arguments against content externalism, related to ourinferential rationality(to use his term). According to his reasoning, the apriority of our logical abilities is inconsistent with certain externalist assumptions. Nevertheless, the problem constitutes an important challenge foranytheory of content, not just for externalism. Furthermore, when we examine what internalists may propose to solve the problem, we see that externalists have at their disposal a more promising repertoire of possible replies than internalists. In that sense, insofar (...) as Boghossian’s scenario is relevant to the debate externalism/internalism, it can be seen (against Boghossian’s original intention) as providing additional evidence for content externalism. (shrink)

Diverse epistemologists have proposed this Discriminability Postulate : If S knows that p, then S can discriminate between the case that p and other relevant alternatives. I propose that DP derives from other, more basic postulate, that sees knowledge as providing some Warrant Against the Risk of Error : If S knows that p, then this knowledge confers on S’s belief that p a warrant against the risk of error. The kind of error mentioned in WARE is the error consisting (...) in mistaking the case that p for some of its relevant alternatives. But the possibility of mistaking in that sense entails that the subject has appropriate representational access to the two items that have to be distinguished. The fact that DP derives from WARE provides grounds to think that if DP is true, then the discriminative capacities than it involves are not jeopardized when the subject cannot have representational access to one of the corresponding items. A corollary of this idea is a weakening of DP and a subsequent reduction of its potential to raise sceptical doubts against claims of knowledge. (shrink)

For Williamson, knowing and believing are mental states, but believing truly and justifiedly-and-truly believing are non-mental states. This discriminatory approach is relevant to his epistemology: his main negative epistemological thesis and his main positive epistemological thesis depend on his metaphysical theory about the demarcation of the mental. I present here a problem for Williamson’s theory of the mental: it imposes implausible restrictions on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. I will describe some options that Williamson would have at his (...) disposal to evade the problem; but I maintain that these options carry some degree of arbitrariness. (shrink)

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke’s anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that —according to them— reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses, for reasons that —as far as I know— have not been pointed out so far. Furthermore, their vignettes are apparently inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to (...) the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.’s theses depend on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions. (shrink)

In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and presents an alternative definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract (...) two relevant conclusions: Williamson's theory of states and concepts only supports the negative thesis because this theory would explain too much, since it imposes implausible necessary limitations on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. So, there is no appropriate non-inductive evidence for the negative thesis. Williamson's own definition of knowledge is at risk. (shrink)

Resumen: los trabajos de perspectiva sociológica que sobre los seminarios diocesanos se han llevado a cabo son muy escasos. Sin embargo el estudio de estas instituciones puede proporcionar al científico social datos de gran utilidad que, por una parte, completan los análisis de la religiosidad española hechos hasta el momento y, por otra, ayudan a comprender mejor el futuro de una Iglesia Católica inmersa en un profundo proceso secularizador. Para desarrollar esta propuesta haremos una reflexión sobre la “misión organizativa” que (...) los seminarios han tenido a lo largo de la historia.*****: The works of sociological perspective that have been carried out about diocesan seminaries are short. However the study of these institutions can provide the social scientific very useful information that, on the one hand, completes the analysis of Spanish religiousness made until the present day and, on the other hand, helps for a better understanding of the future of a Catholic Church immersed in a deep secularising process. In order to develop this proposal we will make a reflection on the “organisational mission” that seminaries have had throughout History. (shrink)

An intelligent model of the incremental capacity curve of an automotive lithium-ferrophosphate battery is presented. The relative heights of the two major peaks of the IC curve can be acquired from high-current discharges, thus enabling the state of health estimation of the battery while the vehicle is being operated and in certain cases, aging mechanisms can be suggested. Our model has been validated using a large dataset representing different degradation scenarios, obtained from a recently available open-source database.

Research on mental health of non-professional caregivers has focused on caregivers of people with specific diseases, especially dementia. Less is known about caregivers of people with other diseases. The aims of this study were (a) to determine the caregivers’ emotional state in a random sample of caregivers of people in situations of dependency, (b) to analyze the association between each disease of the care-recipient (a variety of 23 diseases included in the International Classification of Diseases) and the emotional state of (...) the caregiver, and (c) based on the theoretical model, to analyze the relationship of the different study variables in the appearance of the emotional distress of the caregiver. A sample of 491 non-professional caregivers was selected randomly (89.0% women, average age 55.3 years). Trained psychologists collected sociodemographic and care-related characteristics and evaluated the global emotional distress, somatic symptoms, anxiety-insomnia, social dysfunction, depression, probable mental disorder case, self-esteem and social support. It was found that (a) the caregivers showed moderate emotional distress, and 33.8% presented a probable mental disorder. (b) Caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy was related to suffering from social dysfunction, and caring for a care-recipient with autism was related to having a probable mental health case. (c) Social support mediated the relationship between social class, daily hours of care, monthly family income, self-esteem and global emotional distress. There is an important impact on the emotional state of the caregivers. This impact was similar in caregivers of care-recipients with different diseases, except in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with cat's cry syndrome or epilepsy (related to social dysfunction), and in caregivers caring for a care-recipient with autism (related to having a probable mental health case). (shrink)

The main theme of Euripides’ Bacchae is Dionysus’ divinity and its recognition by the Thebans. The birth of Dionysus is a key point in the myth to determine that he is a god, consequently the playwright makes several of his characters mention it from different points of view. There are two versions clearly in conflict: on the one hand, Dionysus and his worshippers defend that he is a son of Zeus and, therefore, a god who must be venerated. On the (...) other hand, Pentheus, assuming his aunts’ view, thinks that his aunt Semele, who is Dionysus’ mother, lied when she stated that she had conceived a son of Zeus, in order to conceal a love affair with a mere mortal. Therefore, in the king’s opinion Dionysus is not a god but a mere human being. In addition, there are two characters, Cadmus and Tiresias, whose attitudes with regard to this matter are not so clear and have led scholars to interpret them in opposite ways. In this paper I am analyzing the passages of Bacchae on Dionysus’ birth, with special emphasis on those where Euripides shows or refers to Cadmus’ and Tiresias’ opinions, since my aim is to try to clarify, as far as possible, which stand the playwright made those two characters adopt regarding to Dionysus’ divinity. (shrink)

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. Also I argue that (...) it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice. (shrink)