Table of Contents: -/- Panu Raatikainen: Varieties of Ideal Language Philosophy. Jani Sinokki: Descartes on Language: How Signification Leads to Direct Reference. Matti Eklund: Carnapian Frameworks Revisited. Joseph Almog & Andrea Bianchi: The Semantics of Common Nouns and the Nature of Semantics. Gabriel Sandu: The Fallacies of the New Theory of Reference: Some Afterthoughts. Genoveva Martí: Experimental Results on Kind Terms: A Critical Reflection. Michael Devitt: Type Specimens and Reference. Jussi Haukioja: Conceptual Engineering for Externalists. Panu Raatikainen: Fictional Names Revisited. (...) Teemu Tauriainen: Indeterminism about Discourse Domains. Anandi Hattiagandi: Is Logic Normative? Jaakko Reinikainen: Constitutive Rules and Internal Criticism of Assertion. Aleksi Honkasalo: What Could and What Should Be Said? On Semantic Correctness and Semantic Prescriptions. Pasi Valtonen: Rearticulated Psychological View of Generics and Worldly Truthmakers. Joonas Pennanen: The Dual Character of Essentially Contested Concepts. Teemu Toppinen & Vilma Venesmaa: Unified Metasemantics for Expressivists. (shrink)

[IMPORTANT CORRECTION - See end of abstract.] In Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion Principles and Finite Axiomatizability, Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963), 153–167, Richard Montague shows that the use of a single syntactic predicate (with a context-independent semantic value) to represent modalities of alethic necessity and idealized knowledge leads to inconsistency. In A Note on Syntactical Treatments of Modality, Synthese 44 (1980), 391–395, Richmond Thomason obtains a similar impossibility result for idealized belief: under a syntactical (...) treatment of belief, the assumption that idealized belief is deductively closed, together with certain other plausible conditions on idealized belief, imply that an ideal believer with consistent beliefs cannot believe the truth of Robinson's Arithmetic. In this essay I assert an impossibility result similar to Thomason's but which does not assume that belief is deductively closed or ideal in any other way. There are technical mistakes in the formulations of Lemmas 1-4 and Theorem 2, however. Corrections can be found in the Erratum section of the author's website. (shrink)

This anthology consists of forty-nine of Geach’s previously published papers on logic. He opens his Preface by writing: "I bring together here almost all my English articles that I have previously published and have not already collected or cannibalized in other books." It contains his first published paper "Designation and Truth" from Analysis 1947-48 as well as his elegant sketch of a decidable entailment system in the 1970 Philosophical Review. For the most part he has made only stylistic changes and (...) added some notes. So, he claims: "all articles appear without substantial change." However, he admits that he divided his "Quantification Theory and the Problem of Identifying Objects of Reference" from the now classic 1963 volume of Acta Philosophica Fennica. He divided it because he wanted to separate his strong advocacy of a substitution interpretation of the quantifiers from some views on quotation marks, about which he is less than certain. The papers are not in mere chronological order. They are organized by topic within chapters entitled: Historical Essays, Traditional Logic, Theory of Reference and Syntax, Intentionality, Quotation and Semantics, Set Theory, Identity Theory, Assertion, Imperatives and Practical Reasoning, and Logic in Metaphysics and Theology. The chapter titles are a fair guide to content. But note the following. Two lucid papers defending von Wright’s notion of entailment are in the Intentionality chapter. The essay "Ascriptivism" in the Assertion chapter is relevant to discussions of free will because he argues: "to ascribe an act to agent is a causal description of the act" and he urges a search for a non-Humean analysis of causality. The essays in the last chapter are: "Nominalism," "Some problems about time," and "God’s relation to the world.". (shrink)

The only monograph about Leibniz in Finland is Raili Kauppi, Über die Leibnische Logik. This doctoral thesis appeared in series Acta Philosophica Fennica XII in 1960. Kauppi’s thesis continues on the footsteps of Couturat’s and Russell’s, with some original insights. There have also been some influential articles.