While Chile's partial decriminalization of abortion in 2017 was a long overdue recognition of women's sexual and reproductive rights, nearly four years later the caseload remains well below expectations. This pattern is the product of standing barriers in access to abortion‐related health services, especially at the primary care point of entry. This study seeks to identify and describe these barriers. The findings presented here were obtained through a qualitative, exploratory study based on 19 semi‐structured interviews with relevant actors (...) identified through non‐random sampling and snowballing techniques. Coding was inductive and complemented by semantic content analysis. The authors find that the key barriers in primary care to accessing legal abortion are unfamiliarity with the law, insufficient practitioner training, intersectoral discrimination, and the stigma surrounding abortion. They conclude that the government needs to exercise its constitutional mandate as guarantor of public health and act promptly to safeguard and guarantee the abortion rights of Chilean women. (shrink)

The Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 was commenced on 01/01/2019 in Ireland. The Act provides for legal termination of pregnancy under defined circumstances including for any reason at < 12 weeks gestation; and where two doctors agree there is ‘a condition affecting the foetus that is likely to lead to the death of the foetus either before, or within 28 days of, birth’. As such, abortion for congenital anomaly (CA) can occur at a number of time (...) points, depending on the adjudged severity. Infants born with CAs frequently require significant medical intervention and account for a high proportion of admissions to paediatric intensive care units (PICUs). The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the number of infants with CAs admitted to an Irish PICU in the period before and after the implementation of the Act. All PICU admissions < 1 month of age to a single Irish paediatric hospital between 2012 and 2021 were analysed. CAs were recorded, and the periods before and after the commencement of the Act compared. We found a difference in admissions involving CAs, particularly those related to congenital heart disease involving single ventricle anatomy. It is plausible that this difference was as a result of improved access to abortion services following the implementation of the Act. This article explores the legal conditions related to the abortion of a foetus with a CA in Ireland, and the possible impact of the Independent Review of the Operation of the Health ( Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018. (shrink)

In the 1970s, both Denmark and Norway passed abortion legislation that is still the basis for the regulation of abortion in these countries. The legislation was fairly liberal with abortion on demand until 12 weeks of gestation and a permission system for later abortions. This article provides a brief history of the developments leading up to these political compromises and an analysis of the reasons why they have proved remarkably stable. It ends by looking at (...) some factors that may now destabilize 50 years of stable compromise about abortion. (shrink)

About 6% of women in the world live in countries that ban all abortions, and 34% in countries that only allow abortion to preserve maternal life or health. In the USA, over the last decades—even before Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned the federal right to abortion—various states have sought to restrict abortion access. Often times, this legislation has been advanced based on legislators’ personal moral values. At the bedside, in contrast, provision of abortion (...) care should adhere to the normative principles of medical ethics and reproductive justice, centreing patients and their individual reproductive intentions and desires. Abortion regulations, through their influence on patients and providers, may facilitate or impede such ethical care at the bedside. In this paper, we present a framework to model how abortion legislation should fit into the patient–provider relationship and to clarify the dynamics by which legislation may affect healthcare encounters. Our proposed framework serves as a tool to analyse the ethical impact of abortion regulations. We propose a model for assessing abortion policies based not on legislators’ or advocates’ individual moral claims, but on the shared, normative framework of clinical medical ethics. Through contrasting case studies, we demonstrate how a robust normative ethical framework can recentre patients and their reproductive needs. Our model is one way to account for—and safeguard—patients’ diverse viewpoints and needs in the development of abortion policy, and it can serve to ground narratives for advocacy by healthcare workers and their professional organisations. (shrink)

In England and Wales, there is significant controversy on the law related to abortion. Recent discussions have focussed predominantly on the health professional's right to conscientious objection. This article argues for a comprehensive overhaul of the law from the perspective of an author who adopts the view that all unborn human beings should be granted the prima facie right to life. It is argued that, should the law be modified in accordance with this stance, it need not imply that (...) health professionals should enjoy an unqualified right to object to participating in the provision of abortion. Indeed, it is proposed that – in some situations – women should be granted a positive right to abortion. While the focus of this article is on changing the law in England and Wales, it is hoped that the position developed here will also inspire legal debate and reform elsewhere. (shrink)

This thesis challenges prevailing approaches to religiously-based or influenced laws , and proposes an alternative model that makes religious pluralism, gender, and moral identity central considerations. I focus my analysis around abortion as a case study in order to analyze the gendered dimensions of the issue in addition to other, more well-recognized problems with religious lawmaking. ;My overarching thesis is that the prevalent approaches to religious lawmaking in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, as well as in liberal and communitarian moral (...) and legal theory, are inadequate. Liberal approaches tend to protect religious pluralism at the expense of the religious identity of lawmakers, whereas communitarian proposals protect the religious morality of lawmakers at the expense of respect for religious pluralism. Both approaches are also inadequate, I contend, because they are premised upon faulty conceptions of moral identity, and fail to adequately consider the potential of religious lawmaking to perpetuate inequalities based on gender as well as religion. My arguments regarding deficiencies in these approaches are reinforced with empirical evidence regarding abortion views held by American religious groups, as well as the self-descriptions of a number of lawmakers regarding the influence of religion in their decision making. ;In developing alternative ethical and legal frameworks for addressing religious lawmaking, my analysis proceeds along both theoretical and practical lines. On the theoretical level, I propose that the conceptions of the social self and role-based morality developed by the twentieth century pragmatist philosopher George Herbert Mead, as supplemented by feminist and poststructuralist perspectives, provide the basis for a preferable ethical approach to religious lawmaking. ;On the practical level, I develop a legal framework that requires government in qualified challenges to religious lawmaking to show that the law can be fully supported on the basis of publicly accessible reasons and, in some instances, also by a compelling state interest. I explain how this proposal can accommodate the interests of religious lawmakers in relying on their religious convictions in their political and legal decision making, while insuring that the citizenship rights of their constituents are not thereby harmed. (shrink)

Over the past few years, over a dozen states have proposed, and almost as many have passed, something referred to as the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, a piece of legislation that makes abortion impermissible once fetal pain is possible and that further stipulates the fetus can feel pain at or before 20 weeks of gestation. Some very important questions immediately relevant to the abortion debate, perhaps even to the more complex issue of fetal rights, are raised (...) by this legislation, especially because it would impinge on the second-trimester abortion rights guaranteed by Roe. We first inquire whether the claim of fetal pain perception at or before 20 weeks is true and how such a claim should be substantiated. Next, we inquire whether the fetal capacity to experience pain, at whatever stage of development, reflects on the morality of abortion and whether it should be at all relevant to determining its legality. Finally, we would like to explore the implications that a commitment to a pain-related or sentience criterion of rights might have for a pro-life agenda. (shrink)

In the wake of Republican gains in November 2010, anti-abortion bills were common and aggressive during the 2011 legislative sessions.1 State general assemblies passed statutes that include provisions to (a) block abortions after twenty weeks of gestation, (b) require doctors to tell pregnant women that fetuses feel pain at or before twenty weeks of gestation, (c) prevent state or federal health care dollars from reaching clinics and physician groups that provide abortions as part of their services,2 and (d) require (...) doctors to describe the ultrasound images of the fetus and offer women the option to view the ultrasound and listen to the fetal heartbeat before an abortion.3 These statutes are troubling .. (shrink)

Late-term abortions are an issue of immense debate in India, where the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 permits abortions only up to 20 weeks of gestation. In special situations, such as pregnancy arising out of rape especially in the case of minors and the late diagnosis of congenital anomalies, there are no clear guidelines on the legal protocol that is to be followed, often resulting in a lack of consistency in terms of legal decision-making, as well as undue prolongation (...) of legal procedures. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act prohibits late-term abortions on the basis of personhood and viability of the foetus, to reduce sex-selective abortions and as it considers such abortions to be unsafe. However, a legal prohibition of late-term abortions does not prevent them, and this has led to a surge in the number of illegal, unsafe abortions that are detrimental to the health of women. There is also physical, mental and financial distress to women who are forced to continue their pregnancy, coupled with a lack of governmental support for the same. In comparison of India’s abortion laws with Singapore’s, which are more liberal, and Philippines, which are more restrictive, liberalisation of abortion laws appears to have a better outcome in reducing the incidence of unsafe abortions. This paper argues that the way forward is to liberalise the laws in terms of not only extending the gestational limit to at least 24 weeks but also making exceptions allowing no gestational limit in special cases that warrant them, such as rape victims and late foetal anomalies. The laws, drafted and implemented in consultation with medical professionals in the field, must also be lucid and not leave any room for misinterpretation by courts and health care providers. (shrink)

Abortion is forbidden under normal circumstances by nearly all the major world religions. Traditionally, abortion was not deemed permissible by Muslim scholars. Shiite scholars considered it forbidden after implantation of the fertilised ovum. However, Sunni scholars have held various opinions on the matter, but all agreed that after 4 months gestation abortion was not permitted. In addition, classical Islamic scholarship had only considered threats to maternal health as a reason for therapeutic abortion. Recently, scholars have begun (...) to consider the effect of severe fetal deformities on the mother, the families and society. This has led some scholars to reconsider the prohibition on abortion in limited circumstances. This article reviews the Islamic basis for the prohibition of abortion and the reasons for its justification. Contemporary rulings from leading Shiite scholars and from the Sunni school of thought are presented and reviewed. The status of abortion in Muslim countries is reviewed, with special emphasis on the therapeutic abortion law passed by the Iranian Parliament in 2003. This law approved therapeutic abortion before 16 weeks of gestation under limited circumstances, including medical conditions related to fetal and maternal health. Recent measures in Iran provide an opportunity for the Muslim scholars in other countries to review their traditional stance on abortion. (shrink)

In this paper we undertake an examination of the presence of similar “women-protective” discourses in policy debates occurring over two bills on reproductive-related topics considered during the 2013 California legislature session. The first bill, now signed into law, allows nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants to perform first-trimester aspiration abortions. The second bill, had it passed, would remove the prohibition on paying women for providing eggs to be used for research purposes. Using frame analysis we find evidence of (...) similar protective arguments by opponents of both bills, although these advocates do not share ideological positions on abortion rights or women's autonomy. In the case of AB154, anti-abortion advocates use language and frames that call for protecting the health of women against the imputed interests of the “abortion industry.” In the case of AB926, feminists and pro-choice advocates evoke similar frameworks for the protection of women against the interests of the “medical research industry.” Both sides argue for the “protection of women,” from opposing positions on the rights and autonomy of women in relationship to reproductive freedom. (shrink)

A few decades from now, it might become possible to gestate fetuses in artificial wombs. Ectogestation as this is called, raises major legal and ethical issues, especially for abortion rights. In countries allowing abortion, regulation often revolves around the viability threshold—the point in fetal development after which the fetus can survive outside the womb. How should viability be understood—and abortion thus regulated—after ectogestation? Should we ban, allow or require the use of artificial wombs as an alternative to (...) standard abortions? Drawing on Cohen, I evaluate three possible positions for the post-ectogestative abortion laws: restrictive, conservative and liberal. While the restrictive position appears untenable, I argue that the liberal and conservative positions can be combined to form a legally and morally coherent basis for post-ectogestative abortion legislation, offering an improvement from the point of both prolife and prochoice positions. (shrink)

In recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been a subject of debate in Norway. The intensity of this debate reached a tentative maximum when the Legislation Department delivered their interpretative statement, Section 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act, in 2016 in response to a request from the Ministry of Health that the Legislation Department consider whether the Abortion Act allows for MFPR of healthy fetuses in multiple pregnancies. The Legislation Department concluded that the (...) current abortion legislation [as of 2016] allows for MFPR subject to the constraints that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and during autumn 2018 it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic "crossroads" policy and signals from the Conservatives to consider removing section 2.3c and to forbid MFPR. Many of the arguments in the MFPR debate are seemingly similar to arguments put forward in the general abortion debate, and an analysis to ascertain what distinguishes MFPR from other abortions has yet to be conducted. The aim of this article is, therefore, to examine whether there is a moral distinction between abortion and MFPR of healthy fetuses. We will cover the typical arguments emerging in the debate in Norway and exemplify them with scholarly articles from the literature. We have dubbed the most important arguments against MFPR that we have identified the harm argument, the slippery-slope argument, the intention argument, the grief argument, the long-term psychological effects for the woman argument, and the sorting argument. We conclude that these arguments do not measure up in terms of demonstrating a morally relevant difference between MFPR of healthy fetuses and other abortions. Our conclusion is, therefore — despite what several discussants seem to think — that there is no morally relevant difference between the two. Therefore, on the same conditions as we allow for abortions, we should also allow MFPR. Keywords: abortion, ethics, medical ethics, MFPR, selective MFPR. (shrink)

In recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction (MFPR) has increasingly been the subject of debate in Norway, and the intensity reached a tentative maximum when Legislation Department delivered the interpretative statement § 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act in 2016 in response to the Ministry of Health (2014) requesting the Legislation Department to consider whether the Law on abortion allows for MFPR of healthy fetuses in multiple pregnancies. The Legislation Department concluded that current abortion (...) laws allow MFPR within the framework the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and during autumn 2018, it was further intensified in connection with the Christian Democrat "crossroads" and signals from the Conservatives to consider removing §2.3c and to forbid MFPR. -/- Many of the arguments in the MFPR debate appear seemingly similar to arguments pending in the general abortion debate, and an analysis of what sets MFPR apart from other abortions is wanting. The aim of this article is, therefore, to examine whether there is a moral distinction between abortion and MFPR of healthy fetuses. We will cover the typical arguments of the Norwegian debate, and highlight them with scholarly articles from the literature. The most important arguments against MFPR that we have identified we have dubbed the harm argument, slippery-slope argument, intent argument, grief argument, psychological long-term effects for the woman and sorting argument. We conclude that counter-arguments do not measure up in terms of detecting a morally relevant difference between MFPR of healthy fetuses and abortions. Our conclusion is therefore that—despite what several debaters seem to think—there is no morally relevant difference between the two. Therefore, when we allow abortion, we should also allow MFPR. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- One of the recent changes in the UK cabinet, after Liz Truss became the Prime Minister, was that Dr Therese Coffey become the new Health Secretary. Some news outlets were quick to point out her anti-abortion stance (see e.g. (1–3)) and that this, according to them, might be a problem. While pro-lifers might not completely rejoice over this situation as Coffey stated that ‘she wouldn’t “seek to undo” abortion laws’(3), I do not wish to focus (...) here on speculating on the future status of UK abortion legislation. Rather, I wish to focus on some statements quoted by the media as made by Clare Murphy, chief executive of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), who stated that: (2,4) -/- ‘Earlier this year, our new Health Secretary voted to revoke access to at-home abortion care, and recriminalise women who end their own pregnancies without the approval of two doctors.’ ‘In doing so, Therese Coffey voted against the advice of leading medical bodies.’ ‘To have a health secretary who would place their personal beliefs above expert clinical guidance is deeply concerning.’ -/- Coffey is a Catholic, and this brings back to mind some of the aspects of the debate surrounding conflicts of interest in bioethics. There have been, for example, discussions and proposals that having a religious belief should be declared as a conflict of interest.(5,6) But something seems to be missing in these portrayals of conflict of interest and the disagreement between Coffey and these ‘leading medical bodies’. If we regard financial conflicts of interests as the classical case of such conflicts that is used as a reference to other types of conflicts of interest,(5,6) then why do we not see the media complaining that ‘leading medical bodies’ support procedures that will give them more work oppor-tunities and improve their financial stability? To paraphrase Murphy who (according to the BBC 'said while politicians were entitled to their own views on abortion, what mattered was whether their "personal convictions stand in the way of women's ability to act on their own”. (4) perhaps ‘BPAS and the leading medical bodies are entitled to considerations of their financial interests, but what matters is whether the advice they give is clinically sound and founded in the principles of ethical clinical practice. In Matthew 6:24 Our Lord said that one cannot serve two masters, so perhaps we should not be so concerned with Coffey consulting her conscience, but rather scrutinise clinical institutions. (shrink)

In Dobbs v. Jackson, the Supreme Court found that ‘the Constitution does not confer a right to abortion.’ Rather, individual states must determine whether a right to abortion exists. Following Dobbs, state abortion laws have diverged significantly. This has generated confusion over what the law permits. Consequently, some pregnant individuals reportedly have not received timely treatment for life-threatening conditions. Clear guidance on abortion policy is essential, therefore, since continued confusion risks lives. Sweeping calls to improve patient (...) access to abortion will not provide clear guidance, however, since ‘abortion’ is defined differently across jurisdictions. In fact, there are six variables to consider when defining ‘abortion’: (1) the definition of ‘pregnancy,’ (2) whether prescribing abortifacients counts as an abortion, (3) whether abortion successfully terminates pregnancy, (4) whether abortion has some characteristic intention, (5) whether providers must know that they likely will harm fetuses, and (6) whether providers must know that their patients are pregnant. States address each variable differently, so ‘abortion’ means different things across jurisdictions. One may respond that legislators are solely to blame for confusion here, since medical experts, by contrast, possesses a clear definition of ‘abortion.’ Not so. ‘Abortion’ is defined inconsistently throughout medical literature too. As such, both legal and medical domains would benefit from careful discussions of ‘abortion.’ Attending to the six variables identified here is a good starting place. In this essay, I suggest how best to think about each and I propose a definition of ‘abortion’ well-suited for developing clear abortion policy in a polarized society. (shrink)

In most countries where Islam is acknowledged as a, or the, source of legislation, abortion is permitted under certain conditions and at certain stages of pregnancy. This article examines some of these laws and argue that they represent a continuation of the logic that governed the views of pre-modern Muslim jurists on abortion, that is, harm aversion. However, these laws also add a ‘modernist’ twist to that logic – rather than repealing that logic altogether, modernist views on (...) ‘rights’ and the advancement of medical knowledge and technology have influenced the priorities of Muslim jurists and lawmakers as far as abortion and the issues associated with it are concerned. This influence has furthermore been possible by a conscious selection and blending of pre-modern views to serve modern concerns. In all this, however, harm aversion remains the centrifugal principle, even when the abortion discourse in Muslim countries appears couched in the modernist discourse of rights. (shrink)

Induced abortion is a worldwide practice and its legalisation is a persistent demand of the women’s movement. Although in the academic literature there are numerous studies that address the study of fertility, nowhere near as much attention has been given to the analysis of induced abortion and its determining factors, and even less to the consideration of gender equality as a variable through which to understand it. This article focuses on the influence of gender equality on the rate (...) of induced abortion in different European countries. To that end the authors have constructed an econometric panel data model with information from 26 European countries for the period 2006–2011. They have analysed comparative indicators of the gender gap in terms of education, employment and wages. In addition, they have taken into account sociodemographic covariables such as the average age of motherhood, the migration rate and the percentage of births to unmarried mothers in each country. Also, as contextual factors the authors used the Human Development Index and an indicator of the legislation on abortion in the countries studied, as well as the percentage of the population who identify as having religious beliefs. The results show that the induced abortion rate is conditioned not only by national legislation on abortion, but also by gender equalities, specifically that as gender inequality decreases, so too does the frequency of induced abortions. These findings have clear political implications, showing as they do how improvements in the status of women, particularly with respect to their social and economic rights, impact on women’s reproductive decisions. (shrink)

In the context of Ireland’s new legislation governing abortion, I outline and examine the spatial consequences of political decision-making. I argue that Ireland’s new abortion law and its clinical guidance permit travel for some pregnant people but impose fixity on others. I analyse the spatial consequences of legal limitations, including non-medically necessary delays in care and medical control of medication abortions, that necessitate travel for abortion. I demonstrate how current laws fix some pregnant people in place, (...) including diverse migrant populations within Ireland, with no possibilities for abortion-related travel. This critique of the ‘new’ law demonstrates the Irish state’s continued political and medical control of abortion. (shrink)

Abortion has been legal in the United States since the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 ruling in Jane Roe, et al. v. Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County. Over the past forty years, however, access to abortion has diminished as states have devised creative ways to regulate and restrict the abortion procedure. In the first half of 2011, state legislators introduced a record number of antiabortion bills. In 19 states alone, 80 laws ranging from mandatory counseling and (...) waiting periods to gestational laws and bans on insurance coverage were passed, a legislative testimony to the incremental successes of the antiabortion campaign. Since 2011, the rapid increase in restrictive... (shrink)

I argue that whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically capable of (...) being solved, and legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true. (shrink)

The Islamic government of Iran recently passed and announced a new law titled “Rejuvenation of the Population and Protection of the Family.” This legislation is a noteworthy example of biopolitics‐influenced biolaw. In terms of abortion, contraception, prenatal screening, and population control, this law clearly contrasts with women's fundamental rights and freedoms and has significant health‐related consequences for different sectors of the population. A historical review of the population policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran shows the occurrence of (...) multiple abrupt and radical changes in such policies over the past four decades. This new law, promoted by religious biopolitics, is the most recent example, and places stringent limits on abortion. According to it, all decisions concerning abortion must be made in courts rather than in health clinics. Such courts are typically presided over by male religious scholars. This law also limits prenatal screening to the degree that will increase the rate of genetic defects, especially in the population's lower socioeconomic strata. By strictly limiting access to contraception, this law will increase the rate of unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. This paper argues that such an influence of biopolitics on biolaw contrasts with the principles of bioethics. Still, Iran's current institution of bioethics cannot address it effectively. Therefore, a new model of interaction between bioethics, biopolitics, and biolaw is needed to prevent the detrimental consequences of such pieces of legislation. Such a paradigm shift is demanded by the current “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement of the Iranian people. (shrink)

Until recently, Northern Ireland was infamous for having one of the most restrictive legal frameworks for abortion in Europe. This meant that few were performed in the country, and those who wished to terminate a pregnancy were forced to travel to other parts of the UK or further afield. In 2019 a continuing political stalemate in Northern Ireland has indirectly resulted in the relevant legislation recently being repealed by the UK government. For a short time, this meant that (...) the legal position in Northern Ireland regarding abortion became one of the most permissive in Europe. This short paper sets out the current position and, in the light of the political and legislative roadmap set out by the Northern Ireland Office, identifies and briefly discusses some potential problems that might arise. Most notable are the points raised with regard to conscientious objection. Specifically, the potential for developments in Northern Ireland to further calls for healthcare professional’s ability to rely upon conscientious objection to be removed. (shrink)

An anthology of original and reprinted articles expressing views on all aspects of the subject of abortion.

Access to abortion services in the United States continues to decline. It does so not because of significant changes in legislation or court rulings but because fewer and fewer physicians wish to perform abortions and because most states now have "conscientious objection" legislation that makes it easy for physicians to refuse to do so. We argue in this paper that physicians have an obligation to perform all socially sanctioned medical services, including abortions, and thus that the burden (...) of justification lies upon those who wish to be excused from that obligation. That is, such persons should have to show how requiring them to perform abortions would represent a serious threat to their fundamental moral or religious beliefs. We use current California law as an example of legislation that does not take physicians' obligations into account and thus allows them too easily to declare conscientious objection. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOn 28 October 2012, Savita Halappanavar, an Indian woman living in Ireland, died in hospital while under medical care for a miscarrying pregnancy. According to her husband, her repeated requests for an abortion were ignored because of the presence of a foetal heartbeat. Ms Halappanavar’s death was a critical event in the process leading to a referendum on 25 May 2018, when the Irish electorate voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, removing the constitutional ban on (...) class='Hi'>abortion. The name Savita has become indelibly linked to the changing course of abortion politics, so it is timely to reassess the role of the media in shaping the parameters of the debate about the impact of her death on the issue. This study presents a frame analysis of Irish newspapers in the weeks following her death, mapping the political, medical, legal and socio-ethical discourses, as well as the related contemporaneous events that set the agenda for the type of debate that was to follow. It identifies four media frames: Public Tragedy, Political Opportunity, Abortion Legacy and Maternal Health. Our central argument is that the overall effect of media framing provided much face-saving for politicians in the way that the legislative issue was viewed through a conservative party-political lens, despite public outrage. (shrink)

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. _The Ethics of Abortion_ critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also infanticide. It also provides several justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that abortion is (...) not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. _The Ethics of Abortion_ examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being “personally opposed” but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are morally wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. (shrink)

Sir Dugald Baird sketches the history of abortion legislation in Great Britain from the beginning of the century. In his views the 1967 Abortion Act has been one of the most important and beneficial pieces of social legislation enacted in Britain in the last 100 years. It has, however, brought problems both of administration in the hospitals and to individual doctors and nurses, particularly when the patients are young single women and even schoolgirls. One of the (...) consequences of the Abortion Act has been a fall in maternal mortality and perinatal mortality rates. Abortion does not seem to be followed by serious emotional sequelae. Nevertheless recent changes in sexual mores have introduced new and serious social problems which are discussed in relation to the role of the doctor in his relationship with patients seeking abortion. (shrink)

Politics, public discourse, and legislation restricting abortion has settled on a moderate orthodoxy: restrict abortion, but leave exceptions for pregnancies that result from rape and incest. I challenge that consensus and suggest it may be much harder to defend than those who support the compromise think. From both Pro-Life and Pro-Choice perspectives, there are good reasons to treat all abortions as equal.

Abortion, particularly late‐term abortion, and neonaticide, selective non‐treatment of newborns, are feasible management strategies for fetuses or newborns diagnosed with severe abnormalities. However, policy varies considerably among developed nations. This article examines abortion and neonatal policy in four nations: Israel, the US, the UK and Denmark. In Israel, late‐term abortion is permitted while non‐treatment of newborns is prohibited. In the US, on the other hand, late‐term abortion is severely restricted, while treatment to newborns may be (...) withdrawn. Policy in the UK and Denmark bridges some of these gaps with liberal abortion and neonatal policy. Disparate policy within and between nations creates practical and ethical difficulties. Practice diverges from policy as many practitioners find it difficult to adhere to official policy. Ethically, it is difficult to entirely justify perinatal policy in these nations. In each nation, there are elements of ethically sound policy, while other aspects cannot be defended. Ethical policy hinges on two underlying normative issues: the question of fetal/newborn status and the morality of killing and letting die. While each issue has been the subject of extensive debate, there are firm ethical norms that should serve as the basis for coherent and consistent perinatal policy. These include 1) a grant of full moral and legal status to the newborn but only partial moral and legal status to the late‐term fetus 2) a general prohibition against feticide unless to save the life of the mother or prevent the birth of a fetus facing certain death or severe pain and suffering and 3) a general endorsement of neonaticide subject to a parent's assessment of the newborn's interest broadly defined to consider physical harm as well as social, psychological and or financial harm to related third parties. Policies in each of the nations surveyed diverging from these norms should be the subject of public discourse and, where possible, legislative reform. (shrink)

Explores the complex issues of personhood, prenatal life and reproductive rights, international perspectives on the regulation of abortion, health professionals and the provision of abortion services, and prenatal diagnosis and abortion. Belinda Bennett is from The University of Sydney, Australia.

Based on a non-consequentialist ethical theory, this book critically examines the prevalent view that if a fetus has the moral standing of a person, it has a right to life and abortion is impermissible. Most discussion of abortion has assumed that this view is correct, and so has focused on the question of the personhood of the fetus. Kamm begins by considering in detail the permissibility of killing in non-abortion cases which are similar to abortion cases. (...) She goes on to consider the case for the permissibility of abortion in many types of pregnancies, including ones resulting from rape, voluntary pregnancy, and pregnancy resulting from a voluntary sex act, even if the fetus is considered a person. This argument emerges as part of a broader theory of creating new people responsibly. Kamm explores the implications of this argument for informed consent to abortion; responsibilities in pregnancy that is not aborted, and the significance of extra-uterine gestation devices for the permissibility of abortion. (shrink)

Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. This updated edition of The Ethics of Abortion critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also post-birth abortion. It also provides several (non-theological) justifications for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book (...) also critiques the view that abortion is not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. The Ethics of Abortion examines hard cases for those who are prolife, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother's life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being "personally opposed" but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artificial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justification for the view that all intentional abortions are ethically wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. Updates and Revisions to the Second Edition include: --A response to Alberto Giubilini's and Francesca Minerva's now famous 2012 article, "After-Birth Abortion" in the Journal of Medical Ethics--Responses to new defenses of Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist argument--The addition of a new chapter on gradualist views of fetal moral worth, including Jeff McMahan's Time-Relative Interest Account--The addition of a new chapter on the conscience protection for health care workers who are opposed to abortion--Responses to many critiques of the first edition, including those made by Donald Marquis, David DeGrazia, and William E. May. (shrink)

Background: Nurses are in a key position for reproduction health service delivery. Therefore, it is thought that it would be important to inspect opinions of student nurses, who will be health employees in the future, about self-induced abortion to develop women health and public health. Objectives: The goal of this study is to inspect opinions of nursing students with different sociocultural specialties, about self-induced abortions. Research design: It is qualitative type and planned with ethnographic research pattern. Participants and research (...) context: The study was conducted with 20 last-term students of Kırşehir Ahi Evran University, Faculty of Health Sciences, Department of Nursing, who were chosen by maximum diversity sampling technique. Interviews were made with semi-structured interview form and voice records during the study; data were analyzed with content analyzing method. Ethical considerations: Permission from the organization, university ethics committee, and personal approvals were taken from participants to conduct the research. Findings: Based on the analysis, two major themes on self-induced abortion in Turkish nursing students were found: dilemma of traditional perspective and professional identity and occupational awareness. Discussion and conclusion: It is seen that there is a dilemma between traditional point of view and professional identities about self-induced abortion for nursing students, but they had occupational awareness. It should be recommended to give information about national and international licit legislations for reproductive health, self-induced abortion, and setting up ethical discussion environments for nursing students. (shrink)

Abstract.Telling the tale about South Dakota's recent legislative ban on nearly all abortions gets messy, complicated, and dirty. There are no innocent subjects and no simple plot lines. The story reveals other stories underneath and over the top of the others. Stories counter stories, revealing who is in the know and who does the telling. To “tell the old, old story,” as the song goes, is not as simple as it may seem. Religion and medical science are caught in the (...) politics and cultural wars about abortion. (shrink)

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has recently handed down its judgement in the case of three women contesting the abortion law in the Republic of Ireland, which has one of the most restrictive abortion laws in the world. Although the Court ruled that Ireland had to clarify the current law following the success of one of the three claims, the failure of the other two claims allows Ireland to continue to enforce its law, (...) which has an adverse effect on women's health. This paper, therefore, proposes an amendment to abortion legislation in the Republic of Ireland that would be compatible with safeguarding women's health, highlighting several circumstances in which the continuation of a pregnancy may have a detrimental impact on a woman's physical and/or mental health. (shrink)

In this commentary, the core features of the Irish Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 are outlined. This legislation provides, for the first time in the history of the Irish state, a framework for the provision of lawful abortion in Ireland. The paper will explain the background to the legislation, discuss its main features, and reflect on the likely impact that it will have on the availability of abortion in Ireland.

In this paper, I present a case study on a recent attempt at implementing what I refer to as the “Pro-lifer’s Asymmetrical Punishment View” (PAPV), the view that people should be legally punished for performing abortions whereas women should not be so punished for procuring abortions. While doing so, I argue that the endeavor, which took place in the state of Alabama, is incoherent relative to the conjunction of its purported underlying moral rationale and the Alabama criminal code. I then (...) present what I take to be possible explanations for, practical implications of, and solutions to the attempt and its incoherence. Given that other endeavors to implement PAPV are currently in the works and are so with similar underlying moral rationales and within similar criminal codes, what I present and argue here is not limited to Alabama’s attempt at doing so. (shrink)

George, B. J. Jr. The evolving law of abortion.--Guttmacher, A. F. The genesis of liberalized abortion in New York: a personal insight.--Callahan, D. Abortion: some ethical issues.--Jakobovits, I. Jewish views on abortion.--Drinan, R. F. The inviolability of the right to be born.--Schwartz, R. A. Abortion on request: the psychiatric implications.--Fleck, S. A psychiatrist's views on abortion.--Niswander, K. R. Abortion practices in the United States: a medical viewpoint.--Macintyre, M. N. Genetic risk, prenatal diagnosis, and (...) selective abortion.--Messerman, G. A. Abortion counselling: shall women be permitted to know?--Pilpel, H. F. and Zuckerman, R. J. Abortion and the rights of minors. (shrink)

The proliferation of prenatal genetic testing likely to follow from advances in genetic science invites reconsideration of the moral status of abortion. In this article I examine arguments surrounding the moral status of the fetus. I conclude that secular philosophy should ultimately admit that the moral status of the fetus is uncertain, and that this uncertainty itself makes abortion morally problematic. While this does not imply that abortion is always morally wrong or that it should be legally (...) prohibited, it does recommend a presumption in favor of preserving fetal life except in special circumstances. A relevant worry is that the rise of eugenic abortion gives new force to slippery slope arguments that we will be led down a path to a situation where more fetuses are terminated for relatively trivial reasons and that this will promote other bad social consequences. This might justify legislative discouragement of certain genetic interventions. (shrink)

This paper critically analyses conscientious objection to abortion in the context of the new regulation of pregnancy termination in Chile. It argues that adequate regulation should not be blind: The bioethical requirements that seek to balance the interests involved must consider the legal regulation of the interests at stake, the context in which they are implemented, and, fundamentally, the effectiveness of the solutions adopted. Attention should be paid to the risks involved in the political use of conscientious objection to (...) prevent the implementation of women’s reproductive rights. In describing the process of the entrenchment and expansion of conscientious objection to abortion in Chile, we show how this process has overprotected conscience and how the risks of undermining the effectiveness of the new abortion legislation hinder the enjoyment of rights entrenched by the law. (shrink)

This paper offers a qualified defence of physician non-compliance with antiabortion legislation in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The paper examines two ethically troubling trends of post-Dobbs legislation: narrow and vague maternal health exemption clauses and mandatory reporting of miscarriages in jurisdictions where patients may criminal prosecution for medically induced abortions. It then examines and defends a professional obligation on the part of physicians to comply with the law. This (...) obligation, however, is defeasible. The paper then argues that physicians’ obligations to comply with the law is defeated when the law is illegitimate and following the law would constitute bad medical practice. Finally, it argues that the ethically troubling trends in post-Dobbs antiabortion legislation may meet these criteria. (shrink)

From 1989 through September 2017, Chile’s highly restrictive abortion laws exposed women to victimisation and needlessly threatened their health, freedom and even lives. However, after decades of unsuccessful attempts to decriminalise abortion, legislation regulating pregnancy termination on three grounds was recently enacted. In the aftermath, an aggressive conservative drive designed to turn conscientious objection into a pivotal new obstacle, mounted during the congressional debate, has led to extensive, complex arguments about the validity and legitimacy of conscientious objection. (...) This article offers a critical review of the emergence of conscientious objection and its likely policy and ethical implications. It posits the need to regulate conscientious objection through checks and balances designed to keep it from being turned into an ideological barrier meant to hinder women’s access to critical healthcare. (shrink)

Based on a non-consequentialist ethical theory, this book critically examines the prevalent view that if a fetus has the moral standing of a person, it has a right to life and abortion is impermissible. Most discussion of abortion has assumed that this view is correct, and so has focused on the question of the personhood of the fetus. Kamm begins by considering in detail the permissibility of killing in non-abortion cases which are similar to abortion cases. (...) She goes on to consider the case for the permissibility of abortion in many types of pregnancies, including ones resulting from rape, voluntary pregnancy, and pregnancy resulting from a voluntary sex act, even if the fetus is considered a person. This argument emerges as part of a broader theory of creating new people responsibly. Kamm explores the implications of this argument for informed consent to abortion; responsibilities in pregnancy that is not aborted, and the significance of extra-uterine gestation devices for the permissibility of abortion. (shrink)