Is Abortion a Pseudo-Problem?

Philosophy Research Archives 12:101-124 (1986)
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Abstract

I argue that whether abortions are morally permissible depends on whether the fetus has a right to life, the only point of disagreement between the possible theories on this question--the Extreme Conservative, the Middle, and the Extreme Liberal--concerns the relevant temporal proximity to, or degree of probability of actualizing, some selected potential, there is in principle no non-arbitrary way of resolving this disagreement, and hence the problem of abortion is a pseudo-problem inasmuch as it is not theoretically capable of being solved, and legislators should, in the light of this, act as if the Extreme Liberal Theory were true.

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