Résumé L’intérêt pour le café ne date pas d’aujourd’hui, mais les discours promotionnels sur ce breuvage mythique ne cessent de se multiplier depuis l’arrivée d’Internet. Pour mieux comprendre le domaine spécifique des récits gustatifs qui se construisent autour de la passion pour le café, nous avons privilégié une démarche innovante en sciences du langage, la sémiotique du goût. Le site internet de la marque Carte Noire, en misant sur l’expérience gustative euphorisante et la tautologie du désir, offre un corpus approprié (...) pour cette nouvelle approche. L’objectif de notre article est double : il consiste, d’une part, à appréhender le processus de construction des significations du récit passionnel en acte, et, d’autre part, à conceptualiser le sensible, l’imaginaire gustatif et l’hédonisme sur lesquels se basent les stratégies discursives publicitaires adjacentes. (shrink)

Many contemporary authors argue that since certain Hindu texts and traditions claim that all living beings are fundamentally the same as Brahman (God), these texts and traditions provide the basis for an environmental ethic. I outline three common versions of this argument, and argue that each fails to meet at least one criterion for an environmental ethic. This doesn’t mean, however, that certain Hindu texts and traditions do not provide the basis for an environmental ethic. In the last section of (...) the paper I briefly outline and defend an alternative, according to which all plants and animals have intrinsic value and direct moral standing in virtue of having a good. (shrink)

In most common expositions of Indian philosophy the two traditions: self and no-self - are taken to be mutually incompatible. The former, having its origin in the Upaniṣads, finds expression in all āstikadarśanas , though its clearest and most important exposition is found in Advaita Vedānta. The latter having its origin in the teachings of the Buddha finds varied expressions in different schools of Buddhism. The Advaita Vedānta accepts ātman and rejects anattā ; the Buddhists argue for anattā and reject (...) ātman . My exposition in this paper is based primarily on the teachings of the Gautama Buddha and Śaṃkara, the founders of Buddhism and Advaita Vedānta respectively. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, my use of the terms “Buddhist” and “Advaitins” refers to the teachings of these founders rather than to the later philosophers of these two traditions. I will begin with an overview of Advaita Vedānta. (shrink)

The central thesis of the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta is the doctrine of the identity of brahman and ātman. Brahman is essentially sat, being as such in the sense of the dimension of existence in which all worldly goings-on take place. The ātman is conceived as the “seer,” i.e., as the pure subject qua the to-whom of any experiential givenness; and this subject, in turn, is understood not as some entity that performs the seeing but as nothing but the very (...) seeing itself, i.e., as consciousness in the sense of the abiding presence-realm in which permanently changing experiential contents come to givenness. The Advaitic thesis is that this presence-realm—the seeing that takes place “in us”—is ultimately nothing other than the universal being-dimension—brahman—itself, modified by the mental contents of an innerworldly individual. This paper attempts to vindicate this doctrine by a series of reflections on the nature of the I and of reality as such. It argues that Advaita Vedānta can be viewed as a version of cosmopsychism in its idealist version which does not view consciousness as one of the features of the cosmos as a whole, but as its exclusive intrinsic nature, i.e., as the very essence of being as such. (shrink)

Hindu religious and philosophical thought revolves around the basic metaphysical thesis that Atman, the individual self, is identical with Brahman, the Universal Self in which all things are sustained. With a few notable exceptions most Western philosophers have found this thesis too far removed from common sense to consider seriously. My purpose in this essay is to clarify and defend five theses about consciousness which, while formulated independently, have their closest collective affinities to the Advaita Vedanta view of consciousness.

Xeroxed drafts. The originals are held in the University Library, University of Lund, Sweden.

아트만(ātman)과 힌두 전통에서 윤회의 주체를 구성하는 핵심적인 요소로 간주된다. 반면 푸루샤(puruṣa)는 상키야-요가 학파에서 아트만을 대체하는 용어로 사용되며 영아(靈我)ㆍ순수정신 등으로 번역된다. 아트만과 푸루샤는 상키야 학파 내외에서 동일한 개념으로 통용되었다. 본 논문의 목적은 상키야 학파가 힌두전통에서 일반적으로 사용되는 아트만이라는 용어 대신에 푸루샤라는 용어를 사용하게 된 경위를 소묘하는 데 있다. 특히 명상을 통해 지각되는 대상으로서의 아트만과 푸루샤의 묘사하는 서술들에 맞추었다. 아트만과 푸루샤가 명상의 대상으로 취급되면서 중요한 분기점을 맞는 것으로 생각되기 때문이다. 초기 우파니샤드에서는 심장의 빛을 아트만이라고 간주하는 계열이 있으며, 그 개념이 고전 요가 체계에도 (...) 통용되고 있다. 푸루샤와 아트만은 우파니샤드에서 서로 다른 개념으로도, 동일한 개념으로도 사용되는데, 그것은 생리학적 측면과 표현법의 측면이 각각 두 가지씩 분기점을 지닌다. 또한 수행론적인 측면에서도 상반되는 두 가지 실수론이 우파니샤드에서 공존한다. 마하바라타에서 나타난 푸루샤와 아트만에 관한 기술이 큰 개념적 차이 없이 사용된다. 다만 마하바라타에서 푸루샤와 아트만을 구분하는 맥락은 기본적으로 우파니샤드의 존재-인식 분류법과 동일하다. 그리고 마하바라타의 일부 구절에서는 고전 상키야와 거의 흡사하게 아트만과 푸루샤가 지각될 수 없는 존재라는 것을 명확하게 서술하는 부분이 있으며, 반면 요가를 통해서 지각할 수 있는 존재라고 설명하는 부분도 발견된다. 그리고 그것은 상키야와 요가와 구분되는 사정과 관련이 있으나, 고전 상키야에서 아트만이라는 용어를 폐기하고 푸루샤라는 사용한 경위와는 무관하다는 점을 확인할 수 있다. (shrink)

형이상학적 자아의 존재를 부정하는 주류불교에 비해 여래장사상 계통의 경론은 자아라는 개념과 용어를 자유로이 게다가 긍정적으로 사용하고 있다. 이러한 여래장사상 계통의 태도는 인도 정통철학의 자아 개념을 승인하고 있다는 비판을 불러일으키기도 했다. 하지만 후대의 여래장사상가 뿐 아니라 『열반경』과 『보성론』 자체에서도 주류불교의 무아설과 통합시키는 방향으로 자아 개념에 대한 다양한 해석이 이루어지고 있음을 발견할 수 있다. 통합의 유형은 먼저, 자아 개념을 잠정적 의미(neyārtha)의 가르침이란 관점에서 해석하는 것이다. 이 경우 자아 개념은 외도나 중생의 교화를 위한 수단의 의미에 중점이 주어진다. 둘째, 외도나 중생이 집착하는 자아는 부정하되, (...) 여래장사상 계열에서 인정하는 자아는 궁극적 실재를 가리키는 것으로 긍정하는 유형이다. 전자가 부정되는 이유는 여래장사상에서 인정하는 자아 개념에 부합하지 않기 때문이다. 반면 후자는 여래, 불성, 여래장과 동일시되며, 자아라는 긍정적 언어로 서술된다. 셋째, 자아와 무아를 양자긍정의 방식으로 동일시하거나 양자부정의 방식으로 모두 부정하는 유형이다. 전자는 주로 궁극적 실재의 인식불가능성이나 난해성과 관련되어 있다. 후자의 경우는 아견과 무아견을 모두 개념적 다양성의 산물로 격하시키는 대신 궁극적 실재를 보다 고차원적인 것으로 드러내는 방식이다. 마지막으로 한역 『보성론』과 『불성론』에 인용된 『대승장엄경론』의 게송은 자아와 무아를 동일시하는 『보성론』의 입장과 궤를 같이 하고 있다. 하지만 그에 대한 산문주석과 무성 및 안혜의 복주에서는 자아 개념을 본질 개념으로 재해석하고 있다. 이는 여래장사상 계열에서는 거부했던 합리적 해석의 한 유형으로 보인다. (shrink)

I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine, and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones, respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in (...) everyday discourse, but which, contra the strong realist about selves, does not fall into an unhealthy idealization of anything approximating perfect psychic wholeness. (shrink)

Can the Âtman in its infinity and transcendence be made the basis for civil rights? Can we deduce the idea of civil rights and their number from the conception of the Âtman? Can historicity be preserved in the bosom of the Âtman? It has been said that only ideas like that of the dictatorship are possible on the basis of the Âtman as conceived by Indian thinkers. Individual freedom and initiative necessary for new scientific discoveries and inventions are taught by (...) Christ and other Israel-born religions, and the discovery of the atom bomb is due to such ideas. Long ago the late Prof. C.A. Moore of Hawaii urged me several times to handle such criticisms of Indian philosophy and religion. I tried to answer them in some early papers. The most important considerations are: As Kant said, from the highest metaphysical reality it is not logically possible to deduce anything particular or even lower; for instance, we cannot even deduce from “All men are mortal” whether Socrates is or is not mortal, unless we add “Socrates is a man,” which is an empirical statement. And If the Âtman is one and all-comprehensive, no democracy is said to be possible because individual men cannot be real then; but it is overlooked that then nothing is possible, not even trees and stones. Again, if there is only one personal God and if his will is supreme, will he not be a tyrant or a Louis XIV of the heavens, thundering his unquestionable commands? Where do democracy and freedom of the individual go then? On the other hand, if every one is the Supreme Âtman in essence, then everyone is free with all the initiative one can have by birth. Civil rights will then have a metaphysical foundation because every finite individual is inherently one with the Supreme Person and has the same rights and freedom as any king or emperor. But these arguments and counter-arguments cannot impress every one because to deduce anything from the highest Being leads only to antinomies and will be counter-productive in our search for truth. In metaphysics or ontology we can go only from the lower to the higher in logic or discursive thinking, but not vice versa. (shrink)

Suppose we were to randomly pick out a book on Buddhism or Eastern Philosophy and turn to the section on 'no-self' (anatt?). On this central teaching, we would most likely learn that the Buddha rejected the Upanisadic notion of Self (?tman), maintaining that a person is no more than a bundle of impermanent, conditioned psycho-physical aggregates (khandhas). The rejection of ?tman is seen by many to separate the metaphysically 'extravagant' claims of Hinduism from the austere tenets of Buddhism. The status (...) quo has not, however, gone unchallenged. I shall join forces against this pernicious view, integrating some recent contributions into a sustained, two-pronged argument against no-?tman theories of anatt?. At the end it shall be suggested, in line with Thanissaro Bhikkhu, that anatt? is best understood as a practical strategy rather than as a metaphysical doctrine. (shrink)

The Author and the Editor invite us to Discern (viveka) between Real and non-real, between atman (Self) and non-atman (non-Self), between Infinite and finite, between Life and death. In Svami Nikhilananda's words: -This work, which contains only forty-six sloka (verses) is an excellent vade mecum (handbook) for students of advanced courses in Advaita philosophy-. Both Readers and Scholars will welcome the truly Monumental Bibliography. SHANKARA, the Author, has been one of the greatest philosophers of India, and has profoundly influenced not (...) only India's philosophical development, but that of the entire world. RAPHAEL, the Editor, is an author and a Master in the Western Metaphysical Tradition as well as in Vedanta. (shrink)

Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof ( avīta/āvīta ), is presented in a prasaṅga -style, and contains double negation ( na nairātmyam ) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style ( (...) sātmakam ). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa . On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion ( vyāpti ). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman , discusses the negative expressions ‘‘ nairātmya ” and ‘‘ a-nairātmya ” Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman , he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka , whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya , because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs. (shrink)

What sort of a thing is society which the social scientist so avidly studies? Is it something completely independent of the way human beings think about it and conceive it to be? Or is it affected in its very being by the way men think about it and conceive it to be? Has it, so to say, an essence of its own which men have only to find and discover? Or is it something like what the existentialists say about man; (...) that is, something that has no essence of its own, but something which is made and created out of the infinite choices of diverse men? What we confront as society is, on this view, not something given by nature but rather that which was created by men in the past and that which is being made and remade by men in the present. It is like the habits of a man’s own character, created by choices made in the past, but now confronting him and others as something ‘given’, something to be taken as ‘datum’, something to be worked with or worked against, but in any case inevitably to be taken into account. In this context, the chapter discusses two approaches to society, socio-centric and Atman-centric, and helps us go beyond the contemporary logic of a priori sociological determinism. (shrink)

Winner of the 2021 Toshihide Numata Book Award in Buddhism The assertion that there is nothing in the constitution of any person that deserves to be considered the self (ātman)—a permanent, unchanging kernel of personal identity in this life and those to come—has been a cornerstone of Buddhist teaching from its inception. Whereas other Indian religious systems celebrated the search for and potential discovery of one’s “true self,” Buddhism taught about the futility of searching for anything in our experience that (...) is not transient and ephemeral. But a small yet influential set of Mahāyāna Buddhist texts, composed in India in the early centuries CE, taught that all sentient beings possess at all times, and across their successive lives, the enduring and superlatively precious nature of a Buddha. This was taught with reference to the enigmatic expression tathāgatagarbha—the “womb” or “chamber” for a Buddha—which some texts refer to as a person’s true self. The Buddhist Self is a methodical examination of Indian teaching about the tathāgatagarbha (otherwise the presence of one’s “Buddha-nature”) and the extent to which different Buddhist texts and authors articulated this in terms of the self. C. V. Jones attends to each of the Indian Buddhist works responsible for explaining what is meant by the expression tathāgatagarbha, and how far this should be understood or promoted using the language of selfhood. With close attention to these sources, Jones argues that the trajectory of Buddha-nature thought in India is also the history and legacy of a Buddhist account of what deserves to be called the self: an innovative attempt to equip Mahāyāna Buddhism with an affirmative response to wider Indian interest in the discovery of something precious or even divine in one’s own constitution. This argument is supplemented by critical consideration of other themes that run through this distinctive body of Mahāyānist literature: the relationship between Buddhist and non-Buddhist teachings about the self, the overlap between the tathāgatagarbha and the nature of the mind, and the originally radical position that the only means of becoming liberated from rebirth is to achieve the same exalted status as the Buddha. (shrink)

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does so in (...) light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations. (shrink)

희곡에는 극중극(劇中劇)이 있다. 셰익스피어 희곡의 경우, 그것은 두 역할을 한다. 첫째, 반복을 통한 주제 부각의 효과이고 둘째, 마주 보고 있는 두 개의 거울처럼, 두 개의 틀로 관객에게 혼동을 야기하는 것이다. 산스크리트 서사시와 희곡에서도 다양한 극중극이 발견되지만, 철학적 논서에서도 유사한 방식으로 독자에게 혼동을 야기하는 경우가 있다. 그것은 저자가 대론자의 이론을 비판하는 중간에 핵심 주제에서 벗어난 논쟁을 삽입하는 것으로, 논쟁 속의 논쟁(論中論)이라 할 수 있다. 자얀타의 『니야야만자리』의 『니야야수트라』 1.1.10에 대한 주석에서 사용된 열변용(熱變容)과 관련된 논쟁도 논중론의 일종이다. 그는 신체가 욕구 등의 기체라는 차르바카의 (...) 주장을 논파하기 위해 열변용 이론을 사용하면서, 열변용과 관련된 두 이론(피루와 피타라) 사이의 논쟁을 소개한다. 그의 주석에서 열변용 이론 부분은 “① 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제1단계 논증 → ② 열변용 논쟁 I → ③ 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제2단계 논증 → ④ 열변용 논쟁 II → ⑤ 신체의 소멸을 주장하는 제3단계 논증”으로 도식화 될 수 있다. 그러나 이 도식에서 ②와 ④를 제외한 “① 제1단계 논증 → ③ 제2단계 논증 → ⑤ 제3단계 논증” 만을 연결해서 읽어도 논증의 내용은 크게 바뀌지 않는다. 따라서 ②와 ④는 분량 상으로 전체 논증의 반 정도를 차지하지만, 내용상 주제 논쟁에서 벗어난 부연설명이라고 할 수 있다. 그것은 열변용과 관련된 피루와 피타라 이론에 대한 학술정보를 제공해주는 순기능도 갖지만, 난해하고 복잡한 이론 소개는 논리학에 정통하지 않은 독자를 당혹하게 만드는 역기능도 지닌다. 따라서 열변용과 관련된 논쟁은 셰익스피어의 극중극과 유사한 기능을 하는 논중론(論中論)이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Commentary of the verse work with English explanation on the Atman and self-realization; includes text.

This adhyatma gyana is also a part of Ayurveda because it is related to human health especially with mental health; A group of diseases is described independently in Sushruta as adhyatmika dukha. Contemporary books also mention adhyatmika dukha and adhyatma has been described in details. The subject matter of adhyatma has been mentioned from different point of view, but in fact the adhyatma is related to atman, as it is knowledge of atman and its related subjects are the knowledgeable materials (...) of adhyatma. Here in thispaper is a brief review of adhyatma ,terminology and its different prospects in ayurveda. (shrink)

On the concept of Atman in Hindu philosophy.

본고는 의학서임에도 불구하고 윤회를 인정하고 있는 아유르베다의 윤회관을 CS에 의거하여 고찰함으로써, 아유르베다의 독자적인 윤회관 과 그와 연관성을 지니고 있는 상키야학파의 비교를 통해 의의를 정립 하고자 한다. CS에서는 윤회할 때 필요한 요소를 ātman, 5대에서 ākaśa(空)를 제 외한 4대 그리고 이들을 연결시켜주는 역할을 하는 sattva(마음)로 분류 하고 있다. 이들은 불가분의 관계를 지니고 있다. 한편, 윤회의 원인으 로는 정신적 도샤라 일컫는 rajas, tamas와 업이 존재하는데 이들 모두 는 질병으로 연결되어 다음 생에도 병을 지속하게 한다. SK에서는 업의 개념을 담당하고 있는 buddhi(統覺)와 미세신의 이전 을 (...) 통해 윤회가 진행된다. SK의 경우, buddhi의 정신적 기능인 8정태에 따라서 다음 생의 세계가 결정이 되고 CS의 경우, sattva(마음)의 유형 에 따라 다음 생의 세계를 분류하는데 이러한 방식은 CS만의 독자적인 윤회관을 반영하는 것으로 마음이 CS에서 얼마나 중요한 위치를 차지 하고 있는가를 보여준다. 윤회에 있어서 SK에서는 buddhi가, CS에서는 마음이 중대한 원리로 작용을 하고 있다. 양자의 연관성을 미루어 연대적으로 볼 때, CS에서 마음의 기능이 고전 상키야에 이르러 buddhi의 다양한 기능으로 전환ᆞ확대되어 SK에 반영되었음을 유추할 수 있다. (shrink)

Buddhism enthusiasts that the tathAgatagarbha sources were themselves aware of the criticism that they simply taught an Atman in the same way that non- Buddhists did, and they rejected this accusation and defended themselves against the ...

Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western (...) philosophers. He also provides some inkling of how alternative ways of defending phenomenal unity without self fail. A criticism of some Western phenomenological theories of self is that they do not explain how unity is provided by the ‘mineness’ of cognition. Udayana's suggestion that a sort of agency provides such an explanation can be developed as an original argument for a phenomenally unitary self. (shrink)

Prof. Matsumoto Shirō and his colleague, Prof. Hakamaya Noriaki, have together produced a number of lengthy essays on a theme called hihan bukkyō (批判仏教), in English, "Critical Buddhism."1 At the core of their project is the conviction that the concepts of tathāgatagarbha and innate enlightenment (本覺思想) are alien to Buddhism, due to the fact that those concepts imply a belief in a hypostasized self--a type of atman, which Buddhism originally and distinctively sought to refute through the conceptual framework of pratītya-samutpāda (...) (dependent origination). (shrink)

Abstract Sankara's philosophy fails definitively at the point where he leaves the human experience??sinning and suffering??unaccounted for. What in each of us, he asks, sins and suffers? Is it the antahkarana, the ?mental organ? giving rise to the series of mental states (buddins) that file by illumined by the atman? Impossible, he says, for the antahkarana by itself is material (jada,) and therefore unconscious (acit). Then is it the ?tman, upon which the antahkarana is superimposed? Inconceivable, he says, for the (...) atman is identical with Brahman, and Brahman is by definition pure bliss?consciousness, as far removed from sin and suffering as can be imagined. Then is the atman in conjunction with the antahkarana?a partnership that Sankara calls the jiva (or soul)?the sinner and sufferer? Yes, he says, as long as you remember that the sin and suffering are ultimately illusory, as illusory as the antahkarana itself. I show why Sankara's answer fails and what the failure implies, then suggest a fruitful way to approach Sankara and teach his philsophy to our students. (shrink)

This paper aims at giving a brief historical survey of the growth and development of the meaning attributed by the ancient Indians to the term maya. In studying this term we must not lose sight of the fact that it is very often used in various texts without any bearing upon the great problem of the,reality' of the phenomenal world as compared with brahman. In a large number of texts originating in pre-or non-Vedantic circles the word occurs in a great (...) variety of connotations : « power, wisdom, subtle device », and, especially, « incomprehensible power enabling its possessor to create something » ascribed to mighty beings. In the Vedic period there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the phenomenal world in the use of the term. It does not mean « chimera, illusion, fascination, delusion, fata morgana, etc. ». It refers to a reality of an artificial or misleading character, to phenomena produced by a special ability or imagination ; it can often be translated by a locution beginning with pseudo —, or by the Engl. craft in one of its connotations. It can also mean « fraud, deception ». Philosophers often referred to these common meanings of the word in discussing the,relation' of brahman and the phenomena which essentially are brahman. Svet. Up. 4, 9 and 10 nature is called maya : in this upanûad the germs from which the various views or doctrines of the generations to come were to develop had already reached the first stage of growth without differentiating in any considerable degree. Here maya does not express the unreality of the world, but the impossibility of man's understanding its character and the power of its creator. Nor does the Bhagavadgita question the reality of the world either. Deussen and other scholars were wrong in following Sahara's school of thought which interpreted these texts from its own particular point of view. In the history of Indian thought Buddhism is of outstanding importance. According to the ancient Buddhists the world and the individuals are real, but unstable, of a comparatively insignificant,metaphysical dignity'. The Madhyamika's and Nagarjima's relativistic school prepare the way for the idealistic Vijnanavadins who, founding their ontology on the psychology of yoga, hold the view that only vijnana « mere consciousness » exists. Any pretended,reality' outside this reality is to be regarded as dependent on a wrong interpretation of our inner experiences. The,causally dependent aspect', a determined,form of reality' reflects the,absolute aspect'; the lower constructed aspect' or,wrong ideation', the sphere of the concrete phenomena, however, is to be compared to a snake the presence of which we incorrectly assume when, at dusk, we find a cable.In this connection the term maya is also used : a rope may appear in the shape of a snake, or a maya in the shape of a man and other objects which do not really exist in themselves. This maya is void, non-substantial; in the same way the, wrong or constructive ideation' which appears in the, aspect of subject and object' is called non-substantial. In the process by which the reality of consciousness is transformed into the aspect of wrong ideation maya plays an important rôle : it is the power or factor producing the differentiation of the homogeneous consciousness which results in the pseudo-existence of the phenomenal world. Gaudapada, the earliest exponent of the view of pure non-duality writing at a time when the influence of these idealistic Buddhists was predominant, availed himself of the results of their speculative endeavour. On the other hand he made sure of the sanction of the traditional brahminical circles by expounding his views in the form of an expatiation on the Mandukya. Upanmd. The universum, he holds, is like a dream, like a maya ; « it is not actually so ». All phenomenal beings are dreamlike projections of the Divine Self, which is by its very maya able to make itself assume this projected form. But in his book maya also serves to indicate that any relation at all between the world and the Ultimate cannot be rationally sustained, for this,relation' is inexplicable. Maya, inherent to brahman is the condition underlying the,Origin', the pseudo-existence of this world ; but our lack of understanding is also maya. Our empirical knowledge, which makes us believe that things come into being is would-be knowledge. Maya is the hypothesis needed to express in a formula that the diversity of the phenomenal world is neither identical with atman-brahman nor existing by itself. Sawkara likewise regards the world as,pseudo' ; but in contradistinction to Gaudapada who focusses attention on the maya formula and the character of the phenomena, he emphasizes the sole reality of brahman, avoiding any suggestion as to the world's being void, non-being or unsubstantial. This formulation holds good from the higher point of view, viz. that of the supreme reality, into which empirical knowledge cannot penetrate. For practical purposes the world may be considered as really existing. The ignorance which conceals our true character from us and makes us perceive a world which from the standpoint of the Supreme does not exist is maya. Maya hides the reality and projects a pseudo-reality. It is undefinable and inexplicable ; it is neither being nor non-being. Maya is the postulate needed to account for the phenomenon called universe, for the existence of the diversity, though it is only the One which exists. Finally the maya theories of Saktas and Visnuite schools are briefly discussed. According to the former mayasakti is the power of the Supreme to veil itself without ceasing to be what it is ; they emphasize the point of view that « this all is brahman », accusing Sankara of admitting a principle beside brahman. Ramanuja who basing himself on the conviction that Brahman in the first place is God, defends the thesis that the world and the souls are real, and attacks Sankara's maya theory ; according to this great exponent of Visnuite thought maya symbolizes the wonderful and miraculous in God's creation and creative power. (shrink)

The Book Analyses The Concepts Of Atman, Brahman, And The World, Highlighting Sankara S Advaitism . In The Context Of Sankara S Philosophy Vis-A-Vis The Upanisads, It Is Perhaps The First To Explore The Meaning And Functions Of Language.

Since time immemorial Indian culture has been upholding a symbiotic relationship between man and environment. It has led to the all round evolution of Indian culture as an integral whole. This assimilation has been possible due to the spiritual vision of Indian seers. Every Culture is based upon certain values. In India values are usually discussed in the context of the principal ends of human life (chatuspurusartha): dharma (moral value), artha (political and economic values), kama (sensual value) and moksha (spiritual (...) value). Indian cultural tradition shaped human behaviour in accordance with these values, which impinged ecological issues as well. Again, Indian classification of value is based on two percepts. These are (1) the essential infinitude and divinity of all souls and (2) the essential oneness and solidarity of universe and all life. Supreme being resides in all; hence no area of life is alien to spiritual influence. It emphasizes the presence of an infinite knowledge, power, purity and bliss behind the body-mind complex of human beings, which is called Atman. Upanisads express this truth as Aham Brahmasmi (I am Brahman) or Ayam Atma Brahma (the individual soul is Brahman) or Tat Twam Asi (thou art that). Acceptance of the presence of God in everything led Indian culture to maintain and protect the natural harmonious relationship between human beings and nature. Moreover, Indians discovered the essential unity of all existence. The universe is holistic. Here at the deeper level of all pervading consciousness everything in the world is interconnected. Oneness of the entire reality is the basic presupposition and the guiding principle of the spiritualistic approach of Indian culture. The paper is an attempt to show that the holistic view of Indian culture is mirrored in the philosophy of ecology. (shrink)

Dr. George Victor Studies Comprehensively Sankaracarya S Teachings On Vedanta His Views On Scripture, Perception And Inference As Pramanas Or Standards Of Knowledges; His Explanations Of The Relation Between Brahman And Atman, Brahman And Äsvara, Maya And The World; And His Concepts Of Jnana Marga, Karma Marga And Moksa.

v. 1. The spectrum of consciousness ; No boundary ; Selected essays -- v. 2. The Atman Project ; Up from Eden -- v. 3. A sociable god ; Eye to eye -- v. 4. Integral psychology ; Transformations of consciousness ; Selected essays -- v. 5. Grace and grit : spirituality and healing in the life and death of Treya Killam Wilber. 2nd ed. -- v. 6. Sex, ecology, spirituality : the spirit of evolution. 2nd, rev. ed. -- v. (...) 7. A brief history of everything ; The eye of spirit -- v. 8. The marriage of sense and soul ; One taste. (shrink)

The concept of the mahant- ātman-, or “vast self”, found in some of the Early and Middle Upaniṣads, has, at least since the days of Hermann Oldenberg, been explored by a number of scholars, most notably by van Buitenen :103–114, 1964). These studies have usually emphasized the cosmic implications of this concept; the vast ātman- being the non-individualized spirit that brings forth and pervades the universe, then enters the bodies of all created beings as their animating principle. As such it (...) precedes the mahān, or mahat, of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. The present paper argues that the concept of a mahant- puruṣa- or “vast person”, appearing parallel to the vast ātman in these texts, is in fact older, being traceable to Middle Vedic texts; the emergence of the Upaniṣadic ātman doctrine has eventually led to its replacement by the mahān ātmā. Originally, it is argued, the adjective mahant- stressed the difference between this “vast” puruṣa, who is said to dwell in the sun, and the minute puruṣa within man, who is seen as the tiny “person” in one’s pupil, or resides in the heart, having the size of a thumb. In contradistinction to the ātman, the puruṣa is a thoroughly anthropomorphic soul-concept, a “person” within the person. The ultimate identity between this tiny soul-person and the puruṣa in the sun is a recurring, but little studied, motif in the micro-macrocosmic speculations of the Brāhmaṇa texts. This “vast”, solar puruṣa is sometimes identified with the Puruṣa or primeval man of Ṛgveda 10.90, from whose body the universe was formed, and much of the imagery surrounding the vast puruṣa of Middle and Late Vedic literature seems to derive from this hymn. (shrink)

L'absolu a-t-il été inventé par l'espèce humaine? Si oui, quand, dans quelles circonstances, à quelles fins et dans quelles conditions? Si ce n'est pas le cas, est-à-dire que l'absolu serait une donnée immédiate de la conscience humaine? Et si tel est le cas, peut-on le vérifier et qu'est-ce que cela signifie? À travers une enquête de sociologie historique, qui remonte au paléolithique et examine aussi bien la pensée indienne (avec la notion d'Atman dans les Upanisads), les pensées en Asie Mineure (...) (qui conçurent le concept de Dieu) ou les philosophies chinoises (qui thématisèrent les premières la notion de Devenir), le présent essai a pour vocation d'expliquer ce qui semble destiner l'espèce humaine à se poser des questions métaphysiques."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Whereas the Upanishads contain much which is, strictly speaking, of little interest to the historian of Indian thought, the Pre-Upanishadic texts are not completely devoid of passages which are of special importance for anyone who endeavours to trace the origin and oldest form of the main texts of classical Indian philosophy. Too often the difference between Upanishads and Pre-Upanishadic literature has been exaggerated ; too often the philosophical importance of the ritualistic speculations contained in the Brahmanas has been undervalued ; (...) too often these texts have been neglected by the compilers of handbooks. One of those points which have not always received due attention concerns the theoretic foundation of the belief in the possibility of gaining the victory over death and of the efforts to realize this ambition. One of the most important problems in which the Indians have always been interested is the relation between the One and the Many, between this phenomenal world and its source and ground. Already in the Rgveda opinions differ : it has been a divine architect who made the phenomenal world ; it has been an anonymous primeval deity who became a golden germ from which a demiurge was born ; the world has arisen from the impersonal One who desired to create the world, etc. In the course of time these creators and ideas of the original One fused into the great figure of Prajapati, „the Lord of Creatures”. This God, who occupies a central position in the Brdhmawa-texts originally was what he was to remain in popular belief : the deity presiding over biological creation. In the ritualistic speculations of the authors of the Brahmanas he is the Creator, the Father of gods and anti-gods, the origin of creation. In the beginning Prajapati was alone, he was ,all this’, he was the universe in ,concentrated’ and unmanifested form. By way of emanation and self-differentiation he became the manifested universe, including the creatures. After this creative activity he is empty and exhausted, because he has ,entered the universe' or rather transformed himself into the universe. His strength, force and health can however be recovered and restored by means of rites. The world and the creatures which emanated from Prajapati were not perfect ; they were a discontinuum, disintegrated, in the power of death. In order to make life possible and to make the world habitable Prajdpati instituted rites. Prajapati is in the Brahmanas identified with the highest and most general categories ; he is the year, i.e. the complete cycle of time comprising the past and the future, totality and completeness. The year, viewed as an integral structure is the fundamental basis of all that happens. Being also the rite, the sacral act, Prajapati is on the other hand the earthly counterpart of the great cosmic drama. On these two identifications the ritualistic system of these authors is constructed. Among these authorities Sandilya. occupies a prominent place. The mundane events oscillating between the poles of birth and death, of genesis and decay, rites are needed to reintegrate what has become decomposed. They are however also to restore the original unity and totality, to co-ordinate the non-co-ordinated phenomena, to reconstruct Prajapati, to restore his original oneness. The rites reduce, temporarily it is true and with regard to the individual who has them performed, the phenomenal multiplicity to a reintegrated totality, in which the diversity of Prajapati's emanation has been destroyed, and the original unity and oneness has been restored. This theory underlies the structure of the great Fire-altar , by which the sacrificer identifies himself with Prajapati whose original unity is restored. By performing this elaborate ritual the personality of the sacrificer was transformed into a new and divine existence, which was no longer subject to the imperfections proper to this world. That is to say : the sacrificer acquires ,immortality' , he transcends the limits of phenomenal time, he becomes sarva, i.e. safe-andsound, whole. Prajapati-the year will not destroy the man who identifies himself with the totality, with Prajapati-the year, and who has acquired an insight into the meaning of this identification ; that man overcomes disintegration and discontinuity, he gains the victory over death, that is to say : he attains to a sound and complete condition. In the course of time the personal Prajapati and the impersonal Brahman are identified. In the early Upanishads the latter becomes the great fundamental principle. These works resume on the one hand ancient speculations a part of which has been preserved in the Rg- and Atharvavedas, and utilize, on the other hand, the ritualistic theories of the Brdhmawas. The tendency of their authors is however to dissociate themselves from ritualism. Emphasizing the quest for the salvation and spiritual welfare of the individual they go into the problem of the ,Soul' , that is the ,self' or the very core of the personality, which is essentially different from all phenomenal plurality. The hitman is identified with the Punira, the primeval man out of whom the universe arose. It follows that the Atrmn is also cosmic. According to Udddlaka Arum it is the subtle essence of all that exists. All the important potencies in the universe are said to be its manifestations. However, in these works . Htman and Brahman tend to fuse and the great teacher Ydjwavalkya concluded to their being identical. Ordinary men do not understand this identity, but the few who are able to arrive at this highly important insight gain the victory over the imperfections and contingencies of empirical existence. They experience the ecstatic and unanalysable condition of unity, the undifferentiated Plenum or Totality, the ,All'. They know that they are truly Brahman or Sarvam. Now, it is most important to attain to this condition, which implies the victory over death, before one is to die the worldly death. The man who dies without having escaped death will die again and again in the hereafter. Whereas the ritualists attempt to protect themselves from this much feared ,repeated death' by means of rites, especially by the construction of the Fire-altar, the teachers whose words are recorded in the early Upanishads ascribed the delivering power to the esoteric knowledge of the ,under lying theory', to the knowledge of the ritual-cosmic interrelations : the man who knows the relevant speculations will be released. This belief in the redeeming power of the rites and the ,theory' on which they are based was also of special importance with regard to the development of the Karman-doctrine. Thus ritual and spiritual identification with the One which is the Totality, the Primeval Being, the Creator, the Atman enables man by experiencing a transformation to conquer phenomenal time and death. (shrink)

Il faut distinguer, chez Descartes, le passage du Cogito à Dieu du passage de Dieu à l’attribut de véracité. En passant du Cogito à Dieu, l’on ne sort pas du royaume de la pensée, et la réflexion cartésienne est jusque là parallèle à la réflexion hindoue identifiant Atman et Brahman. Mais en passant de l’existence de Dieu à cet attribut privilégié, qui fait Dieu source de toute lumière et incapable de nous tromper, il introduit une croyance : c’est là qu’est (...) le hiatus dans la pensée cartésienne. (shrink)

_Contemporary discussions of self and consciousness have for some time incorporated Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the existence and nature of self (Ram-Prasad 2012). The ideal of responsibly_ _incorporating this dialogue raises an interpretive dilemma: on the one hand, we should eschew the simplistic picture of a “sterile contest” in which all Hindu schools are committed to the doctrine of the self (ātmavāda) and all Buddhists are invariantly committed to denying its existence (2012: 3). To treat Hindu ātmavādins as monolithically opposed to (...) Buddhist no-self theorists without attending to disagreements within the two camps would be to woefully underrepresent the complexity of the terrain at hand. Yet, we should not forget that what we are dealing with is still a structured debate of some sort. I propose that two Jaina “disambiguation strategies” (Balcerowicz 2017)—the theory of viewpoints (naya-vāda) and the theory of sevenfold predication (syād-vāda), also called the sevenfold formula (__sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__)—can together facilitate a re-imaginative reconstruction of Hindu-Buddhist dialogue on the self as something other than a two-sided battle or an arbitrary cluster of views. Following superimposition of the __sapta-bha__ṅ__g__ī__ onto what I temporarily term “the debate,” wherein each figure (bha__ṅ__ga)__ is understood as indexed in part by a specific viewpoint (naya) or a set thereof, we find a dynamic description of an indeterminate phenomenon, embracing affirmation and negation of the “self” (ātman) without antecedent commitment to the substantive existence of the referent of the term. This exercise in working with Jaina tools has implications for broader methodological concerns facing cross-cultural philosophical projects, and bears on how we might fruitfully re-imagine otherwise stymied contemporary debates. _. (shrink)

There are plenty of Buddhist traditions throughout the world. The one of the main causes for the arising of these different sects is philosophic problems that these traditions faced time to time in the sāsanic history. This situation can be seen in the Buddha’s time as well as in the later periods of ‘sāsana’. In the Buddha’s time the ‘ātman’ concept was the focal question that he faced. After the demise of the Buddha, about one hundred years later, sāsana got (...) divided into two and subsequently into many sects or groups. At that time, the central question was that if everything is impermanent how could things exist? (shrink)

The first Chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā offers a critique of causation that includes the Abhidharmic category of the ‘four conditions’. Following the South-Asian commentarial tradition, this article discusses the precise relationship between Madhyamaka philosophy and its fundamental Abhidharmic background. What comes to light is a more precise assessment of Madhyamaka ideas about viable conventions, understood as the process of dependent arising. Since this is primarily in the sense of conceptual dependence, it involves sentiency as a necessary causal element, and the (...) relationship between sentiency and conceptuality is highlighted by Nāgārjuna and his commentators. Viable conventions exclude the possibility of a non-contingent core, and the systems and categories that revolve around such non-contingent element (ātman) are discarded by the Madhyamaka even at a conventional level. (shrink)